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ABSTRACT 
 
This project aims to make a conceptual, methodological and empirical contribution to the 
burgeoning field of Evolutionary Perspectives in Economic Geography. To date, 
Evolutionary Perspectives have tended to underplay the role of the state and macro-
institutions, and how notions of agency, power, and scale feature in the evolution of a 
regional economy. This thesis draws upon Geographical Political Economy to develop an 
Evolutionary Perspective that is more sensitive to these concerns. In particular, I have 
focussed on aspects of policy and governance in the long-term adaptation and resilience 
of old industrial regions coping with disruptive structural change. Based on the Path 
Dependency perspective – which within Evolutionary Perspectives seems best suited to 
theorise aspects of policy and governance - I have developed an analytical framework and 
detailed a methodology of ‘deep contextualisation’, to understand (1) how policies and 
institutions evolve over time, (2) what role they play in long-term adaptation and 
resilience, and (3) how this may be shaped by the wider institutional environment. This 
framework and methodology (with these three distinct levels of analysis) was 
subsequently used to study and compare two cases: the old steel regions of South 
Saarland in Germany, and Teesside in the United Kingdom. These regions both 
experienced a crisis in their economies in the 1970s and 1980s. South Saarland has been 
able to adapt successfully, whereas Teesside continues to struggle. The study presents 
compelling evidence that this has to a considerable extent been a result of (1) different 
priorities and consistency in the policies implemented, (2) the more robust governance 
arrangements present in South Saarland compared to Teesside, and (3) the federal 
government structure and more cooperative form of capitalism in Germany, which 
appears to have been more conducive for long-term resilience than the centralist 
structure and more liberal model in the United Kingdom.  
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Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
“Here in northeast Ohio 
Back in eighteen-o-three 
James and Danny Heaton 
Found the ore that was linin' Yellow Creek 
They built a blast furnace 
Here along the shore 
And they made the cannonballs 
That helped the Union win the war 
 
Here in Youngstown 
Here in Youngstown 
My sweet Jenny I'm sinkin' down 
Here darlin' in Youngstown 
 
Well my daddy worked the furnaces 
Kept 'em hotter than hell 
I come home from 'Nam worked my way to scarfer 
A job that'd suit the devil as well 
Taconite coke and limestone 
Fed my children and make my pay 
Them smokestacks reachin' like the arms of God 
Into a beautiful sky of soot and clay 
 
Here in Youngstown 
Here in Youngstown 
Sweet Jenny I'm sinkin' down 
Here darlin' in Youngstown 
 
Well my daddy come on the Ohio works 
When he come home from World War Two 
Now the yard's just scrap and rubble 
He said ‘Them big boys did what Hitler couldn't do.’ 
These mills they built the tanks and bombs 
That won this country's wars 
We sent our sons to Korea and Vietnam 
Now we're wondering what they were dyin' for 
 
Here in Youngstown 
Here in Youngstown 
My sweet Jenny I'm sinkin' down 
Here darlin' in Youngstown 
2 
 
 
From the Monongahela valley 
To the Mesabi iron range 
To the coal mines of Appalachia 
The story's always the same 
Seven hundred tons of metal a day 
Now sir you tell me the world's changed 
Once I made you rich enough 
Rich enough to forget my name 
 
And Youngstown 
And Youngstown 
My sweet Jenny I'm sinkin' down 
Here darlin' in Youngstown 
 
When I die I don't want no part of heaven 
I would not do heaven's work well 
I pray the devil comes and takes me 
To stand in the fiery furnaces of hell” 
 
Bruce Springsteen – “Youngstown” (1995) 
 
 
 The constancy of change: adaptation and resilience in regional economic 1.1.
development 
Heavy industry transformed a large number of places in Europe and North America (like 
Youngstown) from rural paltriness to industrial greatness in the second half of the 19th 
and early 20th century. But by the 1970s and 1980s this greatness turned out to be very 
transient indeed, as these places often went through a period in which many plants 
closed and manufacturing employment rapidly dwindled. The loss of industry proved to 
be a hugely disorienting and traumatic experience for the communities and people within 
these places. This manifest fleetingness (and sense of profound loss), have been a source 
of fascination and anger; as is clear from the lyrics above, but also from numerous other 
pop songs, television series, documentaries, films, books, photo series, etc.1. The 
                                                     
1
 With regard to pop songs, beside Bruce Springsteen – “Youngstown”, for example Billy Joel – “Allentown” 
(1982), Chris Rea – “Steel River” (1985; about Middlesbrough), and John Rich – “Shuttin’ Detroit Down” 
3 
 
instability of capitalism (as witnessed most clearly by the loss of entire industries in 
places, and the ways of life associated with these industries) is thus a major aspect of 
modern life. 
 
Naturally, this has also been a central theme within Economic Geography. How places are 
affected by economic changes, and the ways in which they cope with such changes, is a 
key concern within the field (see e.g. Storper and Walker, 1989). Indeed especially in the 
1970s and 1980s, many studies appeared on the (successful or less successful) adaptation 
and renewal of local and regional economies in the face of fast-paced deindustrialisation. 
Many of these were studies of single localities or regions2; but also a few wide-ranging 
comparative studies were undertaken3. More recently however, in the light of the 
financial crisis of 2008 and subsequent economic downturn – and influenced by debates 
on ecological change (especially climate change) – attention has shifted to the concept of 
‘resilience’. Meanwhile a considerable debate has emerged on regional economic 
resilience, with regard to its added value, its conceptualisation and its operationalisation4. 
The concept has been applied mostly to assess how various regions have been affected by 
and have recovered from recessions, particularly the most recent one5. However, the 
concept has now also been used to understand the capacity of regional economies to deal 
with more long-run structural changes6. 
 
Also this project takes a more long-term view on adaptation and resilience in regional 
economies. I want to understand adaptation and resilience as dynamic and 
                                                                                                                                                                
(2009). With regard to TV-series, industrial decline is a major theme in e.g. “Boys from the Blackstuff” 
(1982) and “Our Friends in the North” (1996); and with regard to documentaries, e.g. “Roger and Me” 
(1989) and “Tie Xi Qu: West of the Tracks” (2003). Only about Detroit, and its decline and current ‘ruins’, 
there exist more than 20 books (both more journalistic accounts and photography books). 
2
 E.g. Checkland (1976); Hudson (1989); Grabher (1993); Beynon et al. (1994). 
3
 E.g. Cooke (1986, 1989); Hamm and Wienert (1990). 
4
 E.g. Swanstrom (2008); Hassink (2010a); Pike et al. (2010); Simmie and Martin (2010); Bristow and Healy 
(2014a, 2014b); Boschma (2015); Martin and Sunley (2015a). 
5
 E.g. Cambridge Econometrics (2010); Davies (2011); Groot et al. (2011); Hill et al. (2011); Fingleton et al. 
(2012); Doran and Fingleton (2013). 
6
 E.g. Cowell (2013; 2015); Evans and Karecha (2014); Boschma (2015); Hu and Hassink (2015). 
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transformational qualities in regional economic development. Such a concern is of course 
worthwhile for its own sake. As Ron Martin and Peter Sunley (2015b) note: 
“Ultimately, economic development is about the capacity of an economic system – 
be it a firm, an industry or a local economy – to adapt over time in response to or in 
anticipation of a changing market, technological and regulatory conditions and 
opportunities. How such adaptability arises, the forms it takes and the direction(s) 
it assumes all help shape the ‘big processes’ and ‘large structures’ of capitalist 
development, and those big processes and large structures in turn stimulate and 
condition the process of adaptive growth.” (pp. 727-728) 
But my ambition with this project goes beyond this. I believe that by studying long-term 
adaptation and resilience in old industrial regions – and specifically aspects of policy and 
governance within this - it is possible to make a contribution with particular theoretical, 
methodological, and empirical relevance to Evolutionary Perspectives in Economic 
Geography. I will further elaborate on this in the next sections. 
 
 
 The rise of Evolutionary Perspectives within Economic Geography 1.2.
Over the past decade a considerable strand of literature has emerged within Economic 
Geography in which evolutionary thinking is applied to the discipline7. This has led to the 
emergence of a new field of literature which is usually referred to as Evolutionary 
Economic Geography (Boschma and Martin, 2007; Boschma and Martin, 2010a, 2010b; 
Boschma and Frenken, 2011). However, following MacKinnon et al. (2009), Coe (2011), 
Hassink et al. (2014) and Pike et al. (2015), I prefer to speak of Evolutionary Perspectives 
in Economic Geography. Rather than a distinctive, self-contained, and (to some extent) 
coherent ‘school’, the undertaking should instead be seen as a movement to incorporate 
more evolutionary understanding in Economic Geography in general. This implies the 
integration of certain notions, concerns, and methods which emphasise evolution in the 
economic landscape, with notions, concerns and methods of established schools of 
thought within the discipline (particularly within Political Economy, Institutional and 
Relational Approaches). 
                                                     
7
 See Boschma and Lambooy (1999); Boschma and Frenken (2006, 2011, 2015); Frenken (2007); Grabher 
(2009); Hassink and Klaerding (2010); Coe (2011). 
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Evolutionary Perspectives have in common that they examine “the processes by which 
the economic landscape – the spatial organisation of economic production, circulation, 
exchange, distribution and consumption – is transformed from within over time” 
(Boschma and Martin, 2007, p 539; Boschma and Martin, 2010a, pp. 6-7). They highlight 
the ways in which such processes are dynamic (instead of stationary or tending to some 
sort of equilibrium), irreversible (they are rooted in real historical time, and hence the 
order of events is essential), and are the result of novelty (i.e. they take the creative 
capacity of economic agents as a starting point) (Boschma and Martin, 2007; Boschma 
and Martin, 2010a). Another defining presupposition of these perspectives is that the 
spatial dimension of such processes is essential: the economic landscape is not just an 
‘outcome or by-product’, but a ‘determining influence’ as well (Boschma and Martin, 
2007; Boschma and Martin, 2010a). Within Evolutionary Perspectives the themes of 
adaptation and especially resilience have (naturally) assumed central significance (e.g. 
Simmie and Martin, 2010; Martin, 2012; Boschma, 2015; Martin and Sunley, 2015a): how 
do regional economies cope with change, and what determines their success or failure in 
this respect? 
 
An important critique levelled against Evolutionary Perspectives as it has developed so 
far, is the relative neglect of several important basic entities such as the state and 
institutions, and of social processes that highlight collective agency (beyond individual 
firms) and uneven power relations (MacKinnon et al., 2009; Coe, 2011; Hassink et al., 
2014; Martin and Sunley, 2015b; Pike et al., 2015). This critique can be extended to the 
theorisation and operationalisation of regional economic resilience, in which the agency 
of actors – and with this the role of policy and institutions – have not received adequate 
attention (MacKinnon and Derickson, 2013; Bristow and Healy, 2014a, 2014b; Martin and 
Sunley, 2015a). This project is explicitly intended to address these shortcomings, and 
wants to contribute to developing a more holistic approach to evolution in Economic 
Geography, which reconnects with “a sense of political economy” (Martin and Sunley, 
2001, p. 155). Hence in this project I will try to integrate central concerns within 
6 
 
Evolutionary Perspectives (adaptation and resilience) with traditional concerns of Political 
Economy approach: the role of the state and macro-institutional structures, the relations 
between capital and labour, uneven territorial development and the geography of socio-
economic inequalities (Hudson, 2006). I will build on the conceptual and methodological 
papers by MacKinnon et al. (2009), Hassink et al. (2014), Martin and Sunley (2015b) and 
Pike et al. (2015), which have offered many promising avenues of exploration to integrate 
Evolutionary Perspectives and a Geographical Political Economy approach (with 
supplementary insights from Institutionalist and Relational approaches). It will require 
additional conceptual efforts however. Moreover, so far there have been few attempts (if 
any) to operationalise such an approach and undertake empirical work. 
 
 
 Revisiting deindustrialisation and old industrial regions 1.3.
In developing a more holistic approach that integrates Evolutionary Perspectives and a 
Geographical Political Economy approach, I will specifically examine aspects of policy and 
governance in the adaptation and resilience of old industrial regions. The focus on old 
industrial regions is a strategic choice. Old industrial regions are paradigmatic cases of 
regions that have undergone a comprehensive adaptation process in the face of 
disruptive structural change in the 1970s and 1980s (which in many cases seriously 
affected their economic base). Adaptation and long-term resilience are thus particularly 
pertinent for these regions. At the same time, the adaptation process in these regions has 
often been marked by many policy interventions and significant institutional change (e.g. 
Hamm and Wienert, 1990; Hudson, 1994; Cooke, 1995; Birch et al., 2010). Given the 
central importance of the notions of adaptation and resilience in Evolutionary 
Perspectives, and the perceived gaps in Evolutionary Perspectives with respect to the role 
of the state and institutions (and attendant notions of agency and power), how old 
industrial regions have coped with structural change seems an ideal topic to further 
develop the ‘Evolutionary Geographical Political Economy’ approach.  
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Deindustrialisation refers to a process of structural change in which the importance of 
manufacturing is declining (Pike, 2009). In many of the advanced economies in Western 
Europe, North America and to a lesser extent Japan, deindustrialisation set in in the 1960s 
but became particularly manifest after the first oil crisis of 1973 and subsequent 
recession. Employment and (to a lesser extent) output in traditional segments of 
manufacturing (such as steel, coal mining, automotive, shipbuilding, textiles, etc.) 
dropped markedly. Manufacturing firms in Europe and North America – especially those 
that still relied on relatively cheap and semi-skilled labour – had lost part of their 
competitiveness vis-à-vis firms located in other parts of the world (in particular East Asia). 
Some of these firms had moreover been poorly managed, and were in an unfavourable 
strategic, technological and financial state (Rowthorn, 1986; Pike, 2009; Hudson, 2011a). 
Because many of these industries were concentrated in particular regions, the 
subsequent closures and downsizing / rationalisation operations hit these regions 
especially hard. This has been true for e.g. the North of England, South Wales, central 
Scotland, the Ruhr Area and Saarland in Germany, Wallonia in Belgium, Lorraine and Pas 
de Calais in France, parts of the East Coast and the Midwest of the United States and 
parts of Ontario in Canada. Unemployment rose rapidly in these regions, and often long-
lasting problems emerged with regard to poverty, despair, dereliction and crime. 
 
Over time however, new activities did normally develop in services, the public sector, and 
sometimes manufacturing again (e.g. new branch plants). Hence employment in many old 
industrial regions recovered to some extent. Feyrer et al. (2007) find that counties and 
metropolitan areas in the US that experienced waves of job losses in automobile and steel 
production, regained their pre-shock job-levels 5 years later (although outmigration from 
these regions has also been considerable). Also Beatty et al. (2007) note that employment 
in the former UK coalfields has significantly (but not completely) recovered, twenty years 
after the closure of most of the mines in these areas. Performance in terms of 
employment but also in terms of other indicators, has been very uneven however 
between old industrial regions (Hamm and Wienert, 1990; Birch et al., 2010; Power et al., 
2010; Hobor, 2013; Cowell, 2015). Such unevenness points to significant differences in 
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the long-term resilience of such regions. This may be driven by a combination of factors, 
such as differences in size, centrality / peripherality, economic make-up, historical assets, 
natural resources, etc. 
 
 
 This project 1.4.
Notwithstanding other factors, a key guiding proposition in this project, is that the long-
term resilience of old industrial regions has been significantly influenced (though certainly 
not wholly determined) by differences in policy and governance. Policies here refer to the 
authorised and asserted intentions to strive for certain collective objectives. Policies are 
normally subject to political processes, in which various political actors struggle for 
powers and resources8. Governance arrangements are a type of institutions that regulate 
policy-making (as a political process), and structure the implementation of policies (and 
thus facilitate “the steering and coordination of society” (Peters and Pierre, 2006; p. 
209)). 
 
However, I want to develop a more multi-scalar and broader perspective on the evolution 
and role of policy and governance (consistent with a Geographical Political Economy 
approach), which does not only focus on processes and structures within these regions, 
but takes the wider context into account in which such regions are embedded, made up 
by the territorial and functional organisation of the government, and by other macro-
institutional structures (following also Birch et al., 2010). Hence another guiding 
proposition is that differences in policy and governance in old industrial regions are 
strongly conditioned by the wider institutional environment. By examining these 
propositions from an Evolutionary point-of-view, we will thus need to address three 
distinct levels of analysis, which in turn touch upon several central concerns of a 
Geographical Political Economy approach: 
                                                     
8
 Following Harold Laswell’s (1936) definition of politics: ‘who gets what, when, how’. 
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 Relevant structures and processes in the wider institutional environment, in particular 
the role and organisation of the state, and the role and composition of other macro-
institutional structures. 
 The evolution of policies and governance within regions during and after structural 
change. 
 The role of policies and governance in the adaptation process in old industrial regions, 
and thus in their long-term resilience. 
 
The overall aim of this project is thus clear: to contribute conceptually, methodologically 
and empirically to the formation of a more holistic ‘Evolutionary Geographical Political 
Economy’ approach, that integrates notions from Evolutionary Perspectives in Economic 
Geography and Geographical Political Economy. It wants to do this by examining the 
aspects of policy and governance in adaptation and resilience in old industrial regions 
coping with disruptive structural change. I have argued that this particular focus will 
address central concerns in both Evolutionary Perspectives (adaptation and resilience) 
and a Political Economy perspective (the state, institutions, scale, collective agency, and 
power) 
 
To attain these objectives, I will first have to do some conceptual work enriching 
Evolutionary Perspectives with notions that help understand how policies and institutions 
evolve over time, what role they play in adaptation and resilience, and how this may be 
shaped by the wider institutional environment. This will result in an analytical framework, 
which will then be used to analyse and compare two cases: the old steel regions of South 
Saarland in Germany, and Teesside in the United Kingdom, which were both hit hard by 
the steel crisis in particular and deindustrialisation more generally. The two cases have 
been selected because in important ways they are typical and exhibit typical patterns 
within their respective contexts, but are embedded in two ‘extremes’ with regard to the 
type of wider institutional environment. Germany has a federal government structure 
while the United Kingdom (and in particular England) has a unitary and centralist 
structure, which means that Saarland has been able to dispose over many more resources 
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and powers at the regional level while Teesside has been very dependent on London in 
this respect. Furthermore, Germany is characterised by a more cooperative model of 
economic organisation (in which there is much more explicit coordination between 
actors), whereas the United Kingdom has a much more liberal model (in which more 
indirect coordination through market transactions is more dominant). A comparison 
between two ‘extremes’ on a spectrum, should yield conclusions with a broader validity, 
i.e. that have bearing for regions embedded in a context in-between these extremes. This 
broader validity means that these conclusions can thus inform theory development about 
long-term adaptation and resilience in regional economies (George and Bennett, 2005; 
Flyvbjerg, 2006; Gerring, 2007). Such a research design as applied in this project, also 
answers the call by various authors for more rigorous comparative work in Economic 
Geography in general and Evolutionary Perspectives in particular9.  
 
The research questions are as follows: 
With regard to adaptation and resilience in regional economies faced with disruptive 
structural change: 
 How can the evolution and role of policy and governance be understood conceptually 
within Evolutionary Perspectives in Economic Geography? 
 How have policies and governance evolved, and what role did they play in South 
Saarland (Germany) and Teesside (United Kingdom)? 
 How did differences in the wider institutional environment matter in this regard? 
 
In Chapter 2 I will start by conceptualising adaptation and resilience. Subsequently I will 
review the three theoretical frameworks within Evolutionary Perspectives in Economic 
Geography (Generalised Darwinism, Complexity Theory and Path Dependency Theory) 
with regard to how they understand adaptation and resilience in regional development, 
                                                     
9
 E.g. MacKinnon et al. (2009); Boschma and Frenken (2009); Birch et al. (2010); Gertler (2010); Hassink 
(2010b); Boschma and Frenken (2011); Pike et al. (2015). 
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and assess how they accommodate aspects of policy and governance therein. In Chapter 
3, I will then develop an analytical framework to analyse processes and structures at the 
three levels of analysis identified: structures and processes in the wider institutional 
environment, the evolution of policy and governance, and the role of policy and 
governance in regional adaptation and resilience. I will use Path Dependency Theory as 
the main building block, but will also incorporate many other insights from within 
Economic Geography (mainly Complexity Theory, and Institutionalist approaches) but also 
from Political Science (using Historical Institutionalism, State Theory, and Varieties of 
Capitalism). Chapter 4 outlines the methodology of the comparative case study of South 
Saarland and Teesside I have undertaken. In Chapter 5 I will first briefly sketch 
deindustrialisation and the steel crisis as major shocks in advanced economies in the 
1970s and 1980s, and then turn to a discussion of the national (and also European) 
context in which South Saarland and Teesside were embedded. This thus addresses the 
first level of analysis about the relevant structures and process in the wider institutional 
environment. Central in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 are an examination of the evolution of 
policy and governance since about 1970, in South Saarland and respectively Teesside (the 
second level of analysis). These Chapters also contain some contextual information of the 
two regions about their basic characteristics and their economic development prior to the 
1970s; and include a discussion of how they were affected by deindustrialisation and the 
steel crisis. Chapter 8 will attempt to address the third level of analysis: what role did 
policy and governance play in adaptation and resilience? This Chapter however also 
analyses the relationships between the three levels of analysis: how has the particular 
evolution of policy and governance impacted on the role of policy and governance in the 
two regions in their adaptation and resilience, and how has this in turn been conditioned 
by relevant differences in the wider institutional environment? In Chapter 9 I present the 
conclusions with regard to the main findings, conceptual and theoretical advances, and 
methodological contributions. I will then also reflect on the limitations of the research, 
avenues for future research, and policy implications.  
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Chapter 2. EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVES ON POLICY AND GOVERNANCE IN 
ADAPTATION AND RESILIENCE 
 
 
 Introduction 2.1.
This chapter offers a review of Evolutionary Perspectives in Economic Geography with 
regard to their potential to conceptualise aspects of policy and governance in adaptation 
and resilience. Within Evolutionary Perspectives in Economic Geography we can 
distinguish three distinctive, albeit overlapping, theoretical frameworks, originating in 
different conceptual foundations: Generalised Darwinism, Complexity Theory and Path 
Dependence Theory (Boschma and Martin 2010a).10 I thus maintain a broad notion of 
Evolutionary Perspectives, encompassing the entire variety of work that is situated within 
these three different frameworks. I want to be precise about the value of each of these 
theoretical frameworks for understanding policy and governance aspects in adaptation 
and resilience, hence I will discuss the frameworks separately, even though in many 
accounts, ideas of two or all three of the frameworks are combined.11 In the next chapter 
(Chapter 3), I will then draw together the most useful notions from these theoretical 
frameworks, and will combine these with notions from other strands of literature, to 
develop an analytical framework for analysing the policy and governance aspects of 
adaptation and resilience. As defined in the Introduction, policies refer to the authorised 
and stated intentions to pursue certain collective objectives, and governance 
arrangements are a type of institutions that structure policy-making and the 
implementation of policies. 
 
                                                     
10 Simmie and Martin (2010) distinguish a fourth approach: Panarchy. In a footnote also Boschma and 
Martin (2010a) suggest that Panarchy may constitute a fourth field, but has not been sufficiently developed 
yet. Panarchy seems however closely related to Complexity Theory, and is here subsumed under 
Complexity Theory. 
11
 Although especially in what is more narrowly delineated as Evolutionary Economic Geography, notions 
from Generalised Darwinism seem to be the most dominant. 
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I will start by distinguishing between different conceptions that exist with regard to 
adaptation and resilience in regional economic development, and examine which 
conception is the most suited to capture how regions cope with the disruptive effects of 
structural change. Next in section 2.3, I will discuss the three theoretical frameworks, with 
particular attention to how adaptation and resilience feature in these frameworks, and 
how aspects of policy and governance may be theorised. In the last section, I will draw 
some conclusions on this issue. 
 
 
 Conceptualising adaptation and resilience in regional economic development 2.2.
In defining adaptation, three elements are important to consider. First, it concerns a 
process of alterations within a regional economy. Second, it concerns alterations to cope 
with changes in the broader context in which a regional economy operates. The 
immediate alterations brought about by changed circumstances - i.e. the shock or 
disturbance – will not be part of the process of adaptation; neither will alterations that 
occur autonomously within the region (and hence independent of changes in the broader 
environment). Adaptation is about alterations that result in or aim for (in case of a 
deliberate effort at adaptation, which may then also be anticipatory) a greater suitability 
of the operation of a regional economy vis-à-vis the changes in the broader context.12 
And third, such alterations can be purely internally focussed, in which case we can speak 
of a reorganisation, or they can also be directed externally, which means a reorientation 
(see also Martin, 2012, pp. 11-13). 
 
Resilience refers to a “capacity to withstand or recover from market, competitive and 
environmental shocks” (Martin and Sunley, 2015a, p. 13); hence it should be seen as an 
underlying capacity to adapt. Resilience is seen as a property that is present (or absent) 
on a continuous basis, and is about engaging and coping with change in general. 
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 Needless to say, what ‘greater suitability’ means will be problematic and not always be straightforward; 
hence the necessity and character of adaptation may well be subject to contestation (and thus to political 
processes). 
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Adaptation on the other hand is more episodic: i.e. handling a particular shock or 
disturbance. The difference between an actual process on the one hand (adaptation), and 
an underlying capacity on the other (resilience) is quite crucial, as the former can be 
observed from the alterations that take place, whereas the latter cannot, and can only be 
inferred from studying actual adaptation processes and then analysing the underlying 
factors that are important for successful adaptation. It should be clear nonetheless that 
the two concepts are intimately related: resilience as a capacity to adapt may be affected 
by the reorganisation and reorientation processes that have occurred during previous 
shocks (see Martin, 2012), or adaptation in response to indeterminate and inchoate 
shocks may consist of strengthening all-round resilience. Resilience is thus not always a 
stable property, but may be susceptible to change over time (also Swanstrom, 2008; 
Martin, 2012). Moreover, a regional economy may exhibit resilience towards some shocks 
(e.g. macro-economic recession), but not towards others (e.g. structural changes, or 
certain disasters).  
 
The most important aspect along which further distinctions can be made between 
conceptualisations of regional economic adaptation and resilience, is whether a return to 
some equilibrium or development path is presupposed, or not. Grabher (1993) and Pike 
at al. (2010, p. 62) for instance, distinguish between moving along or towards a 
preconceived path in the short run, and a capacity to effectuate new development 
trajectories in the longer run (which they call ‘adaptability’). This is analogous to the so-
called ‘sailing-ship effect’: vigorously trying to make improvements to an existing 
technology (sailing ships), rather than making the transition to a superior, substitute 
technology (steam ships) (see Grabher, 1993; Henning et al., 2013). Simmie and Martin 
(2010), Martin (2012), and Martin and Sunley (2015a) have developed this idea further. 
They make a distinction in between engineering resilience, ecological resilience and 
adaptive resilience. Engineering resilience implies a return to some previous equilibrium; 
ecological resilience suggests that a shock can force a regional economy into a different 
equilibrium state or growth trajectory; and adaptive resilience assumes a dynamic 
process of constant renewal in which regional economies are never in any type of 
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equilibrium (though renewal may at times be more intense). These same distinctions may 
also be applied to the idea of adaptation. 
 
The distinction between engineering, ecological and adaptive adaptation and resilience, 
imply different predispositions with regard to the understanding of the complexity of the 
processes of reorganisation and reorientation in response to change. The engineering and 
ecological conceptions are primarily concerned with the dimensions of resistance (depth 
of the initial reaction), recovery (speed and degree of rebound) and renewal (shift to new 
equilibrium / development path) (Martin, 2012, p. 12). The engineering conception does 
not problematise the underlying processes of reorganisation and reorientation at all; 
whereas in the ecological conception there is only the presupposition that changes do 
indeed take place in orientation and/or organisation but at its core the identity of the 
system in question remains the same, i.e. thresholds that define the basic operation and 
functionalities of the system are not crossed (see Maru, 2010, p. 16). In the adaptive 
conception the processes of reorientation and reorganisation take centre stage however. 
In this conception, adaptation and resilience are then essentially equated to the process 
of, respectively capacity for, transformation (also Pendall et al, 2010)13. One consequence 
of this will be that it will make the concepts less precise and distinctive. But at the same 
time, it may rid these concepts of any conservative overtones and the tendency of 
privileging the preservation of existing social relations.14 Maintaining an existing system is 
then no longer a point of reference; and the processes of reorganisation and 
reorientation behind adaptation and resilience are seen as entirely open-ended.   
 
We now have two important dimensions along which to make relevant distinctions when 
conceptualising adaptation and resilience: 
                                                     
13
 Polèse (2010) makes a distinction between a-Resilience and b-Resilience in the context of urban 
economies; with a-Resilience referring to the ability to survive shocks and b-Resilience referring to the 
ability to constantly transform the economic base and reinvent oneself. 
14
 A critique levelled by for instance Swanstrom (2008) and MacKinnon and Derickson (2013). 
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 Actual process (adaptation) or underlying capacity (resilience). Adaptation will be 
episodic (i.e. a one-off process), while resilience is more continuously present. The 
adaptation process may take a short or a long time period, while resilience will 
normally require a longer period to exhibit itself. 
 Engineering, ecological or adaptive (or rather transformative) conceptions. This 
determines the complexity of understanding of the mechanisms of reorganisation and 
reorientation within the adaptation process or the capacity for resilience.  
The following table shows the six different conceptions of adaptation and resilience in 
regional economic development, along these two dimensions: 
 
 Return to equilibrium or 
steady state 
Move to new equilibrium 
state or growth trajectory 
Dynamic process of renewal 
and creative destruction 
(transformation) 
As an 
under-
standing of 
an actual 
process 
‘Absorb and rebound’ 
Timing: episodic 
Periodicity: short or long 
Reorganisation: not 
problematised 
Reorientation: not 
problematised 
 
‘Adaptation as shift’ 
Timing: episodic 
Periodicity: short or long 
Reorganisation: some changes 
in configuration / composition, 
but within limits (as basic 
operation and functionalities 
remain the same) 
Reorientation: some 
development of some new 
activities (micro-level) and new 
functions (system-level), but 
within limits (as basic 
operation and functionalities 
remain the same)  
‘Adaptation as 
transformation’ 
Timing: episodic 
Periodicity: short or long 
Reorganisation: permanent 
changes in internal structure 
and relations between agents   
Reorientation: permanent 
development of some new 
activities (micro-level) and new 
functions (system-level)  
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 Return to equilibrium or 
steady state 
Move to new equilibrium 
state or growth trajectory 
Dynamic process of renewal 
and creative destruction 
(transformation) 
As referring 
to an 
underlying 
capacity 
‘Engineering resilience’ 
Timing: continuous 
Periodicity: long 
Reorganisation: not 
problematised 
Reorientation: not 
problematised 
 
‘Ecological resilience’ 
Timing: continuous 
Periodicity: long 
Reorganisation: ‘plasticity’ to 
reconfigure and change 
composition, but within limits 
(as basic operation and 
functionalities remain the 
same) 
Reorientation: generation of 
new activities (micro-level) and 
new functions (system-level), 
but within limits (as basic 
operation and functionalities 
remain the same)  
‘Adaptive resilience / 
adaptability / transformative 
capacity’ 
Timing: continuous 
Periodicity: long 
Reorganisation: continuous 
changes in internal structure 
and relations between agents 
Reorientation: continuous 
generation of new activities 
(micro-level) and functions 
(system-level) 
 
Table 1: Six conceptions of adaptation and resilience in regional economic 
development 
 
From an evolutionary perspective, an ‘adaptive’ or ‘transformative’ conception of 
adaption and resilience is the most interesting (Simmie and Martin, 2010; Pike et al., 
2010; Martin, 2012; Boschma, 2015).15 As Boschma (2015) notes: “this approach focuses 
more on the long-term evolution of regions and their ability to adapt and reconfigure 
their industrial, technological and institutional structures in an economic system that is 
restless and evolving” (p. 735). Such a conception is also the most suitable for the 
purposes of this study, as it aims to highlight the nature of the processes of 
reorganisation and reorientation in connection to structural change (i.e. regional 
transformation), and specifically the role of policy and governance arrangements within 
these processes. In relation to such ‘transformative’ conceptions of adaptation and 
                                                     
15
 Many recent quantitative studies of resilience, especially vis-à-vis macro-economic shocks, have however 
employed a conception predicated on some notion of equilibrium (either engineering or ecological 
conceptions) e.g. Cambridge Econometrics (2010); Davies (2011); Groot et al. (2011); Hill et al. (2011); 
Fingleton et al. (2012); Martin (2012), Doran and Fingleton (2013). There may be a trade-off between on the 
one hand, adaptation and resilience taking on the more limited conception employing some notion of 
equilibrium, which can then be operationalised for quantitative measurement, and on the other hand, a 
broad and rich, adaptive conceptualisation which is more suitable for a full analysis of the mechanisms 
behind adaptation and resilience, but which then cannot easily be quantified into simple indicators.  
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resilience, two further issues need to be discussed however: the type of shock hitting a 
region, and the role of (collective) agency. 
 
With regard to the type of disturbances that a regional economy may face, we can 
distinguish between system shocks and slow-burn disturbances (Pendall et al., 2010). 
System shocks may be of two kinds: one-off events such as disasters, and cyclical 
perturbations such as macro-economic fluctuations. Slow-burn disturbances on the other 
hand, are more long-term processes with possible structural ramifications, such as the 
erosion of the competitive position of certain key industries, technological changes, 
global climate change, demographic developments, etc. Deindustrialisation and structural 
change are clearly incidences of slow-burn disturbances. In the case of such slow-burn 
disturbances, it will be less easy to analytically separate the alterations that make up the 
adaptation process in the region, from the alterations that constitute the disturbance 
itself or that occur autonomously. Martin and Sunley (2015; pp. 14-16) thus warn that if 
shocks may also include such slow-burn processes, the notions of adaptation and 
resilience risk losing some of their distinctive meanings. However, though slow-burn 
disturbances may be less clear-cut, they can be particularly disruptive, often even more 
so than system shocks.16 Furthermore, slow-burn disturbances will often become 
manifest during a system shock, and certain tipping points or thresholds are reached. This 
seems to have happened with deindustrialisation when the Oil Crisis of 1974 and 
subsequent recession laid bare underlying problems in manufacturing, and triggered 
plant closures, restructuring operations, the introduction of new technologies, etc. (Pike 
et al., 2012). 
 
Also the role of agency in adaptation and resilience needs to be considered. Actors within 
a regional economy, can anticipate on and prepare for disturbances, will actively cope 
                                                     
16
 Both structural changes as well as macro-economic fluctuations may be seen as emergent phenomena of 
the system of all the connected regional economies in the world, with a downward causation with regard to 
individual regional economies (see Martin and Sunley, 2012; and discussion in section 2.3.2). So 
ontologically the disturbance in both these cases is not purely external to regions, although it does make 
sense to conceptualise and analyse it in this way. 
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with shocks, and can learn from previous experiences (Bristow and Healy, 2014a; 2014b). 
This is true at the level of individual actors, but also at level of a collective of actors. As a 
collective, actors may come together in the face of (potential) disturbances, and draw 
upon their various available resources and capitals (economic, financial, social, political, 
legal, intellectual, reputational, etc.). Moreover, actors will have to make sense of the 
outside world and their position in it (which is also a collective process); and hence there 
will be arrangements in place to develop intelligence, formulate alternative plans and 
scenarios, and communicate and debate opportunities, risks and options (also Weick et 
al., 2005; Pike et al., 2010). This points to the important role of relations and interactions 
between actors for adaptation; not only between actors in the private sector (mainly 
businesses), but also between actors in policy and civil society, and citizens (Bristow and 
Healy, 2014a; 2014b). Moreover, it also points to the important role of institutions in 
organising these relations and interactions, and coordinating efforts of various actors; and 
thus to arrive at “purposeful collective action” (Lang, 2012, p. 290). The state may be a 
particularly important actor in this regard, not only because of its sizeable resources and 
powers in various domains (e.g. financial, legal, symbolic, intellectual), but also because it 
is in a unique position to potentially facilitate networking and interactions, and put in 
place suitable institutional arrangements (see Hill et al., 2012; Cowell, 2013; Cowell, 2015; 
Eraydin, 2015). It is precisely this relational, institutional and political understanding of 
the role of collective agency that I hope to capture by focussing on governance and 
policy. We need to expand this understanding still further, to also include “contextual 
factors” (Martin et al., 2015, p. 143): the interactions with actors and arrangements 
beyond the region in question, at ‘higher’ levels of scales (national, supranational). 
Actions and policies of the national government, supranational bodies such as the 
European Union, or multinational corporations, may have a large influence on the 
performance of a region during and after a shock (Pike et al., 2010; Lang, 2012). And 
processes and frameworks at higher scales may be important in shaping the capacities 
available to different actors within a region, by granting certain powers and providing 
adequate resources to cope with disturbances. 
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 Adaptation and resilience, and aspects of policy and governance within 2.3.
Evolutionary Perspectives 
As noted, within Evolutionary Perspectives in Economic Geography, three distinctive 
theoretical frameworks can be distinguished: Generalised Darwinism, Complexity Theory 
and Path Dependence Theory. In this section I will highlight how each of these three 
frameworks emphasises different mechanisms through which the evolution of the 
economic landscape takes place, and consequently also emphasises different mechanisms 
with regard to ‘transformative’ adaptation and resilience, and the role of policy and 
governance within this. In what follows I will briefly describe the main features of the 
respective frameworks, and examine what they suggest concerning adaptation and 
resilience in regional development. I will then critically discuss each framework with 
respect to their potential to also theorise aspects of policy and governance. 
 
 
2.3.1. Generalised Darwinism 
 
Main features 
Generalised Darwinism involves the explanation of evolution through population 
dynamics, in particular the Darwinian principles of variation, inheritance and selection 
(Hodgson and Knudsen, 2010). Following Nelson and Winter (1982), the starting point for 
an analysis of the spatial economy along these lines, are ‘organisational routines’ (see 
Boschma and Frenken, 2006; Boschma and Frenken, 2011). These routines have their 
basis in the idea of bounded rationality (Simon, 1957; also Malmberg and Maskell, 2007), 
and with this the importance of routine behaviour; but operate on an organisational level 
rather than the level of individuals. They consist of physical technologies (see also 
Essletzbichler and Rigby 2007; Essletzbichler and Rigby, 2010), but also standardised 
patterns of social interactions both within the organisation, and between the organisation 
and the outside world. They have a strong cognitive dimension as they consist for a large 
part of experience knowledge and tacit knowledge, which make them hard to imitate by 
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other firms (Boschma and Frenken, 2006). Furthermore, such routines have a political 
dimension, as they regulate potential conflicts of interests between different 
stakeholders (Boschma and Frenken, 2009). These routines are relatively stable over time, 
although firms have some scope in amending them when it is clear they are not working 
well (Boschma and Frenken, 2006). 
 
Within a region different firms with different routines exist within several different 
industries, and new firms with new routines will appear constantly. Hence within each 
industry there will be firms operating through a variety of routines. There will be a 
mechanism of selection working (Vromen, 1995) as market competition will drive out 
unfit routines, and cause smart, fit routines to diffuse and spread out, mainly through 
differential profit rates. Hence the task is to analyse “the creation and diffusion of new 
routines in space, and the mechanisms through which the diffusion of ‘fitter’ routines 
occurs” (Boschma and Frenken, 2006, p. 278). The proposed mechanisms of replication 
(Vromen, 1995) and diffusion are quite various: firms with fit routines will grow much 
faster and hence come to represent a larger share of the industry in a region, successful 
firms will also produce more spin-offs which will likely locate near the parent firm, and 
some of the successful routines will spill-over to other firms through labour mobility, 
professional networks, and inter-firm collaborations (Boschma and Frenken, 2006). 
Moreover, routines are further diffused through the relocation of firms, merger and 
acquisition activity, and the establishment of new plants and offices by firms in other 
locations (Boschma and Martin, 2010a). Though all these mechanisms may play a role, 
there is meanwhile some evidence that replication and diffusion through spin-offs seem 
more important than replication and diffusion through localisation economies (e.g. 
Klepper, 2007; Boschma and Wenting, 2007; Boschma and Frenken, 2011). 
 
The replication and diffusion of routines will have a strong spatial dimension as the 
growth of a successful firm and the spin-offs and/or spill-overs it will generate, will likely 
be in one geographical location, and hence over time industry clusters will emerge. 
Moreover, through co-evolution – strictly understood as the parallel and reciprocal 
22 
 
development of a second, distinguishable population that impacts on the selection and 
retention mechanisms affecting the first population (Schamp, 2010)17 – also the 
development of institutions, networks, agglomerations, and other meso- and macro-level 
phenomena can by analysed from a Generalised Darwinism perspective (Frenken, 2007; 
Boschma and Martin, 2010b). In this way the ‘selection environment’ is further expanded 
and endogenised; as from routines and local industry dynamics, higher-level patterns 
develop, which impact on the selection and diffusion on the micro-level, etc.18  
 
Adaptation and resilience 
Within the framework of Generalised Darwinism applied to regional economic evolution, 
the prime locus of agency is the individual firm. Thus in its most basic form, when ‘neutral 
space’ is assumed, adaptation in regions is just an aggregate of the adaptation processes 
that relate to firms: in the way they adjust their routines in the case those do not work 
well, and especially in the way that firms with unfit routines go out of business, whereas 
those with good routines grow and diffuse their practices (Boschma and Frenken, 2006). 
Adaptation processes on the level of regional economies, are then entirely a function of 
these processes at the micro-level of individual firms within the respective regions. Hence 
engineering and ecological resilience will largely depend on the region’s portfolio of firms: 
the more varied and diversified, the more resilient, and the more uniform and specialised, 
the less resilient. Furthermore, on the longer run, adaptive resilience will also depend on 
the degree to which regions can qualify as appropriate environments to take advantage 
of new rounds of innovation and entrepreneurship when so-called ‘windows of locational 
opportunity’ are open. Under conditions of ‘neutral space’ however, many regions will 
normally meet the most important requirements for new industries to settle, and hence 
                                                     
17
 Though it should be noted that the concepts of ‘co-evolution’ and ‘emergence’ are often used 
interchangeably in this context, though co-evolution does not necessarily refer to the occurrence of higher-
level patterns, as emergence would necessarily entail; and emergence may occur through a number of 
processes not all of which imply co-evolution in a strict sense (see Schamp, 2010; and Martin and Sunley, 
2012). The concept of emergence is further discussed in the next section on Complexity Theory. 
18
 This dynamic process connects with the idea of path dependence, discussed further on.  
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the emergence of a new industry in a particular region would be largely determined by 
chance events (Boschma and Frenken, 2006).   
 
As described above however, the framework suggests ‘neutral space’ will be gradually 
transformed into ‘real places’. Over time, an infrastructure at higher aggregation levels 
will ‘co-evolve’ with the evolution of firms in a region: knowledge and competence bases, 
innovation networks, specific institutions, agglomerations, etc. This will have two 
consequences for adaptation and resilience as understood within this framework. First, in 
generating innovative activity and the development of new industries, the framework 
highlights the importance of related variety:  a degree of cognitive proximity between 
economic activities that is not too large, to ensure effective learning; nor too small, as 
agents with the same knowledge will have nothing to learn from each other (e.g. Frenken 
et al., 2007; Boschma and Frenken, 2011; Asheim et al., 2011). Hence, on the longer run, 
‘adaptive’ or ‘transformative’ resilience will also crucially depend on the related variety 
between industries within a region, as this will be important for the continued emergence 
of new economic activities (also Boschma, 2015). Second, the higher-level infrastructure 
that emerges, can over time act as constraining rather than enabling, and reduce the 
development of new initiatives and hence the variety available (Schamp, 2010; also 
Boschma, 2004). Hence for adaptation and resilience it is important that such constraints 
are removed in time and variety-reducing processes are offset by variety-creating 
processes (e.g. through extra-regional linkages; Boschma, 2004; Bathelt et al., 2004; 
Boschma, 2015). 
 
Policy and governance aspects 
The framework of Generalised Darwinism has important limitations regarding a role for 
policy and governance. There has recently been an acknowledgement of the importance 
of institutions – including the state and policy interventions – in the long-run 
development of regions (e.g. Boschma and Capone, 2015; Boschma, 2015; Boschma and 
Frenken, 2015). However, when the framework is strictly applied, it seems important to 
make a distinction between those institutions that could (to an important degree) come 
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about through the operation of co-evolution with firms and industries in a region (mainly 
pertaining to e.g. production practices, regulation of conflicts within firms, specialised 
education and training, patenting, social capital, representation of interests, etc.), and 
those institutions that could not plausibly be explained by co-evolution (such as the state 
and many forms of policy interventions, but also aspects that make up overarching 
institutional frameworks, such as industrial relations, corporate governance, or the 
general education system). The former category can be to an important extent 
incorporated, and can be made endogenous to the framework. But the latter category 
will need to remain exogenous to the framework strictly speaking, and will have to be 
addressed by trying to combine the Generalised Darwinism framework with other 
theoretical approaches (e.g. Coenen et al., 2015).  
 
The basic ontology of the Generalised Darwinism framework seems to be one of 
methodological individualism, which explains the emergence of phenomena on higher 
scales from the population dynamics and interactions between micro-level actors 
(primarily firms). This leaves scope for the incorporation of the emergence and evolution 
of some institutional arrangements (and possibly also some governance arrangements) 
through co-evolution. Furthermore a notion of collective action of different firms (and 
other micro-level actors) deliberately working together to achieve common objectives, 
could also be included within the framework (Boschma and Frenken, 2009, p. 155; 
Boschma and Frenken, 2015, pp. 9-10). Importantly though, there appears little room to 
analyse a role for the state or policy interventions in the adaptation and resilience of 
regional economies (see also MacKinnon et al., 2009). These are strictly speaking, 
exogenous forces within the framework.  
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2.3.2. Complexity Theory 
 
Main features 
In comparison to Generalised Darwinism, the framework of Complexity Theory has been 
worked out less extensively with regard to formulating specific mechanisms for the 
evolution of the economic landscape. However, the central idea is to see cities, clusters, 
or regions and other spatial units as so-called ‘complex adaptive systems’. From this point 
of view, we may postulate a set of components (firms, institutions, infrastructures, 
individuals, etc.) which, through the outputs they generate (relations, behaviours, 
knowledge, incomes, etc.), fulfil functions for other components, and can consistently 
reproduce themselves (Martin and Sunley, 2007). This may be said to form a coherent 
whole: a system. But the complexity-aspect implies that these components in turn 
respond to the patterns they create together, and hence the system is not coherent in a 
fixed manner, and will normally evolve over time as components create patterns, and 
these patterns impact on the components, etc. (Arthur, 2009). Complex adaptive systems 
have a number of features, as listed in Table 2. 
 
Property Attributes 
Openness The boundary between a complex system and its environment is neither fixed 
nor easy to identify, making operational closure dependent on context (and 
observer). Such non-isolated systems tend to be dissipative – subject to 
constant interaction and exchange with their environments. 
Distributed nature and 
representation 
The functions and relationships are distributed across system components at a 
whole variety of scales, giving the system a high degree of distributed 
connectivity   
Non-linear dynamics Complex systems display non-linear dynamics because of various complex 
feedbacks and mutually self-reinforcing interactions amongst components. 
Complex systems are thus often characterised by path dependence. 
Limited functional 
decomposability 
Because of its high degree of connectivity, and the open, dynamic nature of its 
structure, there is limited scope for decomposing a complex system into stable 
components. 
Non-determinism and 
non-tractability 
Complex systems are fundamentally non-deterministic. It is not possible to 
anticipate precisely their behaviour even if we completely know the function 
of their components. This does not imply, however, that the behaviour of such 
systems is random, in the sense of being haphazard.   
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Property Attributes 
Emergence and self-
organisation 
There is a tendency for macro-scale structures (including spatial structures) 
and dynamics to emerge spontaneously out of the micro-scale behaviours and 
interactions of system components. 
Adaptive behaviour and 
adaptation 
The same processes of self-organisation imbue complex systems with the 
potential to adapt their structures and dynamics, whether in response to 
changes in external environment, or from within through co-evolutionary 
mechanisms or in response to ‘self-organised criticality’ 
Source: Reproduced from Martin and Sunley (2007), p. 578. 
Table 2:  Some features of complex adaptive systems 
 
Complexity theory as applied to (spatial-)economic systems, highlights their dynamic 
aspects. Instead of an ontology of closed, linear, and equilibrium systems as in 
neoclassical economics, systems are posited to be open, nonlinear and far-from-
equilibrium (Beinhocker, 2007). At the same time, the aspects of self-organisation and 
emergence are stressed. The on-going interactions and dynamics between the individual 
components at one level ‘spontaneously’ (i.e. in a way that is not planned or imposed) 
lead to relatively stable patterns on a higher-level (e.g. at the level of a city, cluster or 
region). As Martin and Sunley (2012) point out, the form of emergence proposed here is 
of a particular kind: so called third-order emergence. Not only are these higher-level 
patterns supervenient on and irreducible to the properties of the lower-level 
components, they also exercise downward causation (i.e. the higher-level patterns impact 
on the lower-level components), in a way that implies ‘selection’ and ‘memory’. That is to 
say, micro-level components are selective in the way they adapt to the changing 
conditions (and hence the nature of downward causation will also change over time), and 
because of this, specific higher-level patterns will exert an irreversible and lasting impact 
on the direction in which the system will develop in the future.19 
 
Adaptation and resilience 
Complex adaptive systems will have a high degree of resilience as they are marked by 
distributed and dispersed (rather than centralised) control, by strong positive and 
                                                     
19
 This clearly resonates with the idea of path-dependence, as discussed below (Martin and Sunley, 2012, p. 
11). 
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negative feedback loops, and by a degree of redundant variety (Martin and Sunley, 2007, 
pp. 598-590). Hence adaptation from this point of view, will take place through a 
restructuring of the relations between components utilising some of the resources and 
aspects within the system which were not fully used yet, and the feedback loops will 
abate the effects of the shock through the system (though in some cases feedback loops 
may actually compound and reinforce these effects). 
 
These supposed relations between the ‘connectedness’ and resources in the system on 
the one hand and resilience on the other, have been further worked out in the Adaptive 
Cycle Model (Holling and Gunderson, 2002), which postulates a dynamic relation between 
these three aspects. The model suggests complex systems go through a four-phased 
process: first connectedness and accumulated resources build up until a period of stability 
sets in (from exploitation to conservation phase), then at a certain point the system 
contracts and declines and loses connectedness and resources (release phase), after 
which it starts to restructure and recombine again (reorganisation phase), subsequently 
the cycle starts again and a period of growth and increasing connectedness sets in (from 
reorganisation to exploitation phase). The degree of resilience – within this model seen as 
‘ecological resilience’, i.e. the ability to maintain similar operations and functionality 
during shocks and disturbances from the outside – will vary in each of these phases. The 
model is depicted in the following figure. 
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Source: Reproduced from Martin and Sunley (2011), p. 1307 
Figure 1:  Adaptive Cycle Model 
 
Another feature of the model is that it postulates adaptive cycles at various scales, with 
those at lower scales ‘nested’ within those at higher scales. The higher scale cycles will go 
through the cycle at a much lower speed, than those at lower scales; hence they will 
normally have a stabilising influence on the smaller scale cycles they also encompass. 
However, within the model it is also possible in certain situations for small scale processes 
to act back on larger scales, and cause a ‘revolt’ from below.    
 
Translated into a regional economic context, we may see accumulated resources as e.g. 
production equipment, physical infrastructures, skills of workers, experience and 
competence, a distinctive business culture, mutual trust, etc. Connectedness may refer to 
knowledge and innovation networks between firms, fixed supply chain relations between 
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firms, local elite networks, formalised institutional arrangements between different 
organisations, formation of interest groups and associations, etc. It is mainly this element 
of connectedness as a result of the ‘self-organising tendencies’ in a Complex Adaptive 
System that has received a lot of attention in the context of regional economic 
adaptation. This has been worked out in two directions: one strand in the literature has 
emphasised the development and role of interfirm relations and knowledge and 
technology networks (e.g. Cooke, 2012; Crespo et al., 2013; Wink, 2013), while another 
strand has focussed on connections between actors for collaboration and coordination 
and thus arrive at collective action (e.g. Safford, 2009; Cowell, 2013, 2015; Bristow and 
Healy, 2014a, 2014b, 2015). This latter direction clearly touches on the role of governance 
and policy, and will be discussed more extensively below. 
 
Within this framework, the adaptive cycles at different scales could represent how 
economies and institutions at the regional level are embedded within those at national, 
supranational and global levels (Simmie and Martin, 2010). Martin and Sunley (2011) 
have extended and modified the adaptive cycle model somewhat to make it less 
deterministic, and to better account for the agency and intelligence of actors in the 
setting of a regional economy, as compared to ecological systems (for which this model 
was developed). They propose that there is no necessity for a regional economic system 
to go through the four phases, but instead they may also exhibit constant mutation (and 
hence stay in the exploitation phase), stabilisation (stay in the conservation phase), re-
orientation (go from stabilisation onto reorganisation without going through a release 
phase), or permanent failure (despite efforts to reorganise, the economy does not enter a 
new cycle of growth).  
 
Hence the framework suggests that there seems to be a ‘natural’ tendency for 
connections to ossify, and accumulated resources to become obsolete, which will then 
diminish ecological resilience; while on the longer run a regional economy may 
successfully restructure after a severe crisis and find new growth again (a type of 
transformative ‘meta-resilience’ in the model). However, following the modifications by 
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Martin and Sunley (2011), depending on the circumstances and the actions of actors 
involved, a regional economy may also display the on-going creation of new connections 
and the constant upgrading of its resources, avoiding decline altogether, hence showing a 
more persistent adaptive resilience. Or – on the downside – an economy may also never 
really recover from a severe crisis, thus dismissing the existence of any type of inherent 
‘meta-resilience’. The framework also suggests that the interactions with higher scales 
may be important for the adaptation processes and capacity for resilience at lower levels; 
but in the context of regional economic development it has yet to be worked out in what 
ways exactly.    
 
Policy and governance aspects 
The idea in the Complexity Theory framework, that the ‘connectedness’ between 
different actors in a region may play a crucial role in collective action, and thus make a 
region more resilient, clearly has bearing on the aspects of governance and policy. This 
idea has meanwhile been worked out in several studies. Sean Safford (2009) has provided 
a detailed account of ‘the strength of weak ties and the weakness of strong ties’ (after 
Granovetter, 1973), in his comparative study of the responses to deindustrialisation in 
Allentown (Pennsylvania) and Youngstown (Ohio). The more loosely connected elite 
network in Allentown facilitated a more effective response to the crisis in its local 
economy in the early 1980s, and the subsequent challenge of renewing the local 
economy. The tightly knit network in Youngstown proved very brittle by contrast: it fell 
apart during the crisis and no fall-back options were available. Thus Youngstown was not 
able to muster an effective response, and has been struggling to renew its economic 
base. Gillian Bristow and Adrian Healy (2014a, 2014b, 2015) have explicitly theorised the 
role of policy and governance in regional resilience from a Complex Adaptive Systems 
framework. They have also highlighted the interactions and connections between actors 
to be able to arrive at an adequate response in the face of a shock. But they have 
furthermore drawn attention to the importance of anticipation, information, 
communication and narratives for such collective agency. Moreover, they have 
distinguished between immediate policy responses to manage an emerging crisis, and 
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interventions aimed at the longer-term transformation of the regional economy. Also 
Margaret Cowell (2013, 2015) has explicitly analysed the role of policy and governance 
(under the heading of ‘leadership’) in ‘transformative’ adaptation and resilience from a 
Complex Adaptive System perspective. She has compared how eight metropolitan regions 
in the American Midwest have dealt with deindustrialisation. She concludes that regions 
in which a diverse set of actors was involved in the decision-making, have generally 
performed better than regions that lacked such diversity. Furthermore, regions that 
responded early to deindustrialisation, and diversified into new economic activities, fared 
better than region that responded relatively late and focussed on retaining 
manufacturing.  
 
So aspects of policy and governance in adaptation and resilience can be explicitly 
addressed within the Complexity Theory framework. The framework highlights the 
importance of connectedness and collaboration between various actors, and the 
collective agency and leadership they may exhibit though this. However, three important 
limitations need to be pointed out. First, the framework has not much to offer with 
regard to the question of how governance arrangements and policy evolve over time. The 
only guidance available in this respect would be the Adaptive Cycle (or its modified 
version), but the role of agency in pushing the development of connectedness, 
governance arrangements, and policy would then be importantly downplayed. 
Consequently the analysis of policy and governance so far has remained essentially static, 
i.e. purely as structures (‘networks’) or agency (‘leadership’20) at certain points in time, 
without much reference to an ‘internal dynamic’ between structures and agency, that 
would explain the development of policy and governance over time. Second, 
conceptualising governance arrangements in terms of ‘connectedness’ highlights the fact 
whether or not connections between actors exist (or not), but overlooks the exact nature 
of these connections. That is, governance arrangements are more than just ‘networks’, 
                                                     
20
 Compare the notion of ‘place-renewing leadership’, introduced by Bailey et al. (2010): “a form of public-
private strategic leadership that empowers institutional and social forms of decision-making to absorb and 
adjust (proactively and reactively) to path-breaking economic change.” (p. 462). 
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especially when they involve coordination and decision-making; and the way 
arrangements structure the interactions between actors, and the way they shape the use 
of powers and resources, should take centre stage. That Bristow and Healy (2014a, 
2014b, 2015) have drawn attention to the processes of anticipation, sense-making, and 
communication, constitutes an important addition in this context, as such processes may 
also be embedded in governance arrangements. Third, the role of relations with actors 
external to the region is yet to be worked out within this framework. With regard to 
interfirm linkages and knowledge and technology networks, this has already been done 
(e.g. through the idea of ‘global pipelines’ (Bathelt et al, 2004)), but for connectedness 
between actors for policy and governance this has been neglected so far. 
 
 
2.3.3. Path Dependency Theory 
 
Main features 
The ‘canonical’ model of path dependence – as based on the works of Paul David and W. 
Brian Arthur – has three main features (Martin, 2010, p. 4): a seemingly small event has 
significant and unpredictable long-run effects (‘nonergodicity’); this event becomes 
progressively ‘locked-in’ through various self-reinforcing mechanisms (e.g. increasing 
returns, network effects, coordination effects, learning effects, self-reinforcing 
expectations, sunk costs, etc.), which limit the scope for alternative development paths; 
and this pattern is then assumed to remain stable until disrupted or dislodged by a shock 
of some kind. Within evolutionary accounts of regional economic development, especially 
localisation economies (e.g. spill-overs, common pool of specialised labour, dedicated 
suppliers, etc.; e.g. Boschma and Frenken, 2011), technological / innovation platforms 
(distinctive technological regime or innovation system; e.g. Maskell and Malmberg, 2007), 
and the development of region- or cluster-specific institutions and social norms (e.g. 
Maskell and Malmberg, 2007; Strambach, 2010), have been discussed as drivers for path 
dependent development. 
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Within the canonical model, path dependence hence seems to inevitably imply a 
movement to a state of stasis and equilibrium, as part of being ‘locked-in’. Martin and 
Sunley (2006) and Martin (2010) have taken issue with this element in the model when 
applying the concept of path dependence in the context of regional economic 
development. Instead they argue that path dependence should also be able to capture 
situations which are ‘metastable’ (Martin and Sunley, 2006, p. 419): i.e. regional 
economies still exhibit continuous incremental development, renewal activity and the 
emergence and disappearance of industries and technologies, but in a manner that 
somehow builds on the assets and legacies of the past. Hence instead of seeing the path 
as a movement to a stable state, the path is then seen as an on-going dynamic process 
(Martin, 2010, p. 21; also Garud and Karnøe, 2001a). This is captured in the following 
figure. 
 
 
Source: Reproduced from Martin (2010), p. 21. 
Figure 2:  Path as on-going dynamic process rather than inevitably ending in a stable 
state 
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As a corollary, the idea that this state of being ‘locked-in’ can only be dislodged by an 
external shock must also be qualified. As there is on-going endogenous dynamism, the 
directions for future development may be shaped from the inside, including events that 
lead to the creation of a new path, the ‘branching’ of paths, or the ‘breaking’ of paths (see 
Garud and Karnøe, 2001b). 
 
In applying the concept of path dependence to regional economic development, we 
should be explicit about the level of analysis (Henning et al., 2013). Path dependence can 
be used to explain the development of a locality or a region as a whole, a cluster or 
industry within a certain region, or - even more particular – the development of certain 
components within such clusters or industries, such as the technological / knowledge 
base, networks, cluster institutions, etc. (Martin and Sunley, 2006). The evolution of each 
of these specific components will have a logic of its own, based on their own self-
reinforcing mechanisms; but at the same time there will likely also be interactions 
between the development paths of the various components, as well as between the 
development paths of various regional industries. For this Ron Martin and Peter Sunley 
(2006, p. 413) have introduced the term ‘path interdependence’. 
 
Adaptation and resilience 
Within the framework of Path Dependency especially the idea of ‘lock-in’ directly relates 
to adaptation and resilience. As discussed above, a lock-in in the context of regional 
economic development is a ‘rigidification’ of structures, technologies, networks, ideas, 
knowledges, etc. which will significantly constrain the options available for further 
development. Hence lock-ins will inhibit adaptation to new and changing circumstances, 
and diminish resilience. Gernot Grabher (1993) in a study of the development of the Ruhr 
Area – once dominated by the coal and steel industries – has distinguished between lock-
ins at three levels within a regional economy: 
 Functional lock-ins: rigidities that inhibit entrepreneurship of people and firms, 
because a lack of boundary spanning functions (marketing, R&D, long term strategy 
department) as a result of strong and tight relations between firms in the supply 
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chain, and investments in specific assets and technologies within these cooperative 
relations. 
 Political lock-ins: arrangements between local businesses and the political leadership 
that ensure that vested interests are protected, and policies are enacted that support 
the status quo and inhibit renewal. 
 Cognitive lock-ins: rigidities in the world views and ways of thinking of key regional 
actors, because of complacency and a lack of critical reflection.  
 
As discussed earlier however, path dependent development does not necessarily imply a 
state of lock-in, but may also exhibit on-going incremental development, new path 
creation, and path branching. With regard to adaptation and resilience within this 
framework, the question then becomes: what determines whether a regional economy 
comes to be dominated by self-reinforcing processes that increase rigidification, constrain 
opportunities and produce strong lock-ins; or alternatively, whether it maintains its 
dynamism and continues to exhibit renewal based on the – enabling instead of 
constraining – legacies and structures built up in the past (also see Hassink and Shin, 
2005; Martin, 2010)? To start answering this question we should – following Henning et 
al. (2013) – focus on the ‘self-reinforcing mechanisms’ behind different types of path 
dependency. Moreover, we should be explicit about the level of analysis at which these 
mechanisms are suggested to operate: what processes at which levels of scale and in 
which domains may be susceptible to mechanisms of path dependency? In other words, 
the notions of ‘regional path dependence’ and ‘regional lock-in’ need to be disentangled, 
and instead the focus should be on their constituent components and the interactions 
between these components (the ‘path interdependencies’ (Martin and Sunley, 2006)). It 
is only by the identification of distinct mechanisms and by circumscribing the domain and 
level of scale of the operation of these mechanisms, that the concepts of path 
dependence and lock-in can be adequately operationalised in the context of regional 
economic development. As noted, Gernot Grabher (1993) has distinguished between the 
functional, political and cognitive domains. Within these domains we may distinguish 
many mechanisms of lock-in (inhibiting adaptation) but also mechanisms of renewal 
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(facilitating adaptation). Within the functional domain, we can further distinguish 
between mechanisms that operate in clusters and industries, in the regional labour 
market, or in the built environment. By theorising the possible mechanisms of path 
dependence in the political and cognitive domains, aspects of policy and governance may 
then be incorporated into the framework.  
 
In the functional domain, the orginal paper by Grabher (1993) primarily highlighted the 
close relations between firms in the supply chain and the subsequent investments in 
relation-specific assets and technologies, as a self-reinforcing mechanism of lock-in. But 
sunk costs in the capital base and infrastructures may also represent a self-reinforcing 
mechanism especially in heavy industries, as these will make more radical strategic 
options or exit less likely, and hence facilitate continuation along the same development 
path (Martin and Sunley, 2006). Furthermore, the industrial organisation among firms 
may result in self-reinforcing mechanisms. When a few large firms dominate the local 
industry this may result in a lack of competition and reduced pressures for continuous 
renewal (Hassink, 2010b; Hervas-Oliver et al., 2011); or alternatively it can lead to 
‘structural congestion’: too many firms in the area which then causes cooperative efforts 
to break down, and a lack of investment in innovation as a result of fierce competition 
(Popp and Wilson, 2007). Furthermore, clusters will over time develop specific 
institutional arrangements and norms for standard practices, quality certification, skills 
training, registration, industry representation, etc. which may lead to a reduction of 
variety and stifle innovation (e.g. Boschma, 2004; Bailey et al., 2010). Lastly, the one-
sided composition of a regional economy, as a result of the dominance of only one or 
several industries, may lead to insufficient scope for new path creation and path 
branching (Martin and Sunley, 2006). In the long run, an important mechanism for 
positive path dependency encompasses a certain amount of diversity in the economic 
structure, and in particular some related variety in the knowledge and technological base, 
from which continued dynamism and renewal will arise (Neffke et al., 2011).  
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The mechanisms listed so far will mainly operate at the level of cluster and industries – 
within and between firms. Such clusters and industries can, however, have a significant 
lasting impact on the region as a whole if they dominated the economic base. This is 
especially true in the case of heavy industries. In his depiction of the economic 
development of Glasgow since the mid-1900s, Sydney Checkland has captured the 
phenomenon that the dominant presence of heavy industries seems to inhibit the 
emergence of new economic activities, with the metaphor of the Upas Tree: a tree in the 
vicinity of which nothing else will grow because of its poison (Checkland, 1976). Some of 
the particular mechanisms that may explain this, are the long term impacts of heavy 
industries on the local labour market and on the wider environment, which may 
subsequently produce persistent rigidities of their own. With the dominance of certain 
(heavy) industries, certain type of skills important for the work within these industries will 
co-evolve in the local labour market. Moreover, a ‘culture’ will develop with certain 
distinctive attitudes towards work (diligence, reliability, etc.), initiative (compliance, 
cooperation, etc.), and community (cohesion, relatively inward-looking, etc.) (Cooke and 
Rehfeld, 2011). As these (heavy) industries contract, the labour market will be 
characterised by skills that are largely obsolete and a culture that does not promote 
entrepreneurship and enterprise (Hudson, 1994; Huggins and Thompson, 2015). A ‘low-
skill equilibrium’ may result, in which only new economic activities will emerge in the 
region that will try to capitalise in on low skills and this characteristic culture, without 
much prospect of investments in upgrading these skills (Finegold and Soskice, 1988; 
Finegold, 1993; Dawley et al., 2014). In addition, heavy industries often mean “significant 
environmental degradation of urban spaces and surrounding countryside through 
industrial smoke stacks, slum housing, chemical outpourings and concentrated human 
waste” (Power et al., 2010). This will also constitute a rigidity as such conditions will not 
easily be remedied. Because of such a lack of attractiveness, private sector investments in 
improving the circumstances may not be seen as viable, which may then result in a 
further deterioration of the urban environment, etc. But likewise, such mechanisms of 
path dependence with regard to the labour market and the built environment, do not 
necessarily have to be negative but can also be positive. In some regions, a ‘high-skill 
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equilibrium’ prevails, in which existing high human capital attracts and fosters firms that 
capitalise in on this human capital, and then leads to continued investment in skills. An 
attractive built environment may lead to on-going investments in improvements and new 
amenities.  
 
Policy and governance aspects 
By way of the Path Dependency framework, we can thus foreground the various 
mechanisms of positive and negative path dependency at different levels and in different 
domains, in the economic adaptation and resilience of regions. Mechanisms of path 
dependency may not only appear in the functional domain, but also in the political and 
cognitive domains. This is indeed how aspects of policy and governance may be 
integrated into the Path Dependency approach. The original study of Grabher (1993), 
suggested that politicians, business leaders, and trade union officials may have 
constituted ‘growth coalitions’ in which they protected each other’s interests. As a result 
they failed to facilitate renewal on time, and the crisis in the steel and coal industries in 
the 1970s and 1980s took them by surprise. In the cognitive domain, forms of 
complacency and myopia may create rigidities in the outlook of local elites (also Maskell 
and Malmberg, 2007). But also in this domain, mechanisms of positive path dependence 
may exist, which facilitate renewal and ongoing development based on the legacies of the 
past. I will discuss these in the next Chapter. Figure 3 presents an overview of the various 
mechanisms of negative and positive path dependence that may be relevant in various 
domains and at several levels of scale, for the adaptation and resilience of regions.  
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Figure 3:  Interdependent mechanisms of lock-in and path-dependence operating in 
different domains and at different levels 
 
Within the literature on Path Dependency in the development of institutions and policies 
in regional economic development, recent contributions have focussed on the one hand 
on contingency of forms of lock-in and path dependency on certain circumstances, and on 
the other hand on the interplay between structure and agency. Robert Hassink and 
colleagues have shown in a comparison of shipbuilding and textile regions in both 
Germany and South Korea, that political lock-ins are also contingent on context-specific 
circumstances during periods of industrial restructuring; sometimes they arise 
(shipbuilding in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, textiles in Daeugu), and sometimes they are 
more or less absent (textiles in Westmünsterland, shipbuilding in Gyeongnam) (Eich-Born 
and Hassink, 2005; Hassink, 2010b). Moreover, these studies also point to the positive 
role in adaptation and resilience, that governance arrangements and policy may also play 
(as apparently they have in Westmünsterland and Gyeongnam). Hence while the 
development of governance arrangements and policies may be path dependent, they do 
not necessarily entail ‘lock-in’ and their development may depend on certain 
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circumstances. These findings suggest the importance of a more open-ended notion of 
path dependence that emphasises on-going dynamism (as suggested by Martin (2010)), 
and also point to the importance of examining the wider context in which mechanisms of 
positive and negative path dependence take place. 
 
The interplay between structure and agency in the path dependent evolution of 
especially institutions is captured by the two, very similar, concepts of ‘path contingency’ 
and ‘path plasticity’. The idea of ‘path contingency’ was introduced to counter the 
tendency within path dependence to afford primacy to structure, i.e. to see only a very 
minor role for agency in the development of a path; agency instead being limited to 
‘critical junctures’ when new paths were being created (Johnson, 2001; Hudson, 2005). 
Path contingency wants to focus instead on the dynamic interaction between agency and 
structure both in the continued development of the path, and also in times of critical 
junctures. Hence within the path dependent development at various levels regions there 
should be room for choices and entrepreneurship within the broad structures that are 
laid out. The role of the state and in particular of certain policy choices may then be more 
easily fit into this framework (Hudson, 2005; Morgan, 2013; Dawley et al., 2015). A 
second suggested refinement – somewhat similar to path contingency – is the idea of 
‘path plasticity’ (Strambach, 2010; Strambach and Halkier, 2013): starting from the 
presumption that paths are not completely coherent in themselves, a broad range of 
options will exist at any moment to combine different elements that have been handed 
down from the past within the path. Hence path plasticity refers to “the dynamics within 
a path and the way actors use the narrowed down or the limited range of choice (…) in 
creative ways for the development of innovation without breaking out of the path.” 
(Strambach and Halkier, 2013; p. 1). The flexibility in the further development of the path, 
and the active shaping of the path are thus highlighted. Strambach (2010) notes how 
actors managed to adapt existing institutions in Germany (which are historically mainly 
geared towards the needs of advanced manufacturing) to better accommodate the 
requirements of developing the customised business software sector. 
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The Path Dependency framework thus offers a good basis for analysing the aspects of 
policy of governance in regional economic adaptation and resilience. It directs attention 
to the various interdependent mechanisms of continuity and change in different domains 
and at different levels of scale. The role for policy and governance in adaptation and 
resilience will be to break through mechanisms of lock-in, and try to create mechanisms 
of positive path dependence (based on on-going dynamism) in the functional domain 
instead. However the framework as worked out so far, does have two important 
omissions. First, the exact mechanisms of path dependence by which the evolution of 
policies and governance could take place in the context of regional development, have 
not yet been sufficiently theorised. The conceptualisation in this regard, needs to go 
beyond lock-in, as Hassink (2010b) and Martin (2010) have suggested. The notions of path 
contingency and path plasticity help in directing our attention to the interplay of structure 
and agency. However, we still need to identify and work out more concrete mechanisms. 
Second, studies within this framework have paid very little attention to the importance of 
structures and relations that go beyond the region concerned. The main focus seems to 
be on mechanisms that operate within a particular area, which so far inhibits the 
importance of more multi-scalar processes and structures for path dependence and lock-
in within a region (Martin and Sunley, 2006; Hassink, 2010b). Especially the role of the 
national state and national institutions needs to be further examined, as these will 
importantly determine the scope and form of specific arrangements and policies within a 
region (Hudson, 2005; Dawley, 2010; Hassink, 2010b; Morgan, 2013; Dawley et al., 2015). 
 
 
 Conclusions 2.4.
At the start of this chapter I examined different conceptions of adaptation and resilience 
in regional economic development. I concluded that an ‘adaptive’ or rather 
‘transformative’ conception will be the most suitable for our purposes: a conception that 
highlights the process of, respectively the capacity for, transformation in the face of 
economic change. Such a conception can also incorporate the idea that adaptation and 
resilience may also be applied in the context of slow-burn and structural disturbances 
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(such as deindustrialisation) and not only discrete events and cyclical fluctuations (such as 
macro-economic recessions). Furthermore, because the focus will be on the underlying 
processes of reorganisation and reorientation (rather than the patterns of resistance and 
recovery), such a conception is much better suited to problematise collective agency and 
a role for policy and governance (Bristow and Healy 2014a, 2014b). 
 
Next I analysed the three different frameworks (Generalised Darwinism, Complexity 
Theory, and Path Dependency Theory) that constitute Evolutionary Perspectives in 
Economic Geography, in terms of the mechanisms they proposed with regard to 
(transformative) adaptation and resilience in general and more specifically on what each 
of these frameworks had to contribute to understanding aspects of policy and 
governance. An overview of the discussion can be found in Table 3 below.  
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 Main mechanisms of 
adaptation and resilience 
Aspects of policy and 
governance arrangements 
Critique 
Generalised 
Darwinism 
 In first instance, aggregate of 
adaptation processes in 
relation to firms (change of 
routines; survival or demise), 
and thus emphasis on the 
importance of varied and 
diversified portfolio of firms. 
 Related variety may play an 
important role in 
diversification and continual 
renewal, and may shape the 
locations of new rounds of 
innovation and 
entrepreneurship. 
 Gradual ossification of co-
evolved knowledge and 
technology networks, 
linkages between firms, and 
institutions may explain how 
industries and clusters 
become ‘maladapted’.  
 Some institutions in cluster 
and regions emerge and 
develop as a result of co-
evolution with populations of 
firms. 
 Potentially a role for 
collective action by groups of 
firms. 
 A role for the state, many 
types of governance 
arrangements, and policy 
interventions, is exogenous 
to the framework. Hence 
these cannot be examined 
within the framework, and 
the framework will need be 
combined with other 
frameworks for this.  
Complexity 
Theory 
 Highlights the rebundling / 
recombining of assets, and 
the restructuring of linkages 
(both in interfirm networks 
as in connections between 
various local actors) in 
adaptation and resilience. 
 Relatively loose 
connectedness and diverse 
set of resources important 
for resilience. 
 Adaptive Cycle model may 
serve (in extended, less 
deterministic variant) as 
heuristic model for the 
evolution of the capacity for 
resilience in the system. 
 A role for policy and 
governance arrangements 
can be incorporated within 
the framework, as (place 
renewing) leadership and / or 
as social networks between 
multiple actors.  
 Policy and governance may 
also play a role through 
anticipation, provision of 
information, communication 
and creation of narratives, to 
cope with shocks. 
 Offers little guidance to 
conceptualise the evolution 
of governance and policy 
over time (other than the 
Adaptive Cycle Model, in 
which the role of agency, and 
the indeterminacy of 
outcomes, would be 
downplayed). Focus is either 
purely on agency 
(‘leadership’) or purely on 
structure (networks), but not 
on their interactions.  
 Understanding governance 
arrangements primarily in 
terms of ‘connectedness’ is 
quite limited: the exact 
nature of relations between 
actors and the various 
functions governance 
arrangements may fulfil, are 
neglected. 
 The role of connections to 
entities outside the region in 
question, in place-renewing 
leadership, has not been 
worked out yet  
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 Main mechanisms of 
adaptation and resilience 
Aspects of policy and 
governance arrangements 
Critique 
Path 
Dependence 
Theory 
 Presence of interdependent 
mechanisms of positive and 
negative path dependence, 
operating in different 
domains (functional, political, 
cognitive) and at different 
levels of scale. 
 Ongoing renewal, and hence 
adaptive resilience, depends 
on maintaining dynamism 
and creating renewal through 
e.g. diversification into 
(technologically) related 
industries, indigenous 
creation of technologies and 
industries, upgrading of 
existing industries, 
heterogeneity and diversity, 
transplantation from 
elsewhere (Martin and 
Sunley, 2006, p. 420). 
 The evolution of policy and 
governance arrangements 
may easily be integrated into 
the framework, by focussing 
on mechanisms of path-
dependence and lock-in in 
the cognitive/political and 
institutional domains. 
 The role of policy in 
adaptation and resilience 
would be to break through 
self-reinforcing mechanisms 
of lock-in in the functional 
domain, and generate 
mechanisms for positive path 
dependency instead. 
 Path dependency in these 
domains should however be 
more refined, and allow for 
sensitivity to the context in 
which forms of path 
dependency are said to 
operate, and a more 
thorough conceptualisation 
of the interactions between 
agency and structures 
(building on notions of path 
contingency and path 
plasticity). 
 The exact mechanisms of 
evolution of governance 
arrangements and policy in 
regional development have 
remained undertheorised. 
 Little attention to the 
importance of structures and 
relations that go beyond the 
region concerned, including 
the role of the national state 
and national institutions. 
Table 3:  The three frameworks in light of adaptation and resilience and aspects of 
governance and policy 
 
The three frameworks highlight somewhat different mechanisms with regard to 
adaptation and resilience, and may actually seem broadly complementary. However, in 
the ways the three frameworks understand the role of policy and governance 
arrangements, there are large differences. The Generalised Darwinism approach offers 
little scope to examine the role of policy and governance arrangements: only a limited 
subset of institutions and policies can be made endogenous within the framework. The 
Complexity Theory framework offers some useful insights, especially concerning the 
importance of connectedness and collaboration, and of anticipation, intelligence, and 
communication, in coping with shocks. It has also been suggestive of the importance of 
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relations and higher-level systems, beyond the region concerned (though this has not 
really been worked out yet). However, the framework has not offered much concerning 
the theorisation of the evolution of policy and governance over time (beyond the 
Adaptive Cycle), and hence has emphasised either ‘leadership’ or ‘networks’ in this regard 
(with little insight in how these develop). The Path Dependence framework seems the 
most encompassing for further theorising the aspects of governance and policy in 
adaptation and resilience. Through this framework we can analyse regional adaptation 
and resilience, through different mechanisms of positive and negative path dependence 
at different levels and in different domains, including the domain of policy-making and 
governance. I will hence take this framework as the principal basis of the analytical 
framework that I will develop in the next chapter, and will then also address the two 
important omissions in the framework: the mechanisms by which policy and governance 
evolve over time, and the impact of structures and processes at other scales beyond the 
region in question. 
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Chapter 3. ANALYSING THE ROLE AND EVOLUTION OF POLICY AND GOVERNANCE IN 
ADAPTATION AND RESILIENCE IN A MULTI-SCALAR CONTEXT 
 
 
 Introduction 3.1.
In the previous Chapter I concluded that within Evolutionary Perspectives, the Path 
Dependence framework offers the best prospects to further theorise the policy and 
governance aspects of adaptation and resilience. I also observed that it still has several 
important lacunas. On the whole the evolution of policy and governance from a path 
dependency perspective has remained undertheorised and underspecified. Although 
there have been some interesting developments recently with regard to this matter: a 
dynamic conception of path dependency has come to the fore, refined by notions of path 
plasticity and path contingency, which put more emphasis on the interactions between 
agency and structures in the shaping of policy and governance. Furthermore, so far the 
relations, structures and processes that go beyond the region – and how these condition 
forms of path dependence within a region – have received very little attention in this 
framework. The aim of this Chapter is to address these gaps, and in doing so to further 
work out a more holistic Evolutionary Geographical Political Economy approach to 
regional adaptation and resilience. I will do so by combining insights from the Path 
Dependence framework, with concepts from other strands of literature within Economic 
Geography (mainly Institutionalism and the Complexity Theory framework), but also from 
Political Science and other social sciences (specifically from Historical Institutionalism, 
State Theory, and Varieties of Capitalism). I will develop an analytical framework that 
seeks to cover the dynamic and multi-scalar aspects of the role and evolution of policy 
and governance in adaptation and resilience in old industrial regions.  
 
I will start this Chapter with an outline of how I intend to develop the analytical 
framework (covering the three distinct levels of analysis mentioned in the Introduction). I 
will also discuss some key concepts and the theoretical debates surrounding these, in this 
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section. Next I will further examine the role of policy initiatives and governance 
arrangements in adaptation and resilience in old industrial regions coping with disruptive 
structural change. In section 3.4 I will further theorise how policies and governance 
arrangements evolve over time (in a path dependent way). In section 3.5 I will turn to a 
discussion of the various elements within the wider institutional environment that may be 
important for regional adaptation and resilience. I will end with presenting the completed 
analytical framework, and with some further conclusions, in section 3.6. 
 
 
 Outline of an analytical framework 3.2.
The framework I intent to develop in this Chapter consists of three core elements: 
 The role of policies and governance in adaptation and resilience. The way that policies 
and governance in old industrial regions, can overcome the various mechanisms of 
lock-in and put in place mechanisms of positive path dependence instead, needs to be 
considered further. Success in this regard will be visible in the development of key 
indicators, such as GVA per head, total employment, and unemployment. Moreover, 
when a region has successfully adapted it will face new challenges and pursue new 
opportunities in economic development, while regions that are not successful will 
continue to struggle with generating new economic drivers and catching up.  
 The evolution of policies and the evolution of governance arrangements in response 
to the disruptive effects of structural change. The mechanisms and patterns through 
which policies and governance can evolve, need to be further analysed. 
 The responses in terms of policies and governance will be shaped by the wider 
institutional environment at especially the national and transnational (i.e. European) 
levels. The most important dimensions by which wider institutional environments may 
differ from each other, need to be specified and the possible influences of differences 
needs to be examined. 
 
The figure below shows how these different elements of the analytical framework are 
related. It is important to note that the links between these elements are not as simple as 
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represented in this figure. The responses to the disruptive shock (in terms of policies and 
governance arrangements) are importantly mediated by a process of interpretation and 
diagnosis of what is going on (the disruptive and structural nature of changes and shocks 
in the regional economy is often not immediately straightforward). Moreover, responses 
are only enacted after a decision-making process between various actors, which can be 
highly political. In addition, differences in the wider institutional environment merely 
condition these responses, but certainly leave much scope for agency of actors. However 
the wider institutional environment does structure the powers and resources available to 
the various actors at different scales, and how these actors interact with each other. The 
outcomes with regard to adaptation and resilience will furthermore not only be 
determined by the responses in policies and governance, but also a broad range of other 
factors, such as size, location, differences in economic make-up, historical assets, chance 
events, etc. 
 
 
Figure 4:  Outline of analytical framework 
 
In the remainder of this section I will discuss and specify the basic concepts within this 
framework: institutions, governance, policy, and institutional environment, and place 
these within wider theoretical debates. 
 
Since the early 1990s there has been increasing interest in the role of institutions within 
Economic Geography (Amin, 1999; Martin, 2000; Peck, 2000; Wood and Valler, 2001). 
This ‘institutional turn’ has coincided with a ‘rediscovery of the region’: the supposition 
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that regional processes and assets are crucial for firms to be able to compete in a 
globalised economy (see Amin, 1999; Peck, 2000; Martin, 2000). These developments 
have given rise to a diverse set of concepts to conceptualise the role of institutions in 
regional development, such as Regional Innovation Systems (Cooke et al., 1998; Cooke, 
2004; Asheim and Gertler, 2005; Asheim et al., 2011), the Learning Region (Morgan, 1997; 
Hassink, 2005), and Local Production Systems (Crouch et al., 2004; Bailey et al., 2010). 
Common to these concepts is a concern for innovation, and how the processes that 
underlie innovation (such as the generation, diffusion, application and exploitation of 
knowledge; social learning; monitoring; and absorption of information) are conditioned, 
facilitated, or hindered by institutions. The focus here can either be on specific clusters – 
defined as geographic concentrations of firms specialised in a particular field, and 
horizontally and vertically linked (Porter, 1998) – or on regions as a whole (also Gertler 
and Wolfe, 2002; Cumbers et al., 2003; Gertler, 2004; Tödling and Trippl, 2004; Tödling 
and Trippl, 2005; Farole et al., 2011). 
 
Institutions can be conceptualised in various ways and from several different approaches 
(see Hall and Taylor, 1996; DiMaggio, 1998; Nielsen, 2001). Without going into a full 
discussion however, here it will be useful to highlight several points. On the one hand 
institutions constrain and regulate behaviour21, but on the other hand institutions also 
have generative and enabling qualities, as they make interaction, coordination, and 
organisation possible (also Wolfe and Gertler, 2002; Cox, 2011; Rodríguez-Pose, 2013; 
Bathelt and Glückler, 2014). Institutions may be formal - such as laws, structures, 
procedures, contracts, statutes, etc. - and informal - such as norms, conventions, 
traditions, routines, etc. (e.g. Gertler, 2004; Rodríguez-Pose, 2013). Furthermore, we can 
distinguish between institutional arrangements, and the institutional environment 
(Martin, 2000). Institutional arrangements refer to the particular organisational forms 
institutions may take, such as organisations, regulatory agencies, bargaining structures, 
cooperation agreements, etc. Institutional environments provide the larger framework for 
                                                     
21
 Following the definition of institutions by North (1990), as “the rules of the game in a society; more 
formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” (p. 3). 
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these arrangements, and will consist of “both the systems of informal conventions, 
customs, norms, and social routines (such as habitual forms of corporate behaviour, 
consumption cultures, socialised work practices, transaction norms, and so on), and the 
formal (usually legally enforced) structures of rules and regulations (for example, laws 
relating to competition, employment, contract, trade, money flows, corporate 
governance, welfare provision)” (Martin, 2000, pp. 79-80). The idea of ‘institutional 
thickness’ was introduced by Ash Amin and Nigel Thrift (1995), and captures how 
institutional arrangements in a region, may make a region more adaptive and resilient in 
the global economy. They have operationalised ‘institutional thickness’ in terms of four 
elements: a strong institutional presence (many institutions, and of different types), high 
levels of interaction between these institutions, shared norms and values, and a common 
purpose (Amin and Thrift, 2005, p. 102 and p. 104). They go on to argue that the 
institutional infrastructure in old industrial regions is often too narrow and one-sided 
(geared towards dominant businesses), and lacks inclusiveness, overall cohesiveness, and 
a common agenda (also Tödtling and Trippl, 2005).  
 
Governance arrangements were already defined earlier as the institutional arrangements 
which fulfil functions of governance, i.e. “the pursuit of collective interests and the 
steering and coordination of society” (Peters and Pierre, 2006; p. 209). 22 This includes 
setting collective priorities and goals, resolving conflicts, organising accountability, and 
implementing initiatives (Peters and Pierre, 2006). Governance is a broader notion than 
government, and draws attention to the fact that steering and coordination normally 
involves multiple actors – both within the public sector, and also in society and in the 
economy at large (Sørensen, 2006). Moreover, governance may take place across scales, 
in networks made up of actors at supranational, national and subnational levels; this is 
further highlighted by the term ‘multi-level governance’ (Bache and Flinders, 2004; 
Piattoni, 2009). Governance – as ‘the steering and coordination of society’ – expresses 
                                                     
22
 An even broader notion of governance exists, which encompasses all sets of mechanisms by which 
behavioural regularities are maintained in society. Such mechanisms may also be more implicit or informal, 
such as markets, hierarchies, associations, and communities. See e.g. Crouch (2005). However, for the 
purpose of this research, the narrower definition will be used. 
51 
 
itself through policies, defined as the explicit and authorised intentions to achieve certain 
goals in ‘the pursuit of collective interests’. Policy-making will involve various stages: 
agenda setting, problem definition, policy formulation, implementation and evaluation 
(see Palumbo et al., 2004). Moreover, for policies to be effective and influence events, 
they require both sufficient powers and sufficient resources. Because such resources and 
policies are scarce, and various actors will differ in the policies they favour, policy-making 
will inherently be a political process in which each set of actors struggles to have their 
preferred policies implemented. 
 
There is an extensive debate about how regions relate to structures and processes at 
higher levels of scale, and what actually constitutes ‘a region’. There are three main 
conceptions with reference to this issue: a ‘classic’ territorial conception, a relational 
conception, and a position in between (MacKinnon, 2011; Cox, 2013). The ‘classic’ 
territorial conception tends not to problematise scale, and sees regions, nations, 
localities, etc. as ‘natural’ and relatively unchangeable units that indicate a certain 
territory. Furthermore, spatial scales have an innate verticality and hierarchy, with the 
central state constraining or even determining processes at lower levels. The relational 
conception dismisses such an ‘essentialist’ and ‘fixed-state’ perspective, and sees spatial 
scales as products of wider processes, discourses, and politics. This conception is explicitly 
process-based, and sees spatial units as more fluid and subject to the ‘politics of scale’. In 
addition, horizontal relationships through space are stressed: state hierarchies give way 
to networks that have no real centrality. Following this through, the very notion of 
territory is questioned: attachments to a certain place and locally dependent connections 
lose relevance. The position in between tries to reconcile these two conceptions (Pike and 
Tomaney, 2009; MacKinnon, 2011; Cox, 2013). It concurs with the relational conception 
that scales are socially constructed and are social representations, and thus subject to 
political processes. However, it emphasises the material and affective forces that tie 
actors to territories. Hence despite the fact the scales (and thus also ‘regions’) are social 
constructions, they have a certain reality nevertheless. Moreover, notwithstanding the 
increasing importance of global networks, the verticality of certain relations cannot be 
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denied: considerable powers are still concentrated within the central state and its 
institutions, which thus still implies a certain hierarchy (though more qualified and 
dynamic than in the ‘classic’ territorial conception). The notion of ‘nestedness’ refers to 
this embeddedness of institutional spaces at ‘lower’ spatial scales (in regions and 
localities) into institutional spaces at ‘higher’ levels (at the national or supranational 
levels), and the conditioning of lower levels by higher levels (Martin, 2000; Bathelt and 
Glückler, 2014). In the following, I will proceed from this in-between position, recognising 
that both territorial and relational aspects are important, but may not always be aligned. 
 
 
 The role of policy and governance in adaptation and resilience 3.3.
Before deindustrialisation and structural change, old industrial regions – especially when 
they relied on heavy industry – were extraordinarily coherent: technology, organisational 
forms, social relations, physical and social infrastructures, etc. formed a tightly-knit and 
synergistic whole. David Harvey has described this as ‘structured coherence’ (1985, pp. 
139-144). And in a later work he theorised the incidence of such coherent places, as a 
‘permanence’: a relative stability in a certain place and at a certain time, with its own 
internal order, carved out from the flow of processes that create and shape spaces (p. 
261). But such ‘permanences’ are nevertheless ephemeral and transient, as they are 
contingent on the processes that sustain them. The structured coherence of places only 
exists “in the midst of a maelstrom of forces that tend to undermine and disrupt it” 
(1985, p. 143), such as technological change, product innovation, class struggles over 
distribution, shifting space relations, etc. Hence what was occurring in old industrial 
regions after structural change set in23, may be analysed as the dissolution of their 
‘structured coherence’ (also Hudson, 1994). As Harvey notes:  
“The tension between place-bound fixity and spatial mobility of capital erupts into 
generalised crisis, however, when the landscape shaped in relation to a certain 
phase of development becomes a barrier to further accumulation. The geographical 
                                                     
23
 As discussed in section 2.2, the slow-burn process of structural change became manifest with the 1973 oil 
crisis and subsequent recession, which then triggered large disruptions (plant closings, restructuring 
operations, introduction of new technologies, high unemployment, etc.). 
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configuration of places must then be reshaped around new transport and 
communications systems and physical infrastructures, new centres and styles of 
production and consumption, new agglomerations of labour power, and modified 
social infrastructures (including, for example, systems of governance and regulation 
of places). Old places have to be devalued, destroyed, and redeveloped while new 
places are created.” (1996, p. 296)  
 
Through the Path Dependency framework we can further analyse this coherence, its 
subsequent dissolution and renewal, and the role of policy and governance. As discussed 
in section 2.3.3, the framework draws attention to various interdependent mechanisms 
that produce continuity in different domains in regional economic development. During 
the period of ‘structured coherence’ the mechanisms of path dependence in the various 
domains were well-attuned, reinforced each other, and had a positive effect; i.e. they 
provided a stable and well-directed basis for the economic prosperity of the region. This 
situation was contingent however on a particular set of circumstances, and when these 
circumstances changed, the main industries in such regions started to experience severe 
difficulties (as a result of e.g. high relative costs, new substitutive products, overcapacity, 
new competition because markets are opened up, etc.) (Lagerholm and Malmberg, 2009). 
The mechanisms of path dependency within the dominant industry / cluster, may at this 
point severely inhibit adaptation. The positive effects of structured coherence, now turn 
into negative effects: the specialisation and mutual dependencies lead to a quick 
deterioration in key economic indicators, such as regional GVA, employment within the 
region, and the unemployment rate. The structured coherence will then partly dissolve: 
the mechanisms of lock-in at the industry / cluster level will mostly disappear with the 
dwindling of the dominant (heavy) industries. Other mechanisms of negative path 
dependency and lock-in will continue to operate however: the mechanisms that shaped 
continuity in the labour market, built-environment, and in policy-making and governance 
may remain relevant long after the previously dominant industries have downsized or 
disappeared. These mechanisms may often inhibit the attraction and creation of a new 
economic base.  
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The role for policy and governance in adaptation then, is to help overcome the various, 
interrelated mechanisms of lock-in in a number of domains, and support the generation 
of mechanisms of positive path dependency (which should then form the basis for on-
going renewal). This will require a comprehensive, coordinated, and long-term effort that 
simultaneously addresses the regional economic base, the labour market, and the built 
environment; to bring about a transformation to a new form of ‘structured coherence’ (in 
which various components are again well-attuned and mutually supporting), which 
should however be less rigid and allow for more dynamism than the earlier phase.24 
However, this process will be made more difficult by the fact that also the political, 
institutional and cognitive domain, where policy and governance take shape, is 
susceptible to mechanisms of path dependency conditioned by the earlier phases of a 
region’s development. The mechanisms that promote continuity in policy and 
governance, should hence also be examined closely with regard to their propensity to 
impede or facilitate renewal (this will be addressed in the next section). The role of policy 
and governance in supporting (or hindering) adaptation and resilience in old industrial 
regions, and their path dependent evolution, is depicted in Figure 5.  
 
                                                     
24
 In that sense, there are similarities to ‘sustainability transitions’, in which also multiple domains need to 
be addressed in a coordinated manner over a long period of time, for a transition to take place from one 
‘regime’ or ‘system’ to another (see e.g. Geels, 2004; Grin et al., 2010; Truffer and Coenen, 2012). 
55 
 
 
Figure 5:  The role of policy and governance in adaptation and resilience, and the 
(path dependent) evolution of policies and governance 
 
Policies and governance arrangements hence play a crucial role in adaptation and 
resilience in old industrial regions from this perspective: they should be the locus for the 
collective agency within a region for the renewal of its clusters and industries, its labour 
market and its built environment. 
 
With regard to policies to guide along and promote adaptation in the face of disruptive 
structural change, we can distinguish between immediate responses to manage the 
emerging crisis, and interventions aimed at the longer-term transformation of the 
economy (following Bristow and Healy, 2014b). With regard to the immediate responses, 
the most important measures will be:   
 Special support measures for affected industries: providing direct financial support to 
large industrial companies in the area to support their restructuring and 
modernisation. 
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 Active labour market policies for redundancies: proactive labour market interventions 
such as phasing of lay-offs, temporary labour subsidies, generous redundancy 
payments, intermediation and retraining, and make work schemes (also see Bristow 
and Healy, 2015). 
On the longer run, policies should support and facilitate the growth of a new economic 
base, and address the negative mechanisms of path dependency outlined above. We can 
distinguish the following major categories within such policies (based on types of policies 
listed in Hudson (1994), Trippl and Otto (2009) and Bailey et al. (2010)): 
 The attraction of inward investment and businesses: Attracting inward investment, 
specifically by multinational companies, and attracting businesses from outside to 
settle within the area. 
 Science, Technology, Innovation (STI) policies: Stimulate knowledge generation (at 
universities and public research organisations within the area), and facilitate 
knowledge transfer to and application within local and regional industries and 
clusters. 
 Enterprise and business support: Facilitating entrepreneurship by small and medium-
sized businesses (especially by improving their accessibility to finance) and supporting 
start-ups within the locality or region. 
 Training and skills policy: Assistance in the attainment and development of skills and 
the (re)training of workers and unemployed. 
 The upgrade of the built environment and urban regeneration: Investment in new 
infrastructure, and in urban development and regeneration, to remediate polluted 
sites, develop new commercial space, upgrade the existing housing stock, create new 
amenities, and improve overall attractiveness.  
 
Governance arrangements may serve two main functions in the process of adaptation 
(and in overall resilience): strategic functions and operational functions. Governance 
arrangements with strategic functions help generate policies, whereas arrangements with 
operational functions instead follow from policies. Thus strategic functions, are the 
functions governance arrangements fulfil in drafting and deciding about the type of 
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policies to pursue and the way to implement those. Such arrangements have also been 
called ‘meta-institutions’ through which deliberation, diagnosis, and design of new 
arrangements takes place (Hall and Soskice, 2001, pp. 11-12; Hall and Thelen, 2009; p. 
12). As we saw in the discussions of the role of agency in adaptation and resilience in 
section 2.2, and of the role of policy and governance in the Complexity Theory framework 
in section 2.3.2, one aspect that is important in this respect, is connectedness and 
collaboration: the inclusion of relevant actors within the public sector, the private sector 
and civil society in decision-making, coordination, conflict resolution, and the mobilisation 
of resources (Safford, 2009; Hill et al., 2012; Lang, 2012; Cowell, 2013, 2015; Wink, 2013; 
Bristow and Healy, 2014a, 2014b). A second aspect, through which governance 
arrangements may fulfil strategic functions (also identified in section 2.3.2) is by 
producing and disseminating strategic intelligence with regard to the local and regional 
economy: analyses, indicators, forecasts, scenarios, strategic options, etc. This 
intelligence will be crucial for the way actors – individually and collectively – can interpret 
potential disturbances, make sense of what is going on, and produce narratives and 
perspectives (Weick et al., 2005; Pike, 2010; Bristow and Healy, 2014a; Bristow and Healy, 
2014b). This may then allow actors to plan ahead, to develop alternative scenarios, and 
take anticipatory measures if needed. On the other hand, governance arrangements may 
fulfil important operational functions, as mandated entities or dedicated organisations, to 
deliver one (or sometimes several) of the policies listed above. For instance: agencies for 
the attraction of inward investment, offices for technology transfer, urban development 
corporations, etc.  
 
The discussion about the functions of various types of policies and governance 
arrangements in relation to adaptation and resilience in the face of disruptive structural 
change, is summarised in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6:  Functions of different types of policy initiatives and governance 
arrangements in adaptation and resilience 
 
 
 The evolution of policy and governance 3.4.
The evolution of policy and governance will be to some extent path dependent; i.e. 
subject to a process in which past legacies and inheritances condition future 
developments (see section 2.3.3). I will explicitly employ the dynamic process conception 
of path dependency, in which paths continue to evolve and hence do not reach a state of 
complete ‘stasis’ (following Martin (2010), and building on e.g. Crouch and Farrell (2004), 
Boas (2007), and Schneiberg (2007)). This conception also leaves more room to integrate 
forms of agency: future states are not wholly determined by past states, but actors can 
actively shape paths and productively employ and recombine elements inherited from 
the past to face new challenges (see Johnson, 2001; Garud and Karnøe, 2001b; Hudson, 
2005; Garud et al., 2010; Strambach, 2010; Strambach and Halkier, 2013; Bathelt and 
Glückler (2014)). In the next section, I will shift attention to the multi-scalar context in 
which regional policy and governance evolve: the fact that these trajectories also depend 
on a wider set of structures and relationships that impinge on and shape the processes by 
which paths evolve. In the following discussion of the evolution of policy and governance 
in regional economic development, I thus want to highlight several key dimensions of 
path dependency: the open-ended and dynamic nature of the process, the interaction 
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between agency and structures, and the impact of configurations at, and relations to, 
other spatial scales, for mechanisms of path dependence in a region. 
 
In this section then I will discuss the mechanisms and patterns of path dependence – in 
accordance to the dynamic process conception - of policy and governance in regional 
economic development. I will first examine how the evolution of policy can be path 
dependent, and subsequently I will do the same for governance. It should however be 
noted, that policy-making by its nature carries a greater element of agency, while the 
development of governance arrangements is much more conditioned by past legacies. 
Moreover, as also discussed earlier, policy initiatives and governance arrangements 
depend on each other: some governance arrangements (notably those that play a role in 
collaboration and in strategic intelligence and planning) structure policy-making, while 
some policies will cause changes in governance arrangements (especially in the 
arrangements to manage specific interventions). 
 
Although policy-making is in essence an expression of agency, it too may be subject to 
constraints and the influence of legacies from the past. On the one hand, the timing of 
policy initiatives will be crucial: options for intervention may only exist for a short time, 
after which the number of options may be considerably reduced. And on the other hand, 
certain cognitive and discursive factors may impact on policy-making, through which 
some options become more salient while others are not considered (also Schmidt, 2008, 
2010). With respect to the timing of policies, the concept of ‘critical juncture’ has been 
used to analyse patterns in which during a relatively short period agents face a broader 
range of options, and the choices during this period will have a long lasting effect in the 
subsequent period (as alternative options are then effectively foreclosed) (Collier and 
Collier, 1991; Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007). In the context of policies for regional 
economic development, such ‘critical junctures’ may be witnessed in particular in the 
immediate responses to moments of crises, e.g. whether or not to provide support for 
firms or industries that face financial difficulties, or to institute proactive labour market 
policies to prevent, or cope with, redundancies (also Bristow and Healy, 2014b). Such 
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measures can only be implemented for a limited period of time, after which firms may 
have gone bankrupt or have been broken up, and workers have been made redundant 
(and a substantial portion may now be unemployed). With regard to cognitive and 
discursive factors, it is important to consider that those involved in policy-making will 
have to make sense of what is happening, and that this is by nature subject to certain 
limitations. Such a process of ‘sensemaking’ builds on previously established identities, 
memories, experiences, habits, frames, labels, etc., and is a collective process (Weick et 
al., 2005; also Pierson, 2000; Schmidt, 2008, 2010). As a result, only certain pieces of 
information may be picked up and be given weight, while other information is ignored or 
rejected (perhaps also as a result of processes of cognitive dissonance). Furthermore, only 
certain options for policy will be considered and debated, as it may not be possible to 
imagine and oversee the full range of alternatives, and within certain dominant 
discourses some options are seen as legitimate while others are immediately dismissed. A 
degree of ‘myopia’ (based on past repertoires) is hence inevitable and may result in 
‘cognitive lock-ins’, especially when there is insufficient openness to outside influences 
(Maskell and Malmberg, 2007). Moreover, the tendency to uphold a measure of 
rationality and consistency, may lead to policies which exhibit ‘escalating commitment’: 
the tendency to commit more and more resources to a course of action, even though this 
has so far been to no avail or has only resulted in negative outcomes (Staw, 1976). 
‘Escalating commitments’ may be reinforced by a desire to ‘save face’ in the political 
arena, and to prove the ultimate rationality of decisions to critics (Staw, 1976; Tuchman, 
1984). Through the process of collective sensemaking, the mechanisms of ‘myopia’ and 
‘escalating commitment’ may thus condition policy-making, and tie policy options at any 
point in time to past legacies. 
 
The path dependence of the evolution of institutions – and governance arrangements – 
has been the subject of numerous reflections and studies in diverse fields within the 
social sciences (e.g. Mahoney, 2000; Pierson, 2000; Thelen, 2003; Thelen, 2004; Crouch 
and Farrell, 2004; Boas, 2007; Schneiberg, 2007). ‘Institutional rigidities’, ‘institutional 
ossification’ or ‘institutional sclerosis’ have been identified as a major factor in the lack of 
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renewal in certain economies, either because they caused excessive constraints, led to 
fragmentation or strong mutual dependencies between actors, or presented possibilities 
for vested interests to obstruct changes (e.g. Olson, 1982; Elbaum and Lazonick, 1986; 
Hodgson, 1989; Setterfield, 1993). To facilitate adaptation, more ‘adaptive’ and ‘flexible’ 
forms of governance seem more appropriate: forms of governance that promote the 
formation of new relationships and networks and that promote and leave space for 
bottom-up processes, self-organisation, and learning (Folke et al., 2005; Rijke et al., 2012; 
Bristow and Healy, 2014b). Institutional change can take place during a ‘critical juncture’ 
(such as a revolution or a regime change), in which many changes take place in a short 
period of time (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007), but institutional change can also be much 
more gradual and incremental (Streeck and Thelen, 2005; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). 
With respect to governance arrangements in regional economic development, such 
processes of more gradual institutional change seem much more relevant, as the 
sovereignty of subnational units will by definition be partial, and thus the scope for 
radical changes and revolutions will be limited.  
 
When conceptualising gradual and incremental institutional change, it is important to 
distinguish between mechanisms and patterns. Mechanisms refer to the processes 
through which actors drive institutional change; while patterns are the different 
configurations that institutional change may come to exhibit. With regard to mechanisms, 
it makes sense to distinguish between three broad types, especially in the context of a 
more multi-scalar approach to institutional change: institutional change through 
reinterpretation and subversion from below, institutional change by decree, and 
institutional change through mutual consent between actors. In the first type of 
mechanisms, actors induce or create institutional change in the governance 
arrangements that exist between them or to which they are subject, through so-called 
‘institutional entrepreneurship’. Arrangements may leave some space for change agents 
(alone, or as part of a coalition) to effectuate changes, because of some ambiguity in the 
arrangements or because other actors cannot block changes from happening (Crouch, 
2005; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). In institutional change by decree, change is ordained 
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or effectuated by actors with authority at the regional level or at higher spatial levels, in 
particular through changes in policy of subnational or central governments. This will 
usually take the form of restructuring, reform or re-organisation of governance 
arrangements (Boyer, 2006; Hall and Thelen, 2009; Pike et al., 2015). Lastly, in 
institutional change through mutual consent, new governance arrangements may be 
created by actors wishing to cooperate with each other, or arrangements are adapted to 
involve new actors that were not previously involved (Boyer, 2006). 
 
Such mechanisms may give rise to various patterns of gradual institutional change:25 
 ‘Layering’ or ‘Sedimentation’: Addition of new institutional arrangements to the 
existing institutional framework (based on Streeck and Thelen, 2005, pp. 22-24; Boyer, 
2006, p. 48; Wood and Lane, 2012, p. 18). 
 ‘Conversion’: Redeployment of existing arrangements for new purposes (based on 
Streeck and Thelen, 2005, pp. 26-28; Boyer, 2006, p. 48; Wood and Lane, 2012, p. 18). 
 ‘Drift’: Considerable loss of relevance of arrangements (but these will continue to 
exist). (based on Steeck and Thelen, 2005, pp. 24-26; Wood and Lone, 2012, p. 18). 
 ‘Displacement’: Gaining in relevance of arrangements, which may cause other 
arrangements to be supplanted (based on Streeck and Thelen, 2005, pp. 19-22; Wood 
and Lane, 2012, p. 18). 
                                                     
25
 The patterns of layering, conversion, drift, displacement and exhaustion, are based on a discussion of the 
‘modes of institutional change’ in Streeck and Thelen (2005), pp. 19-30 (also see Mahoney and Thelen, 
2010, pp. 15-18). My characterisation of these patterns is however considerably different. The modes as 
distinguished by Wolfgang Streeck, Kathleen Thelen and James Mahoney, are associated with only the 
mechanisms of institutional change, based on reinterpretation and subversion from below. However, I wish 
to keep mechanisms and patterns analytically separate. Moreover, Streeck, Thelen and Mahoney employ a 
rather narrow definition of institutions as ‘formalised rules’ (Streeck and Thelen, 2005, p. 10), which seems 
to highlight institutions as constraints on the actions of actors. My definition of institutions and governance 
arrangements is more encompassing: institutions also have an enabling quality, as they “provide the 
necessary conditions under which continuous interaction is made possible” (Bathelt and Glückler, 2014, p. 
351). By broadening the field with regard to the mechanisms of institutional change and with regard to the 
definition of institutions, we then create conceptual space for further patterns of institutional change, such 
as recombination and churning. 
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 ‘Exhaustion’ or ‘Dismantling’: Disappearance of arrangements from the landscape, 
because of a breakdown or because they are abolished (based on Streeck and Thelen, 
2005, pp. 29-30; Pike et al., 2015, p. 189) 
 ‘Recombination’: Redesign and reamalgamation of the links and arrangements 
between actors (based on Crouch, 2005, p. 22; Boyer, 2006, p. 18; Wood and Lane, p. 
18; Pike et al., 2015, pp. 188-189).  
 ‘Churning’: Repeated restructuring and refitting of institutional arrangements (mainly 
as a result of dictates from above) (based on Mulgan, 2010, p. 18; Pike et al., 2015, p. 
190). 
 
 
 The multi-scalar context: diverse institutional environments 3.5.
Policy-making and governance arrangements concerning a region’s economic 
development, will be embedded in a wider institutional environment, which will shape 
and condition policies and arrangements. In the discussion of dimensions within the 
wider institutional environment that follows I will focus especially on differences in the 
formal structures, and hence not on more informal aspects (such as culture, traditions, 
attitudes, religious outlook, etc.). There are two dimensions within these more formal 
structures that will be of particular relevance for policy and governance in regional 
economic development: government structure and economic organisation. 
 
Within government structure there are two main options: a unitary government 
structure, or a federal government structure. Within a unitary government structure, 
sovereignty only resides in the central government, and subnational units of 
administration (such as regional or local governments) derive their authorities and 
resources from the central government. In federal government structures, sovereignty 
resides in multiple tiers of government, both at the central level as well as at the level of 
the constituent units. Hence each level has substantial autonomy and independence in 
their respective spheres, and the powers of each tier of government and the 
interrelations between them are normally covered by a written constitution (Harman, 
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2004; Anderson, 2008). The type of government structure will thus strongly determine 
the division of powers and resources: whether these are decentralised and subject to 
local discretion (as will normally be the case in a federal system), or whether these are 
reserved and subject to central control (as will be the case in highly centralised unitary 
systems) (also Pike, 2011, p. 17). In other words, in unitary states there will normally be a 
greater degree of ‘power dependence’ and ‘resource dependence’ of local and regional 
governments on the central government; whereas such dependence will be more limited 
and more constitutionally regulated in federal systems (see Anderson, 1992). 
 
However, also in unitary government structures, some powers and resources may be 
decentralised, and devolved to subnational territorial units. Intergovernmental relations 
within a nation are hence certainly not static and fixed. In fact, the ‘new regionalism’ in 
Economic Geography (touched upon briefly in 3.2) coincided with a drive towards 
increased decentralisation, especially in economic development policies. Hence instead of 
universal and ‘spatially blind’ policies by central governments that do not take 
geographical factors into account, there has been a move since the early 1990s in many 
industrialised countries towards economic development policies that are more ‘place 
based’, and formulated and implemented by subnational governments (Amin, 1999). It 
has been postulated that a certain ‘economic dividend’ could be derived from such a 
transfer of powers and resources, as regional and local governments could formulate and 
enact policies that would better fit local circumstances and would capitalise in on the 
particular opportunities offered by a place. Moreover, regional and local actors should 
have a better knowledge of what is required for their economic development. Evidence 
that such an ‘economic dividend’ has indeed materialised, has remained elusive however 
(Pike et al., 2012; Ezcurra and Rodríquez-Pose, 2013). 
 
This dynamism in the relations between governments at various spatial scales within 
nations, is part of a larger movement towards more ‘multi-level governance’ (e.g. Bache 
and Flinders, 2004; Sørenson, 2006; Piattoni, 2009). ‘Multi-level governance’ indicates the 
increased interdependence of governments operating at different territorial levels, not 
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just with regard to national and subnational levels, but also with regard to the 
supranational level (in particular the European Union for European countries). The 
concept arose in the context of European cohesion policy, to stress the direct 
involvement of subnational governments in policy-making, ‘bypassing’ the central 
government (Piattoni, 2009). However, over time the meaning of the concept has 
expanded somewhat, as it has been applied to policy-making in other fields. The concept 
now not only encompasses vertical dimensions (the development of a complex set of 
relations between supranational, national and subnational governments), but also 
horizontal dimensions: the increased involvement of non-governmental actors 
(representatives from businesses, civil society organisations, labour unions, etc.) at 
various territorial levels (Bache and Flinders, 2004). So the concept underlines the 
blurring of the traditional distinctions of central and subnational, of domestic and 
international, and of state and society (Piattoni, 2009). Nevertheless, this is still consistent 
with a Geographical Political Economy approach that presumes that governments 
(especially the central state) are particularly influential actors (more so than any other 
single actors involved), by virtue of their powers, resources, and the role they play in 
shaping the framework of governance arrangements.  
 
With regard to economic organisation, a basic typology is offered by the Varieties of 
Capitalism model. Within Varieties of Capitalism the firm takes centre stage, as its 
competitiveness is analysed with reference to the relations it maintains with the 
institutional frameworks within it operates. The approach then postulates that within this 
context, the institutional frameworks in various domains will be mutually attuned in 
systemic ways, producing so-called ‘institutional complementarities’ (Hall and Soskice, 
2001; Hancké, 2009). In particular, such complementarities will exist between the 
frameworks offered with respect to the capital market, industrial relations, education and 
training systems, the internal structure of a firm, and inter-firm relations (with 
competitors and in the supply chain). Next, the model assumes that the relationship 
between firms and these frameworks can be based on two principal types of 
coordination: coordination through market transactions and contracts, or coordination 
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through collaboration and active management (so-called ‘strategic coordination’). The 
first type is of coordination is associated with Liberal Market Economies (LME), while the 
second type of coordination is the primary mode in Coordinated Market Economies 
(CME). In Table 4 the characteristics are listed for both these ‘ideal types’. The USA, the 
UK, and other Anglo-Saxon economies are normally categorised as LMEs, while Germany, 
the Scandinavian countries and other Continental European economies are classified as 
CMEs. 
 
 Liberal Market Economies Coordinated Market Economies 
Capital markets Relatively large role for equity 
markets, which constitute the 
primary source for capital. 
Banks play a key role, hence long-
term relations develop between 
firms and banks. 
Industrial relations Flexible labour markets based on 
decentralised wage bargaining, with 
a small role for labour unions and 
worker representation. 
Regulated labour markets based on 
more centralised wage bargaining, 
with comparatively powerful labour 
unions and various arrangements for 
worker representation. 
Education and training An emphasis on transferable skills 
rather than firm- and industry 
specific skills. 
More investment in firm- and 
industry-specific skills, e.g. through 
dual provision of vocational training 
by both schools and firms. 
Internal structure of a firm Strong top management, and 
relatively hierarchical organisations. 
Top management more geared 
towards creating consensus among 
stakeholders, and hence forms of 
organisation that leave more 
responsibility at lower levels. 
Inter-firm relations Highly competitive relations with 
competitors, and more arm’s length 
and formal contractual relations with 
firms down the supply chain, which 
will thus invest more in switchable 
assets. 
More collaborative relations also 
with competitors, especially through 
business associations; and long-term 
relations with suppliers, based on 
mutual trust and asset specific 
investments. 
Based on Hall and Soskice (2001), pp. 21-33; Peck and Theodore (2007), p. 746. 
Table 4: Characteristics of Liberal Market Economies and Coordinated Market 
Economies 
 
An important implication of the complementarities that arise between the various 
frameworks in the different domains, is that LMEs and CMEs will develop different types 
of ‘comparative institutional advantage’. The competitive strength of firms in LMEs will be 
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in sectors that rely on the flexibility, decentralised decision-making, and/or the strong 
tendencies for price competition allowed in this system, such as high-end business 
services, software development, biotechnology, and standardised manufacturing. While 
the competitive advantage of CMEs will lie in sectors that would benefit from more 
explicit coordination between stakeholders, and the more long-term and high-quality 
orientation that goes with it, such as machinery, car manufacturing, and the 
manufacturing of other capital goods. Crucially, LMEs facilitate more radical innovation, 
based on the development of entirely new products or major changes in the production 
process. CMEs on the other hand, stimulate more incremental innovation, based on more 
continuous and small-scale improvements to existing product lines and processes (Hall 
and Soskice, 2001; Hancké, 2009). 
 
The Varieties of Capitalism model has been critiqued extensively (see Crouch, 2005; 
Hancké et al., 2007; Peck and Theodore, 2007; Wood and Lane, 2012). Three points of 
critique are particularly relevant in the context of this research, as they prompt further 
refinements of the basic model. First the presumption of an equilibrium in the model as a 
result of institutional complementarities, which would not allow for a dynamic analysis 
based on ongoing changes in institutions. Second, the neglect of the role of the state in 
economic coordination, as a consequence of the firm-centeredness of the approach. 
Third, the ‘methodological nationalism’ in the model, which stresses coherence between 
institutions at the national scale, but ignores the variegation of institutional frameworks 
at regional and local scales. I will discuss these points of critique in turn, and as a result I 
will qualify the Varieties of Capitalism model on these aspects. It is this qualified version 
of the model that will feed into the analytical framework I am developing.26 
 
First, the Varieties of Capitalism model can accommodate institutional change when it is 
presumed that institutional complementarity does not entail a strict form of coherence, 
with tight couplings, between institutional frameworks. If instead a notion of 
                                                     
26
 This qualified version of Varieties of Capitalism comes closer to the approach of ‘variegated capitalism’ 
outlined by Peck and Theodore (2007). 
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complementarity is assumed which allows for more loose forms of coupling and a 
constant process of reconfiguration between actors, then institutional change can be 
incorporated (Hancké et al., 2007; Hall and Thelen, 2009; Wood and Lane, 2012). 
Incremental change can in that case occur in a given institutional architecture without 
changing the nature of core complementarities, or alternatively changes could take place 
in one segment of the economy without spilling over or snowballing into other 
segments27 (Hancké et al., 2007, p. 11-12). 
 
Second, the presumption that governments have an important role, is somewhat implicit 
in the Varieties of Capitalism model. They normally play a significant part in the operation 
of ‘meta-institutions’ through which overall coordination across the various domains 
takes place (through deliberation, conflict resolution, rule-making, generation of 
intelligence, etc.) (Hall and Soskice, 2001, pp. 11-12; Hall and Thelen, 2009; p. 12). 
Moreover, governments provide important framework legislation that underpins the 
institutional infrastructures in either LMEs or CMEs, and enact policies that support the 
right incentives for their functioning (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Wood, 2001). However, 
governments may also take on a direct and coordinating role in the economy, by direct 
ownership of firms in strategic sectors, steering investments and innovation, regulation of 
economic activities, and other forms of industrial policy. To incorporate such an active 
role for the state within the model, the typology of LME and CME can be expanded to also 
include e.g. ‘dirigiste’ economies (such as France before the 1990s) or ‘compensating’ 
economies (such as Italy and Spain) (Hacké et al., 2007, pp. 24-28). However, it is 
important to note that also in the basic ideal type of the CME the role of the state is quite 
constrained, and governments do not have a central role in the ‘strategic coordination’ 
process (see Wood, 2001).  
 
Third, the model may also be stretched to accommodate regional and sectoral variations. 
In the context of this project – and for Economic Geography and regional studies more 
                                                     
27
 Alternatively, more systemic change could take place when changes in one segment spread out into other 
segments and undermine core complementarities. 
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broadly – this is a significant refinement, as it allows for a better examination of the many 
variegations of capitalism, not only between nations but also between regions (Peck and 
Theodore, 2007). Recently, a strand of literature has appeared which highlights the 
Regional and Sectoral Varieties of Capitalism (Crouch et al., 2009; Wood and Lane, 2012; 
Schröder and Voelzkow, 2014; Ebner, 2015). This strand suggests that economic 
organisation in local and regional economies will normally mirror national economic 
organisation. However, for some sectors following the national model will adversely 
affect their competitive position (e.g. software development or creative industries in 
Germany, or high value manufacturing in the UK), and at the regional level an alternative 
institutional infrastructure may develop to provide for the needs of these sectors. Hence 
at the regional level, divergences from the national Variety of Capitalism model may 
emerge (so-called ‘productive incoherences’), based on the needs of particular sectors 
which are strongly represented in that region. However it is likely that such regional 
divergences will more easily develop and persist in federal states rather than centralised 
states, as federal scales offer more opportunities for very different focal points in the 
policies of regional governments and other regional actors (Sternberg et al., 2010). Hence, 
this expansion of the Varieties of Capitalism model to Regional and Sectoral Varieties, 
allows for a more multi-scalar perspective in which the institutional arrangements at the 
regional level are ‘nested’ in the institutional infrastructure for economic organisation on 
the national level (and the supranational level). Moreover, the relations between the 
regional level and higher levels of scale can be quite dynamic, as arrangements maybe 
reconfigured and recombined to cope with changes in the economy (following e.g. 
Strambach, 2010). 
 
 
 Analytical framework and conclusions 3.6.
This Chapter set out to develop an analytical framework to better conceptualise the 
dynamic and multi-scalar aspects of policy and governance with regard to adaptation and 
resilience, as part of an approach that combines Evolutionary Perspectives and Political 
Economy concerns (mostly building on Path Dependency Theory). Figure 7 shows the 
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main elements of this analytical framework. It should again be noted that the links 
between these elements are not as clear-cut as they appear in the figure. The responses 
in policies and governance to a disruptive shock as a result of structural change, will be 
mediated by firstly a process of interpretation and sense-making, and secondly a process 
of political decision-making. The wider institutional environment will condition these two 
processes, and will also condition the feasibility and attractiveness of different options to 
respond, but will certainly not completely determine the responses (i.e. it will leave room 
for the agency of various actors). And the role of the responses in policies and governance 
in the adaptation and resilience of a regional economy, will also depend on many other 
factors. 
 
 
Figure 7:  Analytical framework: the evolution and role of policy and governance in 
adaptation and resilience, conditioned by the wider institutional 
environment 
 
The framework distinguishes between different types of policies and different types of 
governance arrangements. With regard to policies, the framework makes a distinction 
between immediate responses to disruptive structural change (support for firms, or 
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policies to cope with redundancies), and longer-term policies in various areas to develop 
new economic drivers. Also with regard to analysing governance arrangements, we 
should be precise about the type of arrangements concerned. On the one hand, there are 
arrangements at the strategic level, to facilitate connectedness and collaboration 
between different actors, and to generate strategic intelligence and undertake strategic 
planning. And on the other hand, there are arrangements at the operational level, to 
deliver and manage specific interventions and policies. These policies and governance 
arrangements can play a role in adaptation and resilience by breaking through 
interdependent mechanisms of lock-in, and trying to install mechanisms of positive path 
dependence instead. The will require a comprehensive, coordinated, and long-term effort 
however, as a transformation is required which addresses several fields: clusters and 
industries, skills and the regional labour market, and the built environment. Success in 
adaptation will subsequently be visible in the development of key indicators and in the 
new challenges and opportunities a region will face when developing a sustainable 
economic base is no longer the primary concern. 
 
The evolution of policies and governance arrangements will follow a particular logic, 
which we need to analyse as well. The evolution of policies will depend on their timing: 
certain options for intervention may only exist during ‘critical junctures’, while at other 
points such options are not really open. The evolution of policies will also be subject to 
certain cognitive and discursive factors, as a result of the process of collective sense-
making and the framing of issues in certain discourses, which are part and parcel of 
policy-making. Hence, policies may reflect ‘myopias’ or ‘escalating commitments’. The 
evolution of governance arrangements in a region on the other hand, can be driven by 
three different mechanisms: reinterpretation and subversion from below, by decree of 
governments at the regional or central levels, or by mutual consent between actors. The 
evolution of such arrangements may then show a variety of patterns: ‘layering’ or 
‘sedimentation’, ‘conversion’, ‘displacement’, ‘drift’, ‘exhaustion’ or ‘dismantling’, 
‘recombination’, and ‘churning’. 
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To analyse the conditioning of policies and governance in a region by the wider 
institutional environment, we focussed on two important dimensions in the formal 
structures in which a region is embedded: the government structure and economic 
organisation. Concerning the government structure, we can make a basic distinction 
between a federal structure and a unitary structure. However, also in a unitary 
government structure, there may be a substantial amount of decentralisation, and thus 
devolution of powers and resources to governments at the subnational level. Over the 
last 25 years or so, such decentralisation has been a trend in economic development 
policy (though by no means uniform), as it would allow for more sensitivity to local 
particularities and circumstances (instead of more generic, spatially blind policies) (Amin, 
1999; Martin, 2000). Hence, it has been postulated that an ‘economic dividend’ can be 
derived from devolution of powers and resources in economic development to the 
subnational level. Such processes of shifting responsibilities between governments at 
different territorial levels, can be seen as part of a larger process in which relationships 
between governments across spatial scales, and between governments and non-
government actors, have become more blurred. This is what is indicated by ‘multi-level 
governance’. In relation to economic organisation, we can at a basic level distinguish 
between Liberal Market Economies (like the USA, UK, and other Anglo-Saxon economies) 
and Coordinated Market Economies (such as Germany and other Continental European 
Economies). Also this Varieties of Capitalism model should be qualified and refined, to 
incorporate processes of institutional change, an explicit role for governments, and 
variegations and relations across spatial scales. Especially with regard to this last aspect, 
the notions of Regional (and Sectoral) Varieties of Capitalism (and the hypothesised 
relations to the national variety) may prove to be useful. 
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Chapter 4. METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 Introduction 4.1.
I have applied the analytical framework discussed in the previous Chapter, to examine 
empirically the aspects of policy and governance in the adaptation and resilience of 
regions to disruptive economic changes, in diverse institutional contexts. The analytical 
framework served as a guide to analyse the evolution of policies and governance 
arrangements in two regions located in different contexts (South Saarland and Teesside), 
and the mechanisms through which policy and governance played a facilitating (or 
inhibiting) role in their adaptation and resilience. Through this guided examination, the 
empirical part of this study can then also serve to further test, refine, and qualify several 
important building blocks of an Evolutionary Geographical Political Economy approach. 
This Chapter details the methodology I have followed. 
 
I will first consider how this project is grounded in a critical realist ontology and 
epistemology. Next sections 4.3 through 4.6 outline the research design of the 
comparative case study between South Saarland and Teesside, including a discussion of 
the selection of the two cases, representativeness, the framework for cross-case 
comparison, and the use of research techniques.  
 
 
 Critical realist ontology and epistemology  4.2.
As stated in the Introduction, this project explicitly aims to contribute to Evolutionary 
Perspectives in Economic Geography, and in particular by further developing a 
Geographical Political Economy approach with its emphasis on the relationships between 
the state, capital and labour, and the tendencies of capitalism for instability and uneven 
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development28 (see Martin and Sunley, 2015b; Pike et al., 2015). Such a project presumes 
particular ontological and epistemological commitments, which are most compatible with 
Critical Realist philosophy (also Bathelt and Glückler, 2003; Hassink et al., 2014). In the 
most general terms, Critical Realism postulates that there exists a reality independent of 
our knowledge of that reality, and that our knowledge of this reality will indeed be 
anchored within the material world, but in an imperfect and dynamic way (e.g. Pratt, 
1995; Sayer, 2010; O’Mahoney and Vincent, 2014). There is much to say about Critical 
Realism, but I want to highlight four elements of its ontological and epistemological 
presuppositions that make it especially suitable as a basis for this project:  
 Critical Realism presumes a stratified reality, consisting of various levels (Sayer, 1982; 
O’Mahoney and Vincent, 2014). Higher aggregation levels are made up of lower-level 
parts, but nevertheless have causal properties of their own. Hence critical realism 
reserves an important role for ‘emergence’. Such an ontology is an alternative for the 
methodological individualism within the Generalised Darwinism framework, and fits 
well with the more holistic and multi-scalar approach adopted in this project. Such a 
stratified ontology also fits well with the emphasis on interactions between different 
geographical scales in this project. Policies and governance arrangements at the 
regional level (i.e. meso-level) are central, but these are placed in a wider context of 
macro-level structures and processes (at the national and European levels) (also 
Mouleart and Mehmood, 2010). 
 The depth ontology of Critical Realism also presumes that behind events that we 
perceive there is a reality of causal powers, structures and especially mechanisms 
(O’Mahoney and Vincent, 2014; Næss, 2015). Social mechanisms become a central 
object of interest: “the recurrent processes linking specified initial conditions and a 
specific outcome” (Mayntz, 2004). The main objective of social scientific research is 
thus to explain particular outcomes by reference of the underlying causal mechanism 
and factors (Næss, 2015; also see Hedström and Swedberg, 1998; Elster, 2007). In the 
context of this study, the challenge is to explain particular patterns in the economic 
                                                     
28
 In Chapter Chapter 3 this has meant that we have engaged with various branches of institutionalism in 
especially Political Science (Historical Institutionalism, State Theory, and Varieties of Capitalism). 
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development (outcome) of regions confronted by a disruptive structural change, from 
the evolution of policies and governance arrangements (within a particular 
institutional context) through a series of mechanisms (see the Analytical Framework 
outlined in the previous Chapter). The adaptation process thus encompasses the 
evolution of policies and governance arrangements, and the series of mechanisms; 
while resilience can be seen as the underlying power (possessed by the constellation 
of actors and structures with regard to a region as a whole) to develop policies and 
arrangements and then effectuate such mechanisms. 
 Relatedly, the emphasis on mechanisms, also directs attention away from the attempt 
to discover ‘universal laws’ (which are valid under all circumstances and should yield 
accurate predictions), but instead leads to a careful consideration of the contextual 
conditions in which such mechanisms may operate (Sayer, 1982; Sayer, 2010; 
O’Mahoney and Vincent, 2014). The specific powers and structures that may exist 
with regard to a region in one institutional environment, may not exist in a different 
environment, and this may then mean that certain mechanisms cannot occur. 
Moreover, even if similar mechanisms exist in different regions, other mechanisms or 
events may inhibit or alter the operation of such mechanisms. In this way, Critical 
Realism fits well with the approach of ‘deep contextualisation’ employed in this 
research (on which I will elaborate later). 
 Critical Realism also postulates a dynamic relationship between structure and agency 
(Sayer, 1982; Næss, 2015). Agents possess basic powers which create, reproduce and 
transform social structures. But at the same time social structures have particular 
irreducible properties and capacities, which constrain, condition, and enable agency. 
In an evolutionary setting, such an ontology will entail a middle ground between too 
much determinism and too much voluntarism (as a result of an overemphasis on 
structure and agency respectively). Moreover, Critical Realism has an emancipatory 
aspect: through better knowledge of the social world, people will be better able to 
change it for the better (O’Mahoney and Vincent, 2014; Næss, 2015). Hence in Critical 
Realism, representations of and discourses about the social world are on the one 
hand seen as a possible part of the causal explanation of certain outcomes in society 
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(because also ideas can have real powers, and should as such be an object of study). 
On the other hand, this also means that researchers should continually reflect on the 
ideas and representations they are propagating, in the first instance in terms of their 
truth (how well do they reflect reality?), but also in terms of the beneficial or harmful 
effects these ideas and representations may have in society (also Sayer, 2007).  
 
 
 Comparative case study and case selection 4.3.
As suggested in section 2.2 the underlying capacity for resilience can only be inferred 
from actual processes of adaptation. By studying the mechanisms of adaptation and the 
conditions under which they operate over a relatively long period of time, and by 
comparing different adaptation processes in different regions to the same type of change, 
we can identify factors that are important for the underlying capacity to cope with 
economic change. The basic method to be used is the comparative case study.  
 
The set-up of the comparative case study is one of ‘most-similar cases’ (e.g. George and 
Bennett, 2005; Gerring, 2007): cases that are in all important aspects quite similar, but 
one. The impact of this one difference can then be examined. In this study the 
repercussions of differences in the wider institutional environment are central, and I shall 
examine how this shapes the evolution of policies and governance, and mechanisms of 
adaptation, in regions confronted by the disrupting effects of structural change. Cases 
should thus be dissimilar in terms of relevant characteristics within the institutional 
environment. However, on other potentially relevant elements, the cases should be as 
similar as possible. Thus cases should be similar in terms of important functional 
characteristics at the outset of the adaptation process they went through. Concretely, this 
means a similar economic structure at the starting point of the period of development 
under investigation, with the same dominant industry (e.g. steel, coalmining, 
shipbuilding, car manufacturing, etc.) with a similar configuration in terms of size, 
product, output, linkages, etc. Cases should also be similar with regard to the type of 
structural change and concomitant shock – i.e. collapse of the dominant industry – in 
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both timing and severity. Cases should furthermore be similar with regard to background 
variables on e.g. population size, proximity to main urban centres and physical geography. 
In these respects, the regions should be delimited by their functional economic areas (as 
a clear concentration of economic activities with a shared labour market), rather than 
their administrative borders. 
 
Other considerations for the selection of cases are more practical in nature. Regions 
within the cases should maximally be restricted to metropolitan areas which are not too 
big, as larger urban regions may show very divergent developments, and hence not 
experience a uniform shock and ensuing responses. Adaptation processes can likely be 
traced more clearly in medium-sized regions (as also discussed below). Furthermore, the 
development path since then should be at least several decades, in order for the most 
important continuities and changes to be identified. As observed in section 2.2, structural 
change will often be a protracted process that may become manifest through an intense 
shock (often related to more cyclical patterns), but of which the first signs already 
become visible earlier, and of which the full extent will take some time to become clear. 
Furthermore, the responses and their effects will also take time to materialise. The period 
of investigation should also not be too long ago in time. Many sources of information on 
the developments within the regions will then be available and more easily accessible; in 
particular people to interview who have actually lived through the changes. 
 
On the basis of the above considerations, it was decided to compare regions in which the 
steel industry was particularly dominant in the early 1970s. These regions experienced a 
similar shock, as there was a steel crisis at that point in time that was global in scope, 
starting in 1974 and lasting until about 1987. Moreover, due to certain characteristics of 
the steel industry (especially its capital intensity, and limited possibilities for product 
differentiation), this crisis was particularly pronounced as an episode within the wider 
process of deindustrialisation. Also government interference has historically been large 
within the steel industry (compared to e.g. car manufacturing or shipbuilding), and hence 
policy responses to the steel crisis more saliently reflect broader patterns in the state-
78 
 
industry nexus in diverse institutional environments. It would furthermore mean that the 
period to be examined would be from the early 1970s until present, which would meet 
the concerns noted above with regard to the length and timing of the period of 
investigation. 
 
As noted, the key difference between the cases should be the wider institutional 
environment in which the regions are located. As discussed in section 3.5 two dimensions 
will be particularly relevant: the type of government structure and the type of economic 
organisation. With regard to the government structure we have distinguished between 
unitary and federal governments. I have also argued that even though such a distinction is 
still valid, it also needs to be qualified somewhat, as unitary states may devolve powers 
and resources to subnational units, and more multi-level types of governance (involving 
actors at various territorial levels) is increasingly common. Also with regard to economic 
organisation, we can – following the Varieties of Capitalism literature - distinguish 
between two broad ideal types: Cooperative Market Economies (CMEs) and Liberal 
Market Economies (LMEs). Again this distinction should be qualified: the role of the 
government may vary within these two types (from more hands-off to more dirigiste, 
especially in CMEs), and on the regional level substantial variegations may exist (captured 
by the notions of Regional Varieties of Capitalism and Variegated Capitalism). While 
taking these qualifications into account, the cases should cover the spectrum defined by 
these dimensions. The domain of institutional environments in which suitable cases may 
be found, is further limited by the fact that not all industrialised countries with an 
advanced capitalist system, have mid-sized old industrial regions in which the steel 
industry was particularly prominent, and not all countries have an institutional 
environment which has been stable from 1970 until now. See also the table below. 
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 Variety of capitalism 
‘Liberal Market Economy’ ‘Coordinated Market Economy’ 
G
o
ve
rn
m
e
n
t 
st
ru
ct
u
re
 
Unitary United Kingdom  
(in particular England) 
France 
(Japan) 
(Con)Federal United States 
Canada 
Germany 
Belgium 
Table 5:  Countries placed along the two dimensions with regard to institutional 
environments 
 
Practical considerations of time and budget available restricted me to two cases. 
Furthermore, also language and available material should be taken into account, which 
made France, Belgium, and Japan less practicable. The United States (because of the 
availability of many mid-sized old industrial regions) and to a lesser extent Canada, would 
be good options, but in combination with either the United Kingdom or Germany the full 
spectrum of institutional environments would not be covered (either government 
structure or economic organisation would then be somewhat similar).29 Hence the United 
Kingdom (especially England) and Germany were chosen as the most suitable countries to 
look for cases of old industrial regions. Because the focus is on mid-sized old industrial 
regions in which steel was a dominant component, only a few regions in these two 
countries would meet the requirements: Teesside and South Wales (Swansea, Port Talbot 
and Llanelli) in the United Kingdom, and South Saarland (Saarbrücken metropolitan area) 
and Oberhausen and surrounding area in Germany. The institutional context for South 
Wales has changed substantially however since the early 1970s, not only because of a 
shift towards a clear LME-type of economic organisation which occurred in the United 
Kingdom more generally from the late 1970s onwards, but also because from 1998 more 
powers and resources were devolved towards Wales, whereas Teesside (and North East 
England) remained more firmly in the centralised government structure. Furthermore, 
Teesside also had some considerable practical advantages in terms of available material, 
                                                     
29
 Although it should be noted that the federal system in the United States and the confederal system in 
Canada, is very different from the federal system in Germany, if only because of the size of the states. 
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and budget and time to be spent (given that I was located in Newcastle). Oberhausen may 
be said to be part of a larger functional economic area including Duisburg and perhaps 
the whole of the Ruhr Area, and thus is not a separate functional economic area in its 
own right. Hence it was decided that Teesside in the United Kingdom, and South Saarland 
(Saarbrücken metropolitan area) in Germany would be the best options for in-depth 
analysis. Some key characteristics of these two city-regions are listed in Table 6 below. 
 
 South Saarland (Germany) 
(Saarbrücken metropolitan area) 
Teesside (UK) 
(former Cleveland County) 
Population size (1970) 0.926 million 0.569 million  
Total area 1,538 km2 583 km2 
Total employment (1970) 0.320 million 0.222 million 
Percentage employment in 
steel industry around 1970 
14% (47,000 workers); 45% 
manufacturing 
14% (32,000 workers); 47% 
manufacturing 
Total crude steel 
production around 1970 
5.4 million tonnes 4 million tonnes 
Other significant industries 
around 1970s 
Coal mining, especially before 1970 
(8-15%) 
Chemicals (13%); Heavy engineering 
(12%) 
Geographical relation to 
other economic centres 
Peripheral, border region. Other 
major economic centres at 70 / 120 
km. 
Peripheral. Other major economic 
centres at 60 / 90 km. 
Physical geography Inland, along river, hilly Coastal, at mouth of river, flat but 
surrounding area moderately hilly 
Stable institutional context Consistently federal and CME Shift from CME to LME in late 1970s 
and early 80s; but as part of being a 
unitary state 
Socio-economic 
performance since 1970s 
0/+ - 
Practicality (travel; 
available materials, 
existing contacts, etc.) 
+ ++ 
Sources: Statistisches Landesamt Saarland (Statistisches Handbuch für das Saarland); Institut für 
Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung Rheinland-Pfalz-Saarland; Office of National Statistics (Census data; 
Annual Abstract of Statistics). 
Table 6:  Relevant statistics and facts for case studies 
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 Representativeness 4.4.
As an intensive research design, a case study approach is well-suited to investigate and 
explain processes of change (like adaptation) and the mechanisms within such processes 
(Sayer, 2010). Extensive research designs, relying on more quantitative cross-case analysis 
of a large-N sample based on available statistics or survey-data, are more suitable to 
investigate regularities and tendencies that are representative for a certain population 
(George and Bennet, 2005; Gerring, 2007; Sayer, 2010). Such extensive research designs, 
will however not allow the ‘explanatory penetration’ and the sensitivity to context which 
are central in this research. Nevertheless, representativeness is a major concern within 
this project, and a comparative case study, when done in the right way, offers 
opportunities to attain a relatively high degree of external validity (George and Bennett, 
2005; Flyvbjerg, 2006; Gerring, 2007). Hence the ambition is to draw inferences about 
adaptation to cope with economic change at a regional level, which have validity for a 
much larger set of cases than the ones investigated. 
 
There are a number of ways in which I have tried to ensure a broader representativeness, 
both across diverse contexts (regarding economic adaptation and resilience in general) as 
well as within the specific contexts of the cases (i.e. what the cases say about economic 
adaptation and resilience in West-Germany and the United Kingdom). The principal way 
of ensuring a broader representativeness across diverse contexts, is through the selection 
of cases. Two considerations are worth elaborating upon. First, I have attempted to 
choose two cases which cover two extremes of a broad spectrum (in terms of different 
types of institutional environments; see next section), and thus the findings from a study 
of these cases will have some bearing on other cases within this spectrum. Second, I have 
selected two medium-sized and peripheral city-regions to compare. The two cases of 
South Saarland and Teesside are in some ways atypical (deindustrialisation was 
particularly disruptive, and – compared to other regions - many policy initiatives have 
been enacted over time to cope with this shock), but in other ways more ordinary (they 
do not represent central economic nodes (such as Global Cities), and do not have a 
particular ‘symbolic’ importance (such as e.g. the Third Italy or Baden-Württemberg) (see 
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Robinson, 2002). But because of these reasons, the evolution of policies and governance 
arrangements, and the mechanisms of adaptation, will be particularly salient. In larger 
and more central city-regions by contrast, there will always be many processes going on 
at the same time, which makes it much more difficult to isolate particular processes and 
the mechanism therein. 
 
Within the specific contexts, the cases of South Saarland and Teesside need - as much as 
possible – to be illustrative of broader patterns for Germany and the United Kingdom. 
Though of course the case studies of South Saarland and Teesside capture the unique 
events, processes and structures with regard to these two areas, I have explicitly 
contextualised these through a form of ‘extended case study’: “to extract the general 
from the unique, to move from the ‘micro’ to the ‘macro’, and the connect the present to 
the past.” (Burawoy, 1998, p. 5; also Barnes et al., 2007; Burawoy, 2009). In particular, I 
have paid close attention to how events, processes and structures within South Saarland 
and Teesside, are conditioned and affected by policies at the national and European 
levels, and by broader structures with regard to especially government structure and 
economic organisation. Ron Martin and Peter Sunley (2015b) have recently called such a 
holistic and systemic approach based on a multi-scalar ontology, ‘deep contextualisation’: 
“to consider the full set of entities, factors and influences, including internal 
(endogenous) and external (exogenous), local and non-local, and structural and 
contingent, that have conditioned and shaped the evolutionary dynamics and trajectory 
of the spatial economic developmental system under study” (p. 721; also Pike et al., 
2015). For the analysis of disruptive structural change and the process of adaptation in 
the two cases, this has meant, a systematic comparison (through a framework of 
comparison), which entails tracing events, processes and structures (through multiple, 
overlapping research techniques) at and between three levels of analysis:  
 The wider institutional environment and any relevant changes in this environment. 
 The evolution of policies and governance arrangements with regard to the case study 
areas. 
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 How these polices and arrangements then work on mechanisms of adaptation in the 
regional economy, and what this entails for the factors relevant for regional resilience. 
 
 
 Framework for cross-case comparison 4.5.
The framework for comparison between the two cases is a further specification of the 
analytical framework developed in the previous Chapter. This means that within this 
framework, the disruptive shock is specified as the deindustrialisation process in the 
1970s and 1980 in general and specifically the steel crisis. Moreover, as part of the cross-
case comparison I will provide contextual information about the historic development of 
both regions until the 1970s. As stated earlier, the framework entails an analysis of 
processes at and between three distinct but interrelated levels: structures and processes 
in the wider institutional environment, the evolution of policies and governance 
arrangements, and the role of these policies and arrangements in adaptation and 
resilience. The framework for cross-case comparison is shown in Figure 8. 
 
 
Figure 8:  Framework for cross-case comparison 
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This framework is rooted in a thorough and extensive review of the literature (Chapter 2 
and Chapter 3). However, common problems with comparative case studies, especially 
between cases in different countries, include differences in definitions, meanings, 
connotations, etc., and the possibility that some concepts of analysis are biased to fit a 
certain context better than another (Kantor and Savitch, 2005; Ward, 2009). Moreover, 
despite taking the availability of information and data into account in the selection of the 
cases, this may still vary and may not match for the two cases. Hence the analytical 
framework and framework for cross-case comparison has been fine-tuned on the basis of 
some of the first findings of the field work in Teesside and South Saarland. Availability 
was a particular issue with regard to quantitative data on indicators that show the 
aggregate development and outcomes of the adaptation process in both regions. 
Comparable data for both regions over a longer time period was available on population, 
employment, structural change in the regional economies, production of steel, 
unemployment, and GVA per head relative to national GDP per head. But reliable figures 
for the overall development of regional GVA (in Purchasing Power Parity) could not be 
obtained, and also comparable data on other more general indicators with regard to 
wellbeing and quality of life in both regions are lacking. Furthermore, most statistical data 
was not available for South Saarland, but only for Saarland as a whole (however because 
South Saarland makes up by far the largest part of Saarland, this is not a large issue). 
Further fine-tuning has also been applied to the categories used for analysing different 
types of policy responses and different types of governance arrangements. Although 
these categories have a basis in the literature, their exact scope and their relevance was 
determined after a first analysis of the empirical results of the case studies.30 
 
Moreover, some ways of analysing the findings of the case studies were more grounded 
in the particularities of each of the two cases, rather than imposed through the 
framework. This is true in particular for the periodisation of the evolution of policies into 
different episodes (as also applied in e.g. Dawley, 2014). These periodisations follow shifts 
                                                     
30
 Which meant that some possible categories (e.g. place marketing or branding as a longer term policy 
response), were dropped, as this response played only a very minor role in both cases. 
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with regard to the main focal points in the policies enacted by the principal actors in the 
two areas (the government of the state of Saarland, and the government of the United 
Kingdom respectively). However, in each of the two areas there were first attempts at 
modernisation and upgrading prior to and partly during the onset of structural change, 
subsequently there was an episode in which new initiatives were being developed to deal 
with the disruptive and large-scale effects of structural change, and in a third episode the 
emphasis was on coping with either enduring or new challenges and concerns. Through 
the comparison between the cases, the specific focal points for policy in each of these 
episodes come out even more clearly. It then also becomes clear what have been the 
‘paths not taken’ in each of the two regions; in other words the two regions in some ways 
constitute each other’s ‘counterfactual development paths’ (see George and Benett, 
2005, pp. 167-170; Capoccia and Keleman, 2006), which also sheds more light on what is 
common between the two cases. This is part of the analysis in Chapter 8. Relatedly, along 
the way I have developed ways to provide overviews of the overall patterns of the 
evolution of policies and governance arrangements, through bulleted tables (see Table 13 
and Table 16) and ‘Gantt-type’ charts (see Figure 19 and Figure 31) respectively, which 
further facilitate the structured comparison between the two cases, and thus lead to 
additional insights. 
 
 
 Research techniques 4.6.
Guided by the analytical categories provided by the framework for cross-case 
comparison, I have traced the processes at and between the three levels of analysis 
identified: structures and policy developments at the national and European level, 
evolution of policies and governance arrangements at the regional level, effects on 
mechanisms of adaptation in the regional economy. Such ‘process tracing’ typically draws 
on many different types of evidence, and thus requires the use of various research 
techniques (e.g. George and Bennett, 2005; Gerring, 2007’ also see Dawley, 2014; Pike et 
al. 2015). In the first place, this has involved a review of the extensive amount of 
academic materials (books, journal articles, discussion paper, manuscripts, etc.) available 
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on the political economy of Germany and the United Kingdom in general, and of Saarland 
and Teesside in particular, over the last decades. In fact, the historical reconstruction of 
deindustrialisation, the steel crisis, and the development of economic governance and 
policy in Germany and the United Kingdom (and at the European level) is almost 
exclusively based on available academic literature (although also some primary policy 
documents were consulted). The reconstruction of the evolution of policies and 
governance arrangements in South Saarland and Teesside however has also entailed 
archival research and interviews. And the analysis of the effects on the mechanisms of 
adaptation, has required the collection of relevant statistics, to trace how crucial 
parameters and indicators have developed (e.g. overall economic structure, employment 
in key industries, unemployment, GVA per head). Fieldwork in Teesside (for archival 
research, interviews, and collection of statistics) was for the largest part and 
intermittently undertaken from January until September 2013 (while based in Newcastle). 
Fieldwork in Saarland (with a base in Saarbrücken) lasted from January until April 2014.  
 
For the archival research, I first compiled an inventory of key policy and programme 
documents (and ancillary reports and documents) with regard to the economic 
development policies for both regions since the 1960s, on the basis of information from 
academic sources, bibliographies, catalogues, and interviews. These documents were 
then searched and collected in various archives and libraries. For South Saarland I was 
able to find the key documents in the main library and the library for Empirical Social 
Sciences (‘Empirische Humanwissenschaften’) of Saarland University. For Teesside, I have 
consulted several archives and libraries to track down documents: Teesside Archives in 
Middlesbrough, the National Archives in London, Durham University library (including the 
special and local collections), Teesside University library, and Newcastle University 
library.31 Much of the statistical data from before about 2000 is not available online, and 
also had to be traced in hard-copy statistical handbooks, yearbooks, and abstracts in 
various libraries. For Saarland and Germany most data was found in the handbooks and 
                                                     
31
 This also seems to be a consequence of the instability in the institutional arrangements in the United 
Kingdom, which will be developed as an important theme in later Chapters. 
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yearbooks of the statistical office of Saarland and the federal statistical office. For 
Teesside and the United Kingdom, some data was available in publications by the Office 
of National Statistics (mainly various editions of the Census, and of the Abstract of 
Regional Statistics, Regional Trends, and Region in Figures). But I have also had to use 
various other sources (academic publications as well as policy reports; cited in the text) to 
complement this data. To develop consistent, dependable, and comparable time-series 
from this data from multiple sources in two different countries and over a relatively long 
time-period, has required some additional operations, to get roughly equivalent 
categories, definitions, and indicators. 
 
The interviews were complementary to the review of academic materials, archival 
research and collection of statistical data. The interviews served several purposes, in the 
spirit of ‘close dialogue’ between researchers and practitioners (Clark, 1998). First, to get 
a quick overview of the evolution of policies and governance arrangements, and thus 
guide the search for relevant policy documents and academic literature. Moreover, 
through the interviews, my interpretations of events and of the relative importance of 
specific policies and arrangements could be tested, and I could obtain additional 
background information. Finally, through the interviews I gained access to materials that 
were not directly available in public archives and libraries, such as unpublished reports 
and notes (a few of these are cited in the text). I conducted 21 interviews for South 
Saarland and 23 interviews for Teesside. The people interviewed can be grouped in four 
broad categories: experts (mainly academics), policy makers, business representatives, 
and representatives from labour unions and community organisations. I have tried to 
interview roughly the same number of people in each category for both cases, with a 
marked emphasis on interviews with policy makers (politicians and civil servants) who 
were closely involved in the development of policy for the region in question. Table 7 
specifies the number of people interviewed in each category in each case; more details 
can be found in the Appendix. 
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 South Saarland (Germany)  Teesside (United Kingdom)  
Experts (academics and journalists) 5 4 
Policy makers (politicians and civil servants) 10 11 
Business representatives 3 4 
Labour union officials and community 
representatives 
3 4 
Total 21 23 
Table 7: Number of interviews by case and category 
 
The starting point for finding interviewees, were academics who had written extensively 
about the development of the respective regions. On the basis of their recommendations, 
and subsequent recommendations in the following interviews, relevant representatives in 
government, business and labour / community were then identified. The most 
informative interviews were generally with politicians and highly placed civil servants who 
were closely involved in policy making in the 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s (and to some 
extent the 1970s, but normally not in a high-level position). Many of these people were 
already retired, and could only be identified and contacted by talking to contemporary 
government representatives first. However in some cases these politicians and civil 
servants also had some wider renown (through media reports and other accounts), as 
they formerly were (prime-)ministers, Members of Parliament, chairmen, or chief 
executives. 
 
The interviewees were sent information beforehand (by e-mail or post) on the main aims 
of the study, and an overview of the preliminary findings on either of the two regions 
(depending on whether the interview was for South Saarland or Teesside). The 
conversations were semi-structured, but the topics to be covered strongly depended on 
the particular expertise and background of the interviewee (see also Yeung, 2007; Sayer, 
2010, pp. 245-246). Topics typically included the background of various policies and 
governance arrangements, the relations between various arrangements and policies (at 
different scales), why the emphasis was on certain types of policies and not on others, 
what explained the particular timing of policies, which documents had been particularly 
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influential, and what the likely impact of policies has been. Interviews lasted about 1 to 
1½ hours on average, and were mostly conducted in the original language of the 
respondents (though several interviews in Germany were in English). I recorded the 
interviews using an audio recorder. After the interview I listened to the recording again, 
and drafted extensive minutes of the interview. I decided not to produce full transcripts, 
as the informational content was central (more easily codified through extensive notes), 
rather than the personal experiences and forms of expression of the respondents. I have 
been fully transparent towards the respondents about the purposes of the study, the 
topics to be discussed, and the way the information from the interview will be processed 
and used (including my intention of recording the interview, for which I always asked 
prior consent). Because of these provisions the research meets all ethical standards.32   
 
The different research techniques (academic sources, primary policy documents, 
collected statistics, and interviews) thus reveal different aspects of the multi-scalar and 
multi-facetted process of adaptation in the two regions (and by extension the factors 
relevant for their transformative resilience) in a complementary way. However, these 
research techniques are also partly overlapping, and thus offer opportunities for some 
methodological triangulation (e.g. Yeung, 2003). By going back to the primary policy 
documents, interpretations and accounts in the academic literature can be checked. 
Through interviews the reconstruction on the basis of written sources (both primary 
documents and more secondary accounts) can be verified. Assessments of failure or 
success in interviews and in earlier publications can be modified and qualified on the 
basis of the comparison of long-term trends of key economic indicators. Hence by 
employing multiple research techniques in a comparative framework, the internal validity 
of the findings has also been reinforced.  
 
                                                     
32
 A full ethical approval form was filled out for this project (with a description of the above arrangements 
to protect the interests of participants), and ethical approval by the Ethics Committee of the Faculty of 
Humanities and Social Sciences was granted on 28
th
 June 2013. 
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 Conclusions 4.7.
Based on the research design considered in section 4.3, and having employed the 
research techniques described in section 4.6, I have applied the framework for cross-case 
comparison (discussed in section 4.5) to analyse and compare aspects of policy and 
governance in the transformative adaptation and resilience in the two cases of South 
Saarland (Germany) and Teesside (United Kingdom). This follows the three distinct levels 
of analysis, and is reflected in the way the next four Chapters are structured: 
 Chapter 5 will for the largest part be made up of a discussion of the institutional 
environments and in the development of policies in Germany and the United Kingdom 
(and at the European level). I will first briefly outline deindustrialisation and the steel 
crisis as major shocks, which hit both countries, and especially the two regions in 
question. 
 Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 will provide a detailed examination of the evolution of policy 
and governance in first South Saarland and then Teesside (after I have first outlined 
some key characteristics and the economic history of both regions, and how they 
were upset by structural change and the steel crisis). 
 Chapter 8 will address the role of policy and governance in adaptation and resilience, 
but as part of a rigorous comparison between both areas that also draws together the 
three levels of analysis (and which thus will very explicitly refer back to the 
comparative framework). 
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Chapter 5. STRUCTURAL CHANGE, THE STEEL CRISIS AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN 
GERMANY AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
 
 Introduction 5.1.
This Chapter examines the broader context with regard to the basic institutional 
framework and policies for economic development in Germany, the United Kingdom, and 
also the European Community (now European Union) since around 1970. The events and 
processes in South Saarland and Teesside were importantly conditioned by this broader 
context. I will also consider structural change and the steel crisis as major shocks in the 
international economy in the 1970s and 1980s. The large scope of this Chapter necessarily 
meant that I had to be very selective in the events, processes and structures to be 
covered, focussing on those that are most relevant for the cases of South Saarland and 
Teesside. 
 
In section 5.2, I will first briefly discuss deindustrialisation and the steel crisis, which 
affected the economies in Western Europe, North America and Japan in especially in the 
1970s and 1980s. In section 5.3 I will then focus on (West-)Germany: I will outline the 
basic institutional framework for local and regional economic development (in terms of 
government structure and economic organisation), and the main policy responses to the 
steel crisis and deindustrialisation (in industrial policy, labour market policy, and urban 
regeneration policy). In section 5.4 I will then do the same for the United Kingdom. In 
section 5.5 I will consider relevant institutions and policies at the European level. The 
Chapter ends with some conclusions in section 5.6. 
 
 
 Structural change and the steel crisis 5.2.
Structural change refers to changes in the structure of an economy: certain sectors within 
an economy grow in importance, while others decline. As such, structural change takes 
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place in all (advanced) economies at an on-going basis, and is not confined to a particular 
episode in time. However, structural change can at times be particularly disruptive; 
especially so when economies go through a process of deindustrialisation. 
Deindustrialisation refers to the contraction and decline of the weight of manufacturing 
industry within an economy (Pike, 2009, p. 51). This is usually measured in terms of 
employment (number of people working in manufacturing compared to the economy as a 
whole), or output (value produced in manufacturing compared to the total). Moreover, 
there may only be a relative decline (loss of importance of manufacturing as a proportion 
to other sectors), or there may also be an absolute decline (decline in employment and 
output). The advanced economies of Western Europe, North America and Japan, which 
had industrialised in the 19th and early 20th centuries, were the first to be affected by 
deindustrialisation. In many of these economies a relative decline of manufacturing 
already started in the 1960s (with the service sector growing at a faster rate than 
manufacturing), and in some sections of heavy industry (notably coal mining) a marked 
reduction in output and employment set in. But especially after the first oil crisis of 1973, 
the pace of change accelerated, and employment (and to a lesser extent also output) in 
many traditional segments of manufacturing (such as steel, textiles, shipbuilding, heavy 
engineering, car manufacturing, chemicals, etc.) started to decline at a rapid rate. This 
coincided with large-scale rationalisation- and modernisation-operations with 
concomitant downsizing and plant-closings (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982).  
 
Certain regions, in which such industries formed the backbone of their economy, were hit 
particularly hard, such as the North of England, the central belt in Scotland, south Wales, 
the Ruhr Area and Saarland in Germany, Lorraine and Pas de Calais in France, Wallonia in 
Belgium, and the Great Lakes region in the United States and Canada. In such regions the 
crumbling of their economic base went hand in hand with among other things a steep rise 
in unemployment, a high incidence of socio-economic problems, abandoned industrial 
sites, and a further deterioration of the built environment. The pace of deindustrialisation 
in these regions slowed down somewhat after the mid-1980s, though the process often 
continued even up to today. After this initial shock, many of these regions experienced a 
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growth in service sectors, knowledge-based activities, and newer forms of manufacturing; 
although the performance has been very uneven (Hamm and Wienert, 1990; Birch et al., 
2010; Power et al., 2010; Hobor, 2013; Cowell, 2015). Similar processes of 
deindustrialisation have taken place at later points in time, in Italy, Spain, Eastern Europe, 
East Asia and Latin America, though often not as pronounced  and fast-paced (Pike, 2009). 
 
Deindustrialisation appears to be at least partly, a ‘natural and inevitable’ process. It 
appears that at a certain stage in the development of an economy, services and 
knowledge-based activities will become more prominent and will grow at a (much) faster 
rate than manufacturing industries, as the so-called ‘maturity thesis’ postulates 
(Rowthorn, 1986; Pike, 2009; Hudson, 2011a). This fits with the relative decline in 
manufacturing. The absolute decline can be partly explained by patterns of ‘trade 
specialisation (Rowthorn, 1986; Pike, 2009; Hudson, 2011a). As economies develop, their 
comparative advantages vis-à-vis other economies will change; so there will be increasing 
pressures to specialise in more high-value economic activities which correspond with 
higher wages and higher skill-levels. Forms of manufacturing which mainly rely on cheap 
and semi-skilled labour will then move to other places where living standards and overall 
levels of education are lower. But absolute decline may be further reinforced by the poor 
competitiveness and/or the poor management of manufacturing firms. This is the so-
called ‘failure thesis’, and it has been invoked in particular to explain the intensity of 
deindustrialisation in the United Kingdom, also discussed later (Rowthorn, 1986; Pike, 
2009; Hudson, 2011a). Moreover, macro-economic, industrial and regional policies by 
governments, may reinforce or alternatively mitigate the process of deindustrialisation. 
Hence, deindustrialisation is only partly ‘natural and inevitable’, but is also very 
importantly shaped by the responses of firms and of governments (Pike, 2009; Hudson, 
2011a). 
 
The steel crisis from 1974 until about 1987 forms a particular episode within the first 
wave of deindustrialisation. Characteristically, the steel crisis was prompted by the oil 
crisis of 1973, and strongly driven by shifts in the global division of labour and patterns of 
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diminishing competitiveness in Western Europe and North America. However, the crisis 
represented an even more disruptive and violent shock, owing to some particularities of 
the steel industry. And moreover, the element of government intervention is particularly 
clear (more so than for any other industries, with the exception possibly of coal mining). 
Below I will list some of the main elements of the steel crisis. The particular responses of 
firms and governments in (West-)Germany and the United Kingdom will be discussed 
further on. 
 The first oil crisis in 1973 ushered in a recession in the world economy, and thus 
demand for capital goods in general and steel in particular declined steeply. The 
macroeconomic situation improved by the end of 1970s and demand for steel picked 
up somewhat, but the second oil crisis in 1979 triggered a new recession in the early 
1980s, and prolonged and deepened the steel crisis. In addition to a fall in demand, 
the higher prices for energy during this time also led to higher costs for steel 
producers. However, these events laid bare more long-term trends in the demand for 
steel. As the post-war economic boom in Europe and North-America was coming to an 
end, demand for bulk steel (especially heavy plates and long products) was 
diminishing: many of the main industries that are large consumers of steel (such as 
shipbuilding, heavy engineering and railways) were starting to experience severe 
difficulties already before the mid-1970s (Mény and Wright, 1987; Bain, 1992; 
Hudson, 1992). Demand for flat products (an input for the car industry and white 
goods), and for more speciality steel products (high specifications, alloys, coatings, 
etc.) continued to grow however (Messerlin, 1987). Moreover, new substitution 
products such as aluminium, engineering plastics, ceramics, and fibres, became 
available, which also affected demand for steel (Hudson, 1992). 
 In the 1960s and 1970s some geographical shifts took place in the production of steel. 
In the 1960s, Japan had rapidly developed into a major producer. In the 1970s also 
several other countries followed such as South Korea, Brazil, India, Venezuela and 
Mexico, while steel production continued to expand steadily in the USSR and Eastern 
Europe (Messerlin, 1987; Hudson and Sadler, 1989; Bain, 1992; Hudson, 1992). Steel 
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producers in Western Europe and North America thus faced increasing competition in 
export markets, but also on their domestic markets. 
 The steel industry went through a succession of changes in the production technology 
in the 1960s and 1970s, with the introduction of Basic Oxygen Steelmaking (to replace 
open hearth and Siemens-Martin processes), continuous casting, and overall 
automation (Messerlin, 1987; Hudson, 1992). Moreover, there were improvements in 
blast furnace and coke oven technologies, which allowed for increasing sizes. 
Economies of scale, and favourable locations at the coast for large imports of iron ore 
and coal, grew in importance. Producers which adopted these technologies (mainly in 
Japan, but also in the Ruhr in Germany) had a competitive advantage, while producers 
that were late and still relied on more archaic plant (mainly in the UK, Belgium and 
France, but also in Saarland) were at a substantial disadvantage.  
 Because of these new technologies and because of optimistic prospects about the 
development of demand for steel, there were large investments in steel plants in 
especially Western Europe in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Messerlin, 1987). 
Because the lead time of these new investments is several years, a lot of new capacity 
became operational in the latter part of 1970s. At the same time, many of the 
obsolete plants remained in operation in Western Europe, and were only closed down 
or downsized at a slow pace (Tsoukalis and Strauss, 1987) (also see next point). There 
hence was a large amount of overcapacity in the steel industry in the late 1970s and 
the early 1980s. Combined with a lack of demand, this meant very low prices and 
massive losses for steel producers (as there costs were to a large extent fixed).  
 The problems in the steel industry were further compounded by the fact that national 
interests weigh heavily with regard to steel production. In many countries the 
industry was considered of strategic importance, and a certain self-sufficiency in the 
production of steel was seen as desirable. Moreover, the steel industry was a major 
employer, especially in regions which were already struggling. Hence many 
governments adopted an interventionist stance. First to help modernise and 
restructure the industry (this started already before the steel crisis), and later to 
support the industry and cope with redundancies during the crisis (Messerlin, 1987). 
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Thus the late 1960s and 1970s saw the rise of ‘national champions’ in the steel 
industry, especially in Western Europe (Mény and Wright, 1987; Tsoukalis and Strauss, 
1987). This limited the scope for bankruptcies and capacity reductions. Moreover, the 
US adopted increasingly protectionist measures after 1969, which hurt the European 
and Japanese steel industry (and also led to some protectionist measures by the 
European Community from 1978 onward) (Messerlin, 1987; Tsoukalis and Strauss, 
1987; Hudson, 1992). It was only since the early 1990s that government interventions 
in the steel industry have decreased, and a further internationalisation of the steel 
industry could take place, with the emergence of multinational companies (as a result 
of merger and take-overs) (D’Costa, 1999; Dawley et al., 2008; Hudson and Swanton, 
2012). 
 
 
 Structural change, the steel crisis and regional development in Germany  5.3.
 
5.3.1. Structural change and the steel crisis in Germany 
Overall, deindustrialisation has been less pronounced in West-Germany than elsewhere: 
the share of manufacturing employment in total employment dropped gradually from 
48% in 1965 to 36% in 1995, which was still the highest share in Western Europe (Pike, 
2009). Underlying this gradual relative decline, is a mixed picture with regard to absolute 
decline. Job losses in some segments of manufacturing have been considerable but less 
than in other countries, while value-added and output have continued to grow (Bade and 
Kunzmann, 1991). Hence, throughout the 1980s and up until today, manufacturing has 
remained important, both in terms of the share in the economy and in employment. 
Rather the new information technologies and the growing parts of the service sector 
associated with these, were an integral part of the on-going modernisation of an 
industrial economy, in which manufacturing remained central (Katzenstein, 1989). Many 
German manufacturing firms successfully managed to remain competitive by focussing on 
quality, innovation, and flexible specialisation, to compensate for the relatively high 
labour costs (Katzenstein, 1989; Streeck, 1997). 
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However, structural change during the 1970s and 1980s has led to some changes in the 
economic geography of Germany. Decline in employment in industry especially hit the 
industrial regions of the Ruhr area and Saarland, but also other major agglomerations in 
the North of Germany (such as Bremen, Hamburg and Hannover) were affected. The 
service sector often did not grow fast enough to make up for some of the job losses in the 
1970s and 1980s, and hence unemployment grew (Bade and Kunzmann, 1991; Streeck, 
1997). In the southern part of Germany however, places like Munich and Stuttgart saw a 
continued expansion of manufacturing. In and around these cities, as well as other places 
such as Frankfurt, Nürnberg, Karlsruhe, and Mannheim, the service sector also grew at a 
faster pace than in agglomerations in northern Germany (Bade and Kunzmann, 1991).  
 
As with deindustrialisation, also the steel crisis was somewhat less pronounced in West 
Germany, as compared to other countries in Western Europe. The principal locations for 
steel production in the early 1970s were the Ruhr Area, which was the centre of 
operations for several large producers (such as Thyssen, Krupp, Hoesch, and Klöckner), 
and Saarland, where three smaller firms operated (Neunkircher Eisenwerk, Stahlwerke 
Röchling-Burbach and Dillinger Hütte). All steel firms in Germany were privately owned.33 
In the Ruhr, the steel industry had modernised and rationalised on a continuous basis 
during the 1950s and 1960s, and was the most advanced and efficient in Western Europe 
by the early 1970s (Esser and Väth, 1987). In the first phase of the steel crisis (up until the 
early 1980s), the steel firms in the Ruhr coped with the crisis on their own, in close 
consultation with the labour unions but without much government intervention. One 
important response was to diversify into new activities (such as machinery, industrial 
construction, and systems technology) (Bain, 1992). From 1979, the Federal government 
set up programmes to support Research and Development and new investment in the 
steel industry. Moreover, the Federal government and European Community also 
provided assistance for redundancies. Only in 1981, did the Federal government (and also 
                                                     
33
 With the exception of Peine Salzgitter in Lower Saxony. 
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the government of Nordrhein-Westfalen) start to make direct financial support available, 
but for a large part conditional on mergers, and restructuring and rationalisation efforts 
by the steel firms (Esser and Väth, 1987). The steel firms could often not agree among 
each other on the course of action, and mergers and restructuring operations were 
delayed, despite the worsening situation in especially the Eastern part of the Ruhr, 
around Dortmund (Esser and Väth, 1987; Mény and Wright, 1987; Bain, 1992). It was not 
until the 1990s that the major firms merged (Hoesch was taken over by Krupp in 1991; 
and subsequently Thyssen and Krupp merged in 1999). Financial support by the 
government increased still further after 1983; but on the whole, the steel industry in the 
Ruhr Area weathered the steel crisis with less government support in comparison to their 
competitors elsewhere in Western Europe (Mény and Wright, 1987; Esser and Fach, 
1989). The situation in Saarland was very different. There the Neunkircher Eisenwerk and 
Stahlwerke Röchling-Burbach operated archaic plants, which proved uncompetitive (while 
Dillinger Hütte had already successfully modernised before and specialised in market 
segments were demand remained strong). The steel crisis hit the area very hard, and an 
extensive and lengthy restructuring and rationalisation process started in 1978. The 
federal government and the government of Saarland provided ample support, starting in 
the late 1970s and continuing well into the 1980s. In section 6.5, I will discuss the steel 
crisis and crisis management in Saarland in detail. 
 
 
5.3.2. The governance of economic development 
The responses by the governments and by firms to deindustrialisation in general and the 
steel crisis in particular, were mediated by the particular government structure and the 
particular type of economic organisation in the Federal Republic of Germany. In this 
section I will briefly discuss these. 
 
Before 1990 the Federal Republic of Germany, was made up of 10 states (with West-
Berlin as a de facto 11th state). After reunification in 1990 a further 5 states were added 
(and the legal status of Berlin was resolved). These states (‘Länder’) have a constitution of 
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their own and are sovereign, except in areas in which the federal state (‘Bund’) has been 
assigned exclusive or priority competences by the federal constitution. In most states 
(with the exception of the city-states of Berlin, Hamburg and Bremen), there are further 
territorial divisions of government, such as municipalities (‘Gemeinden’) and districts 
(‘Kreise’). In economic development, spatial planning, labour market issues and 
education, the individual states have powers, but they have to operate within the overall 
framework provided at the federal level. Typical of the federal system in Germany is its 
‘cooperative’ character: “In contrast to most federal systems, German federalism was not 
conceived as an instrument and guarantor for territorial diversity, but rather dedicated to 
the delivery, through institutional cooperation, of common standards of public policy and 
services across the federal territory” (Jeffery, 2002, pp. 172-173). This has several aspects 
(Scharpf, 1988; Jeffery, 2002). First, the system is strongly geared towards consensus. The 
first chamber of parliament – the ‘Bundestag’ – is directly elected through a system of 
proportional representation, which makes that coalition governments are the rule. The 
states are directly represented in the second chamber of parliament – the ‘Bundesrat’ – 
through which all federal legislation must pass. This means that the states have 
substantial influence over federal policy (Schmidt, 2010). Moreover, for the actual 
implementation of policy, the federal government is in many cases partly dependent on 
the governments of the states (Scharpf, 1988). Second, the states have comparatively 
little powers in raising taxes, and hence are for a large part dependent on federal 
frameworks for their finances. Tax receipts are allocated between the federal 
government, the 16 states, and the municipalities according to certain criteria. Moreover, 
several procedures exist for the redistribution of revenues on the basis of special needs of 
states (Schmidt, 2010). The Fiscal Equalisation Scheme (‘Länderfinanzausgleich’) regulates 
a redistribution between financially strong states and financially weak states. Moreover, 
the constitutional reforms of 1969 reinforced this entanglement (in German 
‘Politikverflechtung’) even further with the introduction of joint tasks and joint 
investment programmes, which are co-financed by the states and the federal government 
(Scharpf, 1988; Schmidt, 2010). The most important of these in the context of economic 
development policy, is the Joint Task for the Improvement of the Regional Economic 
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Structure (‘Gemeinschaftsaufgabe für Verbesserung der Regionalen Wirtschaftstruktur’ 
(GRW)), which regulates support for states that cope with a weak economic structure by 
the federal government and other states. Since reunification in 1990 however, the 
cooperative character of federalism in Germany has waned a bit, and there has been a 
slowly increasing emphasis on differentiation and competition between the states 
(Jeffery, 2002). The constitutional reforms of 2006 attempted to partly undo some of the 
‘entanglements’, by more strictly separating certain competences between the federal 
government and the states (although the GRW was not affected by this) (Schmidt, 2010). 
These reforms, and a further reform in 2009, tried to impose a more stringent discipline 
in the finances of the federal and state governments, so each government will be self-
responsible for their deficits and debts. Among other things, the so-called 
‘Schuldenbremse’ (break on public debts) was introduced, which prohibits governments 
from 2020 to contract new additional debts (except in extraordinary circumstances). 
 
Typical for the economic organisation in Germany, is the high degree to which ‘the 
economy’ is embedded in wider social relationships. This is termed the social market 
economy (‘Soziale Marktwirtschaft’). This has several elements (Streeck, 1997; Martin and 
Swank, 2012). First, a relatively generous welfare state, which provides social protection 
primarily through social insurance funds. These funds mostly get their income through 
equal contributions of employers and employees, and they are also administered by the 
social partners (i.e. employer associations and labour unions) (Martin and Swank, 2012). 
Second, the role of the federal and state governments may be described as ‘enabling’ 
rather ‘dirigiste’ (Streeck, 1997). Hence there are hardly any direct interventions into 
economic affairs. An important reason for this is that power is dispersed vertically and 
horizontally in the federal system (as discussed above), and so the scope for more far-
reaching and swift interventions by governments is limited (Wood, 2001). Instead policies 
are aimed at providing for a good and stable business environment. Another role is to 
ensure the framework conditions for the social partners to coordinate on economic 
affairs. Third, this coordination between the social partners has several layers. The first 
layer is the system of sector-based collective bargaining between employer’s associations 
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and labour unions. The peak associations (the ‘Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen 
Arbeitsgeberverbände’ (BDA)34) and the ‘Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund’ (DGB)35) play 
limited roles, and instead the lead is taken by the sectoral associations. Especially the 
negotiations between the metal industry employers association (‘Gesamtmetall’) and the 
metal workers union (‘IG Metall’) normally set the trend for wages and conditions of work 
in manufacturing (Martin and Swank, 2012). The second layer consists of arrangements 
for worker representation within firms, both through works councils and through 
representatives in the supervisory boards (so-called co-determination (or 
‘Mitbestimmung’)) (Martin and Swank, 2012). And a third layer, is the dense network of 
parapublic institutions and associations, which provide important public goods in the 
functioning of the economy; for example Chambers of Commerce of Industry, 
professional associations, agencies for technology transfer or export promotion, and 
arrangements for the provision of vocational training (Katzenstein, 1989; Streeck, 1997). 
Especially the vocational training system is a hallmark of the social market economy. 
Nearly two-thirds of young people enter vocational training after leaving secondary 
school (Bosch, 2010). It is mostly provided through a dual structure, with part teaching 
within the public school system and part training at firms through apprenticeships. After 
the first qualifications are attained, it is possible to keep earning further occupational 
qualifications. Employers and labour unions are narrowly involved in developing the 
curricula. Vocational training is well-regarded in Germany; not only for traditional crafts 
and manual trades, but also for many other occupations in services (such as IT, 
administration, banking, etc.) (Bosch, 2010). 
 
 
5.3.3. Evolution of central government policies 
The government structure and economic organisation in (West-)Germany formed the 
larger institutional framework for the development of policies by the federal government, 
to promote economic development in general and to cope with deindustrialisation and 
                                                     
34
 Federal Association of German Employer Organisations. 
35
 German Labour Federation. 
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the steel crisis in particular. In this section I will discuss the most important arrangements 
and initiatives in the areas of industrial and economic policy, labour market policy, and 
urban regeneration. In Table 8, the various governments since 1969 are listed. Overall, 
the evolution of policies in Germany has been characterised by continuity, and radical 
changes have not occurred (Streeck, 2009). The Kohl-government did proclaim an 
ambition to carry through a programme of liberalisation and deregulation when it came 
to power in 1982 (the so-called ‘Wende’), but little came of this because it did not have 
the support of German employers (Katzenstein, 1989; Wood; 2001; Martin and Swank, 
2012). However in the latter half of the 1990s and first half of the 2000s, some important 
changes took place in government policy, especially in social policy and labour market 
policy (Martin and Swank, 2012). These changes were driven by rising expenditures in 
social insurance, as an indirect result of the unification in 1990, but also of relatively high 
unemployment before that. Moreover, the German model was generally believed to have 
lost some of its competitiveness and flexibility (Streeck, 2009). 
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1969-1982 ‘Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands’ (SPD)
36
, and 
‘Freie Demokratische Partei’ (FDP)
37
 
Willy Brandt (1969-1974) 
Helmut Schmidt (1974-1982) 
1982-1998 ‘Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands’ (CDU)
38
 / 
‘Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern’ (CSU)
39
, and ‘Freie 
Demokratische Partei’ (FDP) 
Helmut Kohl 
1998-2005 Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) and 
‘Bündnis 90/Die Grünen’
40
 
Gerhard Schröder 
2005-2009 ‘Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands’ (CDU) / 
‘Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern’ (CSU), and 
‘Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands’ (SPD) 
Angela Merkel 
2009-2013 ‘Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands’ (CDU) / 
‘Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern’ (CSU), and ‘Freie 
Demokratische Partei’ (FDP) 
Angela Merkel 
2013-date ‘Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands’ (CDU) / 
‘Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern’ (CSU), and 
‘Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands’ (SPD) 
Angela Merkel 
Table 8: Governments at the federal level in (West-)Germany since 1969 and their 
chancellors 
 
In industrial and economic policy, the role of the federal government is mostly secondary. 
It did provide extensive direct financial support to coal mining firms in the Ruhr Area and 
Saarland from the late 1950s (when the decline in coal mining set in), not only to protect 
employment in these areas but also to ensure energy security (Dörrenbächer, 2007). 
However, financial support for the steel firms during the steel crisis, was relatively 
moderate and tied to conditions for restructuring (Esser and Väth, 1987). In other 
declining industries, such as shipbuilding and textiles, federal involvement was minimal 
(Katzenstein, 1989). The Länder are the primary actors for industrial and economic policy. 
 
At the federal level however there do exist some structures which importantly support 
and shape policy by the states. First, the Joint Task for the Improvement of the Regional 
Economic Structure (‘Gemeinschaftsaufgabe für Verbesserung der Regionalen 
Wirtschaftstruktur’ (GRW)), as already mentioned. The GRW exists since 1968 and 
                                                     
36
 Social Democratic Party of Germany. 
37
 Free Democratic Party. 
38
 Christian Democratic Union of Germany. 
39
 Christian Social Union in Bavaria. 
40
 Alliance 1990 / The Greens. 
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regulates support from the federal government and the Länder for economic 
development in regions that cope with a weak economic structure. This was the main 
instrument for regional economic policy at the federal level, instituted among other 
things in response to the emerging problems of deindustrialisation in several Länder (but 
also to support economic development in rural areas) (Scharpf, 1988). Since the 1990s it 
has decreased somewhat in importance however. For regions that meet the criteria an 
investment programme is decided upon for a certain programming period; for which 
support is then made available. Nowadays the GRW has been harmonised with the 
procedures and funds of the European structural funds. Second, since the late 1960s the 
federal government has enacted policies to stimulate the development of Science and 
Technology (‘Forschungs- und Technologiepolitik’) and their contribution to economic 
development (Dörfler, 2003). This mainly consists of support for research and 
development programmes in certain fields, and of support for universities and research 
institutes. Typical for Germany, are several networks of research institutes which are both 
publicly and privately funded, and bridge fundamental research and applications in 
industry, such as the Max-Planck Gesellschaft, the Fraunhofer Gesellschaft, the Leibniz 
Gemeinschaft, and the Helmholtz Gemeinschaft. 
 
Labour market policies are for the largest part a federal issue. Some relatively stringent 
legal provisions exist to protect employment in Germany. The Protection Against 
Dismissal Act (‘Kündigungsschutzgesetz’) stipulates that employers have to prove there is 
no alternative job in the company before dismissal, and regulates the selection and 
compensation of dismissals (Otto and Wächter, 1996). Also the Works Councils Act 
(‘Betriebsverfassungsgesetz’) offers protection: it requires employers and employees 
(through the Works Council) to agree on a Social Compensation Plan (‘Sozialplan’), in 
which every effort should be taken to prevent loss of employment, and to try to spread 
the burden among all employees in the case employment cannot be maintained. 
Furthermore, the main executive agency for labour market policies is also at the federal 
level. The Federal Employment Agency (‘Bundesagentur für Arbeit’, before 2004 
‘Bundesanstalt für Arbeit’) administrates unemployment insurance and carries out active 
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labour market policies. The agency has its head office in Nürnberg, but also has 10 
regional offices with some devolved powers. It is controlled by representatives from 
employers, employees and different levels of governments (Bund, Länder, Gemeinden); 
and funded through social insurance premiums paid for employers and employees (with 
the federal government covering any deficits). These legal provisions and the Federal 
Employment Agency played a large role in coping with the loss of employment as a result 
of deindustrialisation and the steel crisis. In general, attempts were made to protect 
employment and distributing the costs of redundancy more equally over workers through 
reduction of working time and pay. Moreover, efforts were taken to replace redundant 
workers, to retrain them if needed, and to compensate any loss of income (Bain, 1992). At 
the same time, employers and labour unions (who negotiated about the social plans) – 
often with consent of the federal and state governments - did shift a part of the costs to 
the social security system (Bain, 1992; Streeck, 2009; Martin and Swank, 2012). Hence the 
Federal Employment Agency often had to pay a part of the expenses, mainly with regard 
to redundant employees who went into early retirement or who did not have good 
prospects for replacement.  
 
The adjustments on the labour market as a consequence of structural changes in the 
1970s and 1980s were relatively smooth in Germany, as discussed. Nevertheless, 
polarisation on the labour market has increased (Streeck, 1997; Martin and Swank, 2012). 
Relatively high wages, job security, and good provisions continued to exist for the 
majority of workers. Furthermore, the vocational training system (as discussed above) 
ensured that high skill levels were maintained and reproduced. At the same time, there 
was an increasing group of people that could not benefit from these perquisites. They did 
not possess the skills to participate in the mainstream of the economy. Also some 
younger people fall through the cracks of the vocational training system (Bosch, 2010). 
Unemployment has been consistently high in West-Germany in comparison to other 
countries in Western Europe, and long-term unemployment has been an enduring 
problem (Martin and Swank, 2012). Through the so-called Hartz-reforms and other 
measures in the late 1990s and first half of the 2000s, the federal government has 
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managed to curtail the high and growing expenditures in unemployment insurance. 
However, these reforms have not improved the prospects for people at the lower end of 
the labour market, as they hardly contain elements of active labour market policy (such as 
training, job creation schemes, or special assistance measures) for long-term unemployed 
(Martin and Swank, 2012). 
 
In spatial planning the federal government provides the general framework, while 
individual Länder formulate spatial plans for the state as a whole (and Gemeinden 
prepare plans for their territory) (Jost and Moll, 2007). Investments in federal 
infrastructure (connections between the Länder and into other countries) are funded by 
the federal government (though Länder will be involved in the planning). The Federal 
Urban Development Promotion Act (‘Städtebauförderungsgesetz’) was introduced in 
1971, to promote urban regeneration. Through this act, federal money is made available 
for urban development projects, which is further complemented by money from Länder 
and Gemeinden (also urban regeneration is a subject of cooperative federalism). This – 
together with contributions from the European structural funds – has been the main way 
of funding the redevelopment of brownfield sites after deindustrialisation (Dörrenbächer, 
2013). Since 2004 a similar programme (‘Stadumbau West’) has been operational (also 
co-financed by Bund, Länder and Gemeinden) to redevelop urban areas which have been 
affected by urban decay and high vacancy because of demographic change and economic 
decline. 
 
 
 Structural change, the steel crisis and regional development in the United 5.4.
Kingdom 
 
5.4.1. Structural change and the steel crisis in the United Kingdom 
In contrast to Germany, deindustrialisation has been very pronounced in the United 
Kingdom: the share of industrial employment dropped from 47% in 1965 to 27% in 1995 
(Pike, 2009). This relative decline was the highest of all countries in Western Europe, and 
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went along with very substantial job losses and a steep rise of unemployment (Townsend, 
1983; Martin, 1989). Moreover, also output in manufacturing decreased sharply during 
the recession of the late 1970s and first half of the 1980s (Townsend, 1983; Rowthorn, 
1986). Especially in heavy industry (including steel) some of the problems had their 
origins already in the interwar years (or even before); which the boom years following the 
Second World War partly concealed (Martin, 1989). These became visible again in the 
1960s and 1970s. For other types of manufacturing (such as textiles and car 
manufacturing), serious difficulties began to surface only in the late 1960s and 1970s 
(Rhodes, 1986). Employment in the service sector rose consistently in the UK already 
since the 1950s, especially in business and financial services, leisure, retail, and public 
services (healthcare and education) (Damesick, 1987).  
 
In the UK the decline in manufacturing and the growth in services were largely seen as 
separate processes; the most important new strengths in the service sector (such as 
finance and banking, and other business services) did not rely much on British 
manufacturing (Hall, 1986; Martin, 1989; Crouch and Keune, 2005). Moreover, although 
deindustrialisation had already set in long before 1979, there has arguably also been a 
‘Thatcher effect’ (Martin, 1986, p. 258). The fiscal and monetary macro-economic policies 
implemented by the Thatcher-government after 1979, prolonged and exacerbated the 
recession of the late 1970s and early 1980s, and led to a shortage of capital and credit for 
many firms. As a result many manufacturing firms went bankrupt, and other firms 
rationalised at a large scale. Many of the bigger manufacturing firms moved some of their 
operations (and concomitant employment) abroad (Martin, 1986). 
 
Striking about deindustrialisation in the UK is also its geographically uneven character, 
reinforcing the already existing ‘North-South divide’. Rapid loss of employment in 
manufacturing took place all over the United Kingdom, but for most areas in the South of 
England job losses were less marked, and these areas were less dependent on 
manufacturing (with the exception of London, which was a major industrial centre). 
Moreover, the growth in services and new segments of manufacturing (such as high tech) 
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mainly concentrated in the regions in the South East of England (Martin, 1989; Pike, 
2009). Deindustrialisation and loss of employment had already set in in the more 
peripheral regions (the North-East, South Wales, and the central belt in Scotland) before 
the 1970s (as heavy industry traditionally concentrated there). But also in these areas the 
recession of the late 1970s and early 1980s was felt badly; and since then economic 
growth in these regions (apart from Scotland) has been lagging (Martin, 2012). The 
immediate shock of deindustrialisation in the 1970s and early 1980s was perhaps largest 
in the ‘manufacturing heartland’ (around Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool, Leeds, and 
Sheffield), but since then economic performance in these regions has been somewhat 
better than in the more peripheral areas (Rhodes, 1986; Martin, 1989; Pike and Tomaney, 
2009). 
 
Also the steel crisis was very pronounced in the United Kingdom. The problems in the 
British steel industry can be traced back to before the First World War (Elbaum, 1986). 
Many plants were established in the 19th century, and had a location, a lay-out and 
production technologies that made modernisation difficult. Moreover, the structure of 
the industry was fragmented and domestic demand was sluggish, which prohibited 
coordinated efforts of rationalisation and modernisation (also Tolliday, 1986). It was only 
after nationalisation of the fourteen largest steel producers in 1967, and the formation of 
the British Steel Corporation (BSC), that these issues started to be addressed. The 
industry in the UK had fallen behind in terms of technology and productivity in the 1950s 
and 1960s, compared to e.g. West Germany, France, or Japan (Richardson and Dudley, 
1986; Blair, 1997). With support from the government, BSC started a comprehensive 
programme to modernise and restructure the steel industry. This consisted of closing 
down inland sites, and concentrating production at five coastal locations: Llanwern and 
Port Talbot in South Wales, Ravenscraig in Scotland, and Scunthorpe and Teesside in 
England. This programme also foresaw in the expansion of capacity by about 35% by the 
early 1980s, mainly by means of a new facility in Teesside (Secretary of State for Trade 
and Industry, 1973). This expansion of capacity reflected considerable optimism about the 
growth of the demand for steel in the 1970s; and in particular of domestic demand 
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(which in turn was based on optimistic prospects for the UK manufacturing industries). 
Progress with closing down locations was slow however in the 1970s, among other things 
because in 1974 the new Labour government implemented a review of the closure 
programme (prompted by resistance by trade unions and localities). It was soon obvious 
that projected demand would not materialise, and after the steel crisis started in 1974, 
BSC faced severe overcapacity. With the backing of the government it changed its course 
in 1977. It accelerated the closure programme and cancelled any further investments for 
expansion (Secretary of State for Industry, 1978). The government provided ample 
financial support, first to assist with the invest programme and after 1975 also to cover 
the very considerable losses (Mény and Wright, 1987). After 1979 the newly installed 
Conservative government put the pressure on BSC to improve profitability rapidly. As a 
result, the British Steel Corporation downsized even more radically: whereas from 1975 
until 1979 employment was reduced from about 230,000 to 186,000, in the period from 
1979 until 1984 employment went down by a further 115,000 to 71,000 (Dudley and 
Richardson, 1990). Profitability was finally restored in 1986, and the Conservative 
government privatised BSC in 1988. Hence the restructuring of the steel industry before 
and during the steel crisis was an arduous and erratic process in which the British 
government actively participated. Teesside was one of the sites in which this was felt 
hardest, as I will discuss in section 7.5. 
 
 
5.4.2. The governance of economic development 
The responses by the British government and by economic actors in the face of 
deindustrialisation and the steel crisis, were shaped by the government structure and the 
economic organisation in the United Kingdom. I will discuss these in turn. 
 
The United Kingdom has a unitary government structure, which means that any powers of 
local authorities are in principle derived from the sovereignty of the central state. The 
first-past-the-post electoral system in the United Kingdom usually delivers single-party 
governments, which can then pursue their own policies without much effective 
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opposition (Wood, 2001). Especially in England government is highly centralised (Wilson 
and Game, 2011). A particularity of British system is the fact that at least until 2000 local 
authorities had no power of general competence, and could not act beyond what they 
were statutorily permitted to do (Wilson and Game, 2011). Moreover, subnational 
government is subject to frequent changes in the United Kingdom. There is no codified 
constitution, which makes that the status, rights, and responsibilities of local authorities, 
and their relationships with the central government, are not defined. Before the 1974 the 
local government system had essentially two layers, with county councils as the first tier, 
and boroughs and districts as a second tier. However, so-called county boroughs (mainly 
larger urban areas) were an exception, and formed a single tier, independent from county 
councils. A reform enacted in 1974 applied the two-tier system more uniformly over the 
whole of England, and so also county boroughs became part of a county council (or a 
metropolitan county council). Another reform implemented in the mid-1990s 
(re)introduced a hybrid system of single tier and two-tier local government: some local 
authorities became so-called unitary authorities (Wilson and Game, 2011). 
 
The central government has been the most important actor in local and regional 
economic development. However, local authorities do have some responsibilities in this 
context, with regard to planning, housing, infrastructure, education, and social services. 
During especially the Conservative administration in the 1980s and early 1990s, the 
amount of discretion of local authorities was significantly reduced. Local authorities 
became even more dependent on the central government for their resources and for the 
exercise of their powers. Moreover, over the years, the delivery of many services has 
shifted from local authorities to executive agencies (often quasi-autonomous non-
governmental organisations (quango’s)), or to contracted private companies. After the 
New Labour government came to power in 1997 it tried to introduce a form of regional 
government in England, as part of a wider devolution agenda, which also gave Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland more powers. These plans were only partially implemented, 
but as part of this exercise Regional Development Agencies were established in 1999 with 
some discretion and relatively sizeable resources for policies to further the economic 
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development of their respective regions (Pike and Tomaney, 2009). This episode of 
‘regionalism’ ended in 2010, when the newly elected coalition government of 
Conservatives and Liberal-Democrats expressed a preference for ‘localism’ (Tomaney et 
al., 2012). It abolished the RDAs, and instead promoted the establishment of Local 
Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs). In these LEPs local authorities and representatives from 
businesses, work together to stimulate the economic development in an area (usually 
comprising several local authorities). The resources for the suggested policies of the LEPs 
are mostly dependent on funds and programmes run by the central government, and this 
hence constitutes effectively a (re)centralisation of subnational economic development 
policy (Tomaney et al., 2012; Pike et al., 2015). 
 
In terms of economic organisation (and concomitant economic policy) the United 
Kingdom has made a large turn-around in the second half of the 1970s and early 1980s in 
response to its deindustrialisation. After the Second World War, several corporatist 
institutions were established to manage economic development, which gave a 
considerable role to employers’ associations and trade unions (Hall, 1986; Martin, 1989; 
Wood, 2001; Crouch and Keune, 2005). Until the mid-1970s various governments were 
committed to a Keynesian economic policy, aimed at maintaining full employment and 
providing an extensive welfare state. This was supported by tripartite consultations 
between the government, employers and trade unions, on economic policy in general 
(through the National Economic Development Council set up in 1962) and on incomes 
policy in particular (i.e. limiting wage and price increases to reduce inflation). Also in 
vocational training and labour market policy tripartite institutions existed: the Industrial 
Training Boards (set up in 1962) and the Manpower Services Commission (created in 
1973) (Rainbird, 2010). Moreover, especially the Labour governments in this period, 
increased the government’s direct involvement with the economy, through a series of 
nationalisations (among which was the steel industry in 1967), and through more 
deliberate attempts at planning and controlling economic development (e.g. the National 
Plan for Economic Development in 1965, and regional policy (to be discussed below)). In 
1975 the National Enterprise Board was established to support industrial firms that 
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experienced financial difficulties, and to invest in new technologies. These arrangements 
produced poor results however. On the whole they seem to have enabled British 
industrial firms to resist innovation and restructuring, rather than to pursue it (Hall, 
1986). Moreover, the peak-level organisations of employers (Confederation of British 
Industry) and trade unions (Trades Union Congress), were loosely organised, and could 
not enforce agreements among their constituencies. Thus both employers and organised 
labour in the end failed to contribute positively to the corporatist structures, which 
resulted in increasing strikes and industrial unrest in the 1970s (Hall, 1986; Crouch and 
Keune, 2005).  
 
The Sterling crisis of 1976 can be seen as the breaking point. Loss of confidence of 
investors resulted in a rapid depreciation of the pound sterling, which eventually led to 
the British government having to take out a loan from the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). This loan was conditional on large cuts in public spending and increases in taxes to 
bring down the budget deficit. When the Thatcher government came to power in 1979, 
this policy was further reinforced. Monetarism (instead of Keynesianism) became the 
leading macro-economic philosophy: limiting the money supply and raising interest rates 
to combat inflation, while implementing fiscal austerity (Martin, 1986). Moreover, the 
corporatist institutions were abolished or side-lined; and an extensive programme of 
privatisation was undertaken. The power of the trade unions was effectively crushed in a 
series of strenuous conflicts and by introducing new legal requirements (Martin, 1986; 
Wood, 2001). The Thatcher government saw labour market rigidities as a major 
impediment to economic growth; and hence created the conditions for a decentralised 
and deregulated wage bargaining system (Martin and Swank, 2012). Also the existing 
industry-wide and nation-wide institutions and arrangements for vocational training were 
dismantled: involvement of employers became entirely voluntaristic, and so vocational 
education is mostly supplied and funded by the government (Rainbird, 2010). The result 
of these reforms in economic organisation was that the circumstances for high-value and 
high wage manufacturing to thrive were further undermined (Martin and Swank, 2012). 
However with deregulation in the labour market and the financial sector (and a 
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historically strong higher education sector) conditions improved for a further growth of 
financial services and business services (Martin, 1986; Hall, 1986; Crouch and Keune, 
2005). The flexible labour market also proved favourable for more low-wage, low value-
added services and manufacturing. The New Labour governments from 1997 until 2010 
have not been able or willing to counter these patterns (Martin and Swank, 2012). 
 
 
5.4.3. Evolution of central government policies 
The shifts in government structure and in economic organisation in the United Kingdom 
coincided with notable shifts in policies for regional economic development, in particular 
in the face of deindustrialisation and the steel crisis in large parts of the UK. In this section 
I will examine the most important arrangements and initiatives by the central 
government of the UK in the domains of industrial and economic policy, labour market 
policy, and urban regeneration. Table 9 lists the different governments since 1970. As is 
clear from the previous section, the evolution of policies in the United Kingdom has been 
subject to considerable changes over time. The coming to power of the Thatcher 
government in 1979 brought on large scale policy changes in all domains (as discussed 
above), but also the New Labour government after 1997 enacted many new initiatives.   
 
1970-1974 Conservative Party Edward Heath 
1974-1979 Labour Party 
(with support from Liberal Party during 1977-1978)  
Harold Wilson (1974-1976) 
James Callaghan (1976-1979) 
1979-1997 Conservative Party Margaret Thatcher (1979-1990) 
John Major (1990-1997) 
1997-2010 Labour Party Tony Blair (1997-2007) 
Gordon Brown (2007-2010) 
2010-2015 Conservative Party and Liberal-Democrat Party David Cameron 
2015-date Conservative Party David Cameron 
Table 9: Governments in the United Kingdom since 1970 and their prime-ministers 
 
In industrial and economic policy, the main focal point for a long time (starting already in 
the early 1930s) was the attraction of inward investment into regions with relatively high 
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unemployment (mainly in the struggling centres of heavy industry in the North of 
England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland), and controls on investment in regions 
with near full employment (mainly the South and the Midlands) (Martin, 1986; Martin 
and Tyler, 1992; Wren, 2005). This ‘regional policy’ was the most important spatial 
element of the Keynesian economic policy that was dominant in the UK after the Second 
World War until the late 1970s. Regional policy consisted of various programmes (which 
were modified at times): development of industrial estates and advanced factory 
building, but also a system of development controls and of grants, subsidies and tax 
incentives. The Industrial Development Certificate was needed for investment outside the 
assisted areas. The Regional Development Grant covered parts of the investment sum and 
was paid out automatically when certain conditions were met. Regional Selective 
Assistance was a similar grant scheme but was paid out on a discretionary basis. The 
Employment Premium (from 1967 until 1977) was a subsidy for each job created. 
Different regimes of grants and incentives were in place for Development Areas, Special 
Development Areas, and Intermediate Areas. 
 
The Thatcher government first removed the requirement for an Industrial Development 
Certificate, and curtailed the Regional Development Grants. In 1988 the Regional 
Development Grants were abolished altogether, and the remaining elements of regional 
policy were subsumed under the new Enterprise Initiative (Martin and Tyler, 1992). With 
this initiative a new funding scheme was introduced (the Regional Enterprise Grant), and 
the emphasis shifted much more towards support for start-ups, SMEs, innovation 
projects, and technology transfer (Hassink, 1992). As noted, the Blair government 
devolved large parts of regional economic development policy to Regional Development 
Agencies in 1999. These RDAs were abolished again in 2010, and instead Local Enterprise 
Partnerships were made responsible for formulating local economic development 
policies. Since the turn of the century however, the Labour government and the Regional 
Development Agencies, have slowly been developing an institutional framework for STI-
policies (Perry, 2007). Science and technology policy had since the 1960s selectively 
focussed on defence, aerospace and nuclear energy (Hall, 1986; Hassink, 1992), and a 
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comprehensive framework was lacking. The Technology Strategy Board was set up in 
2004 (now Innovate UK), and since 2010 a network of technology centres (the Catapult 
Centres) has been emerging (on the back of some of the work of the RDAs).  
 
The ‘Contracts of Employment Act’ of 1963, the ‘Redundancy Payments Act’ of 1965 and 
the ‘Industrial Relations Act’ of 1971, offered some provisions for employment protection 
in the 1970s and 1980s: it obligated employers to give notice, to pay redundancy 
payments in case of redundancy, and to give adequate reasons for dismissal. The system 
of National Insurance provides some minimal protection against unemployment, through 
a so-called ‘jobseekers allowance’. The main government institution for labour market 
policies in the 1970s and 1980s was the Manpower Services Commission (MSC). It was 
created in 1973 and part of the more corporatist institutional infrastructure of the UK 
before the late 1970s. Hence its board was made up of representatives of industry, trade 
unions, local government and the education sector. It was responsible for labour market 
intermediation, administrating work creation schemes, and coordinating training 
programmes. MSC was disbanded in 1990 and replaced by a network of Training and 
Enterprise Councils; while its labour market intermediation activities were split off 
already in 1987 and incorporated in the Employment Service Jobcentres (Cole, 2007; 
Rainbird, 2010). During the late 1970s and 1980s levels of unemployment rose quickly in 
many parts of the United Kingdom as a result of the loss of manufacturing employment. 
After the options of a hiring stop and (early) retirement were exhausted, redundant 
workers were mostly dismissed and received a redundancy payment (Bain, 1992). 
Schemes for replacement and retraining were not as elaborate as in West-Germany. The 
Manpower Services Commission was normally involved in large-scale restructuring 
operations: counselling redundant personnel, offering intermediation services, and if 
needed, referring workers to various types of training (Young, 1987). Moreover, for the 
long-term unemployed, MSC ran several make-work and training programmes, such as 
the Special Temporary Employment Programme, the Community Programme, the 
Community Industry Scheme, the Training Opportunities Scheme, and the Job Training 
Scheme (Foord et al., 1985; Finegold and Sockice, 1988). 
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As a result of the disruptive effects of deindustrialisation, many areas in the UK thus 
coped with mass unemployment in the late 1970s and 1980s. This added to the already 
strongly polarised labour market in the United Kingdom. Large segments of the labour 
market are characterised by a low-skill equilibrium (Finegold and Soskice, 1988; Finegold, 
1993; Wilson and Hogarth, 2003). A significant proportion of the economy relies on low 
wages and produces standardised and relatively low value products and services, which 
leads companies to underinvest in training and skills of their employees. Young people 
and workers also lack incentives to pursue the further development of their skills and 
qualifications, as most jobs available will not require this. In some segments (managerial 
occupations, business services, high-technology, financial services) a more high-skill 
equilibrium does exist however, with highly qualified personnel who receive ample 
opportunities for further training. These patterns have been reinforced by the education 
system and by government policy. The education system caters well for young people 
with the ambition and competences to enter higher education, and hence the United 
Kingdom has a relatively high proportion of people with university education. The system 
of vocational education is however fragmented and overall poorly regarded (Finegold and 
Soskice, 1988; Rainbird, 2010). Compulsory education ends at age 16, and for those 
entering the labour market the dominant policy has been to leave investment in training 
to businesses and individuals. Apprenticeships and any further training for employees, 
have thus historically been provided on a voluntaristic basis (with the exception of the 
period between 1964 and 1981 when a levy-grant mechanism was in place) (Rainbird, 
2010). The various governments since 1979 (both Conservative and Labour) have enacted 
many initiatives to bolster the skill levels at the lower end of the labour market (through 
various programmes by the Manpower Services Commission and its successors), and to 
persuade employers to invest more in skills and qualifications (Finegold and Soskice, 
1988; Rainbird, 2010; Martin and Swank, 2012). The principle of voluntarism has however 
not been abandoned, and the low-skill equilibrium has persisted in large parts of the 
labour market (Wilson and Hogarth, 2003; Martin and Swank, 2012; Dawley et al., 2014). 
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The main focal point in the policy responses in the United Kingdom in the context of 
deindustrialisation, has however been urban regeneration. Urban policy had already 
started in 1968, with the introduction of the Urban Programme, to tackle concentrations 
of poverty in British cities (Rundle, 2005). However, especially in the Thatcher years, the 
objective of urban policy changed from combatting poverty and social inequalities, to 
promoting economic growth. Urban policy became effectively economic development 
policy, as ‘property-led regeneration’ was adopted as the leading idea: physical 
regeneration would stimulate new economic activities, which would ‘trickle down’ to 
have wider social benefits, e.g. offering new employment opportunities, remove 
dereliction, reduce crime, increase options in housing and amenities, etc. (Robinson and 
Shaw, 1994). This philosophy was among other things influenced by the alleged successes 
of American cities such as Baltimore and Boston, which had transformed their downtown 
areas and seemed to have turned around their economic fortunes (Loftman and Nevin, 
1995). The main instrument for urban regeneration in the main conurbations of England 
and Wales, were the Urban Development Corporations (UDCs). The first generation UDCs 
were established in 1981 (for the London Docklands and for Merseyside), a second 
generation in late 1980s, and a third generation in the early 1990s. UDCs were assigned 
particular urban development areas, and, for a limited period of time (usually 10 years), 
were given wide-ranging powers and resources to regenerate these areas (Robinson et 
al., 1993). UDCs had significant planning powers within their area, and could bypass the 
statutory planning permissions of local authorities (though they were obliged to ‘consult’ 
with local authorities). Their task was to ‘lever in’ private sector investment, as such 
investment would ‘naturally’ lead to the creation of new employment for local people 
and other community benefits. From the early 1990s onwards the focal point in urban 
regeneration again shifted, this time away from an exclusive focus on economic 
development. Several new programmes were enacted, such as City Challenge (1991-
1994), the Single Regeneration Budget (1994-2001), and Urban Regeneration Companies 
(from 1999), with a greater emphasis on a partnership approach with local authorities 
and local stakeholders (Robinson and Shaw, 1994; Rundle, 2005). 
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 Evolution of policies at the European level 5.5.
European policies have played an important role in the adaptation process of steel 
communities in Germany and the United Kingdom, affected by the steel crisis and 
deindustrialisation. First, crisis management of steel crisis was to a considerable extent a 
European affair. Second, a significant share of the resources for the mitigation of the 
social consequences of restructuring heavy industries in general and the steel industry in 
particular, and subsequent interventions to create a new economic base, came from 
European funds. 
 
The Treaty of Paris between France, West-Germany, The Netherlands, Belgium. 
Luxembourg and Italy, led to the establishment of European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) in 1952. The philosophy behind the ECSC was to restore the ‘natural unity’ of the 
industrial triangle of Western Europe between the Ruhr, Lorraine, northern France, 
Saarland, Luxembourg, most of Belgium, and the southern part of The Netherlands 
(Tsoukalis and Strauss, 1987, p. 188). The objective was to create a common market for 
steel and coal, by removing internal tariffs, quantitative restrictions and forms of state 
aid. Together with these intentions to liberalise and deregulate the market for steel and 
coal, the High Authority of the ECSC was given extensive powers to intervene in case of an 
imminent or manifest crisis. By means of the subsequent Treaty of Rome, the European 
Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community were founded 
in 1958, to deepen the collaboration on economic and energy matters between the six 
countries. The executive bodies of the three Communities were merged in 1967, to form 
the Commission of the European Communities. The United Kingdom (together with 
Ireland and Denmark) joined the European Communities in 1973. The Treaties of 
Maastricht in 1992 and Lisbon in 2007 further streamlined and extended the institutional 
framework of what is now called the European Union (EU).   
 
During the steel crisis the powers that the Treaty of Paris granted to the Commission (the 
successor of the High Authority for the European Coal and Steel Community) were used 
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for the first time. Initially the presumption was that the steel crisis would be temporary 
and would end when the economic situation would improve again. By 1977 however, the 
problems proved to be more serious and long-lasting than expected, and the Commission 
intervened for the first time. This coincided with the formation of the European 
Association of Iron and Steel Producing Industries (Eurofer), as a cartel and representative 
body for the steel industry in Europe. The overall approach was one of stabilising the 
market, through voluntary and - if needed – mandatory production and price measures, 
and through controls on imports from mainly Japan and Eastern Europe (Tsoukalis and 
Strauss, 1987; Voelzkow, 2004). This stability was seen as a precondition for an orderly 
process of restructuring and reducing capacity (Commission of the European 
Communities, 1987). The Simonet-plan of 1977 called for a system of voluntary 
production quotas. The subsequent First Davignon-plan which was operational from 1977 
until 1980, instituted a system of indicative and voluntary minimum prices (with 
mandatory minimum prices for one product category: reinforcing bars). Moreover, 
capacity reduction within the European steel industry became an explicit objective. In 
1978, agreements on voluntary export restraints with the main steel exporters to Europe 
were concluded. After the second oil crisis of 1979 the situation in the steel industry 
changed for the worst, and the voluntary measures implemented by the Eurofer-cartel 
fell apart. A state of ‘manifest crisis’ was declared in 1980, which led to the 
implementation of the Second Davignon-plan, running from 1980 until 1988. This plan 
introduced a system of mandatory production quotas for most steel products; from 1981 
onwards this was supplemented by a system of minimum prices. Furthermore, the 
Commission put additional pressure on member states and steel firms to downsize and 
restructure, by only giving approval for state aid when production capacity was reduced 
(Commission of the European Communities, 1987). The regime of production quotas and 
minimum prices was gradually relaxed after 1985, and abolished in 1988. Since 1988 the 
European Commission has applied an essentially non-interventionist policy towards the 
steel industry, strictly enforcing competition rules and rules prohibiting state aid (Sadler, 
1992). 
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The European Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic Community offered 
extensive support for the redundant steel workers and communities affected by closures 
and restructuring. Through the ECSC, ‘readaptation aid’ was available for redundant steel 
workers, which would pay for supplementary unemployment allowances, the costs of 
early retirement, redundancy payments, and expenses for retraining. Also through the 
EECs’ European Social Fund aid was available for reemployment and work creation 
programmes. These European monies could make up as much as 50% of the total 
expenses for coping with the immediate effects of restructuring operations (Bain, 1992).  
 
For the more long-term economic development policies, European support was available 
through several instruments. Through the ECSC favourable loans could be provided for 
investment projects which offered employment prospects for redundant steel workers 
(Young, 1987). Also the European Investment Bank could grant such loans. Most 
importantly however, support was available through the European Structural Funds; 
mainly the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) but also the European Social 
Fund (ESF). The size of these funds increased considerably from 1975 (when the ERDF was 
established) until the late 1980s, and they were increasingly employed to support regions 
dealing with the negative effects of deindustrialisation (Michie and Fitzgerald, 1997). In 
1988 – following the accession of Spain, Greece, and Portugal in 1986, and anticipating 
the completion of the common market in Europe in 1992 – the procedures with regard to 
these funds were reformed, while they again received extra money from the Community 
budget. The allocation of funds would be less piecemeal, and more programme-based. 
Furthermore, subnational governments in the member states would have an explicit role 
in the formulation and execution of these programmes. Hence there was a move to a 
‘multi-level governance’ framework in European regional development policy (Voelzkow, 
2004). Support for regions coping with deindustrialisation became an explicit objective 
under Objective 2: “conversion of regions facing industrial decline”. Moreover, a 
proportion of the Structural Funds (about 15%) was reserved for Community Initiatives 
(which were not allocated according to specific national quotas, but freely allocated by 
the Commission according to certain criteria). One of these initiatives (RESIDER) was 
121 
 
aimed at conversion of regions affected by restructuring in the steel industry and ran 
from 1988 until 1999 (similar initiatives existed for regions which were dependent on the 
coal mining industry, the shipbuilding industry, and the textiles industry) (Michie and 
Fitzgerald, 1997). European support under Objective 2 and the Community Initiatives, was 
mainly spent on urban regeneration projects, investments in infrastructure, and support 
for SMEs (Sadler, 1992). After 1999, in anticipation of the accession of 10 new member 
countries (mainly in Eastern Europe) in 2004, the procedures and criteria were reformed 
once more. The explicit objective for the reconversion of old industrial regions was 
dropped, and subsumed under a more general objective to promote regional 
competitiveness and employment. This also meant that the attention increasingly shifted 
towards innovation and entrepreneurship support policies, and away from urban 
regeneration and investment in infrastructure. 
 
 
 Conclusions 5.6.
In the latter half of the 1970s and first part of the 1980s, many parts of Western Europe 
and North-America went through a relatively rapid and disruptive process of 
deindustrialisation. This process strongly affected the economic base in many localities 
and regions, and meant a loss of employment on a large scale. To some extent 
deindustrialisation appears to be a ‘natural and inevitable’ phenomenon, but it was also 
partly ameliorated or exacerbated by particular reactions of firms and of governments. 
The process of deindustrialisation itself as well as the recovery from deindustrialisation, 
have been very uneven between different regions. The steel crisis from 1974 until about 
1987, was a particular episode within the deindustrialisation process. Because of certain 
characteristics of the steel industry (levelling off of demand in Europe and North-America, 
strong international competition, new production technologies, economies of scale), and 
because of a high level of government intervention (in expanding and modernising the 
industry, and in preserving employment and capacity), the steel crisis presented a 
particularly violent and disruptive shock in the regions where the steel industry was 
concentrated. 
122 
 
 
Deindustrialisation and the steel crisis have not been as pronounced and disruptive in 
West-Germany as elsewhere. Nevertheless, especially the Ruhr Area and Saarland have 
been hit hard, and have had to cope with large-scale restructuring operations in their 
industrial base and related losses in employment. During the steel crisis, the federal state 
has not supported the steel industry as extensively as in other European countries; 
although by way of exception the steel industry in Saarland has received considerable 
assistance. The wider institutional environment in West-Germany, is characterised by a 
federal government structure, which is distinctly cooperative rather than competitive, 
and an economic organisation which has tried to embed economic relations in wider 
social relations (the so-called ‘social market economy’). The federal government has tried 
to mitigate the negative social consequences of deindustrialisation and the steel crisis by 
subsidising provisions for redundant personnel, and through active labour market 
policies. The more long-term prospects for the regions affected by deindustrialisation and 
the steel crisis, have been helped by programmes under the Joint Task for the 
Improvement of the Regional Economic Structure and the Urban Development Promotion 
Act, and by the excellent networks to support research, technology and innovation. 
Moreover, the dual vocational system has been successful in producing and maintaining a 
relatively evenly skilled labour force (though since the late 1990s there has been an 
increasing polarisation on the labour market). 
 
In the United Kingdom by contrast, deindustrialisation has in substantial parts of the 
country been traumatic and distressing experience, and particularly so in the regions in 
which the steel industry was primarily located. The state did provide support for the 
modernisation of the industry, and later assured the survival of the British Steel 
Corporation. However, a shift in policy meant a rapid and uncontrolled downsizing in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s. Little was done in general to keep redundant workers in 
employment. The Manpower Services Commission did try to cope with high 
unemployment in certain areas through make-work and retraining programmes. The shift 
in policy that affected BSC, was also visible in other domains of economic policy, 
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especially after the installation of the Thatcher-government in 1979: a Keynesian macro-
economic policy aimed at full employment was replaced by a Monetarist policy, mainly 
aimed at combatting inflation. Furthermore, the corporatist institutions that 
characterised the economic organisation before, were abolished or side-lined, and gave 
way for liberalisation and deregulation. This was possible because of the electoral system 
and government structure in the UK gives the ruling government extensive powers. 
Moreover, the government structure is highly centralised and does not offer any 
constitutional protection for local governments, which limits the possibilities for 
alternative policies at the local and regional levels. Also in subnational economic policy 
this shift could be observed, with policy moving from regional development grants before 
the 1980s to ‘property-led regeneration’ in the 1980s and 1990s. In 1999, The New 
Labour government instituted Regional Development Agencies, with some devolved 
powers and resources for regional economic development, which were abolished again in 
2011. Mass unemployment in the 1980s in some parts of the UK added to the already 
strongly polarised labour market. In considerable segments, a low skill equilibrium seems 
to persist, in which many firms do not require better skilled workers. The somewhat 
fragmented system of vocational education, together with a lack of investment in the 
further training of young people by firms, has also reinforced this pattern.  
 
At the European level, the European Coal and Steel Community provided a framework for 
a coordinated management of the steel crisis. Through production quotas, minimum 
prices and import controls, attempts were made to stabilise the market. Furthermore, the 
European Commission pushed for the reduction of capacity, but resistance by national 
governments and steel companies against further closures and against limits on new 
investments, proved to be strong. Only after 1988 the steel industry became to be 
regarded as a more or less regular sector, in which the rules for competition and state-aid 
should be strictly enforced. The effect has been that the steel industry has rapidly 
consolidated and internationalised, with the rise of multinational companies with 
production locations in many countries. The ECSC and the European Economic 
Community, have also been important in providing support for the redundant workers 
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and affected communities. Moreover, the Structural Funds (the ERDF, ESF and 
Community Initiatives) have co-financed many initiatives in economic development in 
regions suffering from deindustrialisation and the steel crisis.  
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Chapter 6. STRUCTURAL CHANGE, THE STEEL CRISIS AND THE EVOLUTION OF POLICY AND 
GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH SAARLAND (GERMANY) 
 
 
 Introduction 6.1.
In this Chapter I will discuss the process of deindustrialisation, the steel crisis and the 
evolution of policies and governance arrangements to cope with these changes in the 
economic structure, in South Saarland. In the next Chapter I will do the same for Teesside. 
In Chapter 8, I will compare the two cases, examine how both city-regions have fared with 
regard to adaptation and resilience on the long run, and discuss in which ways the 
broader institutional environment has been important in shaping policy and governance. I 
will first outline some key characteristics of South Saarland, and then review the 
economic development of the area up until the 1970s. In sections 6.4 and 6.5 I will discuss 
the process of structural change, respectively the steel crisis and crisis management. The 
evolution of policy and governance since the early 1970s is central in section 6.6. The 
Chapter will then end with some conclusions.  
 
 
 Key characteristics 6.2.
Saarland is one of the Länder which constitute the Federal Republic of Germany. The 
capital city and largest city of Saarland is Saarbrücken (population currently 177.000). 
Saarland is Germany’s smallest state outside of the city-states of Berlin, Hamburg and 
Bremen. It is located in the South-West of Germany, on the borders with France and 
Luxemburg (see Figure 9). Within the Federal Republic of Germany, its location can be 
considered peripheral: it is located at quite some distance from the main economic 
centres such as Mannheim to the east – which is nearest at about 120 km from 
Saarbrücken. Frankfurt to the northeast, Stuttgart to the southeast, and Bonn and 
Cologne to the north, are even farther away. Within Germany, Saarland only shares 
borders with the state of Rhineland-Palatinate (‘Rheinland-Pfalz’). Over the border with 
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France to the west and south of Saarland is the region of Lorraine. The main cities in 
Lorraine – Metz and Nancy – are at about 70km respectively 100 km from Saarbrücken. 
To the west, Saarland borders Luxemburg; the distance between Luxemburg City and 
Saarbrücken is about 90 km. 
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Source: http://www.college.columbia.edu/core/sites/core/files/images/Germany_general_map.png 
Figure 9: The location of Saarland within Germany 
 
The landscape of Saarland is characterised by thickly forested hills, intersected in the 
southern part of Saarland by the Saar-valley and Saar-river. The Saar-river flows from the 
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Vosges Mountains to near Trier – just north of Saarland - where it joins with the Moselle-
river (which in turn is one of the major tributaries of the Rhine). The small rivers of Prims 
and Blies flow into the Saar from the northern parts of the region. To the south of the 
Moselle-river and to the east of the Rhine is the low mountain range of the Hunsrück, 
which stretches into the north of Saarland. The state’s highest point is in the Weiskircher 
Heights (near the town of Wadern) at 695 metres. To the south of the Saar-river, the hills 
surrounding the valley pass into the Lorraine plateau. The area extending from across the 
French border in the west (into the eastern part of Lorraine) to Saarlouis and Völklingen 
and further to Neunkirchen in the east, is home to large reserves of coal, and hence made 
up the Saar coalfield. In Lorraine, to the West of Metz and Nancy significant reserves of 
iron ore can be found (so called ‘minette ore’). 
 
At the local level, Saarland incorporates about 50 municipalities (Gemeinden or 
Kommunen). Before the administrative reform of 1974 there were about 345 
municipalities. A district (‘Landeskreis’) is made up of several municipalities; and Saarland 
currently contains 6 districts. Saarbrücken used to be a so-called ‘kreisfreie Stadt’, 
meaning that it was not incorporated into a district. However, since 1974, it belongs with 
its surrounding municipalities to the Stadtverband Saarbrücken (since 2008 renamed 
Regionalverband Saarbrücken). The other five districts in Saarland are: Merzig-Wadern, 
Sankt Wendel, Saarlouis, Neunkirchen and Saarpfalz.  
 
South Saarland is the larger metropolitan area of Saarbrücken. This is historically the 
industrial heartland of Saarland. To the west of Saarbrücken, further downstream of the 
river Saar, lie the towns of Völklingen, Saarlouis and Dillingen, where a lot of economic 
activity has concentrated. On the eastern side of Saarbrücken, also the towns of Sankt 
Ingbert, Neunkirchen and Homburg and surrounding areas should be considered part of 
the conurbation. In the past, this area was the centre of coal mining in the region. For 
practical purposes South Saarland can be delineated by the Regionalverband Saarbrücken 
and the Landkreise of Saarlouis, Neunkirchen and Saarpfalz (see Figure 10 below). The 
northern part of Saarland consisting of the Landkreise of Merzig-Wadern and Sankt 
129 
 
Wendel is more mountainous, much less densely populated, and has remained more 
rural.  
 
 
Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c7/Saarland_karte_neu.png 
Figure 10: Saarland, with South Saarland consisting of the Regional- / Stadtverband 
Saarbrücken and the Landkreise of Saarlouis, Neunkirchen and Saarpfalz. 
 
Even though the area of interest is South Saarland, much data is available only for the 
Land as a whole. Moreover, the main administrative body for the South Saarland area, is 
the government of Saarland. In the remainder of this chapter, many statistics refer to all 
of Saarland (and not just South Saarland), and also many of policies and governance 
arrangements enacted apply to the whole of Saarland. However, South Saarland is very 
much the dominant part of Saarland in terms of economic activity and population; so 
statistics for Saarland as a whole, will be a reasonable reflection of South Saarland (see 
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Table 10); and the governance arrangements and policies to be discussed were focussed 
mainly on the issues in South Saarland.  
 
 1970 2010 
 South Saarland Saarland South Saarland Saarland 
Population size 926,354 1,121,300 822,128 1,017,567 
Total area 1,538 km2 2,570 km2 1,537 km2 2,570 km2 
Population density 602 p/km2 436 p/km2 535 p/km2 396 p/km2 
Total employment 320,000 410,000 350,000. 455,000 
Sources: www.saarland.de; Statistisches Landesamt Saarland (Statistisches Handbuch für das Saarland and 
Statistisches Jahrbuch Saarland); Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung Rheinland-Pfalz-Saarland. 
Table 10: Key facts for South Saarland and Saarland 
 
 
 Economic development until the 1970s 6.3.
 
6.3.1. Economic development until the 1960s 
Saarland has had a particularly turbulent history in the past 150 years. It industrialised 
rapidly in the latter half of the 19th century, but its further development in the first half of 
the 20th century was stalled by the First and Second World Wars and two episodes in 
which the orientation changed from Germany to France and back to Germany. Coal 
mining and iron and steel became the dominant industries in Saarland. These industries 
have in more than one way defined the area. In a most literal sense, as Saarland (which 
was made up of parts of Prussia and Bavaria before 1919), was delineated as a separate 
territory on the basis of its coal mines and steel plants, when control of the area was 
transferred to France as part of the German reparations following the First World War. 
Moreover, coal mining and the iron- and steel industry importantly influenced the 
development of the built environment in especially South Saarland (housing, settlement 
patterns and infrastructure), and the social relationships within the community, with the 
relationships between employers and workers characterised by much paternalism in the 
past. 
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Building on several iron works and coal mining operations that were already established 
in the preceding centuries, Saarland industrialised very quickly and on a large-scale after 
the unification of Germany in 1871. The German Imperial state invested heavily in new 
infrastructure and the expansion of coal mining, while private initiative exploited the 
favourable conditions for the continued expansion of the iron- and steel-industry. In 
addition to the already existing works in Neunkirchen and Dillingen, new iron- and 
steelplants were established in Burbach (near Saarbrücken) in 1856, and in Völklingen in 
1873. And coal mining grew rapidly in terms of number of mines, production, and number 
of people employed. The German occupation of parts of Lorraine and the Alsace after the 
Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71 created new possibilities for the Saarland economy, as 
industrialists from Saarland could expand in Lorraine and could exploit the large deposits 
of iron ore (‘minette ore’) to be found there (Burtenshaw, 1976). Hence in this period, 
coal mining, iron and steel production and iron ore mining, in Saarland, Lorraine and 
Luxemburg became closely linked, through interconnecting supply lines, concessions and 
firm ownership (Burtenshaw, 1976). This region stretches out in a triangular form from 
the eastern area of South Saarland (Neunkirchen / Homburg) to the area around Nancy, 
and northwards to Longwy at the border between France, Luxemburg and Belgium; hence 
the region is also referred to as the ’Montandreieck’ (triangle of steel and coal).  
 
By the late 19th century Saarland had become the third-biggest industrial region in the 
German Empire, after the Ruhr Area and Upper Silesia (Schreiber and Zwick, 2012). This 
also led to a sizeable migration into Saarland from surrounding regions such as the Eifel, 
Hunsrück and the Palatinate, and the formation of miner’s colonies around coal mines 
(Warscheid et al., 2011). As a result, the settlement pattern of South Saarland is 
somewhat distinctive, with many small settlements and towns spread over the landscape 
with small distances between them, and only a few urban cores (Jost, 1989). The iron- 
and steel industry was owned by several private entrepreneurs, most notably the Stumm-
family in Neunkirchen and Röchling-family in Völklingen; whereas the coal mines 
continued to be owned by the German Imperial state (Schreiber and Zwick, 2012). In both 
cases the relations between employees and employers were characterised by a general 
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‘paternalism’, in which employers made services like housing and health care available to 
employees, but also demanded the full compliance of labourers (Schreiber and Zwick, 
2012). 
 
The dominance of coal mining and steel industry thus stretched beyond the area’s 
economy: it also had a considerable influence on the built environment and the social 
relations between workers and industrialists. Moreover, following the First World War, 
the presence of these two industries would have political and territorial consequences, 
which would further reinforce their pre-eminence in the years to come. As part of the 
reparation settlements, France gained control of the coal mines in Saarland and several 
other key parts of the economy, including the steel plants of Neunkirchen and Dillingen. It 
was at this time, that Saarland (then called the ‘Territory of the Saar Basin’) was 
delineated for the first time as a separate territorial unit, made up of parts which 
previously belonged to Prussia and Bavaria. It was explicitly defined on the basis of the 
core of heavy industry and the more rural areas to the north and west of this core, in 
which many people lived who were employed in these industries (Reitel, 1989). 
 
In the first half of the 20th century the further economic development of Saarland was 
impeded considerably by the First and Second World Wars, and connected with this, the 
fact that it changed hands back and forth on two instances between France and Germany. 
Following the First World War, it was controlled by France, as mentioned.41 In 1935, the 
Saargebiet was reunited again with the rest of Germany, then under Nazi-rule. After the 
Second World War (1939-1945) – in which Saarland suffered from many air raids – France 
again took on the administration of Saarland (then called the ‘Saar Protectorate’), and 
again attempts were made to integrate Saarland within the French economic and cultural 
sphere, e.g. by reintroducing the franc as currency, taking over the ownership of the coal 
mines, and founding the University of Saarland in 1947 which taught in both French and 
German (and which was at first an annex to the University of Nancy). After the Allied 
                                                     
41
 Though formally it was administered by the League of Nations, with France together with the United 
Kingdom acting on its behalf. In practice, administration fell mostly to France. 
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occupation of West-Germany following the Second World War had ended in 1955, the 
French held a referendum on the future of Saarland. This eventually resulted in Saarland 
again becoming part of the Federal Republic of Germany, as its 10th state. Full economic 
integration did not take place until July 1959 however, when the Deutsche Mark replaced 
the franc as the currency (Burtenshaw, 1976).  
 
The frequent shifts in boundaries and administrative control in the Saarland-Lorraine 
region between Germany and France, and some of the destructions brought about by the 
two World Wars, had left a large mark on the prospects for the further development of 
Saarland. Firstly, because of uncertainties about access to resources and markets, and 
instability in administration and institutions, new investments in capital and infrastructure 
were held back (relative to other places) (Burtenshaw, 1972; Burtenshaw, 1976; 
Rentmeister, 2006). Technologically the region had fallen behind especially in the iron and 
steel industry and other manufacturing industries (Rentmeister, 2006; Schreiber and 
Zwick, 2012). Moreover, the infrastructure in Saarland was underdeveloped: under 
French rule there was no investment in motorways, and Saarland was poorly connected 
to other centres within Germany (Jost and Moll, 2007). Secondly, due to the French 
occupation immediately after the war, Saarland missed out on the support from the 
Marshall-plan and the strong economic growth in Germany in the 1950s (Burtenshaw, 
1972; Warscheid et al., 2011). Furthermore, it could not benefit from the resettlement of 
major companies and plants originally located in the eastern parts of Germany, following 
the division of the country after the Second World War. The competitiveness of the 
Saarland economy was further hampered by the high valuation of the franc relative to the 
Deutsche Mark (Warscheid et al., 2011). 
 
Immediately after reunification several manufacturing firms in for example machinery 
and consumer goods (e.g. domestic appliances and white goods), could not cope with the 
competition from other German firms, and they either went bankrupt or were taken over 
(Warscheid et al., 2011). This further accentuated the one-sidedness of the economic 
structure. So by the late 1950s, the South Saarland economy was still highly dependent 
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on steel and coal mining. The steel industry employed about 40,000 people, and 
produced about 3.5 million tonnes of crude steel per year (Schreiber and Zwick, 2012). 
The coal mines employed over 60,000 people in 18 mines (Warscheid et al., 2011). Over 
55% of manufacturing employment in Saarland was in steel and coal mining, which 
represented close to 30% of total employment (Warscheid et al., 2011; Lerch and Simon, 
2011). Even though Saarland achieved near full employment in the late 1950s, the 
foundations for economic development were particularly fragile, given the considerable 
reliance on only two industries, which moreover lacked modern technology, equipment 
and infrastructure. 
 
 
6.3.2. Economy by the early 1970s 
During the 1960s it began to become visible that the reliance on coal mining and iron and 
steel in Saarland was problematic. While the iron and steel industry still prospered in this 
period, coal mining started its protracted decline.  
 
After reunification with the Federal Republic of Germany, the steel industry managed to 
profit from the post-war economic growth in Germany. Because of a backlog in 
investments, the steel industry invested heavily in modernisation of the plants 
(Rentmeister, 2006). However, technological advances in steel-making such as large 
diameter blast furnaces and basic oxygen steel (BOS) converters, benefited iron and steel 
plants at coastal locations, which mainly used iron-rich ores and coke imported from 
locations further away (Burtenshaw, 1972; Burtenshaw, 1976). The iron and steel plants 
in South Saarland were at a disadvantage as large parts of the Saar-river were not suitable 
for transport of bulk goods, and hence transport of resources and products still relied 
mainly on the railways. Part of the investments were aimed at improving productivity to 
offset these disadvantages, which coincided with a diminishing dependence on iron ore 
from Lorraine and coal from Saarland (though these still represented by far the largest 
shares) (Burtenshaw, 1976). After a short slump in the German economy in 1966 / 67, the 
steel producers in South Saarland agreed to a work-sharing arrangement. This 
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arrangement was later transformed into one of the four rationalisation groups in 
Germany (’Rationalisierungsgruppe Südwest‘) in 1971, with the aim to coordinate product 
specialisation, investment decisions, iron ore purchases and transport arrangements 
(Burtenshaw, 1976).42 However, the companies and plants in Saarland remained relatively 
small, and the ownership remained fragmented, which put limits to the extent of 
cooperation (Brücher, 1989). 
 
By 1970 there were four integrated iron and steel plants at different locations in South 
Saarland: the Röchling’sche Eisen und Stahlwerke in Völklingen, ARBED Vereinigte 
Hüttenwerke in Burbach (owned by the Luxemburg-based firm ARBED), the Neunkircher 
Eisenwerk in Neunkirchen, and the Dillinger Hütte in Dillingen (indicated in dark red in 
Figure 11). In addition, two smaller plants were operational: the Halberger Hütte at 
Brebach (near Saarbrücken), then specialising in pipes and tubes; and Stahlwerk Bous 
(naar Saarlouis), an electric arc furnace owned at that time by Mannesmann (indicated in 
a lighter shade of red in the map below). By the early 1970s, the iron and steel industry 
could look back at a prosperous decade in which crude steel production had risen to 
about 5.5 million tonnes, with 47.000 people employed. However, despite investments in 
technological advances and capital outlays, the long-term competitiveness of the industry 
was already seriously in question (Burtenshaw, 1972; Marzen, 1994; Rentmeister, 2006; 
Schreiber and Zwick, 2012). 
 
                                                     
42
 This was sanctioned by the European Coal and Steel Community. The coordination of production quotas 
or prices was however not allowed. 
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Source: Rolshoven (1974) 
Figure 11: The ‘Montandreieck’ within Saarland, Lorraine and Luxemburg in the early 
1970s, with steel plants in Saarland (in red) and the Saar coalfield 
 
 
After 1957, the ownership of the coal mines in Saarland was transferred from ‘Mission 
Française des Mines de la Sarre‘ to the newly founded ‘Saarbergwerke AG‘, owned for 
74% by the Federal Government of Germany and for 26% by the Saarland government 
(Warscheid et al., 2011). Immediately after this, coal mining started to experience serious 
difficulties as a result of competition from cheaper oil and natural gas, overcapacity 
because of rapid expansion following the Second World War, and the comparatively high 
costs of coal mining in Saarland43 (Burtenshaw, 1976; Dörrenbacher, 2007; Warscheid et 
al., 2011). Hence coal mining declined dramatically in the 1960s: by the early 1970s, 12 of 
the 18 mines had closed, employment had fallen from over 60,000 to about 27,000, and 
                                                     
43
 Due to the geology of the coal field, with the need to dig deep under the surface and often mine steeply 
diagonal coal seams; and the strict health and safety regulations. 
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output went down from 16.3 million tonnes to about 10.7 million tonnes (Burtenshaw, 
1972; Warscheid et al., 2011). So before being faced with a steel crisis, Saarland was 
already confronted with a coal crisis (‘Kohlenkrise‘ or ‘Erste Montankrise‘) from the late 
1950s until the late 1960s. 
 
Already by the early 1960s there was a growing acknowledgement that the crisis in coal 
mining was structural rather than temporary (Dörrenbächer, 2007). Saarbergwerke 
adapted by a series of measures to cut costs and rationalise production, by concentrating 
operations into fewer, larger and more mechanised mines, and by diversifying into new 
areas (Dörrenbächer, 1989; Dörrenbächer, 2007). The Federal government began to 
provide long-term subsidies for coal mining, to keep German coal competitive vis-à-vis 
imported coal from overseas (Dörrenbächer, 1989; Dörrenbächer, 2007). 
 
Despite the loss of over 35.000 jobs in coal mining from 1957 until the early 1970s, 
unemployment in Saarland stayed relatively low. In the first half of the 1960s this was 
mainly due to the fact that many miners who were made redundant, were close to their 
retirement age (Burtenshaw, 1972), and many others could find jobs in the booming iron 
and steel industry and in other growing sections of the economy (Warscheid et al., 2011). 
Moreover, about 20.000 younger workers left Saarland in search of better opportunities 
in more prosperous parts of West Germany (Burtenshaw, 1976; Esser and Väth, 1986). 
Initially there was resistance from mainly the iron and steel industry and other vested 
interests to any additional measures to promote the economy and the settlement of firms 
from outside the region in Saarland, as under conditions of near full employment this 
would push up wages and hence the costs of labour (Judith, 1980; Jost, 1989). 
Furthermore, the financial situation of the Saarland government was problematic, due to 
the investments in the late 1950s and early 1960s associated with the reunification with 
West-Germany (Hahn, 2003). Hence efforts to diversify the economic base of the Land 
were deferred, despite calls that this was necessary for the long-term prospects of the 
economy (e.g. Sievert and Streit, 1964; Müller, 1967; Isenberg, 1968). 
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In the recession of 1966-1967 however, unemployment reached 4%, which was the 
highest in West-Germany at the time. As a response the Saarland government, with 
considerable support from the Federal government, initiated an extensive programme of 
measures to generate employment and stimulate the regional economy. The core of 
these measures consisted on the one hand of investments in infrastructure, and on the 
other hand in measures to attract inward investment (Minister für Wirtschaft, Verkehr, 
und Landwirtschaft Saarland, 1969; Burtenshaw, 1972; Burtenshaw, 1976; Warscheid et 
al., 2011). In section 6.6.2, these efforts will be described in more detail; but they proved 
very successful. They generated much new employment in the region to offset the job 
losses in coal mining (and later on in the 1970s and 1980s, also some of the job losses in 
iron and steel). Moreover, the economic base of South Saarland became more diversified. 
In the period from 1968 until 1972 around 90 firms were attracted to invest in Saarland 
(Giersch, 2007), in diverse fields of manufacturing, such as automotive, electronics, 
household appliances, textiles, machinery, metalworking (Burtenshaw, 1972). The largest 
and most lasting effect on the regional economy of the influx of inward investment during 
this period, would come from a number of firms in the automotive sector (both car 
manufacturing and suppliers), such as Ford (which opened a new production plant in 
1968 in Saarlouis), ZF (a producer of gearboxes, which settled in Saarbrücken in 1973), 
and Michelin (which settled in Homburg in 1971) (Warscheid et al., 2011). These firms, 
together with a number of firms already present in Saarland, laid the basis for the 
automotive sector eventually becoming a new mainstay of the regional economy. 
 
In summary, the iron and steel industry in South Saarland was expanding in the 1960s and 
early 1970s, but nonetheless its competitiveness was already at issue. With the increasing 
need to use iron ore and coking coal from elsewhere, its inland location proved a 
disadvantage. This was exacerbated by the comparatively small plants with much out-of-
date equipment, together with a fragmented ownership structure. Coal mining started its 
long-term decline from the late 1950s, which seriously began to affect the Saarland 
economy in the mid-1960s. With support from the Federal government, the Saarland 
government enacted a series of measures to modernise and diversify the economy, and 
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generate new employment, mainly by attracting inward investment. This proved to be 
successful: with the pouring in of inward investment from other regions in Germany and 
from abroad, the Saarland economy was experiencing a period of high growth in the early 
1970s; and it was catching up with other regions in Germany, in terms of GDP per head 
and employment (Burtenshaw, 1976; Warscheid et al., 2011).  
 
 
 The process of structural change 6.4.
Thus the process of structural change had already started in the 1960s, with the demise 
of coal mining. In the decades to follow, the economy in South Saarland would undergo 
even more significant changes. As can be seen in Figure 12, during the steel crisis 
employment in the iron and steel industry fell rapidly from the mid-1970s onwards, with 
over 22,000 jobs being lost between 1975 and the end of the 1980s. This will be further 
discussed in the next section. Also coal mining continued its decline, though less rapidly 
than in the 1960s. Coal mining actually resurged for a period in terms of employment and 
output, as a consequence of the oil crises in 1973 and in the beginning of the 1980s 
(Rentmeister, 2006; Dörrenbächer, 2007; Warscheid et al., 2011). However, from the mid-
1980s decline set in again, and after further closures of coal mines in the 1990s and 
2000s, coal mining in Saarland ended altogether in June 2012. At the same time coal 
mining and iron and steel declined, the automotive sector – one of the industries which 
was attracted at the end of the 1960s – grew quite quickly to become the new backbone 
of the regional economy (Giersch, 2007; Schulz and Dörrenbächer, 2007; Warscheid et al., 
2011). 
 
140 
 
 
Sources: Statistisches Landesamt Saarland (Statistisches Handbuch für das Saarland and Statistisches 
Jahrbuch Saarland, multiple editions), Helfer and Dörrenbächer (2014). 
Figure 12: Development of employment in major industries in Saarland 
 
Unemployment rates in Saarland were pushed up to levels which were significantly higher 
than in the rest of West-Germany, as can be seen in Figure 13. In 1986, the official 
unemployment rate for Saarland reached about 13%. In certain localities however, with a 
high dependence on steel and coal mining (such as Neunkirchen, Völklingen, and 
Saarbrücken-Burbach) unemployment rates will have been higher. Total employment in 
Saarland remained at around 400,000 from the mid-1970s until the mid-1980s (with a 
small increase of about 6,000 jobs); and employment in manufacturing (other than steel) 
also remained quite stable. So besides the loss of employment in the steel industry in this 
period (employment in coal mining grew somewhat in the late 1970s and early 1980s), 
also developments in labour demand played a role in pushing up unemployment rates. 
There was indeed a comparatively large influx of young people entering the labour 
market in the 1980s, as a result of higher than average birth rates in the 1960s (Giersch, 
1989). Since the late 1990s unemployment in Saarland has declined significantly to a rate 
comparable to the average in West-Germany at about 7% in 2012.  
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Change in definitions over time, not taken into account.  
Sources: Statistisches Amt Saarland (Statistisches Handbuch für das Saarland / Statistisches Jahrbuch, 
multiple editions); Statistisches Bundesamt (Statistisches Jahrbuch, multiple editions; www.destatis.de)  
Figure 13: Unemployment rates in Saarland and West-Germany 
 
As in almost anywhere else in the developed world, manufacturing lost ground in relative 
terms with regard to employment, while the tertiary sector gained importance (see 
section 5.2). Loss of employment in manufacturing was manageable however, with a loss 
of about 45,000 jobs in total from 1970 to 2008 (on a total of around 140,000 in 1970). 
The growth of employment in the service sector, was more than sufficient to offset this, 
as it gained nearly 140,000 jobs in this same period. The process of deindustrialisation 
was hence somewhat less pronounced in Saarland, and manufacturing still accounts for 
an above average share of the economy in (South) Saarland, with many services also still 
linked to manufacturing (Lerch, 2007; Lerch and Simon, 2011; Warscheid et al., 2011). The 
disruptive effects of deindustrialisation were thus kept in check, especially in comparison 
to Teesside (see section 7.4). 
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Sources: Statistisches Landesamt Saarland (Statistisches Handbuch für das Saarland and Statistisches 
Jahrbuch Saarland, multiple editions); Helfer and Dörrenbächer (2014). 
Figure 14: Structural change in Saarland in terms of employment 
 
With regard to structural change in (South) Saarland, there is both a clear shift within 
manufacturing, as well as a shift between manufacturing and the service sector. 
Concerning the former, it should be noted that the new industries in manufacturing 
(besides automotive, also machinery has grown significantly, to about 16.000 workers 
(Warscheid et al., 2011)), build on the older industries, especially the steel industry (Otto 
and Schanne, 2006; Schulz and Dörrenbächer, 2007). To some extent, the coal-steel 
complex from the past has transformed into a steel-automotive complex (which stretches 
out into Baden-Württemberg instead of Lorraine and Luxemburg however). The car 
industry is now the most important consumer of steel made in Saarland, and so there has 
been a growing interconnectedness in this regard (Schreiber and Zwick, 2012). Moreover, 
several firms with a past in the steel industry and machinery, transformed into important 
suppliers for car manufacturing on the basis of the technology they possess (Strobel, 
2011). Furthermore, the steel industry and the automotive sector make use of a common 
pool of labourers, as required skills and practices (e.g. shift labour) are similar (Otto and 
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Schanne, 2006). Nevertheless, in the supply chains within South Saarland area itself, the 
connections are not as strong. Most steel produced for car manufacturing is used by 
producers in other parts of Germany and Europe (Schreiber and Zwick, 2012). Also within 
the automotive sector in South Saarland the links are weak: Ford – the only Original 
Equipment Manufacturer in Saarland – has several immediate suppliers located near its 
plant in Saarlouis (on a supplier park), but does not have links to the many large first-tier 
suppliers based in South Saarland, such as ZF (gear boxes), Bosch (injectors), 
ThyssenKrupp Gerlach (crankshafts), Halberg Guss (motor blocks), and Michelin (tires for 
trucks). These are in general more oriented on the car manufactures in other parts of 
Germany (especially Baden-Württemberg) (Schulz and Dörrenbächer, 2007). 
 
Employment in the service sector has grown significantly over the years, and the share of 
the tertiary sector rose from about 45% in 1970 to over 70% in 2010. Part of the growth 
in the service sector is still related to manufacturing. Some services have been outsourced 
from manufacturing firms and plants over the years, and some segments of the service 
sector such as engineering, industrial design, or logistics, are clearly dependent on 
manufacturing (Lerch, 2007; Lerch and Simon, 2007). Yet, also some services have 
emerged strongly since the early 1980s in South Saarland, which do not have a direct 
connection to manufacturing, such as information technology (IT; about 7,000 
employees), health care (around 8,500 employees), and insurance services (about 7,300 
employees) (Warscheid et al., 2011). 
 
Related to the rise of the service sector and relative waning of manufacturing, a number 
of changes have taken place in the labour market (Lerch, 2007; Lerch and Simon, 2011). 
First of all, employment among women rose from 34% at the start of the 1970s to 65% in 
2009 (Lerch and Simon, 2011). There has also been a rise in the number of part time jobs 
relative to full time jobs, and in addition an overall decline in the number of hours worked 
(also for full time employees). More flexible forms of employment (such as temporary 
contracts and self-employment), have gained in importance. In terms of qualifications the 
economy in South Saarland is still largely dependent on people with a vocational 
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education (about 60%); the number of people with a college or university degree has 
risen over the years, but at 8% it is still lower than in other parts of Germany (Otto and 
Schanne, 2006; Lerch and Simon, 2011). The number of people with no qualifications has 
fallen significantly over the years. Nevertheless, there seems to be an increasing 
polarisation within the labour market, with some well-paid, relatively secure, high-skilled 
jobs; but also many poorly paid, insecure and low-skilled jobs – mainly in e.g. cleaning, 
retail, hotel and catering industry, etc. – in which women tend to be overrepresented 
(Lerch and Simon, 2011). 
 
 
 The steel crisis and crisis management 6.5.
The steel crisis from 1975 until the mid-1980s is a kick-off point for increased efforts 
aimed at expanding and renewing the economic base of the region (the subject of 
discussion of section 6.6). Furthermore, the management of the steel crisis is telling for 
the way the adaptation process with regard to deindustrialisation was handled from the 
perspective of heavy industry. Today there is still a sizeable and thriving steel industry in 
South Saarland, and in the late 1970s and 1980s the social effects of the restructuring 
operations within the steel industry were kept in check. These outcomes have been the 
result of on the one hand active government interventions (by especially the Saarland 
government, which eventually pushed for more local control), and on the other hand, 
strong labour unions together with a system of corporate governance in which employee 
interests are strongly represented.  
 
The steel crisis and the development of the steel industry since 
In 1970, there were four large integrated iron and steel plants in South Saarland: the 
Röchling’sche Eisen und Stahlwerke (owned by the Röchling-family), ARBED Vereinigte 
Hüttenwerke Burbach (owned by the Luxemburg firm ARBED), the Neunkircher Eisenwerk 
(owned by ‘Eisen- und Hüttenwerke AG‘  from Cologne, and ‘Stumm AG‘), and the 
Dillinger Hütte (owned by French corporation SOLLAC (majority) and Neunkircker 
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Eisenwerk (32.4%)).44 The industry in South Saarland became increasingly vulnerable by 
the early 1970s. Its locational advantages had disappeared: coke and iron ore needed to 
be brought in from outside the region in increasing amounts, the plants were mostly 
relying on the railways for the transport of supplies and products (as transport over the 
river Saar was still not possible), many facilities relied on outdated technologies, and 
operations were comparatively small in scale (due to a lack of investment after the 
Second World War, and the fragmented ownership of the steel companies). 
 
Figure 15 shows that the steel industry lost almost half of its employment between 1975 
and 1988 and that employment only stabilised around 2000. In Figure 16 however it can 
be seen that production levels in term of crude steel, remained more or less stable at 
around 5 million tonnes per year (with significant fluctuations). 
 
                                                     
44
 In addition, two smaller and more specialised plants existed: Halberger Hütte and Stahlwerk Bous. These 
are not considered here, as they were not greatly affected by the steel crisis and their importance for the 
Saarland economy was very limited (Brücher, 1989). 
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Calculation of production of crude steel per employee is based on the total number of employees in the 
steel industry in Saarland, including employees employed in the further processing of steel (casting, rolling, 
forging, etc.). 
Source: Statistisches Amt Saarland (Statistisches Handbuch für das Saarland and Statistisches Jahrbuch, 
multiple editions). 
Figure 15: Development of employment in the steel industry, and production of crude 
steel per employee in Saarland 
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From 1991 onwards (after unification with East Germany) crude steel production in West Germany was 
estimated by assuming that it is about 87% of total German steel production. This percentage is based on 
historical data for East German steel production from 1980 until 1990. 
Sources: Statistisches Amt Saarland (Statistisches Handbuch für das Saarland and Statistisches Jahrbuch, 
multiple editions), Statistisches Bundesamt (Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
multiple editions), World Steel Association (www.worldsteel.org; Annual crude steel production archive). 
Figure 16:  Crude steel production in 1,000 tonnes in Saarland, and production of 
Saarland as a percentage of West-German production 
 
Already before the 1970s Dillinger Hütte had specialised into market segments in which 
the conditions remained favourable (such as high quality steel used for heavy 
engineering, construction and pipes). For this reason it experienced fewer problems: 
employment and production remained at similar levels throughout (Schreiber and Zwick, 
2012). The major problems occurred at the three other steel plants, which would merge 
into Saarstahl in 1978. Saarstahl went through a long sequence of restructuring 
operations, which spawned over almost 25 years. The problems at Saarstahl were only 
fully resolved in 2001. The restructuring operations had two primary aims. Firstly, to 
move from primarily bulk steel making towards more high-grade, speciality steel 
production. The decision was made to concentrate on high-quality long products (wire 
rods, bars, strips, etc.). Secondly, the aim was to modernise production facilities and 
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concentrate these at certain locations to improve efficiency. At the end of the 
restructuring process three of the four integrated plants were disbanded, with coke ovens 
and blast furnaces only located at Dillingen (though the facilities are jointly owned by 
Dillinger Hütte and Saarstahl), steel making at Dillingen and Völklingen, and casting and 
various types of further processing spread over the four locations. Table 11 lists the main 
events in the restructuring of the steel industry in South Saarland. 
 
1971 Merger of Röchling’sche Eisen und Stahlwerke and ARBED Vereinigte Hüttenwerke to 
form Stahlwerke Röchling-Burbach (owned by ARBED (50%) and the Röchling-family 
(50%)). 
1978 ARBED becomes the (near) full owner of Stahlwerke Röchling-Burbach (except for a 
remaining 2.1 %), and Neunkircher Eisenwerk becomes almost fully owned by 
Stahlwerke Röchling-Burbach (but remains a separate company). 
First restructuring at Stahlwerke Röchling-Burbach: 
 Closure of blast furnaces in Burbach (1978). 
 New steel-making facility in Völklingen, to replace steel works based on dated 
technologies in Völkling, Burbach and Neunkirchen, by 1982/3. 
 The production of finished rolled products is to be concentrated in several rolling 
mills /special product mills. 
 Reductions of employment and production capacity. 
 Start of financial support by Saarland and Federal government. 
1981 Modified restructuring: further reductions of employment and capacity.  
Concentration of blast furnaces in Dillingen under joint venture (Roheisengesellschaft 
Saar (ROGESA)) between Dillinger Hütte and ARBED Saarstahl from 1981 (to be 
completed in 1985). Concentration of coke ovens in Dillingen using a similar construct 
between the two steel companies and Saarbergwerke, in Zentral Kokerei Saar (ZKS). 
1982 Complete merger between Stahlwerke Röchling-Burbach and Neunkircher Eisenwerk to 
form ARBED Saarstahl.  
Closure of last of the blast furnaces in Neunkirchen. 
Of the original 22 rolling mills, only 8 are still in operation. 
1982-1985 Further restructuring and rationalisation, with further losses of employment and 
reduction of production capacity. 
Several large-scale demonstrations and industrial actions by the labour unions 
(especially in 1982 and 1983) against further downsizing and proposals to reduce 
wages.  
Repeated financial support by Land and Federal government. 
1984 Option agreement between Saarland, Federal government and ARBED: ARBED is 
obliged to transfer up to 76 % of the capital shares in ARBED Saarstahl to a third party 
to be named by the Federal and regional governments, in exchange for continued 
financial support. 
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1986 The option is pulled: 76% of the shares in ARBED Saarstahl are transferred to a trust, 
set up and managed by the government of Saarland. 
The company's name is changed to ‘Saarstahl Völklingen’ 
The management of Saarstahl Völklingen is transfered to Dillinger Hütte, and 
preparations start to combine Saarstahl Völklingen and Dillinger Hütte. 
Closure of blast furnaces in Völklingen. 
1987 Establishment of the ‘Stahlstiftung’ (Steel Foundation) to cope with redundancies, in 
which redundant employees receive extra unemployment money (above the regular 
unemployment benefits), and are offered reemployment, training and work creation 
schemes, funded mostly through European, national and state funds, and private 
donations. 
1988 Canalisation of the Saar-river is completed, and inland port at Dillingen is operational. 
1989 Establishment of a Holding (Dillinger Hütte Saarstahl) that combines Saarstahl and 
Dillinger Hütte in 1989: Holding is 100% owner of Saarstahl, and about 95% of Dillinger 
Hütte (remaining 5% remains with small stockholders). Usinor-Sacilor – which 
succeeded SOLLAC as the majority owner of Dillinger Hütte – becomes 70% owner of 
the new Holding, Saarland has 27.5% of the shares; and ARBED 2.5%. 
Saarstahl Völklingen is renamed ‘Saarstahl’. 
1993 Saarstahl files for bankruptcy due to insolvency, and goes into receivership. Dillinger 
Hütte and majority owner Usinor-Sacilor do not want to cover the losses of Saarstahl 
any longer. Search for a solution in which the financial difficulties of Saarstahl would 
not affect the whole holding (and thus also Dillinger Hütte). 
1994 Saarstahl is taken out of the Dillinger Hütte Saarstahl Holding; with Saarland taking 
over 100% of the stocks of Saarstahl. 
1996 Stockholdings are reorganised, with the result that Usinor-Sacilor sees its share in the 
Dillinger Hütte Saarstahl Holding reduced to 48.75%. For decisions in the Holding at 
least 70% of the shares are required. So Usinor-Sacilor effectively loses control of the 
Holding, and thus over Dillinger Hütte. 
1996-1999 Settlement of claims with creditors of Saarstahl, and various changes of ownership in 
Saarstahl: per 1999 48.1% of the stocks are owned by Saarstahl Treuhand, 26.8% by 
Saarland, and 25.1% by the Dillinger Hütte. 
2001 Resolution with so called ‘Hüttenlösung’: establishment of a foundation ‘Montan-
Stiftung-Saar’ and ‘SHS Strukur-Holding-Saar’, which together with interlocking 
shareholdings between Saarstahl and Dillinger Hütte / Dillinger Hütte Saarstahl 
Holding, now covers all of Saarstahl and most of Dillinger Hütte. This means that money 
earned in the steel industry in Saarland will for the most part remain in a foundation 
(with no dividend payments to external parties), and so can be used for the further 
development of the industry. Only a remaining 30.08% of the Dillinger Hütte Saarstahl 
Holding (only containing Dillinger Hütte) is still owned by ArcelorMittal (which has 
incorporated Usinor-Sacilor and ARBED), and there are still 4.72% small stockholders in 
Dillinger Hütte. 
Saarstahl goes out of receivership. 
2001-date Various new investments in production facilities at Dillinger Hütte and Saarstahl. The 
most important of which is a new forge (‘Saarschmiede’) to cast steel, which went into 
operation in 2010. 
Sources: Brücher (1989); Hartz (1990); Marzen (1994); Penner (2011); Schreiber and Zwick (2012); 
www.saarstahl.de. 
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Table 11: Chronology of the restructuring of the steel industry in South Saarland from 
the late 1960s 
 
At the end of these restructuring operations, two things stand out: South Saarland 
managed to retain a sizeable steel industry, which is (currently) stable, competitive and 
flourishing; and great efforts have been taken to limit the negative social and economic 
effects of the redundancies from the restructuring operations. The first has been the 
result of active support by the Federal government and Saarland government, as well as 
interventions by especially the Saarland government to influence the strategic direction 
of the restructuring operations and to gain more local control. Crucial for the second 
outcome, have been the relatively powerful labour unions in combination with a system 
of corporate governance system in which the interests of employees are strongly 
represented. I will discuss these two factors, and how they affected the decisions that 
were made during the steel crisis, in turn. 
 
Strategic decision-making and the role of the state 
The fact that the steel industry has managed to successfully restructure and upgrade to 
speciality steel production, was in no small part the result of active support and 
interventions by the Saarland government and Federal government. The financial 
resources of the steel companies in Saarland were inadequate to carry the vast losses and 
pay for the necessary investments, so from the beginning the government of Saarland, 
the federal government, as well as many banks, were involved in the restructuring of the 
steel industry. At the time of the crisis (especially from 1977 onwards), the companies, 
the shareholders, banks, the labour unions, the Saarland government, the Federal 
Employment Agency, and the federal government met frequently to negotiate about the 
restructuring operations, the redundancy policies, and the funding of these measures 
(Esser and Väth, 1986). Moreover, these parties agreed on the basic strategic direction on 
the longer run, to specialise in high-quality long products. There was effectively a policy of 
‘indirect nationalisation’ by the Saarland and federal governments from 1977 until 1986 
(Esser and Väth, 1986, p. 651 and p. 660): assuming most of the commercial risks and 
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trying to exert control, but without a transfer of ownership into the public sector. Up until 
1993 about DM 4 billion of support money and guarantees were provided, mostly by the 
Federal government but also by the Saarland government (Penner, 2011). 
 
With the change of government at the Federal level in 1982 from a coalition of SPD and 
FDP, to a coalition of CDU and FDP, there was a growing reluctance to continue the 
federal support for the steel industry in Saarland. Also the government of Saarland – a 
CDU and FDP coalition as well – began to express doubts about “pouring more money in a 
bottomless well” (Hartz, 1990, p. 70). However, the newly elected SPD-government of 
Saarland which came to power in 1985, was in favour of sustaining the support for the 
steel industry, even though it had to do this without the continued support from the 
federal government. It furthermore adopted a policy to push for local control of the steel 
industry: “decisions about the organisation and development of steel in Saarland, should 
be made in Saarland”45 (Klimmt, 1998, p. 11). It was not until 1993 however, when 
Saarstahl went into receivership – after also the new French majority owner of both 
Saarstahl and Dillinger Hütte (Usinor-Sacilor) could no longer carry the losses – that this 
policy of local control could be fully implemented. The final step in a series of measures to 
reorganise the ownership of Saarstahl and Dillinger Hütte, came in 2001 when Saarstahl 
and the stockholdings in Dillinger were subsumed under a Holding (‘Struktur-Holding-
Saar), which in turn is owned by a foundation (‘Montan-Stiftung Saar’), with the purpose 
to promote the steel industry in Saarland, and contribute to research and development, 
qualifications of its employees and environmental protection measures (Schreiber and 
Zwick, 2012). This means that money made in the Saarland steel industry for the most 
part remains in the industry46. This money can be used to secure the long-term future of 
the steel industry in Saarland, and promote auxiliary social and environmental objectives. 
 
                                                     
45
 “Entscheidungen über Struktur- und Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten der Stahlindustrie müssen an der Saar 
fallen.” 
46
 Only a limited part is paid out in dividends, through the remaining ownership of Arcelor-Mittal (which 
succeeded Usinor-Sacilor and ARBED) and some other small holdings. 
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Coping with redundancies and the role of the unions 
From 1977 until the early 1980s most redundancies were dealt with through automatic 
staff turnover with a hiring stop, and through early retirement (for employees from 55 
years) (Bosch, 1989; Otto and Wächter, 1989). In addition, also reduction in working time 
was implemented, with the lower wages partly (usually 60 to 65%) compensated by the 
Federal Employment Agency, though work reduction time payments (‘Kurzarbeitergeld’) 
(Otto and Wächter, 1989). Furthermore some workers left voluntarily with a settlement, 
or went into retraining programmes to qualify for a different job (Esser and Väth, 1986; 
Bosch, 1989; Otto, 2005). When in 1986 a further 3,500 empoyees were made redundant 
at Saarstahl, the so-called Steel Foundation (‘Stahlstifftung’) was established. This 
foundation was set up by Saarstahl, together with Dillinger Hütte, the labour unions, the 
Federal Employment Agency and the Saarland government (Hauch, 1987). Redundant 
employees terminate their employment at Saarstahl, and are instead registered as 
unemployed. They would receive unemployment benefits, but in addition would also 
receive payments as members of the Steel Foundation, so their income would be at 50% 
up to 90% of their previously earned wages (depending on the situation) (Bosch, 1989). 
Saarstahl promised to offer any vacancies that would become available in the future, to 
the members of the foundation first. For especially those younger than 50 the Foundation 
would also offer opportunities for reemployment, retraining, and employment in work 
creation schemes (e.g. in industrial archaeology and cleaning up of contaminated sites), 
through an Employment Enterprise (‘Beschäftigungsgesellschaft’). In 1993, when 
Saarstahl went into receivership, the Steel Foundation was the most important 
instrument for coping with redundancies, especially for those close to early retirement 
and harder cases for whom the prospects of finding employment elsewhere were small 
(Otto and Wächter, 1996; Otto, 2005). 
 
For the steel industry the most important unions are IG Metall and the ‘Deutsche 
Gewerkschaftsbund’ (DGB; a federation of unions). The organisation rate tends to be very 
high in the steel industry; often above 90%. Unions can exert influence in two ways: 
directly, through negotiations with the steel companies, the government of Saarland, the 
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federal government, the Federal Employment Agency, and banks; and more indirectly, 
through the works councils and other provisions within the corporate governance of steel 
firms. Also the legal provisions for employment protection in Germany (as discussed in 
section 5.3.3), contribute to the relatively powerful position of the labour unions. During 
the restructuring operations from 1977 until 2001, the labour unions have thus been able 
to negotiate relatively generous redundancy policies. On the whole, the labour unions 
accepted the need for the restructuring operations that were implemented, and in 
general exhibited a cooperative attitude.47 They mostly pushed for the abatement of the 
social consequences of these operations. This consisted of demands to (Simon, 1985; 
Esser and Väth, 1986): 
 Phase the reductions in the labour force, and avoid forced lay-offs. 
 Deal with redundancies through early retirement, hiring stops, and termination of 
temporary contracts. 
 Relatively high compensation for those made redundant. 
To assert these demands, the labour unions organised frequent demonstrations and 
meetings. These demonstrations and actions intensified in 1982 and 1983 (including a 
local strike at one of the plants in Burbach), when continued support by the federal and 
Saarland governments was in question, and at the same time further redundancies were 
announced and reductions in wages were proposed (Simon, 1985; Hartz, 1990). These 
issues were not resolved until 1985, when the new SPD-government pledged further 
financial support. 
 
The corporate governance of large steel companies in Germany, offers several 
opportunities for labour unions and other representatives of employee interests, to exert 
influence on policy: 
 A strong role for works councils (legally secured in the Works Councils Act 
(‘Betriebsverfassungsgesetz’)), with provisions for works councils to be informed 
about, to be consulted on, and to co-determine aspects of company policy that affect 
                                                     
47
 Though it should be noted, that the process was certainly not free of conflicts, see e.g. Judith (1980) and 
Hartz (1990). 
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workers. Most of the members of the works councils are labour union 
representatives.  
 Typical for corporations in the steel industry and coal mining in Germany, is the 
system of equivalent co-determination (‘Paritätische Mitbestimmung’; regulated 
through the ‘Montanmitbestimmungsgesetz’). The system of equivalent co-
determination means that half of the Supervisory Board consists of representatives 
from employees, and the other half of representatives from shareholders; with both 
parties having to agree on an independent chair. In addition, one member of the 
Executive Board cannot be appointed against the wishes of the representatives for 
employees in the Supervisory Board: the labour director (‘Arbeitsdirektor’) who is 
responsible for personnel management.  
 Through the process of collective bargaining between unions and employer’s 
federations at the industry and regional levels (regulated by the Collective Bargaining 
Act (‘Tarriffvertragsgesetz’)), unions can also exert considerable influence.  
Hence, shareholders and management have to work closely together with labour unions 
(and other representatives speaking for the interests of employees) in the operation of a 
corporation. Also through this – more indirect – way, labour unions could push for 
measures to mitigate the social consequences of restructuring. Moreover, labour unions 
and employees have a considerable say in the strategic direction of the companies and on 
concomitant investment decisions (e.g. the investment in the new forge (‘Saarschmiede’) 
has been mostly the result of pressure from unions and employees). 
 
 
 Evolution of policy and governance 6.6.
Active government interventions by mainly the government of the Land, with a push to 
protect some of the interests of the wider community and to gain more local control, has 
thus been a key element in the retention of a sizeable and competitive steel industry. 
While powerful labour unions and the representation of employee interests in the 
strategic decision-making within steel companies, have importantly contributed to the 
mitigation of many of the negative social consequences from the restructuring 
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operations. These represent efforts to actively manage the decline of the steel industry in 
Saarland. These efforts have been complemented by policy and governance interventions 
to facilitate the growth and expansion of other parts of the economy on the longer run, as 
the significance of heavy industry continued to diminish. 
 
Such policy and governance interventions were aimed to guide and influence the 
‘transformation process’ within the economy in South Saarland towards a new economic 
base, and were spread out over many decades. The normal spending on economic 
development (quite narrowly defined as expenditure on the attraction of inward 
investment, entrepreneurship and business support, and urban regeneration) can be 
estimated at around 1% of Gross Value Added in Saarland since the early 1980s.48 
Although as discussed, the support of the steel industry (by both the Saarland 
government and the Federal government) has been very sizeable over the years, and also 
coal mining has been heavily subsidised by the federal government (see Miehe-
Nordmeyer, 2000); both these expenditures are not included in this figure. In this section, 
I will discuss the policy and governance initiatives for economic renewal. I will however 
start by first outlining the government institutions which concern themselves with the 
economic development of South Saarland. 
 
 
6.6.1. Framework of government institutions 
For policy-making for and governance of the economic development of South Saarland, 
different government institutions are relevant, which operate at different levels of scale: 
                                                     
48
 Based on figures from the ‘Bericht zur Landesentwicklung’ of 1992 and 1997 (Minister für Umwelt 
Saarland (1992) and Minister für Umwelt, Energie, und Verkehr Saarland (1997)), and the Haushaltsplan of 
2012 (budget of the government of Saarland on www,saarland.de)). More precise estimations would 
require much more information on spending by the Saarland government, the municipalities, and through 
the GRW and European Structural Funds. This would take more time and effort than is warranted for the 
purpose of this study. 
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 The government of the Land is the primary actor: Saarland has its own constitution, 
and has broad powers in economic development. Further on I will give a detailed 
account of the institutional framework at this level. 
 At the national level, the federal government (Bund) provides the legal and financial 
framework for industrial and economic development policy, labour market policy, and 
spatial planning, as discussed in Chapter 5. The most important instrument for 
regional economic policy at the federal level (especially before the 1990s) is the Joint 
Task for the Improvement of the Regional Economic Structure 
(‘Gemeinschaftsaufgabe für Verbesserung der Regionalen Wirtschaftstruktur’ (GRW)). 
For the labour market, the most important institutions and programmes are provided 
at the federal level, with the Federal Employment Agency (‘Bundesagentur für Arbeit’, 
before 2004 ‘Bundesanstalt für Arbeit’) as the main executive body. It has its head 
office in Nürnberg, and 10 regional offices, of which one is for Saarland and 
Rhineland-Pfalz. 
 At the wider regional level, cross-border cooperation arrangements exists since 1970 
between Saarland, Lorraine in France, Luxemburg, and parts of Rhineland-Palatinate 
(Trier and Westpfalz). These were the areas which (in a broad sense) made up the 
‘Montandreieck’, discussed earlier. These arrangements facilitate cooperation on a 
voluntary basis on topics such as investment in transport infrastructure, spatial 
planning, education and training, cross-border commuting, place marketing, etc. 
 At the local level, municipalities (Gemeinde) and districts (Landkreise) can play only a 
relatively minor role in economic development; they do have some powers in spatial 
planning, and in some cases can actively develop and support urban redevelopment 
projects. 
 
Figure 17 shows the main government entities at different levels of scale with regard to 
the economic development of South Saarland. 
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Grey indicates entities (controlled) at the national level, turquoise at the (wider) regional level, blue on a 
city-region level, and red at a local level. 
Figure 17: Government entities at different levels with regard to economic 
development in South Saarland 
 
As mentioned above, the state government of Saarland is the primary actor with regard 
to economic development in South Saarland. It has an extensive institutional framework 
in place. The core institutions of the state of Saarland, are: the parliament (‘Landtag’); the 
cabinet (‘Landesregierung’), with a minister-president (‘Ministerpräsident’) and several 
ministers; the Ministries which support the cabinet, and the Constitutional Court 
(‘Verfassungsgerichtshof’). The most important Ministers and Ministries for the economic 
development of Saarland are: the minister-president and Staatskanzlei (minister-
president’s office), Economic Affairs (‘Wirtschaft’), Science (‘Wissenschaft’), Education 
(‘Bildung’), Work (‘Arbeit’), Transport (‘Verkehr’), Energy (‘Energie’), Internal Affairs 
(‘Inneres’), and Environment (‘Umwelt’) (these last two especially for spatial planning).49 
The parliament is chosen for a period of 5 years, and a majority of the parliament has to 
agree on a cabinet (formed from the parties represented in the parliament). The 
                                                     
49
 Some of these subject areas are normally combined and allocated to one Minister and Ministry; however 
this varies over the years depending on the ambitions of individual governments. 
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constitution of Saarland also accords formal roles to the Chamber of Commerce 
(‘Industrie- und Handelskammer’), the Chamber of Trades (‘Handwerkskammer’), and the 
Chamber of Labour (‘Arbeitskammer’)50, in the representation of different interests (of 
businesses, professions, and employees, respectively). These institutions advise the 
government of Saarland, and work together to implement various programmes and 
projects. 
 
There are also a number of entities at the state-level, which have a more specific role in 
the economic development of Saarland. These were often established in the late 1940s 
and 1950s (partly modelled after similar institutions in other Länder51), and are usually (at 
least partly) controlled and funded by the Land. In the early 1970s, the following entities 
were in place: 
 ‘Zentrale für Produktivität und Technologie Saarland’ (ZPT) (recently renamed 
‘Saarland Innovation und Standort’ (Saar.is)), which is responsible for business advice, 
internationalisation, technology transfer, skills development, labour market 
qualifications, etc. It is funded mostly by the Land but also by the three Chambers and 
various employers’ associations; who are also represented in the presidium that 
oversees its activities.  
 ‘Gesellschaft für Wirtschaftförderung Saarland’ (GW Saar), which was originally 
established to promote the export of Saarland products to the rest of West-Germany 
after reunification, but is now mainly responsible for attracting inward investment. It 
is owned by the Land. 
 ‘Landesentwicklungsgesellschaft Saarland’ (LEG Saar), which is a development 
corporation, mainly responsible for the development and project management of 
public real estate projects, infrastructure projects and industrial sites. It is also owned 
by the Land. 
                                                     
50
 Saarland and the city-state of Bremen are the only Länder in Germany with a Chamber of Labour. 
51
 This is especially true for the Landesentwicklungsgesellschaft, and the Investitionskreditbank, which exist 
in similar forms in almost all Länder.  
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 ‘Saarländische Investitionskredit Bank’ (SIKB), which is a development bank. It 
provides credits, guarantees, and equity participations, to firms that want to invest in 
Saarland. It is owned for 51.02% by the Land, and for 48.98% by various banks active 
in Saarland. 
 The University of Saarland (‘Universität des Saarlandes‘), and the University of Applied 
Sciences of Saarland (‘Fachhochschule des Saarlandes‘, since 1991 the ‘Hochschule für 
Technik und Wirtschaft des Saarlandes‘ and ‘Hochschule der bildenden Künste Saar‘). 
These receive their funding primarily from the Land. 
This institutional framework for economic development at the level of Saarland, is shown 
in  
Figure 18.  
 
 
Figure 18: Institutional framework for economic development in Saarland in the early 
1970s 
 
 
6.6.2. Evolution of policy programmes and initiatives 
Because the Land is the primary actor, changes in the government of Saarland will be the 
most significant factor in the evolution of policy programmes and initiatives in economic 
development. Before 1985 the government was made up by CDU-dominated coalitions, 
led by minister-presidents Franz-Josef Röder (1959-1979) and Werner Zeyer (1979-1985). 
In 1985 the SPD won the elections and enacted some important new focal points in 
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economic development policy, under minister-presidents Oskar Lafontaine (1985-1998) 
and Reinhard Klimmt (1998-1999). Since 1999 the government has again consisted of CDU 
and CDU-dominated coalitions, led by minister presidents Peter Müller (1999-2011) and 
Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer (2011-date), which have more or less continued along the 
lines of the previous SPD-led governments but in new formats. In Table 12 the various 
governments in Saarland since 1970 are listed. 
 
1970-1977 ‘Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands Saar’ 
(CDU)  
Franz-Josef Röder 
1977-1985 ‘Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands Saar’ 
(CDU), and ‘Freie Demokratische Partei / Demokratische 
Partei Saar’ (FDP / DPS) 
Franz-Josef Röder (1977-1979) 
Werner Klummp (1979) 
Werner Zeyer (1979-1985) 
1985-1999 ‘Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands Saarland’ 
(SPD) 
Oskar Lafontaine (1985-1998) 
Reinhard Klimmt (1998-1999) 
1999-2009 ‘Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands Saar’ 
(CDU) 
Peter Müller 
2009-2012 ‘Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands Saar’ 
(CDU), ‘Freie Demokratische Partei / Demokratische 
Partei Saar’ (FDP / DPS), and ‘Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen 
Saarland’ 
Peter Müller (2009-2011) 
Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer 
(2011-2012) 
2012-date ‘Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands Saar’ 
(CDU), and ‘Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands 
Saarland’ (SPD) 
Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer 
Table 12: Governments in Saarland and their prime-ministers since 1970 
 
We can distinguish between the following episodes: 
 Episode 1 (until 1985): Inward investment and improving infrastructure connections. 
 Episode 2 (1985-1999): New programmes in STI and business support.  
 Episode 3 (1999-date): Cluster-based policies and new challenges. 
An overview of the main focal points in each episode is given in Table 13.  
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Table 13: Development of policy programmes and initiatives in South Saarland 
 
Overall, the development of initiatives and policies in South Saarland has shifted from an 
emphasis on inward investment to an emphasis on Science, Technology, Innovation (STI) 
policies and entrepreneurship / start-up support. Sizeable investments in upgrading the 
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Highlights 
Episode 1 
(until 1985) 
• • •  • • • 
 Successive CDU- and CDU-FDP-coalition 
governments.  
 Strong emphasis on attracting inward investment 
(‘Ansiedlung’); especially successful (on the longer 
run) in the automotive sector. 
 Large investments in upgrading the built 
environment, mainly new transport infrastructure 
(especially in the late 1960s / early 1970s), and in 
making new industrial sites available. 
Episode 2 
(1985-1999) 
• • • • • • • 
 Successive SPD-governments. 
 Continuing support for steel industry; policy towards 
local control. 
 Set up of programmes for science, technology and 
innovation, including attraction of new research 
institutes and centres to the University of Saarland 
(in IT / computer science, biotechnology, 
nanotechnology, etc.)  
 Programmes to support start-ups and 
entrepreneurship by SMEs. 
 Investment in (re)development of sites once 
occupied by heavy industry, by local governments 
and also by Saarland. 
Episode 3 
(1999-now) 
  • • • • • 
 Successive CDU- and CDU-dominated coalition 
governments. 
 Continuation of policy for science, technology and 
innovation, but cluster-based. 
 Development of new industrial sites because of a 
lack of large locations.  
 New programmes for promotion of Saarland as 
tourist / leisure destination. 
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built environment have complemented this shift, but were more secondary. Training and 
skills have not been a special focal point for policy, but the vocational training system has 
been a consistent strength (as also discussed in the previous Chapter). Despite the 
changes in emphasis (and some of the rhetoric surrounding these52), the development of 
policy for South Saarland, has been characterised by much continuity and gradual change. 
Policy efforts were undertaken in a relatively coordinated manner, both between 
different policy domains and between different actors. Furthermore, financial support 
from both the federal government (within the framework of cooperative federalism in 
Germany) and European structural funds, has been substantial. 
 
Episode 1 (until 1985): Inward investment and improving infrastructure connections 
As mentioned earlier in section 6.3.2, the Saarland economy coped with a crisis in coal 
mining (‘Kohlekrise’) in the early and middle of 1960s. The policy response to diversify 
and strengthen the economic base was delayed, because of opposition from mainly the 
steel industry, and the Saarland government’s lack of financial resources. However, after 
Saarland was seriously hit by the brief recession in the German economy of 1966 and 
1967, and unemployment rose further, new policies in especially attracting inward 
investment and the building of new infrastructure were quickly implemented. These 
policies, together with some complementary measures in spatial planning and cross-
border cooperation with especially Lorraine and Luxemburg, formed the core of economic 
development policy in Saarland until 1985. 
 
The first step in the development of these policies, came when the Saarland government 
petitioned the federal government through a Memorandum in 1967, asking for support 
because of its current economic and financial difficulties and its lagging development 
                                                     
52
 For example, in the SPD-manifesto ahead of the elections in 1985: “The current policy of fearfulness and 
inaction must end. Saarland needs a comprehensive programme for economic renewal. It should be 
endorsed by all progressive forces and realised collectively.” (“Mit der bisherigen Politik der Ängstlichkeit 
und Tatenlosigkeit muβ Schluβ sein. Das Saarland braucht ein umfassendes Programm der wirtschaftlichen 
Erneuerung. Es muβ von allen vorwärtsdenkenden Kräften getragen und gemeinsam verwirklicht werden.“) 
(SPD Saar, 1985, p. 15). 
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since the reunification with West-Germany in 1957: “the great political success of the 
reunification with the Federal Republic of Germany, should not now be diminished in 
hindsight, because the necessary, supplementary measures remain unimplemented or 
are not enacted on time.”53 (Regierung des Saarlandes, 1967, p. 6). This Memorandum 
requested additional funds from the Federal government to further intensify the support 
for inward investment to create additional employment to offset job loss in coal mining 
and iron and steel. Furthermore, it asked for a number of measures to improve 
infrastructure connections. In 1968 and 1969, a planning group (‘Planungsgruppe’) at the 
Prime minister’s office developed a programme (‘Strukturprogramm’) to further detail 
these policies, and develop these into a coordinated set of measures (Plannungsgruppe 
beim Ministerpräsidenten des Saarlandes, 1969). At the same time, the Joint Task for the 
Improvement of the Regional Economic Structure (‘Gemeinschaftsaufgabe Verbesserung 
der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur’ (GRW)) was created by the Federal Ministry of 
Economic Affairs in 1968, which is jointly funded by the federal government (50%) and 
the states (50%). The scheme works with Action Programmes for 5-year periods, and for 
Saarland the first Action Programme (‘Aktionsprogramm Saarland-Westpfalz, Teilbereich 
Saarland’) was based on the earlier work of the planning group (Minister für Wirtschaft, 
Verkehr, und Landwirtschaft Saarland, 1969). 
 
Investment in infrastructure mainly entailed the extension of the motorway network in 
Saarland, and the incorporation of the region within the national and transnational 
motorway network. This included extending the motorway from Mannheim to 
Saarbrücken across the border into France, a motorway northwards connecting Saarland 
to Koblenz and Cologne, and a motorway along the Saar-river in the direction of 
Luxemburg and Brussels (Burtenshaw, 1972; Burtenshaw, 1976). At the same time also 
the railway connections were extended and upgraded, with e.g. an intercity rail 
connection from Paris to Frankfurt over Saarbrücken in 1970. Moreover, a regional 
                                                     
53
 “Der groβe politische Erfolg der Wiedervereinigung mit der Bundesrepublik sollte nicht nachträglich 
dadurch geschmälert werden, daβ die noch notwendigen ergänzenden Maβnahmen unterbleiben oder 
nicht rechtzeitig in Angriff genommen werden”.  
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airport opened near Saarbrücken in 1969 (Burtenshaw, 1972). Another major investment, 
for which construction started in the early 1970s (but not fully realised until the mid-
1980s), was the canalisation of the Saar-river from Saarbrücken to its confluence with the 
Moselle, which would make the river suitable for inland navigation of bulk goods 
(Burtenshaw, 1976). The main beneficiary of this would be the iron and steel industry, as 
it enabled easier and cheaper transport of iron ore and coal to and from Saarland. 
 
The attraction of inward investment comprised of investment grants of 15 to 20% in areas 
affected by the closure of the coal mines, through the programme of the GRW (Minister 
für Wirtschaft, Verkehr, und Landwirtschaft Saarland, 1969). These investment grants 
complemented a series of incentives (e.g. tax rebates, low-interest loans, and premiums) 
implemented under less comprehensive and more specific federal programmes for 
specific parts of Saarland, such as the Federal Development Town (‘Bundesausbauort’) 
programme of 1959 and the Coalfield Adaptation Law (‘Steinkohle-Anpassungsgesetz’) of 
1968. The highest grants and tax rebates were available in the heavily affected eastern 
part of South Saarland around Neunkirchen and St Ingbert; but also in other centres in 
South Saarland, such as Saarbrücken, Völkingen, Saarlouis, Homburg and Lebach, 
investment grants and incentives were offered (Burtenshaw, 1972). GW Saar was made 
responsible for promoting Saarland as a favourable location to invest, and together with 
the SIKB it managed the day-to-day operations of this system of grants and incentives 
(Hahn, 2003). As noted, this policy drew in a lot of new investment into Saarland, 
especially from 1968 until 1973 (Burtenshaw, 1976; Giersch, 1989; Giersch, 2007; 
Warscheid et al., 2011). In addition to the investment grants and other incentives 
however, these firms were also attracted by the availability of a pool of well-qualified 
workers, who were used to industrial labour (e.g. shift work, physical strain, overtime, 
etc.), in a situation where there was full employment everywhere else in Germany 
(Giersch, 2007; Warscheid et al., 2011). Also the strategic location of Saarland in a more 
economically integrated Western Europe played a role, which was reinforced by the large 
investments in infrastructure (Giersch, 2007). Some of the new investments that were 
attracted by the prospect of low costs (as a result of the grants, incentives, and relatively 
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low wages (also from female employment)) – in e.g. textiles, electronics and household 
appliances – did not take root and disappeared after several years (Der Spiegel, 1977; 
Giersch, 1989). However, in especially automotive and investment goods, a more lasting 
match was found between the requirements of the establishments and the assets of the 
region. For these sectors, the ongoing support for inward investment also after 1973, 
continued to be important for investments to further expand existing facilities (Giersch, 
1989; Giersch, 2007). 
 
Attracting inward investment and expanding and upgrading transport infrastructure, 
were the two main focal points in the economic development policy in Saarland until the 
early 1980s. These policies were complemented by interventions in three other domains: 
spatial planning, vocational and further education, and cross-border cooperation. 
 
In the spatial planning office of the Saarland government, the need for diversification 
within and expansion of the economic base of the Saarland economy was already 
perceived comparatively early (Jost and Moll, 2007). Already in 1964 it started to make an 
inventory of available sites for the settlement of new plants; the so-call ‘atlas of industrial 
sites’ (‘Industrieflächenatlas’) (Jost and Moll, 2007). 50 sites were identified, which built 
up to 17 ‘industrial focal points’, the most important of which were all in South Saarland. 
These 50 sites, together with several other large sites which were identified in addition, 
were included in the Strukturprogramm of 1969, with estimations of the investments 
needed for preparation and reclamation. The focal points for industrial development 
were formalised in 1970 in the Spatial Planning Programme (‘Raumordnungsprogramm’) 
(Minister des Innern, 1970). The availability of these sites and the certainty that could be 
provided with regard to planning status, facilitated the efforts to attract inward 
investment significantly (Jost and Moll, 2007). Based on the positive experiences with the 
integral Strukturprogramm for Saarland of 1969, spatial planning became increasingly 
integrated with the coordinated planning for different policy domains (population, 
employment, economy, transport, environment, social policy, etc.) in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. Thus there was a system of regional development programming 
166 
 
(‘Landesentwicklungsprogrammierung’) from 1978 onwards (which was abolished in 
1994). The basic policy to concentrate industrial activities within the industrial focal 
points, most of which were in South Saarland, remained the same throughout this period 
(Minister für Umwelt, Raumordnung und Bauwesen Saarland, 1979). 
 
Vocational training was reformed in Germany as a whole, and so also in Saarland, in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s to increase the formation of more general skills, needed to 
cope with increasing uncertainties in the labour market (Plannungsgruppe beim 
Ministerpräsidenten des Saarlandes, 1969; Bosch, 2010). A stepwise programme was 
introduced with first basic training, and next increasingly more specialised training. The 
dual education system with training in both schools and apprenticeships continued to 
exist, although more support was made available for apprenticeships that were not tied 
to a specific company. Moreover, the institutes for vocational education, would start to 
offer courses and programmes aimed at the skills development and retraining of the 
existing workforce. Also the ZPT, Chamber of Trades, Chamber of Labour and Chamber of 
Commerce, labour unions, and the Federal Employment Agency expanded their provision 
of courses in further education over the years. 
 
In 1970 a Governmental Commission was established between the governments of 
Germany and France to work on increased cross-border cooperation. A year later also 
Luxemburg joined this commission. Also in 1971, a Regional Commission was formed 
between Saarland, Lorraine, Luxemburg and Trier / West Palatinate (both part of 
Rhineland Palatinate), to give practical shape to cross-border cooperation between the 
regions. In 1980 a formal agreement was signed between Germany, France and 
Luxemburg which laid down the basic parameters for the collaboration between the 
border regions. As is clear from section 6.3.1, the industrialisation processes of Saarland, 
Lorraine and Luxemburg were closely linked. Initially the idea was that the crisis in heavy 
industry in the three regions should also be combatted together (Niedermeyer and Moll, 
2007; Damm, 2012). At first the emphasis in cross-border cooperation was hence on 
improving transport infrastructure between the regions and to other economic centres in 
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Germany, France and Belgium, on common projects (such as ‘Saar-Lor-Chemie’ and a 
German-French Business Centre), and on coordination in spatial planning for economic 
development (Plannungsgruppe beim Ministerpräsidenten des Saarlandes, 1969). 
However, little progress was made in these areas (with the exception of improving 
infrastructure; though this has taken much longer than anticipated), because funding and 
practical organisation could not be resolved (Niedermeyer and Moll, 2007). Behind this 
however, is the fact that by the late 1970s economic cooperation in this way, was no 
longer a shared interest: the Luxemburg economy moved away from (heavy) industry 
altogether into banking and financial services, and also in Lorraine the economy was 
(centrally) guided away from (heavy) industry in favour of coastal locations in France, 
where prospects were seen as more favourable (Damm, 2012). From the late 1970s the 
main focal points of cross-border cooperation hence shifted to other domains: resolving 
impediments in cross-border commuting, collaboration in education and research, shared 
marketing and development of tourism, coordination in energy provision, etc. 
(Niedermeyer and Moll, 2007; Damm, 2012). 
 
Episode 2 (1985-1999): New programmes in STI and business support 
At the elections in 1985 the SPD under its leader Oskar Lafontaine, achieved a majority in 
the Landestag, after the CDU had dominated the political landscape in Saarland ever since 
reunification in 1957. The CDU-FDP-coalition governments under Werner Zeyer of the late 
1970s and early 1980s had tried to give new policy impulses to facilitate structural change 
in Saarland (as laid down for example in the Guidelines for Economic Development Policy 
(Minister für Wirtschaft, Verkehr, und Landwirtschaft Saarland, 1976) and another 
Memorandum to the federal government in 1977 (Regierung des Saarlandes, 1977)), but 
were plagued by the poor state of the public finances in Saarland and the high costs of 
supporting the steel industry. Moreover, from 1983 Saarland received far less money 
through the GRW-arrangement, and the Saarland government decided to partly 
compensate for part of these cut-backs by instituting and paying for its own 
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programme54, with a similar focus on business attraction and support for investment 
(Anderson, 1992). 
 
Through various ways the new SPD-government managed to gradually free up resources 
for a new impetus in economic development policy, and reduce financial commitments to 
the steel industry and coal mining: 
 Funds coming in from the European structural funds increased significantly in the mid-
1980s, as the allocation from the funds became less piecemeal and more programme-
based, and as Saarland could benefit from several special programmes such as 
RESIDER and RECHAR. This allowed the Saarland government and municipalities to 
invest in redevelopment projects and in programmes for technology transfer from 
universities and research institutes to businesses. 
 The SPD-government managed to stop the drain on the finances of the Land from the 
ongoing support to Saarstahl, by lifting the option on a majority of the shares in 
Saarstahl and pushing for a merger with Dillinger Hütte (under the larger umbrella of 
Usinor-Sacilor). This process was helped considerably by the fact that the costs of 
further restructuring were much reduced as a result of the construct with the 
Stahlstiftung, followed by a brief upswing in global steel from 1988 until 1990 (after 
which in 1992 issues with Saarstahl continued, until a final resolution in 2001). 
 By again petitioning the Federal government through a Memorandum in 1986 
(Regierung des Saarlandes, 1986), and moreover taking the case (together with 
Bremen) of ‘structural financial distress’ (‘Haushaltsnotlage’) to the Federal 
Constitutional Court (‘Bundesverfassungsgericht’). Saarland and Bremen eventually 
won this case in 1992. As a result Saarland was awarded more funding from the 
Federal government and more affluent Länder, and it managed to reduce its debts in 
the 1990s (the so-called ‘Teilentschuldung’ (partial debt relief)). 
 In 1997 a compromise was reached on the future of coal mining in Germany between 
the Federal Government, the governments of Saarland and North Rhine-Westphalia, 
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 ‘Landesprogramm zur Verbesserung der regionalen Beschäftigungslage und der Wirstschaftsstuktur’ 
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the coal mining companies and the labour unions. As part of this compromise, the 
shares of the Saarland government (27%) and the federal government (63%) in 
Saarbergwerke AG were sold to Ruhrkohle AG to form one (privately owned) coal 
mining company for the whole of Germany. Furthermore, federal subsidies to coal 
mining would be reduced considerably by 2005, and so further mine closures and 
restructuring operations would be necessary. As a further job loss of about 12,000 
was foreseen, Saarland would receive extra funding for a programme of economic 
development measures to compensate for this (laid down in another Memorandum in 
1997 (Regierung des Saarlandes, 1997)). This extra funding would also counteract the 
reduction in funding for Saarland from the GRW from the mid-1990s as a result of the 
incorporation of the East-German Länder within this arrangement (Minister für 
Umwelt, Energie, und Verkehr Saarland, 1997)  
 
Increasingly the main focal points of economic development policy shifted towards 
promoting technological development and innovation, and supporting entrepreneurship 
and start-ups. These policies were complemented by the development of technology 
centres and science parks, partly on sites previously used by the steel industry or coal 
mining, and by changes in further education. 
 
The impulses to Science, Technology and Innovation (STI), and the encouragement of 
entrepreneurship and start-ups, consisted of: 
 The establishment and attraction of many new research centres and institutes 
affiliated to the University of Saarland (to complement the one Fraunhofer Institute55 
already established in 1972)56. 
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 Fraunhofer Institute in Nondestructive Testing (‘Fraunhofer-Institut für Zerstörungsfreie Prüfverfahren’) 
56
 For example: the Leibniz Institute for New Materials (‘Leibniz-Institut für Neue Materialien’; established 
in 1987), the Fraunhofer Institute for Biomedical Engineering (‘Fraunhofer-Institut für Biomedizinische 
Technik’; started in 1987); the Max Planck Institute for Informatics (‘Max-Planck-Institut für Informatik’; 
established in 1988), the German Research Centre for Artificial Intelligence (‘Deutsche Forschungszentrum 
für Künstliche Intelligenz’; established in 1988, and incorporating the already existing Institute for 
Information Systems (‘Institut für Wirtschaftsinformatik’)), the International Conference and Research 
Centre for Computer Science in Schloss Dagstuhl (initiated in 1988; with now also the Leibniz Centre for 
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 Reforms in energy policy. Building on past efforts to develop new technologies for the 
use of coal in the production of energy by Saarbergwerke AG and with coal mining in 
terminal decline, the SPD-government started a programme to promote and 
incentivise technological development in energy efficiency (in especially district 
heating and energy saving), and renewable energy sources (Minister für Unwelt 
Saarland, 1987). One concrete measure was the establishment of an Energy Agency 
(‘Energie-Agentur’) in 1987 to develop and implement energy saving measures in 
firms and government organisations.  
 Programmes for technology transfer. Through the Zentrale für Produktivität und 
Technologie Saarland (ZPT) the government of Saarland already offered advice and 
mediation on technological development since 1978. In 1985 this was accompanied 
by offices (‘Kontaktstellen’) for technology transfer to businesses, at both the 
University of Saarland and the University of Applied Sciences of Saarland (Minister für 
Umwelt Saarland, 1987), and a Research and Development program (‘Forschungs- und 
Technologieprogramm’) for small and medium-sized businesses, in which the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs would consult and cooperate directly with firms in the 
development of R&D projects, and provide further support when necessary (Minister 
für Umwelt Saarland, 1987; Minister für Umwelt Saarland, 1992; Minister für Umwelt, 
Energie, und Verkehr Saarland, 1997). 
 Increased (financial) support for start-ups and SMEs. For guidance and coaching start-
ups and SMEs could already turn to the Chamber of Commerce, the 
Handwerkskammer and the ZPT. Also grants, low-interest loans and guarantees were 
available for start-ups and firms through respectively Federal programmes, and the 
Saarländische Investitionskredit Bank (SIKB) with affiliate institutions. In 1985 the 
government of Saarland tried to further promote start-ups by introducing a premium 
of 20% of first equity capital (Minister für Umwelt, 1987), and in 1996 it started the 
‘GründungsInitiative Saar’ (Start-up initiative Saar), to make the process of 
establishing a company easier and more streamlined (Minister für Umwelt, Energie, 
                                                                                                                                                                
Informatics (‘Leibniz Zentrum für Informatik’)), and the Korea Institute of Science and Technology in Europe 
(founded in 1996). 
171 
 
und Verkehr Saarland, 1997). It also introduced a venture capital programme for 
recently established companies in 1984, which was further expanded in 1997 
(Minister für Umwelt, 1987; Minister für Umwelt, Energie, und Verkehr Saarland, 
1997). 
 
The programme for physical redevelopment during this episode consisted on the on hand 
of the development of technology centres and science parks, to accompany the shift to 
STI-policies, and on the other hand of the redevelopment of former industrial sites for 
other economic activities in e.g. retail, leisure, manufacturing and business services. 
Especially in the early and mid-1980s these projects were often driven by municipalities 
rather than the Land. The city of Saarbrücken created the ‘Gesellschaft für Innovation und 
Unternehmensförderung’57 (GIU) in 1984, to redevelop a part of the district of Burbach 
with considerable financial support from European structural funds into the ‘Saarbrücker 
Innovations- und Technologiezetrum’ 58 (SITZ; in 2002 renamed ‘IT Park Saarland’): a 
technology centre in which entrepreneurs and firms (mainly in IT) can locate together and 
receive advice and support (Warscheid et al., 2011). In addition, a ‘Science Park’ with 
start-up support and technological facilities was developed on the campus of the 
University of Saarland near Saarbrücken in the late 1990s (Minister für Umwelt, Energie, 
und Verkehr Saarland, 1997). Through the late 1980s and 1990s, other development 
companies similar to the GIU were set up in South Saarland (at Landeskreis-level), which 
established more, but smaller, start-up and technology centres (Warscheid et al., 2011).  
 
From 1994 onwards GIU was furthermore responsible for the redevelopment of part of 
the site of the iron and steel plant in Saarbrücken Burbach into ‘Saarterassen’, again with 
support from the European structural funds. After decontamination (which required 
significant efforts), the site was developed into a mixed business park with a focus on 
services, new media, telecommunications, and craft ateliers (Warscheid et al., 2011; 
Dörrenbächer, 2013). Also sites previously used by the steel industry in Neunkirchen and 
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 Corporation for Promoting Innovation and Entrepreneurship. 
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 Saarbrücken Innovation and Technology Centre. 
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Völklingen were redeveloped (with considerable support through the Federal Urban 
Development Promotion Act programme, and European structural funds): in Neunkirchen 
the site in the town centre was developed into a retail and leisure centre from 1984 until 
the mid 1990s, and in Völklingen the old iron works complex was converted into a 
museum and art centre after closure in 1986 (and was named a UNESCO World Heritage 
site in 1994) (Warscheid et al., 2011; Dörrenbächer, 2013). In 1992 the government of 
Saarland established a development company for the Land as a whole, mainly for the 
development of industrial and commercial sites: ‘Saarland Bau und Boden’59 (SBB). The 
best known project the SBB undertook in the 1990s was the Ford Industrial Supplier Park 
in Saarlouis (opened in 1998) in which the first-tier suppliers were located on the same 
site as the car assembly plant of Ford in Saarlouis and production of the different parts is 
coordinated and synchronised (Schulz and Dörrenbächer, 2007). 
 
Also in further education some new measures were introduced by the government of 
Saarland. By means of the ‘Zukunftqualifikationsprogramm’60 (1986), the 
‘Aktionsprogramm zur Förderung der beruflichen Weiterbildung’61 (1991) and the 
‘Saarländisches Weiterbildungs- und Bildungsurlaubgesetz’62 (1990), a system of 
provisions, subsidies and incentives came into being to facilitate and promote further 
education and attaining additional qualifications for existing employees and unemployed 
(Minister für Umwelt Saarland, 1987; Minister für Umwelt Saarland, 1992). 
 
Episode 3 (1999-date): Cluster-based policies and new challenges 
When the CDU regained power in Saarland in 1999, the new government led by Peter 
Müller did not alter the main focal points in economic development policy. However, it 
did change some important characteristics of especially the Science, Technology, 
Innovation policies. Also in entrepreneurship and business support, further education and 
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 Saarland Construction and Land. 
60
 Future Qualifications Programme. 
61
 Action Programme for the Promotion of Further Education. 
62
 Saarland Law for Further Education and Training Leave. 
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skills, and the development of the built environment of Saarland, there were some new 
emphases.   
 
In the 1980s and 1990s some new technological fields and sectors emerged in South 
Saarland, alongside the older strongholds in steel, energy and automotive, partly as a 
result of the policies enacted and partly because of more autonomous developments. In 
particular, strengths emerged in information technology (IT) and to a lesser extent in 
nanotechnology and biotechnology. Also new development opportunities arose in 
logistics (due to the implementation of the Schengen-agreement in 1995) and higher 
education. In the Innovation Strategy (‘Innovationsstrategie’) of 2001, with some 
revisions in 2004, the government of Saarland implemented a cluster-based approach to 
further develop these fields. Six spearheads for the Saarland economy were named which 
were to be developed as clusters: information technology, nano- and biotechnology, 
automotive, energy, logistics and knowledge (Ministerpräsident des Saarlandes, 2001; 
Ministerpräsident des Saarlandes, 2004). For IT, nano- and biotechnology and 
automotive, cluster-bodies were established in 2003 to bring different actors within these 
fields together and facilitate coordination. In the other ‘clusters’ responsibility for the 
development was kept more centralised within either the Ministry of Economic Affairs or 
ZPT. A temporary staff unit was established at the Prime-Minister’s Office (‘Staatskanzlei’) 
from 2001 until 2004, to act as a change agent within the Saarland government, and 
coordinate about 80 project initiatives through which the strategy was implemented 
(Anne Otto, personal communication). This staff unit was directed by a Steering 
Committee, consisting of the Prime Minister, several other Ministers and August-Wilhelm 
Scheer, a professor in IT at the University of Saarland and successful entrepreneur 
(founder of IDS Scheer). After 2004, when the main initiatives within the Innovation 
Strategy were set up and progressing, the staff unit and Steering Committee were 
dissolved, and all responsibilities for the strategy were more structurally embedded 
within the Ministry of Economic Affairs. In 2007 the Innovation Strategy moved into the 
second phase. This was kicked off by the formulation of 100 projects by 11 working 
groups with more than 100 representatives from various segments of the Saarland 
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economy (Ministerpräsident des Saarlandes, 2008; Warscheid et al., 2011). Two more 
spearheads were added to the existing six: mechatronics and automation, and health care 
and medical technology. 
 
The actual achievements within the various ‘clusters’ were varied. In IT and nano- and 
biotechnology the already strong knowledge base within South Saarland could be further 
strengthened with new research institutes.63 While for mechatronics and automation, a 
new research centre was established in 2009.64 In automotive, energy, and logistics, the 
knowledge base remains poorly developed however (Lerch, 2005); although new 
initiatives are being deployed to address this. IT continues to grow as an important 
segment within the South Saarland economy, while expansion in nano- and 
biotechnology, health care and medical technology, and mechatronics and automation, 
remains mainly aspirational (Lerch, 2005; Warscheid et al., 2011).  
 
Under the banner of the Innovation Strategy (as ‘acceleration factors’65), as well as 
alongside the strategy, several new initiatives were enacted in entrepreneurship and 
business support and skills development and further education. For start-ups the 
‘Saarland Offensive für Gründer’ (Saarland Offensive for Start-ups) and ‘Business Angels 
network’ were launched in 2000, to succeed the ‘GründungsInitiative Saar’, with more 
emphasis on outreach, active encouragement, and coaching by existing entrepreneurs 
(Warschied et al, 2011). Also the financial instruments available for start-ups and SMEs at 
the SIKB and affiliate institutions, were streamlined (Saar Revue, 2001). In skills 
development and further education, different institutes in education and research were 
brought together as part of the ‘knowledge-cluster’, and new initiatives were introduced, 
e.g. to expand the provision of further education at the Universities, to develop courses 
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 Such as the Max Planck Institute for Software Systems (’Max Planck Institut für Softwaresysteme’; 2004), 
Intel Visual Computing Institute (2009), Material Engineering Center Saarland (2009), and the Helmholtz 
Institute for Pharmaceutical Research (’Helmholtz Institut für Pharmazeutische Forschung‘; 2009). 
64
 The Centre for Mechatronics and Automation technology (’Zentrum für Mechatronik und 
Automatisierungstechnik‘). 
65
 ‘Beschleunigungsfaktoren’ 
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offered online, and improve certification for skills (Ministerpräsident Saarland, 2001; 
Ministerpräsident Saarland, 2008). The ‘Lernzeil Produktivität’ (Learning Objective 
Productivity) programme – which became operational in 1995 - made allowances of up to 
70% of training costs available to support further education of employees in the face of 
technological change, especially in several growth branches such as call centres, 
automotive suppliers, and tourism (Arbeitskammer, 2005; Warschied et al., 2011). 
 
In upgrading the built environment, the focus turned on the one hand to the 
development of new commercial and industrial sites, and on the other hand to the 
further development of Saarland as a tourism and leisure destination. With the 
‘Masterplan für Gewerbe und Industrieflächen’ (Masterplan for Commercial and 
Industrial Sites) formulated in 2007, the Saarland government wanted to tackle the 
shortage of large plots of land available for industrial and commercial development. In 
this Masterplan six new sites are identified for new development with co-funding by the 
European Regional Development Fund (GW Saar, 2007; Warscheid et al., 2011). The 
‘Tourism Masterplan for Saarland’66 (2001) and ‘Tourism Strategy Saarland 2015’67 (2009), 
formulate a programme to upgrade Saarland as a tourism and leisure destination 
(Minister für Wirtschaft, 2001; Minister für Wirtschaft und Wissenschaft, 2009). 
Important parts of this programme are the improvement of hiking and bike routes, 
refurbishment of the convention centre in Saarbrücken, construction of a large event hall, 
facilitating new tourism accommodation, the creation of new attractions (as well as 
initiatives in marketing, information provision, services to tourists, etc.).  
 
 
6.6.3. Evolution of governance arrangements 
Over the years new governance arrangements have been set up, and other arrangements 
have been altered. With regard to economic development in South Saarland, governance 
arrangements seem to have generally stayed intact: arrangements do not seem to have 
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been abolished and replaced with new ones. Over the course of time, some existing 
arrangements have been assigned new tasks (and sometimes lost other tasks); and new 
governance arrangements were established alongside existing arrangements. The 
development of governance arrangements from 1970 onwards, is shown in Figure 19. 
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Grey indicates entities (controlled) at the national level, turquoise at the (wider) regional level, blue on a city-region level, and red at a local level. 
Figure 19: Development of governance arrangements in South Saarland 
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As outlined in section 3.3, governance arrangements may have three main functions with 
regard to adaptation and resilience: 
 They can serve to connect different parties and interests. 
 They can produce strategic intelligence, such as analysis, foresight and development 
of strategic options. 
 They can be aimed at managing specific policy programmes. 
For each of these functions, I will discuss how arrangements have developed. 
 
Connectedness and collaboration 
Connectedness was already strongly developed before South Saarland went through the 
changes in its economic structure, and this connectedness was maintained and expanded 
to further enable effective management of the adaptation process. Connectedness is 
evident at three levels. First, regular consultations and interaction between the 
government of Saarland and different parts of the local economy through the main 
representative organisations of Industrie- und Handelskammer (Chamber of Commerce), 
Arbeitskammer (Chamber of Labour) and Handwerkskammer (Chamber of Trades). 
Second, within their respective fields (industry, employees, and professions), these 
organisations in turn also connect different actors. Within industries and (large) firms 
there will furthermore be frequent discussion and interaction between employers, 
employees, and other stakeholders, through Works Councils, Supervisory Boards (with 
often (former) representatives from labour unions, civil society organisations, and 
governmental bodies), and wage bargaining arrangements. And third, besides these 
formal arrangements, there are also well-developed informal networks in Saarland. 
Because of its relatively small size and its specific culture, people from different 
institutions know each other well, and frequently meet at events and within associations 
to discuss issues on an informal basis. In addition, interlocking positions at different 
organisations and job changes from one organisation to another organisation, are not 
uncommon. 
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These existing arrangements have been further expanded with the establishment of the 
‘Saar-Gemeinschafts-Initiative’ in 1993, which formalised the involvement of different 
parties and interests in the society of Saarland in coping with economic challenges (Lerch, 
2007; Lerch and Simon, 2011). It played an important role in overseeing and negotiating 
the final reductions in coal mining in the 1990s and 2000s. Since then, its role has 
diminished. In addition, connectedness was sometimes expanded on an ad-hoc basis to 
deal with particular issues, as in the case of regular meetings between government 
institutions and social partners with regard to the restructuring of the steel industry in the 
late 1970s and 1980s, and the Steering Committee and staff unit to implement the 
Innovation Strategy from 2001 until 2004. 
 
With the deepening and formalisation of cross-border cooperation (also facilitated by the 
European Union), connectedness now also stretches beyond the borders of the Land. This 
connectedness is no longer only limited to the Saarland government, but there are also 
arrangements in place in which local governments respecitively social partners meet with 
their counterparts from other regions, such as the EuRegio SaarLorLux+ (1995), Zukunft 
SaarMoselle Avernir (1997), the Interregional Council of Labour Unions68 (1976), the 
Working Group of Chambers of Commerce and Trades69 (1990), the Economic and Social 
Committee70 (1997), etc. (Niedermeyer and Moll, 2007; Wille, 2011). This has expanded 
the range of options open to Saarland, in dealing with labour market shortages, 
coordinating infrastructure and planning decisions, and place-branding and tourism 
marketing.  
 
The well-developed connectedness between the different actors has greatly facilitated 
the adaptation process. The policy programmes were on the whole underwritten by all 
political parties and all social partners, which importantly contributed to the continuity 
and coherence within the development of policy. Furthermore, the Chambers of 
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 ‘Interregionaler Gewerkschaftsrat‘ 
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 ‘Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Industrie- und Handelskammern‘ 
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 ‘Wirtschafts- und Sozialausschuss der Großregion‘ 
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Commerce, Trades, and Labour, and the employers’ associations and labour unions, 
organised cooperation and understanding among their support, and often took on 
additional tasks to complement government policy, in e.g. business support, training, and 
guidance and mediation in finding work. Only in the mid-1960s (from about 1963 until 
1967) and again in the early 1980s (from about 1982 until 1985), there were periods of 
impasse. In the 1960s efforts to diversify the economy were deferred, partly because it 
would hurt the interests of steel companies, and in the early 1980s disagreements 
emerged about the management of the steel crisis. Characteristic for both these episodes 
was a lack of financial resources, and a divergence of interests with regard to what the 
priorities should be between CDU and SPD, and between industry and the labour unions 
(see Hahn, 2003). Crucial for breaking these spells were: a growing deterioration of the 
situation until the necessity for action became undeniable, and an increasing realisation 
that the issues could not be tackled without support from outside. Once this was the 
case, and – crucially – additional financial support by the federal government and in the 
1980s also by the European Community, was provided, the conflicts and stalemates were 
resolved quickly. 
 
Strategic intelligence and strategic planning 
In the 1960s various academic studies about the need for diversification of the economy 
in South Saarland came out (e.g. Sievert and Streit, 1964; Müller, 1967; Isenberg, 1968); 
insights of which eventually found their way into the Saar-Memorandum of 1967 
(Regierung des Saarlandes, 1967) and subsequent Strukturprogramm Saar 
(Plannungsgruppe beim Ministerpräsidenten des Saarlandes, 1969) (see Hahn, 2003). The 
shift to Science, Technology, Innovation policies from 1985 onwards was to an important 
extent a result of a federal policy shift towards more emphasis on science and technology 
in the early 1970s, which Saarland embraced somewhat belatedly. The intellectual basis 
of the Innovation Strategy of 2001 came partly from August-Wilhelm Scheer (a professor 
in IT at Saarland University and entrepreneur) and several of his students (Anne Otto, 
personal communication). The ‘intelligence system’ in which these ideas were discussed, 
assessed, detailed, and evaluated, has grown more elaborate and more sophisticated 
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over the years, as more expertise and experience with regard to economic development 
in Saarland in general and structural change in particular, has been built up.  
 
Within the governance framework, the generation of strategic intelligence takes place at 
several places. First of all, at the Ministries of the Land, and at the entities which are 
mainly responsible for the execution of policies, such as the Strukturholding Saar and the 
Zentrale für Produktivität und Technologie (ZPT; now renamed Saar.is). But also the 
Industrie- und Handelskammer (Chamber of Commerce), Arbeitskammer (Chamber of 
Labour) and Handwerkskammer (Chamber of Crafts), have their own intelligence units, as 
one of their main tasks is to advise the government of Saarland. Furthermore, because of 
their involvement in policy-making and in strategic decisions at firms, also employers’ 
associations and labour unions, develop their own intelligence. Until the mid-1990s there 
also was a lot of expertise at the University of Saarland about the economic development 
of the region (within Department of Economics and Department of Geography); however, 
this has largely disappeared because of cut-backs and restructuring operations at the 
University of Saarland in the 1990s (resulting in an increasing focus on natural sciences, 
engineering and medicine) and the retirement of specific experts (see Arbeitskammer des 
Saarlandes, 2011, Chapter 2). Since 1994 there is however an Institute for Cooperation 
between Science and Labour (‘Kooperationsstelle Wissenschaft und Arbeitswelt’), co-
funded by the University and the labour unions, which regularly investigates socio-
economic themes in Saarland. There are still many studies undertaken on the 
development of Saarland outside of these policy circles (as the sources cited in this 
Chapter also testify). Typically, this ‘intelligence system’ thus incorporates multiple 
perspectives, with also academics and the representative bodies of employers, 
professions and employees, involved in producing of strategic intelligence. The variety of 
places where intelligence is present and is being produced, and the variety of 
perspectives, will contribute to more considered policy-making, as more alternatives are 
being proposed and discussed.  
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Managing interventions 
With regard to arrangements aimed at managing interventions, already many 
arrangements existed in various domains before the 1970s (see Figure 18): the Zentrale 
für Produktivität und Technologie Saarland (ZPT) for business advice, internationalisation, 
skills development, and other services; the Gesellschaft für Wirtschaftsförderung (GW 
Saar) for export promotion; the Landesentwicklungsgesellschaft (LEG Saar) for developing 
and managing public real estate projects; and the Saarlandische Investitionskredit Bank 
(SIKB) for development finance. Moreover, the Land is the main source of funding of the 
University of Saarland and the University of Applied Science. Figure 20 shows how in 
particular the institutional framework for economic development at the state-level in 
Saarland, has changed and expanded since the early 1970s, as a result of the 
development of policy programmes and initiatives. 
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Figure 20: Current institutional framework for economic development in Saarland 
 
The existing institutional framework has thus been very useful for the execution of the 
policy programmes enacted over the years to guide and support the adaptation process 
within the economy, and this framework has been expanded and adjusted whenever 
needed. Changes in the institutional framework to manage interventions, have been 
driven primarily by the development of policy within Saarland. The main patterns of 
institutional change that can be observed in the framework for managing interventions, 
are ‘layering’ / ‘sedimentation’ and – to a lesser extent – ‘conversion’. 
 
Layering or sedimentation involves adding new elements to the existing framework (see 
section 3.4). This can be seen in the following instances:71 
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 Layering could also be clearly observed in the arrangements for connectedness, discussed earlier. With 
the establishment of the Saar-Gemeinschafts-Initiative in 1993 a new, more formalised arrangement was 
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 GW Saar and LEG Saar were also subsumed under one holding (‘Strukturholding 
Saar’), in order to better coordinate the attraction of inward investment and the 
planning and development of industrial sites and other projects. Saarland Bau und 
Boden (SBB) was then created in 1992 to implement such projects; thus adding a new 
entity to contribute to the upgrading of the build environment. Over the years, the 
Strukturholding Saar took on task in the management of industrial heritage and 
facility management. 
 The Zentrale für Produktivität and Technologie (now Saar.is) expanded its range of 
options for further education and skills certification, got a central role in facilitating 
technology transfer from 1978 onwards, and after 2001 took on tasks for managing 
the clusterbody for automotive.  
 Through the Saarländische Investions Kreditbank new affiliate institutions were 
created (in which also other banks active in Saarland participated), such as the 
‘Saarländische Kapitalbeteiligungsgesellschaft’ in 1972 (aimed at equity 
participations), the ‘Saarländische Wagnisfinanzierungsgesellschaft’ in 1997 (aimed at 
venture capital), and the ‘Bürgschaftsbank Saarland’ already in 1959 in its first form 
(aimed at providing guarantees for credit). 
 At the University of Saarland and the University of Applied Science, many new 
research institutes were attached since the mid-1980s, offices (‘Kontaktstellen’) for 
technology transfer were created in 1985, and a centre of excellence was set up in 
Information Technology in 2004 (which acts as the main cluster-body for the IT-
cluster). 
 At the local level the Gesellschaft für Innovation und Unternehmensförderung (GIU) 
was established in 1984 by the city of Saarbrücken to undertake the redevelopment of 
sites within the city. Over the course of the late 1980s and 1990s similar entities were 
created at Landeskreis-level in other parts of Saarland as well. 
                                                                                                                                                                
created for interaction between the government of Saarland and the social partners. And since 1970 the 
institutional arrangements for cross-border cooperation within the ‘Greater region’ have expanded, not 
only through the Regional Commission and regular summits between the governments of the constituent 
parts of the ‘Greater region’, but also through arrangements between social partners and between local 
governments across the borders. 
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Coversion refers to a redeployment of old institutions to new purposes. This can be seen 
in the following instances: 
 The tasks of GW Saar evolved from first just export promotion to mainly attracting 
inward investment in the late 1960s, and in addition growing and maintaining a 
network of international partners in the 1980s.  
 LEG Saar converted its focus from public real estate projects to developing industrial 
sites and urban development projects.  
 
 
 Conclusions 6.7.
Building on rapid expansion of coal mining and the iron and steel industry, South Saarland 
industrialised rapidly in the latter part of the 19th century. In this period also close links 
developed with Lorraine and Luxemburg. During this time a society emerged which was 
dominated by heavy industry in many respects: not only economically but also in terms of 
social relations and the built environment (settlement patterns, housing, infrastructure, 
etc.). In the first part of 20th century, economic development levelled off, as a result of 
the First and Second World Wars and the changing of hands of Saarland between 
Germany and France after both wars. As part of the reparations of Germany to France, 
Saarland was actually defined for the first time in 1919 as a separate territory (made up of 
parts which previously belonged to Prussia and Bavaria) on the basis of its heavy industry. 
The dependence on coal mining and iron and steel, together with this chequered history, 
led to economic problems in the 1960s, after Saarland had reunited with Germany in 
1957/1959. Structural change in South Saarland thus already started with the decline in 
coal mining which began in the 1960s. However, the process of structural change was 
slow and relatively orderly, as many former employees within coal mining, and later the 
steel industry and other contracting sectors within manufacturing, found work within 
growing manufacturing industries (mainly automotive and machinery) and in services. 
Several new industries in South Saarland have emerged and grown over the years: 
information technology, logistics, health care, and insurance services. 
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The steel crisis hit parts of the steel industry in South Saarland (the plants which would 
eventually combine to form Saarstahl) very hard. But nevertheless a sizeable and now 
thriving steel industry has been retained. Moreover, mass unemployment and other 
negative social and economic effects, have by and large been avoided. This was the result 
of active government support and interventions, by the federal government but 
especially the Saarland government, which was closely involved in the strategic decision-
making at Saarstahl during the restructuring operations and adopted a policy to attain 
more local control. In 2001 this was finally resulted in Saarstahl and (most of) Dillinger 
Hütte being subsumed under a foundation, with the primary objective to promote the 
long-term development of the steel industry and its place within the wider community. 
Also the legally secured representation of employee interests within the steel companies 
(through Works Councils and the Supervisory Board), and the powerful labour unions, 
have been important in preserving the steel industry for South Saarland and mitigating 
the social and economic impacts during the restructuring operations. 
 
Policy responses with regard to structural change in the regional economy, already 
started in the mid 1960s, with the decline in coal mining. Initially there was a strong 
emphasis on attracting inward investment, especially from firms with their home base in 
other parts in Germany. This policy consisted on the one hand of the provision of 
investment grants and other incentives, and on the other hand of investments in 
transport infrastructure and the development of industrial sites. Especially in the late 
1960s and early 1970s this policy was quite successful, and many firms invested in new 
plants in South Saarland. Over time especially investments in automotive and investment 
goods, developed into new mainstays for the manufacturing sector. After 1985 – when 
the SPD came to power - the Saarland government finally managed to free up resources 
for new impulses to economic development policy, and the focus shifted more towards 
Science, Technology, Innovation policies. New research institutes and centres were 
established and attracted at the University of Saarland, in particular in Information 
Technology, biotechnology and nanotechnology. These policies were complemented by 
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supporting start-ups and entrepreneurship, developing technology centres and science 
parks, and several new schemes in further education and skill formation. When the CDU 
regained control in 1999 it effectively continued the emphasis on STI, but made these 
policies cluster-based. In addition it launched some new initiatives to promote Saarland 
as a tourism- and leisure-destination and further expand the number of industrial and 
commercial sites.  
 
The government of Saarland has clearly been the main actor, and possesses a broad range 
of powers and instruments in economic development. There has been much continuity 
and gradual development in the evolution of policy, and the programmes and initiatives 
in various domains have in general been well-coordinated. Governance arrangements for 
connectedness were already well developed and have expanded slightly through the 
‘formalisation’ of previously informal arrangements to consult with social partners, and 
through new arrangements for cross-border cooperation. These tight connections have 
overall facilitated the adaptation process, as they supported a broad consensus on the 
need and direction of renewal efforts. In the mid-1960s and early 1980s, there were 
however brief episodes of impasse. At these times resources were tight and interests 
between important actors started to diverge. Additional financial support through federal 
government programmes and in the 1980s also European structural funds has been 
crucial to resolve these stalemates. Arrangements for strategic intelligence and planning 
are also well-developed, with intelligence units at various places within the Saarland 
government, at the three Chambers, and at other representative bodies. By design these 
arrangements incorporate a variety of perspectives (labour, firms, professions), and are 
sufficiently receptive for new insights. Governance arrangements have gradually 
expanded over the years, to implement new policies and take on new tasks. Hence 
‘layering’ / ‘sedimentation’ and to a lesser extent ‘conversion’ seem to be the dominant 
patterns of institutional change. 
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Chapter 7. STRUCTURAL CHANGE, THE STEEL CRISIS AND THE EVOLUTION OF POLICY AND 
GOVERNANCE IN TEESSIDE (UNITED KINGDOM) 
 
 Introduction 7.1.
In this Chapter I will consider the process of structural change, the steel crisis and crisis 
management, and the evolution of policy and governance in Teesside. The Chapter 
follows the exact same structure as the previous one. I will start by discussing some key 
characteristics of Teesside. The economic development of Teesside up until the 1970s, 
will be the topic of section 7.3. In section 7.4 I will then examine how the area was 
affected by deindustrialisation since the 1970s. Next I will look at the steel crisis and the 
way the crisis was managed. Section 7.6 will detail the evolution of policy and governance 
with regard to the economic development of Teesside. Finally in section 7.7, I will present 
some conclusions.  
 
 
 Key characteristics 7.2.
Teesside is a conurbation of several towns in the North-East of England, straddling 
between the historic counties of Durham and the North Riding of Yorkshire. The largest 
town is Middlesbrough. Teesside is at some distance from the main economic and 
population centres in the United Kingdom: London is at almost 400 km, and Leeds and 
Manchester (the main centres in the North of England) are at about 100 km and 160 km 
respectively. The most nearby centres are Newcastle-upon-Tyne at about 60 km, and York 
at about 80 km. 
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Source: http://www.ezilon.com/maps/images/europe/physical-map-of-UK.gif 
Figure 21: The location of the Teesside area (with Middlesbrough as its largest town) 
within the United Kingdom 
 
For the purposes of this research, the Teesside-area is taken be comprise of the towns of 
Middlesbrough (population currently about 138,000), Stockton-on-Tees (population 
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about 84,000), Billingham (population about 36,000), Redcar (population about 38,000), 
and Hartlepool (population about 92,000) and their surrounding areas.72 This delineation 
of Teesside coincides with the administrative unit of the County of Cleveland (which 
existed from 1974 until 1996), and now consists of the boroughs of Middlesbrough, 
Stockton-on-Tees, Redcar and Cleveland, and Hartlepool (total population currently about 
557,000).73 
 
 
Source: Beynon et al. (1994), p. 1 
Figure 22: The Teesside area 
 
The landscape of the Teesside-area is made up of a large flat lowland stretching from 
Stockton to Redcar and Hartlepool, enclosing the river Tees. This lowland area is 
                                                     
72
 This follows e.g. Beynon et al. (1994).  
73
 Darlington is hence not included in this delineation of Teesside (unlike the studies of e.g. House and 
Fullerton (1960) and North (1975), which did include it). Darlington was less a centre for heavy industry in 
the past than the other towns, and always had a more diversified economic structure. Since 1997 however, 
Darlington together with the Teesside-area is part of a wider economic area, generally referred to as ‘Tees 
Valley’. 
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surrounded by a landscape of gentle relief which extends northwards and westwards 
further into County Durham. To the South and South East, this landscape changes into a 
hill range: the Cleveland Hills, of which the highest peak is 454 meters. Especially on the 
northern edge of the Cleveland Hills, and within the the Eske valley further South, 
significant deposits of iron ore were to be found, and numerous mines existed from 1850 
until 1964 (North, 1975). To the north and west of Teesside is the Durham and 
Northumberland coal field, for a long time one of the principal locations for coal mining in 
the United Kingdom. 
 
In terms of administrative organisation, several changes took place over the last decades. 
Until 1968 local government consisted of numerous districts: county boroughs, municipal 
boroughs, urban districts, and rural districts. With the exception of the county boroughs 
of Middlesbrough and West Hartlepool (which formed a single-tier local government), 
these districts were in turn subsumed under the counties of Durham and North Riding of 
Yorkshire (a two-tier local government system). In 1968 many of these districts in 
Teesside (with the exception of the eastern most areas around Guisborough, Saltburn, 
Skelton and Loftus) were merged into the Teesside County Borough and Hartlepool 
County Borough, which meant that most of the Teesside-area was then encompassed by 
a single-tier system. However in 1974, there was another local government 
reorganisation, in which a two-tier system was reintroduced: the area was administered 
by the County of Cleveland, with four boroughs: Middlesbrough, Stockton-on-Tees, 
Hartlepool and Langbaurgh-on-Tees. In 1996 the local government system in Teesside 
reverted back to a single-tier system, when the County of Cleveland was abolished and 
Middlesbrough, Stockton-on-Tees, Hartlepool, and Redcar and Cleveland (formerly 
Langbraugh-on-Tees) became unitary authorities. At the regional level, no official 
government layer exists. However, some government entities in planning and economic 
development operated at this level, and the region is also a unit used for statistical 
purposes (NUTS1). Teesside is part of the North-East of England region. Until 1996 the 
North-East of England and Cumbria were for some purposes taken together to constitute 
the Northern Region. 
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 1971 2011 
Population size 568,834 557,227 
Total area 583 km2 597 km2 
Population density 976 p/km2 933 p/km2 
Total employment 222.000 236,000 
Population and total area in 1971 refer to Cleveland County, while working population for 1971 refers to 
Middlesbrough and Hartlepool County Boroughs. Data for 2011 refers to Middlesbrough, Stockton-on-Tees, 
Hartepool and Redcar and Cleveland unitary authorities. 
Sources: Office of National Statistics (Census data 1971 and 2011). 
Table 14: Key facts for Teesside 
 
 
 Economic development until the 1970s 7.3.
 
7.3.1. Economic development until the 1960s 
The industrialisation of Teesside started already in the 1820s, and during the 19th century 
the area developed into a major centre for iron production and subsequently also steel 
production. In the wake of this, also heavy engineering and shipbuilding developed as 
important industries. Furthermore, from the 1920s onward, the chemical industry 
emerged to rapidly become one of the mainstays of the local economy. The prevalence of 
heavy industry in Teesside over many years, has to a considerable extent shaped the 
social relations and built environment in the area. 
 
The start of the industrialisation of the Teesside-area can be traced back to the Stockton 
and Darlington Railway, opened in 1825. The Stockton and Darlington Railway brought 
coal from the south-west part of the Durham coalfield to Stockton, where it could be 
distributed further. The export trade to London and other markets, was so successful 
however, that it was soon decided to extend the railway to Middlesbrough further 
downstream, where the Tees was deeper. The owners of the railway – a group of Quaker 
men from Darlington – bought the piece of land that would serve as the new terminus of 
the line (the ‘Middlesbrough Estate’), and started to develop this into a new town. In 
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1850 the area would receive an important new impulse to its economic development: the 
Cleveland main seam of iron ore was discovered in the Cleveland Hills near Eston. After 
this, Middlesbrough, and Teesside more generally, were transformed. With a great supply 
of iron stone and coal in the vicinity, together with good provisions for transport because 
of the river and developing railway network, the location was ideally suited for the 
development of the iron industry. From the 1850s onwards Teesside developed into the 
most important area for iron production in the United Kingdom, and – by extension – the 
world at this time: by the 1870s it produced about 30% of pig iron in the UK, and about 
14-15% of pig iron in the world (Yasumoto, 2011). The growth in iron-production in 
Teesside coincided with the growth of shipbuilding, heavy engineering, and railway 
industries in the North-East of England. Coal mining in Durham, iron stone mining in the 
Cleveland Hills, iron production - and from the 1880s onwards, steel production – in 
Teesside, shipbuilding and heavy engineering in Tyneside, Wearside and Teesside 
(especially Hartlepool), and railway engineering in Darlington and Newcastle, formed one 
large industrial complex, in which the different parts fed on the other parts to create 
distinct economies of localisation and a particular dynamism (see Milne, 2006; Tomaney, 
2006). 
 
With rapid economic growth came rapid increase of the population (mainly through in-
migration from rural areas around Teesside but also Ireland). The expansion of 
Middlesbrough and Teesside were shaped by the interests of heavy industry. The iron and 
steel industries – and to a lesser extent heavy engineering and shipbuilding – not only 
dominated the development of the economy, but also of the landscape and the local 
society. Large plants and wharfs covered both sides of the river Tees from Stockton to the 
coast, low quality housing estates sprung up in the vicinity of the works, smoke and soot 
filled the air, and the river was heavily polluted by discharges and waste. Civic traditions 
and social institutions were mostly lacking in the community (Briggs, 1963; Hudson and 
Sadler, 1985); and industrial relations were characterised by a system in which large 
corporations provided for many of the needs of their workers (housing, job security, 
benefits, etc.) in return for a dependable and cooperative workforce. The population in 
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the area was dominated by (mostly male) manufacturing workers, while the middle class 
remained comparatively small; increasingly so when by the end of the 19th century the 
ironmasters and their descendants ceased to live in the town, and moved to the 
countryside (Briggs, 1963; Yasumoto, 2011). Hence, as Middlesbrough and the other 
towns in the vicinity developed, these mainly catered to the immediate necessities of the 
working class: cheap housing near the works, food, drink and clothing.  
 
By the time of the First World War, the numerous iron and steel firms that existed in 
Teesside in the 19th century, had amalgamated to three principal firms: Bolckow Vaughan 
(founded in 1840), Dorman Long (founded in 1875), and South Durham Steel and Iron 
(founded in 1898). In addition, a relatively small producer – the Skinningrove Iron 
Company (founded in 1880) – ran a single iron and steel plant in Skinningrove on the 
coast south of Redcar. By then metal manufacturing on Teesside had already lost a part of 
its competitive edge. The industry had moved from wrought iron as the primary output, 
to steel; which meant that economies of scale became more important. The 
comparatively new plants constructed by the competition in continental Europe could 
take greater advantage of this. Moreover, iron ore deposits in the Cleveland Hills were 
gradually becoming depleted from the 1910s onwards. The interwar years were a 
particularly difficult period for the Teesside area(and more generally for the North-East). 
Domestic demand dropped and ground was lost to competitors in export markets. The 
iron and steel industry tried to respond by moving into the production of constructional 
steel and tubes, and diversifying into bridge building and heavy engineering. Dorman 
Long took over Bolckow Vaughan in 1929; but a merger between Dorman Long and South 
Durham did not take place in the early 1930s despite lengthy negotiations (Tolliday, 
1986). Other industries, most notably shipbuilding in Hartlepool and along the Tees-river, 
declined considerably (North, 1975)  
 
This period also saw the emergence of the chemical industry, which would quickly 
become a new staple industry in the Teesside-area. In 1918, the government devised a 
scheme to construct a plant for the production of synthetic ammonia (to be used for the 
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manufacture of explosives), in Billingham. With the end of the First World War, this 
scheme was subsequently taken over by Brunner Mond in 1920, which was to use 
synthetic ammonia for the production of fertilisers and dyestuffs. In 1926 Brunner Mond 
merged with three other chemical companies to form Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI). 
Billingham developed into one of the main production and research and development 
locations for the new firm (North, 1975; Beynon et al., 1986). With the expansion of the 
chemical complex, it drew in large amounts of labour from the Durham coalfield and 
industries in recession. With this, Billingham quickly transformed from a village into a 
company town (similar to Middlesbrough and surrounding towns in the 19th century), in 
which much of the housing and basic community services were provided for by ICI 
(Beynon et al., 1986). 
 
The 1930s also saw the first involvement of central government in the regions 
characterised by heavy industry. Up to this point, the central government’s policy had 
been not to involve itself in economic affairs; but unemployment levels reached 30 to 
40% in many parts of the North-East, including parts of Teesside (North, 1975). In 1934 
the central government therefore issued the Special Areas Act, in which land could be 
acquired and transferred to organisations willing to undertake redevelopment. With an 
amendment in 1937 also some (limited) financial support became available for new 
investment (Warren, 1973; North, 1975). Of the Teesside-area, only Hartlepool was 
included as a Special Area however. After the Second World War, this pattern of 
government involvement would be further extended. The post-war Labour-government 
tried to implement a programme of nationalising several key industries. Coal mining was 
nationalised in 1947. The iron and steel industry (with Dorman Long, South Durham, and 
Skinningrove Iron as the main companies on Teesside) followed in 1951; however this was 
quickly undone by the new Conservative government, coming into power later in 1951. 
Still investment in iron and steel became subject to approval by a new Iron and Steel 
Board, set up in 1953 (North, 1975). With the Distribution of Industry Acts of 1945 and 
1950, a system was furthermore put in place to stimulate investment in manufacturing in 
certain areas (Development Areas; renamed from Special Areas) through active spatial 
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planning and grants, and discourage investment in other areas (mainly in the South of 
England). The whole of Teesside was included in the North-East Development Area. The 
Teesside Industrial Development Board was formed in 1945 to promote investment in the 
area and set up new industrial estates (alongside the North-East Industrial Development 
Association, which did the same for the whole of the North-East) (Cousins et al., 1974; 
North, 1975). These measures had the unintended effect however of reinforcing the 
dependency of the area on heavy industry, rather than countering it (also see Hall, 1986). 
 
By the late 1950s, 40,000 people were employed in iron and steel in Teesside, while 
about 29,000 were employed in the chemical industry (of which about 25,000 at ICI) 
(House and Fullerton, 1960). In iron and steel, Teesside was still one of the leading 
production centres in the UK (after South Wales), with 4.4 million tonnes of steel being 
produced in 1957 (North, 1975). By this time, it had also become one of the most 
important sites for the production of chemicals in the world (Beynon et al., 1986; Greco, 
2002). ICI had continued to develop and expand rapidly in Teesside during and following 
the Second World War, both at its existing complex in Billingham and at its new 
petrochemical complex at Wilton (which focussed on e.g. plastics, synthetic rubbers, 
paints, adhesives, and nylon). 
 
 
7.3.2. Economy by the early 1970s 
After the 1950s the post-war boom was over, which meant that the demand for iron and 
steel, heavy engineering and ships slowed down. Chemicals experienced high growth 
however, and it continued its rapid expansion on Teesside. Also the involvement of the 
central government within heavy industry and within the area, continued to grow. 
 
The two main iron and steel firms on Teesside – Dorman Long and South Durham – 
invested extensively in replacement investments in the 1950s and early 1960s, and 
extended some of their milling capacity (Hudson and Sadler, 1985). However, 
complacency in the boom-period in the 1950s, controls on new investment by the Iron 
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and Steel Board, and uncertainty over renationalisation, meant that not enough was 
invested in the application of new technologies, like basic oxygen steel-making (BOS) 
(Blair, 1997). Hence, the competitiveness of iron and steelmaking on Teesside (and other 
parts of the United Kingdom) was diminished. In 1967, the Labour-government under 
Harold Wilson, which had assumed office in 1964, renationalised the fourteen largest 
steel companies in the United Kingdom (among which Dorman Long, South Durham, and 
Skinningrove Iron) to form the British Steel Corporation (BSC). The strategy of BSC 
became to concentrate investment in five ‘heritage sites’ on coastal locations, including 
Teesside. In the 1973 it was officially announced that a massive, new integrated works 
was to be constructed on Teesside which would push total capacity up to 12 million 
tonnes by the 1980s (Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, 1973). These facilities 
would replace much of the older plants in other locations (to the east of Middlesbrough, 
in the Ironmaster’s District, and in Hartlepool). By the early 1970s about 30,000 people 
were employed in the iron and steel industry in the Teesside area, producing about 4 
million tonnes of steel (Cleveland County Council, 1983; North, 1975). 
 
Chemicals production flourished in the 1960s. Demand for ICI’s products continued to be 
high, and the company was one of the technological leaders in the field. Teesside 
remained one of its most important production and R&D locations. This meant large 
investments in further expansion of capacity and modernisation, and the application of 
new product- and process-innovations in both Billingham and Wilton (North, 1975; 
Beynon et al., 1986; Greco, 2002). In the 1960s, also an area of marsh land on the north 
bank of Tees, at Seal Sands, was drained and prepared for the development of a third 
branch to the chemical complex at Teesside. A refinery was established in 1966 as a joint 
venture between ICI and Phillips Petroleum; and several other large chemical firms 
(mainly from the US) constructed branch plants on Seal Sands. Also Shell built a refinery 
on Teesside, opposite to Seal Sands on the south bank of the Tees. The discovery of North 
Sea oil and gas in the latter half of the 1960s gave a further boost to the developments at 
Seal Sands and chemicals production more generally. By the early 1970s, chemicals 
employed over 30,000 people (Robinson and Storey, 1981). 
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Meanwhile shipbuilding in Teesside suffered from a drop in demand after the initial post-
war boom. Several shipyards closed in Hartlepool and along the river in the 1960s, while 
others were taken over by the Tyneside-based Swan Hunter group. The decline of 
shipbuilding, as well as the decline in demand for railway equipment, meant that also the 
engineering industry had to adjust. The large investments in chemical and iron and steel 
plant on Teesside, the emerging offshore industry, and the development of new power 
plants, offered some new opportunities. Many of the engineering firms became however 
part of larger consortia, also to be able to compete at the international level (North, 
1975). The figure below shows the main locations of heavy industry on Teesside in 1970.   
 
 
Source: Warren (1974), p. 28 
Figure 23: Heavy industry in the Teesside area 
 
In the early and mid-1960s, a broad consensus emerged about the further development 
of Teesside, which included the central government, the local authorities, regional bodies 
(the North-East Development Council and Northern Economic Planning Council) (all with 
representatives from both the Labour and Conservative Parties), major employers (in 
particular BSC and ICI), and the trade unions (Foord et al., 1985; Beynon et al., 1989; 
199 
 
Hudson, 1990; Beynon et al., 1994). They embraced a programme consisting of three 
main strands: the modernisation and rationalisation of existing heavy industry on 
Teesside, expansion of the area’s infrastructure and provision of industrial land, and the 
attraction of new employment in light manufacturing and services (as it was foreseen that 
employment in heavy industry would go down somewhat). The main outlines of this 
programme will be further discussed in section 7.6.2. As a result of this programme, the 
investments by BSC and ICI in the Teesside-area were supported by generous grants from 
the central government; and were furthermore complemented by large amounts of 
public investment. For example, the land reclamation of Seal Sands (already referred to 
above), the new Tees Dock (constructed in the early 1960s), a nuclear power station close 
to Hartlepool (built in the late 1960s), and an airport (which was reconverted from an old 
RAF-base in 1964).  
 
Hence in the early 1970s considerable optimism existed about the economic future of 
Teesside. And on the face of it Teesside appeared a very dynamic place, with a boom in 
new investment and construction in iron and steel, chemicals, new land reclamation, and 
infrastructure.74 However, also in the 1960s several strategic parameters had shifted to 
the disadvantage of the area. Firstly, with the gradual dismantling of the industrial 
complex of the North-East (as a result of the decline of coal mining and ship building), the 
locational advantages of iron and steel and – to a lesser extent – chemicals on Teesside 
had become even less specific. Economic activity and industry on Teesside had become 
more and more footloose. Competitiveness in international markets became ever more 
important; even more so when the United Kingdom joined the European Economic 
Community in 1973. Secondly, more and more control of economic development in 
                                                     
74
 As may also be evidenced by the following excerpt from the Sunday Times in 1976, which also refers to 
the Sterling-crisis at the time: “’If only the speculators could see this.’ So said Henri Simonet, Vice-President 
of the European Commission, when he visited Teesside ten days ago. More than a billion pounds is being 
invested there in steel and chemical plant, nuclear power and oil installations, and the area can fairly claim 
to be Europe’s most dynamic industrial site. But, as Simonet said: ‘Nobody in Europe knows about this.’ … 
Even now, at a dark moment for the British economy, more than £1,200m is being invested in Teesside, in a 
series of projects of great boldness, advanced technology and crucial significance for our balance of trade.” 
(quoted in Beynon et al., 1989, p. 271). 
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Teesside shifted from the local level to the national level and even international level. The 
large firms on Teesside in iron and steel, but also in engineering and shipbuilding, became 
part of even larger firms, with their headquarters outside the Teesside area. Much of the 
manufacturing on Teesside was characterised by branch plants of national or 
international firms. Furthermore, the central government had acquired a growing 
influence in heavy industries such as iron and steel (but also coal mining and 
shipbuilding), and had developed an increasing interest in the Teesside-area itself, as a 
strategically important location for national economic interests. 
 
 
 The process of structural change 7.4.
In the 1970s Teesside was the site of much investment and much construction activity. 
However, employment levels in steel and chemicals were already dropping somewhat. 
The steel crisis from 1975 until the mid-1980s hit the area hard, and also other 
manufacturing industries experienced problems from the early 1980s onward. Figure 24 
shows the development of employment in the steel industry and in chemicals. Losses in 
employment in the steel industry already started in the late 1960s, but accelerated 
rapidly during the steel crisis. From 1975 until 1984 almost 2/3 of employment in steel 
(more than 18,000 jobs) was lost. Since then, decline has been less rapid, but 
nevertheless quite consistent; and currently, the steel industry is not a major employer 
anymore in Teesside (though still a significant factor for especially the Redcar area). Job 
loss in the chemical industry proceeded more gradual. In 2010 it still directly sustained 
nearly 10,000 jobs (down from over 30,000 jobs in the late 1960s).  
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Sources: Office of National Statistics (Census data 1971); Beynon et al. (1994), p. 104; Robinson and Storey 
(1981), p. 166; Cleveland County Council (1995a), p. 29; Sadler (2001); House of Commons North-East 
Regional Committee (2010), p. 5; TERU and TBR (2000); NEPIC (2013). 
Figure 24: Development of employment in major industries in Teesside 
 
As can be seen in Figure 25, unemployment in the Teesside-area rose dramatically from 
the mid-1970s until the mid-1980s, reaching a peak of about 24% in 1985. By then 
Cleveland County was the county with the highest rates of unemployment on mainland 
Britain (only surpassed by parts of Northern Ireland) (Beynon et al., 1985; Foord et al., 
1985). In some parts of Teesside – especially in Middlesbrough, Thornaby, and north of 
the river in Port Clarence – unemployment exceeded 40% (Foord et al., 1985). Between 
1975 and 1985, total employment in the Teesside area contracted by about 60,000 jobs. 
This was primarily the result of the loss of employment in the two staple industries in 
Teesside, as well as in other manufacturing industries (such as engineering and 
shipbuilding). But also in construction there were large losses of employment, when the 
construction boom of the 1970s ended: about 12,000 jobs (more than half of the total) 
between the mid-1970s and mid-1980s. Multiplier effects through suppliers to the 
manufacturing industries and through loss of consumer spending, also affected parts of 
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the service sector. Total employment in the service sector remained about equal – at 
about 110,000 jobs – from the mid-1970s until the 1980s, before growing to about 
170,000 jobs in 2008 (Foord et al., 1985; Beynon et al., 1994; NOMIS). 
 
 
Change in definitions over time, not taken into account. Figures for Teesside from 2004 onwards, are 
calculated from unemployment figures for Middlesbrough, Stockton-on-Tees, Hartlepool, and Redcar and 
Cleveland. 
Sources: Cleveland County Council (1995b), Office for National Statistics (Regional Trends), NOMIS 
(www.nomisweb.co.uk) 
Figure 25: Unemployment rates in Teesside / Cleveland County and Great Britain 
 
The rapid loss of employment in iron and steel, chemicals, other manufacturing 
industries, and construction is reflected in Figure 26, which depicts structural change in 
Teesside in terms of employment. The percentage of employment in manufacturing went 
from nearly 50% (about 105,000 jobs) in the early 1970s, to slightly more than 10% (about 
25,000 jobs) in 2008. The service sector gained ground quite quickly in relative terms; 
even considering the fact that employment in the service sector did not grow from 1975 
until 1984 (as noted). Structural change in the Teesside area was hence pronounced, 
203 
 
rapid, and disruptive; especially compared to structural change in South Saarland 
(discussed in section 6.4). 
 
 
Figures for 1971 refer to Teesside and Hartlepool County Boroughs; 1975, 1978, 1981, 1984 and 1988 refer 
to Cleveland County; and 1995, 2001 and 2008 are calculated from figures for Middlesbrough, Stockton-on-
Tees, Hartlepool and Redcar and Cleveland. 
Sources: Office of National Statistics (Census data 1971); Beynon et al. (1994); NOMIS 
(http://www.nomisweb.co.uk). 
Figure 26: Structural change in Teesside in terms of employment 
 
Within the manufacturing sector, a rapid contraction of heavy industry (steel, chemicals, 
and engineering) took place, while in light manufacturing – contrary to expectations in 
the 1960s and early 1970s – there was no growth. The contraction of steel on Teesside 
since the early 1970s will be discussed in detail in the next section. In chemicals, large 
investments in the 1970s in Billingham, Wilton, and Seal Sands, had not led to any 
additional employment. Instead, efficiency gains as a result of these investments had led 
to a small decrease in employment (as can be seen in Figure 24). From about 1980 
onwards, Teesside started to lose significance as a location for chemical industry; a 
development which accelerated in the 1990s and 2000s. From the early 1980s ICI shifted 
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its strategy from being a diversified chemical company, producing a full range of 
chemicals, to becoming a chemical company specialising in more high-margin commodity 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals (Greco, 2002; Phillips, 2011). This was in response to 
increasing overcapacities in the global production of heavy chemicals (such as 
petrochemicals), developed in the 1970s (Beynon et al., 1986; Greco, 2002). For ICI’s 
integrated complex on Teesside this meant a series of sell-offs and closures over the 
1980s, 1990s and 2000s (Greco, 2002; Chapman, 2005). Up to 2008, when ICI ceased to 
exist as a separate company, Teesside had thus become more and more peripheral within 
its operations. Moreover, ownership of different parts of the complex, has become 
increasingly dispersed among a multitude of companies, mostly from outside the United 
Kingdom. Currently, the chemical industry on Teesside thus consists mostly of branch 
plants of large international chemical firms, and managing the mutual dependencies 
between different parts of the complex has become a growing concern (Chapman, 2005).  
 
In engineering there was some growth in employment in the first part of the 1970s 
(Robinson and Storey, 1981), as many of the larger companies were involved in the new 
investment in plants in the steel and the chemicals industries, and moreover, as the 
exploitation of North Sea oil and gas, provided new opportunities in offshore engineering 
(Sadler, 1986). However, by the early 1980s also engineering started to shed jobs (Storey, 
1985), when the boom of investments in Teesside ended, and a fall in oil prices in the 
1980s limited new investments in offshore engineering equipment (Sadler, 1986). Also in 
light manufacturing (such as the food industry and textiles) there were gains in 
employment in the late 1960s and early 1970s, but these were not sustained in the 
second part of the 1970s (Robinson and Storey, 1981; Storey, 1985). Since 1980, Teesside 
has had some moderate success in attracting new manufacturing, though only few large 
establishments came to Teesside and stayed. 
 
There has been a clear shift from manufacturing to services in the Teesside economy. A 
part of this can be explained by the outsourcing of services such as cleaning, catering, 
maintenance and certain engineering services, by the large firms (ICI and BSC) in Teesside 
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in the 1980s and 1990s (Greco, 2002). Furthermore, though many production activities in 
engineering have disappeared over the years, a core of expertise in civil and mechanical 
engineering has been retained. Several firms still operate in the area offering design and 
consultancy services in engineering around the world (Hudson, 2011b). Most growth in 
the service sector has however come from activities which do not rely on the old 
manufacturing base, such as retail, back-office and call-centre services, health care, and 
other public sector services (Beynon et al., 1994; Tees Valley Joint Strategy Unit, 2002). 
Especially health care is a major employer with over 15,000 jobs. Also Information 
Technology (IT) and Digital Media have emerged as potential growth sectors since the late 
1990s on the back of the strong reputation of Teesside University in these domains. 
 
These shifts in the structure of the Teesside economy and the high levels of 
unemployment experienced in the area over time, have coincided with several 
developments in the labour market (Beynon et al., 1985; Foord et al., 1985; Beynon et al., 
1989; Beynon et al., 1994; Greco, 2002): 
 As can be seen in Figure 27, with the rise of employment in the service sector, the 
economic activity rates of females have risen strongly. Male employment dropped 
substantially in the 1970s and 1980s, and only started to grow again from the 1990s. 
 Especially in the 1980s, a considerable amount of people left Teesside, in search of 
opportunities elsewhere. Some moved to other parts of the United Kingdom. Others 
took on contract work in chemicals, engineering and construction in e.g. the Middle 
East. 
 Growing ‘flexibility’ has been a major characteristic in the labour market. The tacit 
pact between employees and employers, of job security and relatively high wages in 
return for a cooperative attitude and harmony in industrial relations, has broken 
down for large parts of the workforce. Hence there has been a much higher incidence 
of temporary contracts and part-time work (especially among women), less 
demarcation of responsibilities and more ‘multitasking’, and a growing control of 
management on the way work is performed (together with a declining influence of 
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trade unions). At the time of mass unemployment in the 1980s, also the informal 
economy – in which jobs were performed off the books – was sizeable on Teesside. 
 Insecurity, casual work, frequent changes from job to job, and from job to 
unemployment / inactivity, are common features for large segments of the labour 
market. Other segments though – especially in management and more high-skill 
professions – still enjoy job security and relatively high wages. This has led to a 
growing polarisation within the labour market. 
 
 
1971 refers to Teesside and Hartlepool County Boroughs; 1981, 1991, 2001 refer to Cleveland County; 2011 
refers to Middlesbrough, Stockton, Hartlepool, and Redcar and Cleveland unitary authorities.  
Source: Office of National Statistics (Census data, 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001, 2011) 
Figure 27: Structural change in Teesside: male and female employment and 
unemployment patterns  
 
 
 The steel crisis and crisis management 7.5.
The process of deindustrialisation was very marked and particularly disruptive in the 
Teesside area. The crisis in the steel industry was an important part of this process, and 
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the way the crisis was managed demonstrates some crucial issues with regard to how 
deindustrialisation was coped with at the subnational level in the UK. After the creation of 
British Steel Corporation in 1967, the major decisions affecting iron and steel in the 
Teesside-area were no longer taken in the area itself and the activities based on Teesside 
became increasingly marginalised within BSC and the subsequent firms of which it was a 
part.75 Moreover, the societal and economic disruption in the Teesside-area, as a 
consequence of the restructuring operations at BSC, was stark during the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. These outcomes were the result of a sequence of strategic decisions by the 
British Steel Corporation and the central government in the 1970s and early 1980s, and 
an inability to avoid and subsequently deal with large-scale redundancies. 
 
The steel crisis and the development of the steel industry since 
After the nationalisation of the fourteen largest steel companies in the United Kingdom in 
1967 (which included Dorman Long, South Durham, and Skiningrove Iron in the Teesside-
area), and the formation of the British Steel Corporation, the new company started a 
programme to concentrate and rationalise the iron- and steelmaking operations. The 
steel industry in the UK still mostly relied on old-fashioned technologies (most plants had 
not yet implemented basic oxygen steel-making, continuous casting, or other innovations) 
and productivity was low (Richardson and Dudley, 1987; Blair, 1997). Teesside was 
designated in 1971 as one of the five coastal locations which were to become the main 
centres of production. Other locations for iron and steel production in the UK were 
scheduled to be closed or downsized considerably during the next decade. Moreover, 
Redcar-Lackenby in Teesside was selected as the site for a large, new integrated works 
(the ‘South Teesside works’) with a capacity of up to 12 million tonnes, to enable BSC to 
increase its total capacity from about 27 million tonnes in 1972 to about 36-38 million 
tonnes in the early 1980s (Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, 1973). The new 
integrated works would replace the existing iron and steel production plants in the area, 
notably the works in Cargo Fleet, Cleveland, Hartlepool and Skinningrove (see Figure 23). 
                                                     
75
 Corus (1999-2007), Tata Steel (2007-2011) and Sahaviriya Steel Industies (2011-2015). 
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Some rolling mill capacity would however remain at Hartlepool, Stockton, Cleveland and 
Skinningrove. As a result of the steel crisis, the building of this new plant on Teesside was 
truncated, and the last phases of its construction were never realised (Hudson and Sadler, 
1985). This has left the operations in Teesside in an economically and technologically 
disadvantaged position, which eventually resulted in further crises in the early 2000s, in 
2010-2011 and in 2015.  
 
Figure 28 shows the decline of employment in the steel industry from 1965 until 2009. 
Reductions were rather gradual in the late 1960s and 1970s, but from 1978 until 1984 
there was a rapid decrease from over 25,000 to around 10,000 jobs (a loss of about 60% 
of employment). Since then, the industry has continued to shed jobs, and by 2009 still 
offered direct employment for about 3,000 people in Teesside. Figure 29 depicts the 
development of crude steel production for the Northern Region (which until 1974 also 
included steel production in Workington and until 1980 in Consett; both outside the 
Teesside-area). Production went from about 5 million tonnes at the start of the 1970s to 
under 3 million tonnes at the early 1980s, as a result of closures of many works (not only 
in Consett and Workington, but also within the Teesside-area). From the mid-1980s it 
stabilised at around 3 to 3.5 million tonnes. By this time production only took place in the 
Redcar-Lackenby facility in Teesside. However – as is also clear from Figure 29 - there 
were further crises in the early 2000s and in 2009-2011 (and in 2015), in which steel 
production was much lower, and even ceased.  
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Calculation of production of crude steel per employee is based on the total number of employees in the 
steel industry in the Northern Region, including employees employed in the further processing of steel 
(casting, rolling, forging, etc.). Before 1980 steel production also took place in other parts of the Northern 
Region (Consett until 1980, and Workington until 1974). After 1980, steel production and employment in 
iron and steel industry in the Northern Region, are almost exclusively concentrated in Teesside. 
Sources: Office of National Statistics (Census 1971; and Report on the Census of Production, multiple 
editions), Beynon et al. (1994), p. 104; Robinson and Storey (1981), p. 166; Cleveland County Council 
(1995a), p. 29; Sadler (2001); House of Commons North-East Regional Committee (2010), p. 5; Iron and 
Steel Statistics Bureau (Annual Statistics for the United Kingdom, multiple editions).  
Figure 28: Development of employment in the steel industry in Teesside, and 
production of crude steel per employee in the Northern Region 
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Sources: Office for National Statistics (Annual Abstract of Statistics, multiple editions); Iron and Steel 
Statistics Bureau (Annual Statistics for the United Kingdom, multiple editions).  
Figure 29: Crude steel production in 1,000 tonnes in Northern Region, and production 
of Northern Region as a percentage of production in the United Kingdom 
 
Table 15 lists the main events with regard to the restructuring of iron- and steelmaking in 
the United Kingdom and in Teesside since the late 1960s. 
 
1967 Formation of British Steel Corporation, including the Teesside-based companies 
Dorman Long, South Durham Steel and Iron, and Skinningrove Iron. Total employment 
at the new company is about 254,000. 
1969-1984 Rationalisation and restructuring of iron- and steel production on Teesside. Including 
the closure of coke ovens, blast furnaces, steel making facilities and some rolling mills 
at Hartlepool, Stockton, Cargo Fleet, Cleveland and Skinningrove. Only secondary steel 
mills remaining at Hartlepool (pipes), Stockton (pipes), Cleveland (beams), Lackenby 
(coil plate) and Skinningrove (sections). Construction of Basic Oxygen Steel (BOS) 
steelmaking facility at Lackenby with a capacity of 2.2 million tonnes per year in 1972, 
to replace outdated open hearth and Bessemer steel-making plants elsewhere.  
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1971 ‘Development Plan’ by British Steel Corporation. A large scale investment programme 
to push up production to about 40 million tonnes per year by 1980. Production is to be 
concentrated at five ‘heritage sites’ on coastal locations: Llanwern and Port Talbot in 
South Wales, Ravenscraig in Scotland, and Scunthorpe and Teesside in England. 
Planned closure over 10 years of works at other locations in the United Kingdom 
(including Consett and Workington in the Northern region). Teesside selected as the 
location for a new integrated iron and steel works, at Redcar / Lackenby site, with 
planned capacity of more than 12 million tonnes.  
1973 White Paper ‘British Steel Corporation: Ten Year Development Strategy’ (Secretary of 
State for Trade and Industry, 1973). Department of Trade and Industry effectively 
supports BSC’s investment programme (as outlined in the Development Plan). 
However, expansion of capacity by 1980 is limited to about 33-35 million tonnes 
instead of the 40 million tonnes proposed by BSC. 
1973-1979 Realisation of first two phases of new South Teesside works. Construction of iron ore 
and coking coal onloading facilities (completed in 1973), a blast furnace and ancillary 
facilities (for coke and sinter production) at Redcar , and expansion of BOS steel-making 
at Lackenby site to 4.65 million tonnes annual capacity. 
1974-1975 Newly installed Labour-government asks Lord Beswick (Minister of State for Industry) 
to review the necessity of the plant closures under the Development Plan. This leads to 
a delay in the implementation of the restructuring operations, and a phasing over a 
longer time period of plant closures. 
1975 BSC Industry is established with a responsibility to create new alternative employment 
for those made redundant in the steel industry, e.g. by leasing land or buildings owned 
by the company to firms outside the steel industry, and providing support / securing 
finance for business proposals. 
Total employment at BSC still at around 230,000, but would drop to 186,000 in 1979.  
1977 Much lower than expected demand for steel in 1975 and 1976, resulting overcapacity 
and losses, and poor prospects, lead BSC to abandon the ten-year investment plan, and 
settle for a lower overall capacity of 30 million tonnes per year by 1982. 
1978 White Paper ‘British Steel Corporation: The Road to Viability’ (Secretary of State for 
Industry, 1978). Department of Industry endorses revised course by BSC. Projects that 
are already nearing completion should be completed, but projects for further 
expansion should be deferred. Closures of inland plants should be accelerated. 
1979 Only first two phases of the construction of the new integrated plant at Redcar-
Lackenby are completed; the subsequent phases III. IV and V are postponed for the 
time being. Hence plans for a new plate mill at Lackenby, two additional blast furnaces 
at Redcar, and additional steel making and milling capacity at Lackenby, are not 
realised. Capacity of plant is about 3.6 million tonnes per year (instead of the planned 
12 to 13 million tonnes), and primary output of plant are semi-finished steel slabs (as 
remaining rolling mill capacity is insufficient to convert these steel slabs into finished 
products). 
Newly installed Conservative government puts extra pressure on BSC to restore 
profitability, in order to limit its liability to additional financial support, and to 
anticipate on future privatisation. This leads to reductions in overall production from 
22 million tonnes to about 15 million tonnes per year; and hence the course of the 
company becomes one of contraction. Reduction of employment of 52,000 announced 
for 1980. 
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1980 General strike at British Steel Corporation from January until March, over plans for 
massive reductions in the workforce and a pay freeze for workers. Government reduces 
pressure on BSC and makes extra financial support available. Workers receive a pay 
rise, but decline in employment nevertheless accelerates: whereas from 1975 until 
1979 about 44,000 jobs were lost, 1979 until 1984 would see a job loss of about 
115,000 (down to about 71,000 in 1984).  
1981-1986 Sale of some parts of British Steel Corporation not directly involved in steelmaking and 
-processing. Several joint-ventures in speciality steels with private sector steel 
companies involving BSC assets. 
1988 Privatisation of British Steel Corporation, renamed to British Steel. Total employment 
at time of privatisation about 52,000. 
1999 Merger of British Steel with Dutch steel firm Hoogovens to create Corus. 
2000-2001 Restructuring of South Teesside works, leading to a reduction of employment of about 
2,000 jobs. Closure of Lackenby coil plate mill, which makes plant even more 
dependent on semi-finished steel as output.  
2003 Corus decides that semi-finished steel from South Teesside works is surplus to its 
internal demand, and hence should find an outlet on the global market. The works are 
renamed Teesside Cast Products (TCP). Corus enters into a ten-year agreement (2004-
2014) with Duferco SA (Switzerland), Marcegaglia (Italy), IMSA (Mexico) and Dongkuk 
(South Korea) to take off 78% of TCP’s output (with the remainder continued to be 
used within Corus).    
2007 Corus is taken over by Indian conglomerate Tata, and is integrated into Tata Steel. 
2009 The consortium of four companies reneges on the off-take agreement, as a result of 
the poor situation on the global steel market. 
2010 Tata Steel decides to mothball Teesside Cast Products in February of the year. 
Remaining mills at Skinningrove, Hartlepool, and Cleveland continue to be operated by 
Tata. 
2011 Thai firm Sahaviriya Steel Industries (SSI) buys Teesside Cast Products of Tata Steel, as it 
lacks primary iron- and steelmaking capacity at its operations in Thailand. 
2012 After refurbishing the plant, SSI restarts iron- and steelmaking at Teesside Cast 
Products in April of the year. 
2015 Iron and steelmaking facilities again mothballed per September of 2015. About 1,700 
workers redundant, and SSI UK has been put into liquidation. 
Sources: Heal (1974), Hudson and Sadler (1985); Richardson and Dudley (1987), Young (1987), Dudley and 
Richardson (1990), Blair (1997); Dawley et al. (2008); Hudson and Swanton (2012); www.ssi-steel.co.uk. 
Table 15: Chronology of the restructuring of the steel industry in Teesside from the 
late 1960s 
 
The remaining iron and steel works – the South Teesside works, now Teesside Cast 
Products – are not very competitive. Iron and steel-making capacity at the works exceeds 
rolling mill capacity; so a large part of the output of the plant is semi-finished steel (British 
Steel General Steels, 1990; Hudson and Swanton, 2012). The margins for semi-finished 
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steel are much lower than for finished steel products, and the demand for semi-finished 
steel is more volatile. This is the root cause of further restructuring operations in the early 
2000s and mothballing of the plant in 2010-2011 and in 2015. Its current prospects for 
reopening look bleak.76 Furthermore, as is clear from the reduction of employment in 
steel in Teesside in the 1970s and early 1980s, the social impacts of the restructuring 
operations over the years, have been enormous. Behind these two outcomes, are a 
number of factors: the shifting policies of the central government in the UK with regard to 
the British Steel Corporation, and the inability to manage and cope with redundancies. 
 
Strategic decision-making and the role of the state 
The fact that the British Steel Corporation was a state-owned company, has had 
important effects on some of the decisions taken before, during, and after the steel crisis. 
With the large-scale investment programme formulated in the ‘Development Plan’ of 
1971, the British Steel Corporation wanted to improve its competitive position by taking 
“one great leap forward” (Richardson and Dudley, 1987). At this critical juncture, it was 
decided to increase capacity very substantially. These expansion plans fitted in with the 
plans of successive governments in the 1970s to regenerate British manufacturing 
industry, and so – at least officially – considerable optimism existed about the demand for 
steel. Moreover, the government was tempted not to get involved too directly and leave 
most responsibility to the British Steel Corporation; while BSC was enticed to take more 
risks than a privately owned company would do, by the certainty that additional financial 
support from the government would be available when the company would get into 
trouble (Richardson and Dudley, 1987). These circumstances hence contributed to the 
decision to embark on the ambitious expansion programme in the early 1970s, which – 
despite being curtailed in 1977 – would greatly exacerbate the problems of the late 1970s 
                                                     
76
 Teesside Cast Products’ place within the networks of global steel production was already very vulnerable 
under SSI: “as such, raw materials from the other side of the world (coking coal and iron ore from, for 
example, Australia, Brazil, Colombia and parts of Africa) will be transported to a high-wage location in the 
global ‘North’, transformed into a low value-added product, which will then be exported to a low-wage 
location in the global ‘South’ where it will be converted into higher-value-added finished products.” 
(Hudson and Swanton, 2012, p. 11). 
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and early 1980s. Moreover, when a new Labour-government was installed in 1974, the 
restructuring and rationalisation operations which would also be a part of the 
‘Development Plan’, were postponed and phased over a larger time period by the 
Beswick review in 1974 and 1975. This further hampered the British Steel Corporation in 
its efforts to improve its competitiveness.  
 
After the steel crisis started in 1974, and the British Steel Corporation reported losses 
from 1976 onwards (only in 1986 the company started to be profitable again), the central 
government did provide extensive financial relief. Between 1967 and 1979, BSC received 
an estimated £7.6 billion of support; and in the early 1980s a further £4.5 billion was 
written off in loans and capital (Mény and Wright, 1987; Dudley and Richardson, 1990). 
However, when a Conservative government came to power in 1979, it immediately 
adopted an aggressive attitude towards BSC’s financial position. It wanted to gain more 
control on public expenditure, and ready the firm for privatisation in the years to come. 
The government announced that it would not finance any more losses after March 1980 
(which was BSC’s own target to break even again). This prompted the British Steel 
Corporation, to accelerate its downsizing programme and further reduce production. 
Even though the financial constraints on BSC were relaxed during 1980, as it was clear the 
company would otherwise collapse, and a large part of the debts and capital were 
actually written off in 1981 and 1982, BSC continued to shed employment rapidly in the 
early 1980s. Between 1979 and 1984 more than 115,000 jobs were lost at the British Steel 
Corporation, and about 15,000 in Teesside (a loss of about 60% in both cases). Central 
government policies hence contributed importantly to the rapid shedding of employment 
in steel in the early 1980s, which would have severe disruptive effects on the local level, 
including on Teesside. 
 
Coping with redundancies and the role of the unions 
Some of the loss of employment in the steel industry could be coped with, through early 
retirement and hiring stops, however many workers were made redundant and had to 
look for new employment elsewhere. These workers would receive a generous 
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redundancy payment (often partly funded through support provided by the European 
Coal and Steel Community), but the prospects for finding a new job in Teesside – as well 
as other affected areas – were often bleak. By the early 1980s, at least 10% of all 
unemployed in Teesside were former steel workers (Cleveland County Council, 1983). The 
Manpower Services Commission (MSC) offered advice and guidance to redundant 
workers. It furthermore provided support for retraining and further education when 
needed. The MSC and Cleveland County Council developed various schemes to create and 
retain employment (further discussed in section 7.6.2), however only a limited number of 
unemployed could benefit from these schemes (Hudson and Sadler, 1984; Foord et al., 
1985; Young, 1987). The British Steel Corporation founded BSC Industry in 1975 – later 
renamed UK Steel Enterprise – to help create new alternative employment in the affected 
areas, by redeveloping land and buildings into sites for new economic activities, and by 
providing support and finance for business proposals by redundant workers (Young, 
1987). The number of redundancies from the steel industry clearly peaked in the late 
1970s and the early 1980s in Teesside and other areas in the UK (as a result of decisions 
and processes at the central government and headquarters of BSC). This then also 
coincided with a loss of employment in other manufacturing industries. As a result, 
unemployment rates rose quickly at the local level, and became intractable. The 
interventions by the MSC and local authorities – which were in addition confronted by 
cutbacks in the early 1980s – did not have much effect (Foord et al., 1985; Young, 1987). 
 
The Iron and Steel Trades Confederation (ISTC) – since 2004 Community Union – has been 
the dominant union in the iron and steel industry; however workers were also organised 
through a number of other unions. Both at the national level and the local level, the ISTC 
and the other trade unions were unable to play a significant role in mitigating the social 
impacts of the restructuring operations. At the national level, the trade unions were not 
able to influence policy at BSC or at the central government after the Beswick-review of 
1974-75 (by e.g. pressing for the phasing and managing of the reductions in the labour 
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force, or for an alternative programme of divestments and investments77). At least on 
paper, the corporate governance structure of British Steel Corporation offered several 
possibilities for the representation of employee interests. The Steel Industries 
Consultative Committee: a committee with representatives from the various unions to 
discuss all matters with senior management except wages. And the installation of ‘worker 
directors’ who represented employee interests in divisional and later also central board 
meetings, from 1968 until the early 1980s (Richardson and Dudley, 1987; Dudley and 
Richardson, 1990)78. Despite these possibilities for involvement, the labour unions were 
largely bypassed (Dudley and Richardson, 1990). On the one hand, this was because the 
unions – and especially the main union ISTC – were generally quite accommodative and 
did not contest the necessity of the restructuring and rationalisation operations. 
Preservation of employment was not made into an issue; and even the general strike of 
1980 was principally a dispute over pay (Morgan, 1982; Dudley and Richardson, 1990). On 
the other hand, unions could not exercise much influence because the relations between 
and within the trade unions were characterised by much rivalry (Morgan, 1982). ISTC was 
clearly the largest union, but other, smaller unions were often the main representatives 
of various separate trades and crafts. Also within the unions, rivalry existed between the 
various branches at different locations. With these fragmented interests it was difficult to 
organise a national campaign to prevent redundancies. 
 
Also at the local level, the ISTC and other unions did not participate in campaigns to 
oppose closures and restructuring operations at particular locations, as this could put 
other locations at risk and would thus fuel internal conflict (Morgan, 1982; Hudson and 
Sadler, 1986). Central control within the ISTC was very tight and little solidarity existed 
between different locations in the UK (Richardson and Dudley, 1987; Dudley and 
                                                     
77
 The Iron and Steel Trades Confederation (ISTC) did publish an alternative strategy in 1980 – ‘New Deal for 
Steel’ – with some proposals to this effect; but this had no discernible impact on BSC’s policies (Richardson 
and Dudley, 1986). 
78
 In 1977 the BSC furthermore proposed the Steel Contract: a restructuring of relations at plant, division 
and central levels, which would encourage greater participation and involvement of employees. The unions 
however felt they were being co-opted into essentially a programme of contraction and closures, and 
stalled the negotiations on the Steel Contract (Dudley and Richardson, 1990; Upham, 1997). 
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Richardson, 1990; Sadler and Thompson, 2001). Furthermore, once closures and 
restructuring operations went ahead, the trade unions did not have a significant role in 
discussions and measures on how to cope with redundancies. Initiatives at the local level 
were generally coordinated through a coordinating committee, with representatives from 
local governments, MSC and other government agencies, and BSC Industry, but with little 
union involvement (Young, 1987). In the later crises in 2000-2001 and 2009-2011 task 
forces were established (the Corus Task Group and the Corus Response Group 
respectively) which would investigate and help implement investment programmes to 
facilitate economic development in the Teesside-area (John Bridge, personal 
communication; House of Commons North-East Regional Committee, 2010; see also Pike, 
2002). Unlike earlier restructuring operations in the 1970s and 1980s, the trade unions 
did manage to play an active role in these task forces, and were instrumental in 
persuading SSI to buy Teesside Cast Products (Evening Gazette, 2010). The responses to 
the most recent mothballing of the plant are still on-going.  
 
 
 Evolution of policy and governance 7.6.
After 1967 strategic decision-making with regard the iron and steel industry in Teesside 
has disappeared from the area. This has left it subject to decisions made elsewhere. The 
decision of BSC in 1977 (with support of the central government), to move from a 
strategy of expansion to one of contraction, has been particularly fateful for steel-making 
in Teesside. The modernisation and expansion plans for the Redcar-Lackenby plant were 
not fully implemented, as a result of which the plant is economically vulnerable, as has 
been witnessed by recurrent crises in 2000-2003, 2010-2011 and 2015. Moreover, the 
shift in central government policies vis-à-vis the British Steel Corporation after 1979, led 
to further drastic and rapid downsizing, also in Teesside. The loss of employment in the 
iron and steel industry in the late 1970s and early 1980s, contributed significantly to the 
mass unemployment in the Teesside-area in the 1980s. The trade unions could do little to 
push for the amelioration of the social impacts of the downsizing and restructuring 
operations, both at the local and at the national levels.  
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The rapid and disruptive changes in the Teesside-economy, were accompanied by a series 
of policy and governance initiatives by actors at various scales, to regenerate the 
economy in Teesside and combat (mass) unemployment. Normal spending on economic 
development (narrowly defined as expenditure on the attraction of inward investment, 
entrepreneurship and business support, and urban regeneration) can be approximated at 
around 0.5 to 1% of Gross Value Added in Teesside since the early 1980s; though at times 
expenditure has exceeded 1.5 or even 2% (in particular when Teesside was a main 
beneficiary of Regional Development Grants in the late 1970s, and during the operating 
period of the Teesside Development Corporation from 1987 until 1998).79 In this section, I 
will discuss the main developments in policy and in governance, after first briefly 
introducing the main outlines of the institutional framework provided by various 
government entities.  
 
 
7.6.1. Framework of government institutions 
Government policy making and policy implementation with regard to the economic 
development of Teesside, happens at different levels of scales: 
 Most powers and resources are concentrated at the national level. Various central 
government departments administer aspects of economic development: Trade and 
Industry (now Business and Innovation), Environment (with Transport and Housing), 
Employment / Work, Education, etc. Other central government departments such as 
the Prime Minister’s Office, the Deputy Prime Minister’s Office, Treasury and Local 
Government have a more supervisory and coordinating role. Over the years, many 
                                                     
79
 Based on figures from the Statement of Accounts and Statistical Information 1992/1993 (Cleveland 
County Council, 1993)), Tees Valley City-Region: A Business Case for Delivery (Tees Valley Joint Strategy 
Unit, 2006), and current spending by the Local Enterprise Partnership (www.teesvalleyunlimited.org.uk). 
Figures for spending on Regional Development Grants are from Foord et al. (1985, p. 32) and figures for 
spending by the Teesside Development Corporation are from Robinson et al. (1999, p. 158). More precise 
estimations would require much more information on spending from many different government bodies 
and organisations active in Teesside over the years, and on support from the European Structural Funds. 
This would be difficult to come by and would take much more time and effort than the purpose of this 
study permits. 
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executive agencies have been created (and sometimes disbanded again) to execute 
specific tasks, such as managing and developing real estate, labour market 
intermediation, training and skills development, and business support. These 
executive agencies are primarily administered by the central government, but often 
have offices at subnational levels. Also the British Steel Corporation was as a state-
owned enterprise until its privatisation in 1988, controlled by and accountable to the 
central government. 
 At the local level, frequent changes have taken place over the years. Since 1996, 
Middlesbrough, Stockton, Redcar and Cleveland, and Hartlepool Borough Councils are 
unitary authorities, which means they do not have to share or submit powers to a 
county council. Between 1974 and 1996 however, Cleveland County Council covered 
the Teesside-area, and there was a two tier system of local government, with 
Cleveland County, and the four boroughs of Middlesbrough, Stockton, Langbaurgh 
and Hartlepool. Also from 1968 until 1974 there was a one-tier system, with Teesside 
County Borough (covering Middlesbrough, Stockton, and a substantial part of present-
day Redcar and Cleveland) and Hartlepool County Borough as local authorities. 
 At the level of the city-region of Teesside, Cleveland County Council had some limited 
resources to promote economic development, and had powers in spatial planning: it 
was responsible for structure planning, while the four boroughs were responsible for 
development planning. Cleveland County Council also acted as the Local Education 
Authority, responsible for delivering primary, secondary and further education (after 
1996, this function transferred to the Borough Councils). After the abolishment of 
Cleveland County Council in 1996, the four local authorities in the Teesside-area, 
together with Darlington Borough Council (collectively called ‘Tees Valley’), decided to 
coordinate strategic planning, and economic development and intelligence. They also 
established a joint development company for the area (Tees Valley Development 
Company). From 1987 until 1998, the Teesside Development Corporation - as an 
urban development corporation – had a mandate for the whole Teesside-area. Urban 
development corporations were established by, and accountable to, the central 
government, and had broad planning powers (overruling many of the planning 
220 
 
powers of local authorities) to develop sites that were previously occupied by 
industry. Also Teesside University (before 1992, Teesside Polytechnic) primarily 
operates at the level of the city-region. The Port Authority (now PD Ports; but before 
privatisation in 1992, Tees and Hartlepool Port Authority), manages harbour activities 
along the river Tees and in Hartlepool, and is also the owner, developer and landlord 
of some tracts of land (most notably Seal Sands). 
 At the regional level, several bodies have existed over the years for the economic 
promotion of the North-East and the Northern Region (between 1974 and 1999; 
which encompassed a somewhat broader area than the North-East): the North-East 
Development Council / North of England Development Council (1961-1986; renamed 
in 1974), the Northern Development Company (1986-1999), and ONE North-East 
(1999-2011). The coalition government of Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, which 
came to power in 2010, abolished the entities for economic development at the 
regional level. From 1965 until 1979 a Northern Economic Planning Council (together 
with a Planning Board) existed, to coordinate economic planning for the Northern 
Region (without formal planning powers however). ONE North-East had similar 
coordinating responsibilities as a Regional Development Agency. From 1994 until 2011 
a Government Office for the North-East existed, in which the regional representations 
of the various central government departments (Trade and Industry, Environment, 
Employment, Education, etc.) were integrated. 
 
Figure 30 shows the main government entities at different levels with regard to the 
economic development of Teesside. 
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Grey indicates entities (controlled) at the national level, turquoise at the regional level, blue on a city-region 
level, and red at a local level. 
Figure 30: Government entities at different levels with regard to economic 
development in Teesside 
 
 
7.6.2. Evolution of policy programmes and initiatives 
As the national government is the primary actor, changes in the central government will 
be the most important driver in the changes in economic development policies. The most 
important ‘breaking points’ occurred in 1979, when a new Conservative-led government 
with Margaret Thatcher was installed, and in 1997 when New Labour won the elections 
and got to power. These breaking points are based on some marked shifts in policy, the 
effects of which were usually felt in the Teesside-area with a slight delay of 2 or 3 years. 
Around these points however also within the area some important political and 
institutional changes took place. From 1979 onwards, and especially after 1981 – when 
Labour gained control of Cleveland County Council – local authorities and other local 
actors, started to enact their own economic development policies (where previously their 
activity was limited to just spatial planning). Around 1996-1998 several institutional 
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changes took place in the area, which changed the ‘playing field’ somewhat. Cleveland 
County was abolished in 1996, and with this the Boroughs of Middlesbrough, Stockton, 
Hartlepool and Redcar and Cleveland became unitary authorities. These local authorities 
– together with Darlington – continued to work together on issues of strategic planning 
and economic development. Furthermore, the 10-year operating period of the Teesside 
Development Corporation ended in 1997, and the corporation was wound up in 1998. 
 
We can hence distinguish the following episodes in the evolution of policy programmes 
and initiatives: 
 Episode 1 (until 1979): Modernisation of heavy industry and (failed) diversification. 
 Episode 2 (1979-1997): Divergence of local and national policies, and property-led 
regeneration. 
 Episode 3 (1997-date): More integrated economic development policies. 
Table 16 presents an overview of the main focal points in each episode. 
 
 
Sp
ec
ia
l s
u
p
p
o
rt
 s
te
el
 in
d
u
st
ry
 
d
u
ri
n
g 
st
ee
l c
ri
si
s 
A
ct
iv
e 
la
b
o
u
r 
m
ar
ke
t 
p
o
lic
y 
fo
r 
re
d
u
n
d
an
ci
es
 
In
w
ar
d
 in
ve
st
m
en
t 
/ 
b
u
si
n
es
s 
at
tr
ac
ti
o
n
 
Sc
ie
n
ce
, T
e
ch
n
o
lo
gy
, I
n
n
o
va
ti
o
n
 
(S
TI
) 
p
o
lic
ie
s 
En
tr
ep
re
n
eu
rs
h
ip
 /
 b
u
si
n
e
ss
 
su
p
p
o
rt
 
Tr
ai
n
in
g 
/ 
sk
ill
s 
p
o
lic
y 
U
p
gr
ad
e 
o
f 
b
u
ilt
 e
n
vi
ro
n
m
en
t 
/ 
U
rb
an
 r
eg
en
er
at
io
n
 
Highlights 
Episode 1 
(until 1979) 
• • •   • • 
 Modernisation of heavy industry in Teesside, 
assisted by national government through e.g. 
Regional Policy investment grants., and financial 
support for British Steel. 
 Planning for projected growth, with investment in 
transport infrastructure, and efforts to diversity 
economy in Teesside towards more light 
manufacturing and services (not successful). 
 Initial consensus between national government, 
local governments, and large companies (BSC and 
ICI), increasingly tenuous by the late 1970s. 
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Highlights 
Episode 2 
(1979-1997) 
 • •  • • • 
 Divergence between local and central government 
policies. 
 Local initiatives to deal with crisis: mainly in active 
labour market initiatives (work creation and 
(re)training), and enterprise / business support. 
 Central government imposed ‘property-led 
regeneration’ through the Teesside Development 
Corporation and urban policy. 
 Teesside Polytechnic becomes Teesside University in 
1992; Durham University establishes campus in 
Stockton, and first initiatives to facilitate technology 
transfer. 
Episode 3 
(1997-date) 
 
  • • • • • 
 Better coordination between sub-regional / local, 
regional and national initiatives through Tees Valley 
Partnership and Tees Valley Vision. 
 Also focus on Science, Technology, Innovation, 
through Centres of Excellence and technology 
transfer / innovation programmes in process 
industry, digital media, and renewable energy. 
 Increased attention for development of skills of the 
labour force. 
Table 16: Development of policy programmes and initiatives in Teesside 
 
Overall there has been little continuity in the evolution of policy in economic 
development, and until about 2000 a coordinated attempt to transform the area in 
response to deindustrialisation, has been absent. There was a shift from a broad 
consensus to modernise heavy industry in Teesside and diversify the economic base 
through inward investment until the late 1970s, to a period in the 1980s and 1990s in 
which policies were incoherent and fragmented. The main focal point of central 
government policy was on property-led regeneration during this period, while local actors 
focused (with few resources) on coping with mass unemployment and supporting 
entrepreneurship and local businesses. In this time, there was little coordination between 
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initiatives and interventions. After the New Labour government came to power in 1997, 
several changes in policy and governance took place; the effect of which was that policies 
were better integrated and synchronised. At this point, also developing the available 
knowledge base in the area and supporting innovation (i.e. Science, Technology and 
Innovation policies), became important focal points in some designated sectors: the 
process industry (building on chemicals and engineering), renewable energy and digital 
media.  
 
Episode 1 (until 1979): Modernisation of heavy industry and (failed) diversification 
As discussed in section 7.3.2, there was a broad consensus between the central 
government, local authorities, regional entities, major firms, and trade unions in the 
1960s about the necessity to modernise Teesside’s economy. Teesside was designated as 
part of the ‘growth zone’ in the North-East (together with Tyne and Wear, and parts of 
Durham County), which should be the main focus of investment and efforts to promote 
economic growth in the region (and offset the decline in other parts of the North-East, as 
a result of the closure of coal mines). From the early 1960s onwards a comprehensive 
programme for the development of Teesside was drafted and subsequently further 
refined, which basically guided the initiatives and actions of the main actors (central, local 
and regional government bodies, British Steel Corporation and ICI, and the trade unions) 
until the late 1970s. There existed a broad agreement between the main employers in 
Teesside and other actors (including the trade unions), in which it was presumed that 
what was best for the large firms was best for Teesside. Institutionally this consensus was 
supported by the fact that many councillors at the local authorities in Teesside were 
employees of BSC or ICI. Moreover, entities such as the Teesside Industrial Development 
Board (which existed from 1945 until 1969) and its successor Teesside Regional 
Organisation for Industrial Development (until 1974), also brought together 
representatives from the local authorities, employer organisations, trade unions, and 
other actors (Beynon et al., 1989). The main elements of the programme were already 
formulated in a 1963 White Paper on the development of North-East England (Secretary 
of State for Industry, Trade and Regional Development, 1963). In the 1966 report by the 
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Northern Economic Planning Council ‘Challenge of the Changing North’ (Northern 
Economic Planning Council, 1966), and especially the ‘Teesside Survey and Plan’ of 1969 
(Wilson and Womersley, 1969) and the ‘Teesside Structure Plan’ (Cleveland County 
Council, 1977 / 1983), the specifics of the programme were further worked out. 
 
This programme aimed to ‘upgrade’ the whole of the area: “Teesside, born in the 
Industrial Revolution, offers to the second half of the twentieth century both a 
tremendous challenge and an almost unique opportunity. The challenge lies in the legacy 
of nineteenth century obsolescence; the opportunity is to make it one of most 
productive, efficient and beautiful regions in Britain; a region in which future generations 
will be able to work in clean and health conditions, live in dignity and content and enjoy 
their leisure in invigorating surroundings.” (Wilson and Womersley, 1969, p. 3). Hence the 
programme also encompassed objectives to improve the environment, housing and 
amenities in the area, and to stimulate research and technological innovation. However, 
in the end the expansion and modernisation of capital-intensive heavy industry took 
priority over other goals.80  Reservations from local authorities and local action groups 
about for instance the negative environmental effects of the development of Seal Sands, 
were brushed aside by the central government, the large industrial firms, and trade 
unions (Hudson, 1986; Beynon et al., 1989). Plans for a university in Teesside (to the east 
of Middlesbrough) to stimulate the development of the knowledge base in the area, also 
did not receive backing from the central government (Wilson and Womersley, 1969; 
Cleveland County Council, 1977 / 1983).81 Hence in practice the main elements of the 
programme in terms of economic development were: the modernisation and 
rationalisation of existing heavy industry on Teesside, the expansion of the area’s 
transport infrastructure and provision of industrial land, and the attraction of new 
employment in light manufacturing and services. These three elements will be further 
discussed below.  
                                                     
80
 For a personalised account about the interests of heavy industry taking priority above other interests 
during this period, see Medhurst (2011). 
81
 Although the already existing Constantine Technical College became Teesside Polytechnic in 1969. 
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In the 1970s, large-scale investments took place in the steel industry and chemical 
industry on Teesside to expand, modernise and rationalise their operations (already 
discussed in sections 7.3.2 and 7.5). These investments were to a considerable extent 
facilitated by incentives offered by the central government. Under Regional Policy, there 
was a generous system of grants, tax allowances, grace periods, and loans for investment 
in buildings, plant and machinery, which came with the status of Development Area (for 
most of Teesside) and Special Development Area (for Hartlepool) (North-East 
Development Council, 1971; Warren, 1973). The grants varied somewhat over time, but 
were generally about 25 to 35% of the investment sum. In the second half of the 1970s, 
the Regional Development Grants to support investments in Cleveland County, regularly 
exceeded 25% of the total amount of grants for the whole of the United Kingdom (Foord 
et al., 1985, p. 32). Moreover, as a publicly owned corporation, the British Steel 
Corporation had its £3 billion investment programme (with the new plant in Redcar / 
Lackenby) financially underwritten by the central government. 
 
The second major element of the ‘modernisation’ programme for Teesside, was to 
provide industrial land and invest in new road and port infrastructure. To enable the 
expansion of the chemical industry and oil refineries, the reclamation of Seal Sands was 
to be continued, and provisions were made for the further development of Billingham 
and Wilton. For the new integrated steel plant, land was made available near Redcar 
(despite concerns about the environmental and visual impact). For the attraction of light 
manufacturing, several new industrial estates were established throughout Teesside 
(Cleveland County Council, 1977 / 1983). The main north-south and east-west highway 
connections connecting Teesside to the rest of the North-East were improved, and within 
the Teesside-area a new primary road system was put in place to take the increase in the 
volume of car traffic into account (Cleveland County Council, 1977 / 1983). Also port 
activities expanded with the opening of a container terminal at Tees Dock in 1967, the 
iron ore terminal at Redcar in 1973, and new berths for the oil refineries and chemical 
plants at Seal Sands. 
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The third element was the attraction of new employment in light manufacturing and 
services. It was foreseen in Teesside Survey and Plan that employment in steel, chemicals 
and heavy engineering would drop slightly in the 25-year period from 1966 until 1991 
(Wilson and Womersley, 1969). Hence if the ambitions for Teesside as a ‘growth zone’, 
compensating for employment loss in other parts of the North-East, were to be realised, 
additional employment needed to be generated. The Teesside Survey and Plan and after 
this the Teesside Structure Plan, proposed to accomplish this though the attraction of 
light, labour-intensive manufacturing (such as light engineering, electronics, textiles, food 
and drink, etc.), and to a lesser extent, of services and public sector activities. New 
investments were to be attracted through the elaborate system of investment incentives 
by the central government already discussed. Between 1967 and 1976, the central 
government also paid out Employment Premiums for each worker employed in 
manufacturing in the Development Areas. In addition, local governments catered for new 
industrial estates and office developments, as well as undertaking promotional activities 
for the attraction of new investments (supported by the North-East Development Council 
/ North of England Development Council). Though the rate of attraction of light 
manufacturing was reasonably good in the 1970s (compared to many other areas), it was 
(by far) insufficient to compensate for loss of employment in heavy industry (Cleveland 
County Council, 1979; Cleveland County Council, 1977 / 1983). Also in the service and 
public sectors, employment growth was less than expected (as discussed in section 7.4). 
Part of this was because in 1979 the Conservative government cancelled an earlier 
decision of 1976 to relocate the Property Services Agency (with 3,000 jobs) to 
Middlesbrough (Hudson, 1990).  
 
 
Episode 2 (1979-1997): Divergence of local and national policies, and property-led 
regeneration 
By the late 1970s it was clear that the objectives to increase the amount of employment 
in the Teesside-area, while also diversifying the economy and increase the quality of 
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employment, were not going to be met. Job loss in especially steel, heavy engineering, 
shipbuilding and to a lesser extent chemicals, took place at a much faster rate than 
anticipated, and attraction of new employment proceeded only moderately. 
Unemployment was rising quickly. Doubts were being raised about the benefits for the 
area of continuing to cater to the needs of heavy industry: “The structure plans aim to 
diversity the County’s economic base by attracting light manufacturing and service jobs, 
whilst at the same time they encourage the growth of capital-intensive industry by zoning 
2,000 acres of land for further growth. Are these two things incompatible, or can they 
both realistically be pursued side by side?” (Cleveland County Council, 1979). The broad 
consensus on the modernisation and upgrading of the economy on Teesside, thus fell 
apart. Moreover, in May 1979 a new Conservative government took over at the national 
level, which led to a number of very different focal points in local and regional economic 
development policy. The period from 1979 until 1997 – and especially the period from 
1979 until 1990 - is characterised by a striking divergence of policy-making, between on 
the one hand policies to cope with mass unemployment and further economic 
development by local authorities and other actors at the local level, and on the other 
hand the central government trying to impose its own agenda. I will discuss the evolution 
of policy-making at both these levels, in turn. 
 
At the local level, the local authorities started to undertake their own economic 
development policies to complement the attempts to attract inward investment through 
incentives. These were mostly aimed at supporting more indigenous development 
through entrepreneurship and growing local businesses (Hudson, 1986). From 1979 
onwards Cleveland County Council launched several measures in this domain. Some of 
these measures were aimed to provide financial assistance to small firms (Gallant, 
1982).82 Other measures focussed on providing counselling and information service 
(Robinson, 1979; Hickie, 1985).83 These schemes complemented similar measures 
available through the central government (partly funded through the European Regional 
                                                     
82
 Such as the Small Business Grant and the Flexible Assistance Scheme. 
83
 Such as the creation of Enterprise Agencies and the publication of business directories. 
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Development Fund) (Greene et al., 2004).84 From the late 1980s onwards, the first 
initiatives started to emerge in Teesside and in the North-East region more broadly, to 
stimulate more technology transfer from higher education institutions and research 
centres, to firms in the area (Cleveland County, Council, 1990; Hassink, 1992). In 1992 
Teesside Polytechnic was granted university-status; it subsequently expanded its 
programmes in part-time education and in ensuring widening participation, as well as its 
ties and collaborations with local businesses (Brennan, 2009). 
 
However, these efforts could by no means stem mass unemployment in Teesside, as a 
result of the restructuring and closures in the steel industry and other heavy industries. 
Hence many policies enacted by the local authorities and the Manpower Services 
Commission in the 1980s were directed at combatting and alleviating unemployment, 
often partly funded through the European Social Fund. MSC operated several make-work 
and training programmes over the years to help long-term unemployed and school-
leavers (re)gain work experience and skills.85 Cleveland County Council tried to stimulate 
the formation of workers’ co-operatives and community enterprises, through loans, 
grants, training, and advice (Gallant, 1982). Cleveland County Council furthermore 
operated several schemes to subsidise hiring unemployed people (Hickie, 1985).86 In 
addition, several new training centres were established, to help (potential) workers 
acquire skills especially in working with computers and information technology (Gallant, 
1982; Hickie, 1985). Most of these initiatives were very small-scale, in relation to the size 
of the unemployment problem in Teesside, and hence they could in many ways be seen 
as attempts to just “manage unemployment” (Foord et al., 1985, p. 48). 
 
                                                     
84
 Such as the Business Improvement Scheme (1984-1989), the Business Development Initiative and the 
Regional Enterprise Grant (from 1988) by the Department for Trade and Industry; and the Enterprise 
Allowance Scheme by the Manpower Service Commission (which operated from 1982 until 1991), in which 
unemployed people could retain unemployment benefits while working to establish a new business. 
85
 Such as the Special Temporary Employment Programme, the Community Programme, the Community 
Industry Scheme, the Youth Training Programme, the Training Opportunities Scheme, and the Job Training 
Scheme. 
86
 Such as the Recruitment Premium Scheme and the Cleveland Assistance Scheme for Employment. 
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From 1979 onwards, the central government imposed drastic cuts on the expenditures by 
local authorities. Moreover, through the Local Government, Planning and Land Act of 
1980 and the Local Government Finance Act of 1988, central government increased its 
control on their policies, finances and tax rates. Hence, the resources and powers of local 
authorities to shape their own economic development policies were further reduced. 
Moreover, some large-scale changes took place in Regional Policy. In 1982, the whole of 
Cleveland County was made into a Special Development Area, which meant a more 
favourable regime of grants and other incentives. But already in 1984 these grants were 
revised and the conditions were made more stringent. The Regional Development Grant – 
which before 1984 was paid out automatically when certain conditions were met, and 
irrespective of any employment created – became more targeted on the creation of 
employment, and on projects that would not have happened without support (Wren, 
1988). This meant that many of the investments by the large firms on Teesside (in 
particular ICI and BSC) would no longer receive assistance. In 1988, the Regional 
Development Grant was abolished. From then on only Regional Selective Assistance was 
available: a scheme which provides grants for investments on a discretionary basis (Wren, 
2005).87. Nevertheless, the attraction of inward investment continued to be one of the 
focal points of economic development policy in Teesside and the North-East (Hassink, 
1992). Local authorities, and from 1987 also the Teesside Development Corporation, 
would promote the area within the UK; while the North of England Development Council, 
and its successor from 1986 onwards, the Northern Development Company, would do the 
same internationally. There was only some limited success in attracting large 
establishments however. In 1994 Samsung opened a plant for microwaves and computer 
monitors, north of Billingham; but closed the plant again in 2004 never creating the 3,000 
jobs initially foreseen (Gow, 2004).  
 
As noted in Chapter 5 (section 5.4.3), the main emphasis in central government policy 
with regard to subnational economic development in the United Kingdom, shifted to 
                                                     
87
 Decision-making on applications for larger projects, also shifted from the Regional Office of the 
Department of Trade and Industry, to the main office in London (Wren, 1988). 
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urban policy. Urban policy was effectively economic development policy, as ‘property-led 
regeneration’ was adopted as the leading idea: physical regeneration would stimulate 
new economic activities, which would then result in wider social benefits (Robinson and 
Shaw, 1994). From the late 1970s onwards a plethora of initiatives and instruments were 
instituted.88 By far the most important intervention in Teesside within the framework of 
urban policy was the establishment of the Teesside Development Corporation, which 
operated from 1987 until 1998. The Teesside Development Corporation was a second-
generation Urban Development Corporation (UDC) established under the Local 
Government, Planning and Land Act of 1980. UDCs were vehicles to carry out a 
development programme for a designated area; that is “to bring land and buildings into 
effective use, encourage the development of existing and new industry and commerce, 
create an attractive environment and ensure that housing and social facilities are 
available to encourage people to live and work in the area” (Local Government, Planning 
and Land Act, 1980; quoted in Robinson, 1993, p. 4). Exemplifying the philosophy of 
‘property-led regeneration’ the task for UDCs was to ‘lever in’ private sector investment 
in urban development projects, which would then lead to the creation of new 
employment and other benefits for the community. 
 
The Teesside Development Corporation stayed very close to this remit and philosophy 
throughout (Robinson et al., 1999). It operated in a very singular, opportunistic, brash and 
                                                     
88
 Under the Inner Urban Areas Act of 1978, local authorities could receive funding for urban renewal 
projects through various grants. Furthermore, Middlesbrough was made a programme authority, which 
meant that it could designate certain areas as Industrial Improvement Areas in which subsidies and loans 
were available to assist new private investment (Robinson, 1979; Hickie, 1985). In 1981 respectively 1983, 
Enterprise Zones with relaxed planning restrictions and tax exemptions were established in parts of 
Hartlepool and Middlesbrough (Foord et al., 1985). In 1984, the Cleveland Initiative was launched: a 
programme of investments for the reclamation and development of formerly industrial sites on both sides 
of the Tees-river. Under the Inner Cities Initiative, a task force was set up for central Middlesbrough in 1986 
to support in targeting the money available for the area through the many different programmes at the 
local and central levels (Action for Cities, 1988). City Challenge was initiated in 1991: it allowed local 
authorities to bid for funds for projects with economic, social and environmental objectives in 
disadvantaged urban areas (Robinson and Shaw, 1994; Rundle, 2005). They were required to follow a 
partnership approach with business involvement and community support. In 1994, City Challenge and many 
other urban policy programmes were combined into the Single Regeneration Budget (1994-2001). Several 
projects in the Teesside area received support through City Challenge and the Single Regeneration Budget. 
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secretive manner, with the relationships with the local authorities and community 
organisations in Teesside deteriorating quickly over time (Coulson, 1989; Robinson et al., 
1993; Robinson et al., 1999). It did manage to implement a significant programme of 
developments across Teesside. This included some projects which corresponded with the 
priorities outlined in successive strategies such as Cleveland Initiative (1984), the 
Cleveland Structure Plan (1988), and the Cleveland Economic Strategy (1990), to further 
develop the port, to develop more opportunities for tourism, and to develop the service 
industry. With the support of the Teesside Development Corporation, the facilities of 
Teesport were expanded, and new road infrastructure was put in place, while a new Tees 
Offshore Base was created at the site of a former shipyard (Smith’s Dock). In Hartlepool 
part of the docks were converted into a marina, with further visitor attractions. South of 
the river from Stockton, the former location of the Head Wrightson heavy engineering 
works, was transformed into a large mixed office and housing development (‘Teesdale’)89, 
which also included a new college of Durham University (Queen’s Campus Stockton). 
Other schemes (such as Teesside Park, Preston Farm, and Riverside Park) mainly consisted 
of out-of-town retail and industrial estates, with very little transformative impact 
(Robinson et al., 1999). While at still other sites, such as Middlesbrough Dock / 
Middlehaven and South Bank very little development took place. Hence for the amount of 
money it was able to spend (over £400 million in 10 years), the impact it had on creating 
new economic development prospects for the Teesside-area, was disappointing. 
Moreover, because of its style of operating it undermined the capacities of local actors to 
develop partnerships and networks which would have been important for continuing 
regeneration (Robinson et al., 1999). 
 
Episode 3 (1997-date): More integrated economic development policies 
In 1997 Labour won the national elections, and took control of the central government. 
This again meant a shift in priorities for local and regional economic development in the 
United Kingdom. At around the same time some considerable institutional changes took 
                                                     
89
 For this scheme, it was also necessary to build a barrage in the Tees-river further downstream, to stop 
ebb and flow, and prevent salt (and polluted) water from flowing upstream.  
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place in the Teesside-area and in the North-East region. After Cleveland County was 
abolished in 1996, the new unitary authorities of Middlesbrough, Stockton, Hartlepool 
and Redcar and Cleveland – together with Darlington – continued to collaborate on issues 
of economic development. They formed the Tees Valley Joint Strategy Unit to undertake 
strategic planning and generate economic intelligence, and the Tees Valley Development 
Company, to promote inward investment and tourism in the area. Furthermore, the 
Teesside Development Corporation came to the end of its 10-year term, and it was 
wound up in 1998. The new Labour government devolved more economic and political 
powers to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland; and also intended to delegate some of 
these powers to the regions in England. In 1999 it established Regional Development 
Agencies, with a broad mandate and a substantial budget combining contributions from 
different central governments departments and from European funds, to further the 
economic development of the English regions (Perry, 2007). Concomitantly it also created 
Regional Assemblies, with representatives from local authorities, and business and civil 
society stakeholders. These were intended to act as precursors of a new regional tier of 
government, the plans for which – after a failed referendum in the North-East about 
more devolved powers in 2004 – were abandoned. The Regional Development Agency for 
North-East England – ONE North-East – provided some important new stimuli to the 
economic development policies in the Teesside-area. On the one hand, it shifted policy 
towards more of an emphasis on Science, Technology and Innovation, especially after 
2002. On the other hand, it further delegated some of its budget and responsibilities to 
subregional partnerships within the North-East. Especially the partnership for Tees Valley 
/ Teesside took this as an opportunity to formulate a comprehensive programme for its 
economic development, which would subsequently provide guidance for various other 
initiatives and programmes after 2000. At the same time, as a third development, the 
central government, put increased emphasis on vocational training and the development 
of skills. These three developments after 1997 will be further discussed below. 
 
In 2002 ONE North-East initiated a £200 million long term investment plan under the 
label Strategy for Success. As part of this programme, a Science and Industry Council was 
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established to oversee the investments, together with a venture finance agency NStar to 
provide access to finance, proof of concept investment, and commercialisation assistance 
(Hudson, 2011b). At the centre of the investment programme were five Centres of 
Excellence in areas in which the region had particular research strengths and which 
offered opportunities for commercial success (identified in a report by Arhur D. Little). 
Two of these Centres of Excellence were based in the Teesside-area: the Centre for 
Process Innovation (CPI) for process industries (which was to be based in the former ICI 
R&D-facilities at the Wilton Centre); and Codeworks, focused on innovation in digital 
media in Middlesbrough (and also Sunderland) (ONE North-East, 2012). The Centre for 
Process Innovation has been particularly successful as a research centre, and expanded 
quickly over the years since its establishment in 2004. It was initially focused on bringing 
research at the regional universities (especially Newcastle, Teesside and Durham) 
together with industry primarily based in Teesside. But now it has gradually expanded the 
technological domains within it is active, to also include biotechnology, nanotechnology, 
photonics, and printable electronics; and with this also its geographical reach in terms of 
university and industry partners is much larger (Goddard et al., 2012). CPI has thus 
evolved into a national research centre, which was confirmed in 2011, when it was 
designated as one of the central government’s new network of centres of excellence: the 
Catapult Centres. Nevertheless, CPI is still an important asset for the Teesside-area and is 
at the centre of much new innovative activity in the remaining heavy industrial base, now 
renamed as ‘process industry cluster’ (mainly consisting of chemical industry, but 
recombined with expertise in engineering and steel-making). Codeworks has been less 
successful, and was remade into a business network organisation in 2004 (ONE North-
East, 2012). However, ONE North-East has continued to support Digital City in 
Middlesbrough, which combines a knowledge base in digital media at Teesside University, 
with a support organisation and incubator for start-ups and businesses in Middlesbrough. 
 
When it became clear that ONE North-East would delegate part of its responsibilities and 
budget for a programme in Tees Valley, the Tees Valley Partnership was formed in 1999, 
comprising of the five local authorities, the Chamber of Commerce, the Learning and Skills 
235 
 
Council and Tees Valley Tomorrow (a local business organisation). The Tees Valley Joint 
Strategy Unit acted as its secretariat. This Partnership guided the production of the Tees 
Valley Vision, and subsequently after 2002 when the vision and associated investment 
programme were finalised, the Partnership was reformed and expanded into a body 
which would supervise its implementation. The Tees Valley Vision is an attempt to 
coordinate initiatives and actions in multiple domains and by various actors: it is built 
around three main themes: “creating sustainable jobs, creating attractive places, and 
creating confident communities” (Tees Valley Joint Strategy Unit, 2002). With regard to 
the future development of the economy, it emphasises the value of existing assets and 
activities: “we must recognise that our economy is a manufacturing one based on world 
class chemicals clusters, a port - the second largest in terms of volume in the UK, an 
infrastructure able to support further economic growth – and an engineering and growing 
service economy which is largely dependent on the manufacturing base” (Tees Valley 
Joint Strategy Unit, 2002, p. 7). The further development of the chemicals / process 
industries cluster, and associated opportunities in renewable energy, environmental 
technologies, biotechnology, engineering and logistics, are hence a central element of the 
vision; in addition to more generic policies aimed at business and enterprise support, 
upgrading the built environment, and enhancing people’s skills base and aspirations. 
Within this vision, the remaining steel industry is no longer regarded as a dependable and 
important asset, but rather as one of multiple elements within the ‘process industry’. The 
comprehensive programme of the Tees Valley Vision, with some clear priorities, has 
served as a guide for policies from 2002 onwards, albeit with various changes in the 
broader institutional and funding arrangements (to be discussed in the next section). 
Despite these frequent changes, the basic strategy and priorities have been similar 
throughout (see e.g. Tees Valley Joint Strategy Unit (2006) and Tees Valley Unlimited 
(2011)). 
 
The New Labour government developed a number of new initiatives in vocational training 
and development of skills after 1998. The ‘New Deal’ – which ran from 1998 until 2010 – 
was a workfare programme that tried to tackle youth unemployment and long-term 
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unemployment, by creating new employment and training opportunities (Martin and 
Swank, 2012). In 2001, the Learning and Skills Council was established, to succeed the 
Training and Enterprise Councils, to coordinate and fund further education after the age 
of 16. It meant that resources and powers became again more centralised (similar to the 
period before the Training and Enterprise Councils, when the Manpower Services 
Commission operated). The Blair administration also developed several initiatives to 
improve the quality of vocational training provision, and support and incentivise young 
people in continuing their education (Chapman et al., 2007). Common to all these 
initiatives was to more closely involve employers (and to a lesser extent also trade 
unions) in vocational training and in the development of skills at the lower end of the 
labour market. However, on a purely voluntary basis. On the whole, the increased efforts 
have not led to more expenditures by, and a greater participation by, employers in 
vocational education and skill development (Martin and Swank, 2012). Hence, these new 
initiatives have done little to reverse the low skill equilibria that seem to persist in many 
sectors and many regions, including Teesside. 
 
 
7.6.3. Evolution of governance arrangements 
As is clear from the preceding section, there have been many initiatives and programmes 
enacted over the years, and frequent changes and shifts.in policy. This is also reflected in 
the arrangements with regard to the governance of economic development in Teesside. 
Many institutions have been established and abolished again, or changed their set-up 
(and name). The development of the most important governance arrangements since 
1970 can be seen in Figure 31.  
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Grey indicates entities (controlled) at the national level, turquoise at the regional level, blue on a city-region level, and red at a local level. 
Figure 31: Development of governance arrangements in Teesside 
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As discussed in section 3.3, such governance arrangements can perform different 
functions with respect to adaptation and resilience: 
 They can serve to connect different parties and interests. 
 They can produce strategic intelligence, such as analysis, foresight and development 
of strategic options. 
 They can be aimed at managing specific policy programmes. 
For each of these functions, I will analyse how arrangements have evolved in Teesside. 
 
Connectedness and collaboration 
When the consensus on the modernisation and upgrading of the economy in Teesside fell 
apart in the late 1970s, arrangements to coordinate initiatives in economic development 
across the various governments, executive agencies, and social partners, - and thus guide 
the transformation process - were lacking. Especially in the 1980s and 1990s this has 
resulted in many different initiatives by different actors, but without much coordination 
and often without much receptivity for local circumstances and needs. Two factors are 
important in this respect. Firstly, government departments and executive agencies retain 
most powers and resources, and perform many of the tasks with respect to economic 
development on a subnational level. These departments and agencies are primarily 
accountable to the central government, and hence there are strong forces working on 
these organisations to operate within their own ‘silo’ and remit, and apply a standardised 
approach without much sensibility for local circumstances. This makes the coordination of 
actions and pooling of resources at a subnational level, inherently problematical.90 
Secondly, different functions and different policy initiatives in subnational economic 
development operate at different spatial levels (North-East region, Teesside / Tees Valley 
city-region, localities, and even the whole of Northern England (as in the case of the 
                                                     
90
 This also makes direct relations with the national level quite important, both to lobby and to keep track of 
what is happening; both within the civil service (White Hall) and within the political arena (Westminster). 
Members of Parliament have a role to play in this regard (especially when their party is in government), as 
they represent a constituency within the area, but have access to political decision-making at the national 
level. 
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Northern Way-initiative91)); especially in the 2000s this created a “messy morass of 
competing spatial imaginaries” (Pike and Tomaney, 2009, p. 26). Hence the institutional 
landscape with regard to subnational (economic) governance in England, has been 
described as a “confusing patchwork” (Robinson and Shaw, 2001, p. 474), and “a pattern 
of bewildering complexity” (Pike and Tomaney, 2009, p. 24). Given these circumstances 
and shifting parameters, it has been difficult for actors within the Teesside-area to arrive 
at a coherent set of policies with long-term commitments. 
 
A new institutional infrastructure to bring the various actors within the area together 
(local authorities, central government departments, executive agencies, businesses, trade 
unions, etc.) was only slow to take shape. First, at the regional level, local authorities, 
central government departments, and the regional sections of the Confederation of 
British Industry and the Trades Union Congress, came together in 1986 to enhance the 
resources and mandate of the regional development body, to enable the region to 
compete more effectively for the attraction of inward investment (especially with 
Scotland and Wales) (Anderson, 1992; Hassink, 1992). As a consequence, the existing 
North of England Development Council was replaced by the Northern Development 
Company. Second, at the subregional level new business networks emerged in Teesside in 
the 1980s and 1990s, such as Teesside Tomorrow (later Tees Valley Tomorrow) and the 
Teesside Chemical Initiative, as ICI and BSC became less important in the area’s economy, 
and outsourced or sold off parts of their operations. Third, also the boards of Teesside 
University, Teesside Development Corporation, Tees Valley Development Company, and 
later Tees Valley Regeneration, facilitated connections between representatives from 
various actors, mainly local governments and businesses. But it was only in 2000, with the 
Tees Valley Partnership, that an entity was formed which could connect many different 
actors and act as a platform to work out a more integral programme for the economic 
development of the Teesside-area. 
                                                     
91
 The Northern Way Initiative was a collaboration between the RDAs for North East England, North-West 
England and Yorkshire, initiated by the Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott in 2004. It was intended to 
develop and implement strategic initiatives for the economic development of the whole of the North of 
England. A central element was a focus on City-Regions. 
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The Tees Valley Partnership was set up between the five local authorities, the Chamber of 
Commerce, the Learning and Skills Council and Tees Valley Tomorrow, to manage the 
delegated funds from ONE North-East for the Tees Valley sub-region: it first oversaw the 
formulation of the Tees Valley Vison, and from 2002 it coordinated its implementation. 
The Tees Valley Joint Strategy Unit served as the secretariat for the Partnership. In 2007, 
the Tees Valley Partnership was transformed into a more formal arrangement – Tees 
Valley Unlimited – with an overall leadership board, supporting boards for specific 
themes, and consultation forums (Tees Valley Joint Strategy Unit, 2006). Tees Valley 
Unlimited was put in place in anticipation of additional money from other sources than 
ONE North-East for the economic development of Tees Valley, as a result of the Northern 
Way-initiative and a multi-area agreement (which was indeed concluded in 2008). From 
2010 onwards, Tees Valley Unlimited operates as a Local Enterprise Partnership for the 
Tees Valley area, under the new localised economic development agenda of the 
Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government. Moreover, with the dismantling of 
ONE North-East in 2012, it can maintain direct relations with the central government 
(even though this has also meant reduced funding). Despite these changes in the 
arrangements of the Tees Valley Partnership and Tees Valley Unlimited, connectedness 
has actually become more formalised and has been reinforced over the years, which has 
also led to more consistency and a better coordination in policy initiatives. It should also 
be noted however, that with regard to involvement of actors from the private sector, 
these arrangements have strongly prioritised representation from businesses, and trade 
unions and civil society organisations have hardly been involved. 
 
Strategic intelligence and strategic planning 
From 1974 onwards, there has been an entity in place which provides strategic 
intelligence and planning for the city region: first Cleveland County Council Research and 
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Intelligence unit (together with the Economic Development and Planning units)92, and 
subsequently – after the abolition of Cleveland County in 1996 – the Tees Valley Joint 
Strategy Unit, which was then fully integrated with Tees Valley Unlimited in 2010. Also at 
the regional level, entities to generate strategic intelligence and facilitate economic 
planning have regularly existed, with the Northern Economic Planning Council and Board 
(1964-1979) and ONE North-East (1999-2012). In addition, also at the regional universities 
(Durham, Newcastle, Teesside, and Northumbria), a lot of expertise have been build up 
on the economic development and economic issues of the North-East region in general 
and the Teesside area in particular (much of which has been used and cited in this 
chapter). Both at the city-regional level and regional level, many strategy and vision 
documents have been produced over time.93 The Teesside Survey and Plan (1969), the 
Teesside Structure Plan (1977/1983), guided the consensus of the 1970s, and the Tees 
Valley Strategic Vision (2003) has been the principal document outlining the current more 
integrated strategy and priorities. But the recurrent production of strategy and vision 
documents (compared to South Saarland), also seems to reflect a need to substantiate 
requests for additional resources and initiatives on the part of the central government 
(where most resources and powers are reserved). 
 
Important weaknesses of the framework for strategic intelligence and planning, appear to 
be that it does not incorporate multiple perspectives, and that expertise has been quite 
concentrated (whereas in South Saarland it is more dispersed among different actors). 
Until about 2000 the main unit for strategic intelligence and planning, primarily served 
the local authorities (Cleveland County Council and the Borough Councils). So the 
                                                     
92
 Other county councils (especially in the metropolitan areas) in the UK developed similar economic 
intelligence, as within the planning regime they were responsible for strategic planning and had to 
formulate and implement structure plans. 
93
 For the city-region: ‘Teesside Survey and Plan’ (1969), ‘Teesside Structure Plan’ (1977 / 1983), ‘Cleveland 
Structure Plan’ (1988), ‘Cleveland Economic Strategy’ (1990), ‘Tees Valley Strategic Vision’ (2003), ‘Tees 
Valley City-Region: A Business Case for Delivery’ (2006), and ‘Tees Valley Strategic Economic Plan’ (2014). 
For the region: ‘Challenge of the Changing North’ (1966), ‘An Outline Strategy of Development to 1981’ 
(1969), ‘Strategic Plan for the Northern Region’ (1977), ‘Unlocking our Potential’ (1999), ‘Realising our 
Potential’ (2002) and ‘Leading the Way’ (2006), and various programmes for support from the European 
Structural Funds.  
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intelligence and planning documents it produced mainly served their needs. After 2000 
the Tees Valley Joint Strategy Unit serves to support the Tees Valley Partnership and 
subsequently Tees Valley Unlimited. These arrangements complement the local public 
sector perspective, with a business perspective on the development of the area, as 
representatives from businesses have a leading role in these organisations (as well as in 
the boards of other important institutions for economic development in the area (also 
see Robinson and Shaw, 2001)). Trade unions or community groups however do not 
normally have a place within these arrangements (as before). This also means that they 
have developed little expertise and viewpoints with regard to the economic development 
of the area. Academic studies by academics of the universities in the region (e.g. Foord et 
al., 1985; Beynon et al., 1994; Robinson et al., 1999; Chapman, 2005) have been quite 
critical of the approaches behind some the policies enacted in Teesside, though their 
critique has been primarily directed at the central government. However, also actors 
within Teesside seem to have often been introspective in outlook, with little interest in 
alternative approaches, or a more fundamental reflection on the strategic direction of 
economic development policies (as is documented in Gray, 2001 and Chapman, 2011). 
 
Managing interventions 
As is clearly visible in Figure 31, there is a lack of consistency in operational governance 
arrangements over time, which reflects the lack of continuity in the evolution of policy 
discussed in section 7.6.2. This history of “instability” and “perpetual restructuring” in the 
institutional arrangements for subnational economic development in the UK, has also 
been noted elsewhere (Gray, 2001, p. 142; Elcock, 2014; p. 330; Mulgan, 2010, p. 18; Pike 
et al., 2015, p. 17). Many of these changes have been driven by forces external to the 
area, usually as a result of shifts in central government policy, especially after changes in 
power from Labour to Conservative or vice versa. These changes may be directly 
implemented by central government, or be a more indirect result of new central 
government programmes and funding regimes. ‘Churning’ (see section 3.4) is the best 
way to describe this dominant pattern: a recurrent restructuring, refitting, dismantling 
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and creation of arrangements, mainly driven by forces from outside of these 
arrangements: 
 There have been frequent changes in local government organisation: in 1974 and 
1996 major reorganisations took place (and in Teesside there was another 
reorganisation in 1968).  
 Central government executive agencies, which perform tasks related to economic 
development on Teesside, have been regularly subjected to reorganisations, and thus 
their institutional evolution exhibits a pattern of churning. The national agencies for 
labour market mediation, training and skills, and real-estate management and 
development, have all been reorganised several times over the years. Sometimes 
organisations have been created and again dismantled, as in the case of Business Link 
(which was put in place to support businesses). 
 The regional presence of central government departments has also undergone some 
changes. First in 1994 the offices for the region (mainly located in Newcastle) of 
various departments (Trade and Industry, Environment, Employment, Transport, 
Education, etc.) were integrated into one government office; but subsequently in 
2011 this office was closed (and consequently currently there is no longer any 
regional presence). 
 At the regional level, churning has regularly affected the entities for attracting 
businesses and investment (mainly from overseas), and for regional economic 
planning. In 1986 a major overhaul took place, when the local authorities in the region 
decided to replace the North of England Development Council by the Northern 
Development Company, and also involved the Confederation of British Industry 
(employers’ organisation), and Trades Union Congress (trade unions) (Anderson, 
1992; Hassink, 1992). In 1999 there was another restructuring, when the Labour 
government decided to establish Regional Development Agencies in every region in 
England, and the operations of the Northern Development Company were 
subsequently subsumed by the newly established ONE North-East. After a little more 
than a decade, ONE North-East was however dismantled in 2012 by the Conservative 
– Liberal-Democrat-coalition government. In regional planning, the Northern 
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Economic Planning Council and Board (established in 1964), was abolished by the 
incoming Conservative government in 1979. Strategy-making for economic 
development at a regional level, was revived again with the establishment of ONE 
North-East (whose primary mandate was to work out, regularly review, and support 
the realisation of a Regional Economic Strategy). 
 Multiple changes have taken place in the arrangements for urban and industrial 
development and attracting of inward investment, again reflecting a pattern of 
churning. First from 1987 until 1998 the Teesside Development Corporation, was the 
main agent to perform these tasks. In 1997, directly after Cleveland County Council 
was abolished and as the operating period Teesside Development Corporation came 
to the end of its fixed term, the local authorities set up the Tees Valley Development 
Company as a vehicle to attract inward investment. The Tees Valley Development 
Company was then subsumed into Tees Valley Regeneration in 2002. Tees Valley 
Regeneration was set up as an Urban Regeneration Company, which, with support of 
central government money, was made responsible for several regeneration projects in 
the area94 (in a similar fashion as the Teesside Development Corporation, but this 
time in close cooperation with the local authorities). Tees Valley Regeneration was 
dismantled in 2010, and its functions were transferred to the local authorities (urban 
development) and Tees Valley Unlimited (promotion of inward investment). The Tees 
and Hartlepool Port Authority (which owns large parts of the industrial land along the 
river Tees, e.g. Seal Sands), has remained intact over the years, but was converted 
from a trust port to a private company in 1992, and changed owners several times 
since.  
 
The local government reorganisations, the restructuring of executive agencies, or the 
creation of entities with specific tasks in local and regional development by Acts of 
Parliament (such as the Teesside Development Corporation and ONE North-East), are 
mainly the result of direct interventions by the central government. The conversion of the 
                                                     
94
 Tees Valley Regeneration was also part of the government support programme after renewed 
restructuring operations at the Corus-plant in the years before (John Bridge, personal communication). 
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Tees Valley Development Company into Tees Valley Regeneration, and of the Tees Valley 
Partnership into Tees Valley Unlimited were also driven by changes in central government 
policies, but more indirectly through shifts in broader programmes and available funding. 
Several changes were more driven by policy-making internal to the area however, such as 
the creation of the Tees Valley Development Company (and the Joint Strategy Unit) after 
the abolition of Cleveland County Council in 1996, and at the regional level, the overhaul 
of the regional development body to create the Northern Development Company in 1986. 
Moreover, the establishment of several centres of excellence and innovation hubs in 
Teesside in the early 2000s (Centre for Process Industries, Digital City, and Renew Tees 
Valley / Renew), with the support of ONE North-East, may also be said to be the result of 
decisions within the area and region. 
 
 
 Conclusions 7.7.
The Teesside-area industrialised rapidly in the latter half of the 19th century and first half 
of the 20th century on the back of the iron and steel industry, heavy engineering, 
shipbuilding and later also chemicals. These industries not only shaped the make-up of 
the economy of the area, but also the skills and mentality of its population, its (lack of) 
civic institutions, and its physical appearance. From the 1930s onwards the involvement 
of the central government within some of the heavy industries (especially in steel and 
shipbuilding) and within the area increased, reinforcing the overall pattern of 
dependency. The process of deindustrialisation has been very disruptive and pronounced. 
Arguably, the area never really recovered.  
 
The steel crisis was an important part of this process of rapid structural change in the 
area. The contraction and rapid downsizing of British Steel Corporation (despite it being a 
state-owned company), have been badly felt in Teesside. As a result of the loss of demand 
and overcapacity, the construction of a modern and large integrated works to replace 
existing plants, was curtailed. This has left the area with a plant that proved not to be 
very competitive, and suffered from repeated crises in the early 2000s, 2010-2011, and 
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2015. Especially in the early 1980s there were mass lay-offs as central government 
pressure grew on BSC to restore viability. Relatively powerless and passive trade unions 
could do little to prevent and mitigate these negative social impacts in Teesside and 
elsewhere. Combined with redundancies from other industries, this led to intractable 
mass unemployment at the local level. 
 
With regard to the evolution of policy in economic development, a consensus existed 
between the most important actors until the end of the 1970s, to upgrade and modernise 
the economy in Teesside. Both the private sector and public sector invested heavily in the 
area, and until the mid-1970s a great optimism about the future prevailed. Part of the 
programme was also to attract new employment in light manufacturing and services, as it 
was foreseen that employment in heavy industry would decrease somewhat. However, by 
the end of the 1970s it turned out that employment in heavy industry decreased much 
more and much quicker than expected, and that it had proven impossible to attract much 
alternative employment. In the 1980s, policies between the central government and local 
government started to diverge, with central government imposing ‘property-led 
regeneration’ as its favoured solution to the problems in old industrial towns (mainly 
through the Teesside Development Corporation), while local actors (with limited means) 
tried to cope with mass unemployment through make-work and training schemes, and 
attempted to assist local businesses and promote start-ups. It is only around 2000 that a 
more integral policy was established, with more coordinated actions in several policy 
domains. Most significantly, this led to initiatives to enhance the knowledge base and 
support innovativeness through the Centre of Process Innovation, and to a lesser extent 
through Digital City (together with supplementary programmes). This has led to the 
branching out of some new economic activities from some of the existing strengths in 
chemicals and engineering, such as renewable energy, low carbon technology, recycling, 
and offshore technology. 
 
The evolution of policy has thus been disjointed, especially during the 1980s and 1990s. 
This is also reflected in the evolution of governance arrangements, which is characterised 
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by a lack of consistency and fragmentation. The fact that the central state retains many 
powers and resources in most areas, and frequently changes its priorities with regard to 
territorial policies and other policy domains (economic policy, labour market, education, 
etc.), is an important factor behind this. Frequent changes have taken place over time 
both in government organisation at the local and regional level, as in the executive 
agencies managing particular activities and interventions; ‘churning’ seems the dominant 
pattern in the evolution of governance arrangements. As such, there do not seem to have 
been any episodes of institutional / political ‘lock-ins’ (taken as stand-offs as a result of 
powerful interests inhibiting renewal) (see Grabher, 1993). Rather, connectedness 
between actors and control of resources within the Teesside-area were at a very low level 
for a long time, which made that the area was at the mercy of decisions and forces 
elsewhere. During the modernisation process in the 1960s and 1970 this was relatively 
unproblematic, but in the 1980s and 1990s this meant a period of relative chaos. Only 
after 2000, actors within the Teesside-area have been able to a certain extent to take 
matters in their own hand again and start working on a more coordinated and focused 
transformation process. Although the increased connectedness since 2000 is still 
somewhat limited, as trade unions and community groups are hardly involved. The 
provision of strategic intelligence and planning has been quite concentrated within the 
area, and arrangements do not promote exchange between multiple perspectives.  
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Chapter 8. COMPARING POLICY AND GOVERNANCE IN ADAPTATION AND RESILIENCE IN 
SOUTH SAARLAND AND TEESSIDE 
 
 
 Introduction 8.1.
In the previous two Chapters I have discussed in detail how policy initiatives and 
governance arrangements have developed to cope with the steel crisis and structural 
change in South Saarland and Teesside. In Chapter 5 I outlined the wider institutional 
environment and development of policies at the national levels of Germany and the 
United Kingdom, and at the European level. In this Chapter I will compare the evolution of 
policy and governance in the two areas, and analyse the role these played in adaptation 
and resilience. Furthermore, I will scrutinise the impact of differences in the institutional 
environment, and thus closely examine the multi-scalar context in which both areas are 
embedded. The analysis in this Chapter explicitly applies the analytical framework 
discussed in Chapter 3 (which was the basis for the comparative framework outlined in 
Chapter 4), and thus I will employ the concepts reviewed there. 
 
I will first examine how South Saarland and Teesside have performed in terms of 
adaptation and resilience, by looking at their performance on key indicators, and with 
regard to the opportunities and challenges they currently face. I will then also discuss the 
development of both regions in three functional domains: industries / clusters, labour 
market / skills, and the built environment. Next I will compare and analyse the evolution 
and role of policy and governance. And lastly, I will discuss the importance of differences 
in the institutional environment, and assess how the processes of adaptation and 
resilience were facilitated or hindered by structures and processes at higher scales. 
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 Adaptation and resilience in South Saarland and Teesside 8.2.
Overall, South Saarland has adapted more successfully than Teesside, and has thus shown 
more resilience in the face of disruptive structural change. This is evident from the 
development on a number of key economic indicators: total employment, the 
unemployment rate, and the development of GVA / head compared to the national 
average. Furthermore, the principal challenge facing Teesside is still to develop new 
drivers for the regional economy, whereas in South Saarland a new economic base has 
developed and the area now faces a number of new challenges. Lastly, if we look at the 
developments that have taken place in the domains of industries / clusters, labour market 
/ skills, and built-environment, South Saarland seems to have been much more successful 
in overcoming lock-ins and creating new positive mechanisms of path dependence. I will 
discuss these three points in turn. 
 
In Figure 32 the development of total employment in both areas can be seen. 
Employment in Saarland shows a moderate growth over the years (with some occasional 
ups and downs). Employment in Teesside on the other hand fell very significantly in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, and recovery to the level of 1981 did not take place until 
around 2000. 
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Calculated from figures on total employment by employees (full-time and part-time). 
Sources: Statistisches Amt Saarland (Statistisches Handbuch für das Saarland / Statistisches Jahrbuch); 
Office of National Statistics (Census 1971; Region in Figures; Annual Population Survey); Beynon et al. 
(1994); Cleveland County Council (1995a). 
Figure 32: Index of development of total employment in Saarland and Teesside 
(1981=100) 
 
The poorer and more versatile performance in employment in Teesside is also reflected in 
the development of the unemployment rates, shown in Figure 33. Unemployment in 
Saarland peaked far less high than unemployment in Teesside in the 1980s and 1990s, 
and in general unemployment shows a less cyclical pattern. This is evidence that the 
social consequences of structural change have been less far-reaching in Saarland than in 
Teesside. Moreover, the unemployment rate in Saarland has converged with the average 
rate in West-Germany, whereas the rate in Teesside is still – and has consistently been – 
above the rate in Great Britain. 
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Changes in definitions over time are not taken into account. Figures for Teesside from 2004 onwards, are 
calculated from unemployment figures for Middlesbrough, Stockton-on-Tees, Hartlepool, and Redcar and 
Cleveland. 
Sources: Statistisches Amt Saarland (Statistisches Handbuch für das Saarland / Statistisches Jahrbuch); 
Statistisches Bundesamt (Statistisches Jahrbuch; www.destatis.de); Cleveland County Council (1995b), 
Office for National Statistics (Regional Trends), NOMIS (www.nomisweb.co.uk) 
Figure 33: Development of unemployment rates in Saarland, West-Germany, Teesside 
/ Cleveland County, and Great Britain 
 
Figure 34 shows a similar pattern of convergence, with the GVA / head in Saarland slowly 
catching up with the average in West-Germany over time, and making some significant 
gains in especially the 1970s and first half of the 2000s. GVA/head in Teesside was still 
relatively high in the 1970s, but has since consistently lost ground compared to the 
national average. In particular in the second half of the 1990s its relative position 
deteriorated quite rapidly, but in the 2000s the situation seems to have stabilised 
somewhat (excluding the effect of the financial and economic crisis after 2008). It should 
be noted however that in both South Saarland and Teesside, population has been 
declining in both absolute terms and relative terms. Hence the figures for GVA/head 
relative to national GDP/head are partly driven by this effect; the effect is however similar 
for both regions. 
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Changes in calculation methods over time are not taken into account. For Teesside, GVA/head up until 1995 
refers to Cleveland County; and after 1995 it is calculated from data for Stockton and Hartlepool, and South 
Teesside NUTS3-regions. 
Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt (Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland; 
Regionaldatenbank Deutschland; www.destatis.de), Statistisches Landesamt Saarland (Statistisches 
Handbuch für das Saarland / Statistisches Jahrbuch Saarland); Office for National Statistics (Abstract of 
Regional Statistics; Regional Trends; Region in Figures: North-East; NOMIS; Reference Table Regional GVA 
NUTS3 1997-2013; ww.ons.gov.uk). 
Figure 34: Development of GVA / head relative to national GDP / head 
 
Another indication that South Saarland has performed better than Teesside, is given by 
the type of challenges the areas face at the moment. The main policy ambition in 
Teesside is still to develop new drivers for the area’s economy, as discussed in section 
7.6.2. Currently, efforts are concentrated on developing the ‘process industry’-cluster and 
possible offshoots in for example renewable energy, recycling, biotechnology, materials, 
and pharmaceuticals. Furthermore, also digital media / IT is seen to offer some 
opportunities, and is supported through incubators, counselling, and financial assistance. 
In South Saarland there are still policies in place to further enhance the strengths of the 
area’s economy (as discussed), but it has meanwhile developed some robust economic 
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drivers (a manufacturing core around automotive, steel, and machinery; and the IT-
sector). Some new challenges have emerged however, which are now seen as the main 
priorities for the area’s further development: the poor state of the public finances of the 
Saarland government, and the ageing and decline of the area’s population. As a result of 
the large expenditures to restructure and preserve the steel industry, the relatively high 
unemployment in the 1980s and 1990s, and the somewhat weaker tax base over the 
years, the government of Saarland has accumulated large debts (Kurtz, 2014). Currently 
the level of debt is at around 46% of regional GVA, and about 20% of the state’s budget is 
now spent on interest payments. Hence to an extent the success in economic adaptation, 
has taken its toll on the long term health and sustainability of the public finances in 
Saarland. The state of the public finances has been made particular acute by a new clause 
in the German constitution (adopted in 2009) which prohibits new additional debts from 
2020 (except in extraordinary circumstances). Hence the government of Saarland is 
currently implementing a comprehensive austerity programme to halt deficit spending 
and reduce the public debt (Kirch, 2014).95 Also demographic changes are unfavourable in 
Saarland: since 1970 it has lost over 11% of its population: from over 1.1 million people to 
less than 1 million currently (the population in just South Saarland went from 925,000 in 
1970 to less than about 800,000 now). This decline is expected to continue at an 
accelerated pace, with about 900,000 people projected to be living in Saarland by 2030 
(and about 740,000 in just South Saarland) (Bertelsmann Stiftung (www.wegweiser-
kommune.de)). This population decline will coincide with a further ageing of the 
population (IW Consult, 2009; Warscheid et al., 2011). To prevent these demographic 
changes from negatively affecting the economic prospects of Saarland, policies have 
recently focussed on further increasing labour market participation by especially women, 
improving educational performance, and attracting and retaining people, especially those 
who are more highly skilled (Warscheid et al., 2011).  
 
                                                     
95
 If Saarland does not conform to this clause, there is a possibility it may lose part of its autonomy (or even 
its independence, but only if the population of Saarland would consent to a merger with one of the other 
Länder) (Kirch, 2014). 
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In section 2.3.3, I argued that various, interrelated mechanisms of path dependency can 
exist in old industrial regions in three functional domains: industries / clusters, labour 
market / skills, and the built environment. Table 17 lists the most important 
developments in these three functional domains for the two cases. From this table we 
may conclude that South Saarland has been successful in ‘path-creation’ in automotive 
and in IT over the years, as a result of policies implemented there in the late 1960s, 1970s 
and 1980s (Trippl and Otto, 2009). In Teesside such efforts at ‘path creation’ in new 
manufacturing industries and more high-end services have by and large failed, with most 
growth in employment taking place in low-end services and the (semi-)public sector 
(especially health care). Recent policies have focussed on ‘path branching’ from the 
existing strengths in chemicals and engineering; the long-term effects of which are not 
visible yet. Moreover, in Teesside lock-ins in the labour market and in the built 
environment seem to persist. Whereas in South Saarland these mechanisms have by and 
large been overcome, and there is some evidence of the emergence of some positive 
mechanisms in these domains. 
 
 South Saarland Teesside 
Development 
of industries / 
clusters 
 The steel industry has meanwhile found a niche 
in speciality steel products and is stable, 
healthy, and competitive, but weakly linked to 
the knowledge infrastructure (Trippl and Otto, 
2009; Isoplan, 2012). 
 Coal mining has completely disappeared; but 
the decline has been protracted and carefully 
managed, through support and policies from 
mainly the Federal government (Dörrenbächer, 
2007). 
 South Saarland has been very successful in 
creation and development of a new path in 
automotive through the attraction of inward 
investment in the late 1960s / early 1970s; 
based on the availability of skilled and 
disciplined workers (redundant in coal mining), 
and related technologies within the machinery 
and steel processing sectors (Hamm and 
Wienert, 1990; Schulz and Dörrenbächer, 2007; 
Strobel, 2011). Although the cluster consists 
mostly of ‘co-located branch plants’. 
Employment at local SME firms continues to be 
 With the recent mothballing of the main works, 
the prospects for the steel industry look very 
bleak. Its competitiveness and stability was 
already at issue before this however (Hudson 
and Swanton, 2012). The links within the local 
and regional supply chain for the steel industry 
in Teesside, have become more flexible over 
time (Sadler, 2004). 
 The existing chemical and engineering industries 
have developed into the ‘process industry 
cluster’, which has further branched out in 
related industries such as renewable energy, 
pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, biofuels, 
renewable materials, etc. (NEPIC, 2013) After 
the demise of ICI in the 1990s, cluster 
institutions have developed; but the cluster 
consists mostly of ‘branch plants’.(Chapman, 
2005). The operations of large multinational 
corporations continue to be a dominant aspect 
of the economy in Teesside (Tees Valley 
Unlimited, 2013). 
 The creation and development of new economic 
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 South Saarland Teesside 
less than in other parts of Germany (Otto and 
Schanne, 2006). 
 South Saarland has also managed to create and 
develop new strengths in IT / software 
development (now about 7,000 jobs), and to a 
lesser extent in nano- and biotechnology, 
mainly through pro-active STI-policies started in 
the 1980s (Roscher, 2007; Trippl and Otto, 
2009). Other parts of the service sector which 
provide relatively much employment are health 
care and insurance services (Warscheid et al., 
2011). 
drivers has been limited. Teesside has had little 
overall success in attracting and embedding new 
kinds of manufacturing. In the service-sector, 
the main employment growth has taken place in 
retail / hospitality, logistics and low-end 
business services (call centres, back office 
processing, etc.) since 1980s (Tees Valley 
Unlimited, 2013; NOMIS Business Register and 
Employment Survey 2013). More recently, there 
has been the emergence of a digital media / IT 
cluster (as a result of strong competence in that 
field of Teesside University), though 
employment is still comparatively small (around 
1,000 to 1,500 jobs) (NOMIS Business Register 
and Employment Survey 2013). 
 Teesside relies relatively heavily on public sector 
and semi-public sector employment, in 
particular in health care. Over 26% of 
employment is in the public sector, compared to 
21% nationally (Tees Valley Unlimited, 2013). 
Development 
of labour 
market and 
skills 
 The percentage of employed people with low 
qualifications (no further education after 
secondary education) has been dropping in 
Saarland, and is about the same as in other 
parts of West-Germany. The percentage of 
employed people with a higher education 
degree in Saarland has risen to about 10% (from 
about 5% in 1990), but is still less than in the 
rest of West-Germany, where it is currently 
about 13% on average, and was about 6% in 
1990. Saarland seems to be losing ground in this 
respect (Statistics from Bundesagentur für 
Arbeit Nürnberg 2014). 
 There has been an outmigration of more 
ambitious and highly educated young people to 
other parts of Germany since the 1980s (Miehe-
Nordmeyer, 2000; Kurtz, 2014). 
 There exists a relatively large pool of skilled 
labourers in the manufacturing core of 
automotive, steel, and machinery (with related 
skills), and a ‘parallel’ (to an important extent, 
unrelated) labour market has developed over 
the years for university graduates and 
researchers, through the success in attracting 
research institutes, expanding higher education 
and developing IT- and high technology sectors 
(Trippl and Otto, 2009; Otto et al., 2014). 
 Despite efforts to facilitate and promote 
entrepreneurship, levels of enterprise (in terms 
of new company formation) remain below the 
 The percentage of people with no qualifications 
has dropped rapidly in Teesside, and is now only 
slightly higher than in other parts of Great 
Britain (whereas it used to be much higher). The 
percentage of people with qualifications at 
NVQ4-level or higher (degree-level equivalent or 
higher) has increased from around 10% in 1990 
to about 28% currently, but is still lower than 
the rest of Great Britain, where it is at about 
35%. The gap has remained about the same (as 
the percentage for Great Britain in 1990 was 
about 15%). (Statistics from ONS Census 1991 
and NOMIS Annual Population Survey 2014). 
 Teesside lost some of its skill-base in the 1980s 
and 1990s through outmigration of skilled 
workers (Hudson, 2000), and there is still 
outmigration of ‘higher achievers’ (Chapman et 
al., 2007). 
 There remains a comparatively large pool of 
workless and low-skilled people in Teesside, 
with few prospects; and the relatively poor 
quality of the job offer in Teesside goes hand in 
hand with a relatively low skill level on average 
and low aspirations (Chapman at al., 2007; Tees 
Valley Unlimited, 2010). 
 There are comparatively few opportunities for 
employment in Teesside in higher grade skill 
occupations, and at the same time some skill 
gaps exist in particular sectors (mostly in 
engineering and offshore) (Chapman et al., 
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 South Saarland Teesside 
national average, though there has been 
improvement over the years (IW Consult, 2009). 
2007; Tees Valley Unlimited, 2013). 
 Despite efforts to facilitate and promote 
entrepreneurship, levels of enterprise (in terms 
of new company formation) remain below the 
national average, though there has been 
improvement over the years (Tees Valley 
Unlimited, 2013). 
Development 
of built- 
environment 
and amenities 
 There have been large investments in this 
domain over the years, both through site 
remediation and urban regeneration projects, 
and through new investments because of new 
economic dynamism (Dörrenbächer, 2013). 
 Derelict, old industrial sites are hardly a 
problem, and instead there is a shortage of 
larger plots of land for industrial and 
commercial use (see section 6.5.2). 
 The attractiveness of Saarland has improved 
notably, also because environmental pollution 
and degradation have been significantly 
diminished (Warscheid at al., 2011). Since 2000 
there have been significant investments to 
improve Saarland as a tourism and leisure 
destination (see section 6.5.2). 
 There have been large investments in key 
locations on Teesside in the 1980s and 1990s by 
especially the Teesside Development 
Corporation as part of ‘property-led 
regeneration’, and subsequently Tees Valley 
Regeneration has continued to work on the 
development of several flagship projects in the 
area. There have been many projects in 
neighbourhood renewal and community 
regeneration (GHK, 2000; Rundle, 2005; 
McGuinness et al., 2012). 
 Derelict, old industrial sites are still an issue, and 
there is ample land available for industrial and 
commercial use (Tees Valley Unlimited, 2010). 
Moreover, the housing stock in Teesside is 
relatively dated and there is a lack of variety, as 
there is a high proportion of pre-war, terraced 
housing (Tees Valley Unlimited, 2010). 
 Despite notable improvements in the reduction 
of environmental pollution and degradation, 
and in the availability of amenities, Teesside is 
still considered unattractive and has a poor 
reputation (see e.g. The Economist, 2013; The 
Guardian, 2014). Teesside can cater well for the 
leisure needs of its own population, but is 
hardly perceived as a destination for tourism 
outside of the area (Tees Valley Unlimited, 
2010). 
Table 17: Development of South Saarland and Teesside within three functional 
domains 
 
 Evolution and role of policy and governance 8.3.
South Saarland has thus on the whole successfully adapted to the deindustrialisation and 
steel crisis of the 1970s and 1980s, whereas Teesside is still struggling with the effects. 
Several factors may have played a role. The location of Saarland in the heart of Western-
Europe may be considered more favourable, as it can benefit easier from integration in 
supply chains and access to consumer markets. From a European perspective, the 
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location of Teesside is more peripheral. The somewhat different make-up of the economy 
in South Saarland as compared to Teesside (with besides steel, a stronger reliance on coal 
mining and machinery, instead of chemicals and heavy engineering) may have made a 
difference. It meant that the process of structural change started somewhat earlier in 
Saarland, with a crisis in coal mining (when heavy industry in Teesside was still booming), 
and hence there seemed to have been a greater sense of urgency earlier on for policy 
responses. Moreover, the reintegration of Saarland back into the Federal Republic of 
Germany in the late 1950s, offered scope for additional economic support programmes 
from the Federal government in the 1960s. However on the other hand, it could just as 
well be argued that the coastal location and port of Teesside offers many opportunities, 
which perhaps have not been fully exploited. Similarly, the considerable investments in 
Teesside in the 1970s by both the private sector and the public sector, which 
underpinned the boom, could have perhaps also been directed differently. 
 
In this section and the next section, I will argue that the greater transformative resilience 
of South Saarland can for a large part be explained by the institutional framework – both 
within South Saarland and in the wider context offered by Germany – and by the policies 
implemented over time. The institutional framework in Teesside and the UK, and the 
policies adopted there, were less suited for a coordinated and comprehensive adaptation 
process, and hence it has exhibited far less transformative resilience to cope with 
disruptive economic change. In this section I will first briefly review and compare the 
evolution of policy and governance in South Saarland and Teesside (already extensively 
discussed in the previous Chapters), and next I will discuss what role these policies and 
governance arrangements played, in particular by examining how they contributed to 
overcoming mechanisms of lock-in, and creating positive mechanisms instead. 
 
 
8.3.1. The evolution of policy initiatives 
Table 18 below reiterates the highlights and focal points in the evolution of policy in 
South Saarland and in Teesside. As noted at the start of sections 6.6 and 7.6, the 
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expenditure on economic development policies (narrowly defined as attraction of inward 
investment, entrepreneurship and business support and urban regeneration) can on 
average be estimated to have been somewhat higher in South Saarland than in Teesside 
(around 1% of regional GVA versus between 0.5% and 1%). However at times spending in 
Teesside has been much greater (1.5% to or even above 2% of regional GVA); especially 
when Teesside was a major recipient of Regional Development Grants (in the late 1970s), 
and during the operating period of the Teesside Development Corporation (1987-1998). 
Also the state support for the steel industry, has been far more generous in Saarland (also 
given the fact that Teesside was one of many works within the BSC).96 
 
                                                     
96
 It should also be noted that coal mining in South Saarland has been very heavily subsidised by the Federal 
government for about 50 years (from the early 1960s until the last coal mine closed in 2012), and hence its 
managed decline has also come at a high price. Although the rationale for these subsidies was not only to 
prevent negative economic and social impacts in the coal mining regions (chiefly the Ruhr Area and 
Saarland), but also to contribute to energy security. 
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Episode 1 (until 1985) 
- Strong emphasis on 
attracting inward 
investment. 
- Large investment in 
transport 
infrastructure and 
new industrial sites. 
• • •  • • • 
Episode 1 (until 1979) 
- Modernisation and 
rationalisation of 
heavy industry in 
Teesside. 
- Encouragement of 
diversification 
through attraction of 
inward investment in 
light manufacturing 
and services. 
• • •   • • 
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Table 18: Comparing the evolution of policy programmes and initiatives in South 
Saarland and Teesside 
 
We can distinguish five key moments with regard to the strategic direction of economic 
development policies. At these moments, important choices were made about the main 
policies; although these choices were strongly conditioned by the respective institutional 
frameworks, as I will further discuss below and in section 8.4. 
1. In the restructuring of steel industry, there was a focus on speciality steel in South 
Saarland (1978-1993), while in Teesside there was a focus on economies of scale and 
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Episode 2 (1985-1999) 
- Continuing support 
for steel industry; 
policy towards local 
control. 
- Set up of 
programmes in STI, 
and enterprise / 
business support. 
- Redevelopment of 
sites occupied by 
heavy industry. 
• • • • • • • 
Episode 2 (1979-1997) 
- City-region / local 
initiatives to cope 
with structural 
problems in 
economy. 
- Urban policy and 
property-led 
regeneration through 
Teesside 
Development 
Corporation. 
 • •  • • • 
Episode 3 (1999-date) 
- STI-policies become 
cluster-based. 
- Development of new 
industrial sites, and 
promotion of 
Saarland as leisure / 
tourism destination. 
  • • • • • 
Episode 3 (1997-date) 
- More coordinated 
and integrated 
approach, based on 
Tees Valley 
Partnership and Tees 
Valley Vision. 
- Also STI-policies for 
process industry, 
digital media and 
renewable energy. 
  • • • • • 
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expansion of bulk steel making (from 1973 until 1977) and then rapid downsizing to 
achieve efficiency (1977-1986). 
2. In South Saarland, there was a controlled process of job reduction, and a proactive 
mitigation of negative social consequences. In Teesside by contrast, there was a rapid 
and uncontrolled downsizing especially in the early 1980s, contributing to intractable 
mass unemployment in the area. 
3. During the late 1960s and 1970s there was an emphasis on attracting inward 
investment in especially manufacturing in both areas, through various incentives and 
through the provision of industrial sites. However, in Teesside this was combined with 
large-scale investments in heavy industry, which may have made the area less 
attractive for other types of inward investment. 
4. By the mid-1980s, there was a move in South Saarland to an emphasis on STI-policies 
and entrepreneurship / business support. In Teesside, the main focal points were 
urban policy (‘property-led regeneration’) complemented by attracting inward 
investment, and to a lesser extent support for entrepreneurship and local businesses. 
5. From the late 1990s the two regions started to differ in the main issues they face: the 
focus in South Saarland shifts to further enhancing and embedding the existing 
economic strengths, improving its attractiveness as a place to live and visit, and 
increase the availability of sites for further industrial and commercial development. 
Whereas in Teesside efforts are still aimed at developing drivers for new economic 
prosperity: now the emphasis has shifted more to STI-based policies applied to the 
remnants of the heavy industrial base (the process industry and renewables) and 
strengths of Teesside University (digital media) . 
 
The first, second and fourth moments can be said to have been ‘critical junctures’, which 
were crucial for subsequent developments in the two areas. The strategic direction 
chosen for the respective steel industries – in both cases strongly influenced by the 
government (though in Saarland this was mainly the government of the state, while in 
Teesside this was the central government) – and the way redundancies were coped with, 
determined the assets available in both areas. In South Saarland a significant and 
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competitive steel industry was retained in the end (though at a high price) which now still 
acts as an economic driver and generates beneficial effects for other parts of the 
manufacturing core. Moreover, the specific skills of workers could also mostly be 
retained, not only in the remaining steel industry but also in growing manufacturing 
industries such as automotive and mechanical engineering. In Teesside on the other hand, 
the remaining works have been commercially (and technologically) vulnerable: there have 
been further crises in the early 2000s, 2010-2011 and 2015, and steel has continued to 
lose in importance for the regional economy. Moreover, as a result of the rapid job 
reductions in the steel industry and simultaneous employment loss in other 
manufacturing industries, the skills of many workers were rendered far less valuable (as 
any new forms of employment utilised a different set of skills). Since the 1980s, there has 
been a strong focus on STI-policies in South Saarland. As a consequence, the knowledge 
base in the area has expanded considerably (mainly in IT, and to a lesser extent also other 
technologies, such as nano- and bio-technology). In Teesside, the main emphasis during 
the 1980s and 1990s was urban policy, reflecting a philosophy of property-led 
regeneration, complemented by attracting inward investment. A shift towards STI-
policies, only took place in the early 2000s. 
 
In general, the evolution of policy in South Saarland has shown much continuity and 
gradual development. By contrast, the evolution of policy has been rather more ‘messy’. 
Especially in the 1980s and 1990s, there were many initiatives in Teesside by various 
actors, but there was little integration between these. The main reason for this difference 
is the fact that many of the strategic decisions with regard to the management of the 
steel crisis and the focal points in economic development policy, were taken in London by 
BSC respectively the central government, whereas in South Saarland they were mainly 
taken within the area. The policies in South Saarland have been more sensitive to local 
circumstances and local impacts. In Teesside – and the United Kingdom in general – such 
sensitivity has been much less. Moreover until about 2000 the actors at different 
territorial levels and in different policy domains hardly coordinated their initiatives in 
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Teesside. In South Saarland, the greater level of local control resulted in a much better 
coordination between policies.  
 
‘Cognitive lock-ins’ do not seem to have played an important role in policy-making in 
Saarland; rather the consistency in the evolution of policies seems to have been a result 
of the debate and exchange of viewpoints between various actors in the Land, before 
important decisions were taken. This tendency to attain support from different actors, 
meant there were no large shifts in policy when the government in Saarland changed 
from a CDU-dominated coalition to SPD in 1985 and then back again in 2000. The only 
incidence of a type of ‘cognitive lock-in’ may have been the continued support of the 
steel industry by the Saarland government after 1984 (when the Federal government 
cancelled further support). To some extent this may be regarded as a form of ‘escalating 
commitment’: further investment to justify cumulative prior investments. However, in the 
end the Saarland government did manage to resolve the crisis at Saarstahl, as discussed; 
but at a considerable expense, which has added to the poor state of the public finances of 
the Land.  
 
In the development of policy-making in Teesside, central level actors have been leading. 
The main decision-makers in the central government had less appreciation for particular, 
local circumstances and were on the whole less aware of the geographical impacts of 
their measures. Moreover, characteristic for policy-making in economic development 
(and other domains) in the UK, are recurrent changes in ideological points of reference. 
The most important breaks in this respect were in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
(especially the first few years of the Thatcher-government), and to a lesser extent also in 
the latter half of the 1990s (with New Labour coming to power) (as discussed in section 
5.4.3). This has led to some forms of ‘myopia’ at the central government, in which only 
certain pieces of information and certain policy options have been considered, but other 
information and alternatives have been ignored (sometimes willingly). In this respect, 
‘cognitive lock-ins’ do seem to have played a role in the development of policy in 
Teesside, though mostly in the world views of central level actors, rather than regional 
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actors97. On the one hand, this explains why the development of policy in Teesside 
exhibits some important shifts, such as the change of policy of the central government 
vis-à-vis the British Steel Corporation after 1979, the abolishment of regional policy in the 
1980s, the policy of regional devolution after 1997, and the turn towards localism after 
2010. But on the other hand, in the periods in-between such shifts, central government 
policy has at times been very rigid, which then may have led to a disconnect between the 
wishes of local actors and the policies enacted. This seems the have been especially true 
for the policies inspired by the philosophy of ‘property-led regeneration’, which shaped 
subnational economic development policy (especially in the old industrial areas in the UK) 
in the 1980s and first half of the 1990s (Robinson et al., 1993; Robinson and Shaw, 1994). 
Hence the messy pattern in the evolution of policies in Teesside, is explained by both such 
shifts and such rigidities.  
 
 
8.3.2. The evolution of governance arrangements 
A striking feature of the institutional framework for economic development in Teesside is 
the strong role of the central government and central government agencies. In South 
Saarland however the government of the Land is the main actor, and the institutional 
framework is mainly concentrated at this spatial level. Hence the adaptation process in 
Teesside was – at least until about 2000 - mainly determined by decisions elsewhere, 
whereas in South Saarland there has been much more local control. This highlights the 
multi-scalar nature of adaptation and resilience, and will be further discussed in section 
8.4. We have seen above, that this has been a major factor behind the lack of integration 
and consistency in policy in Teesside. However, also the level of connectedness and 
collaboration between actors within the two areas and the arrangements of strategic 
planning and intelligence, have played an important role in this. Connectedness within 
South Saarland has always been well-developed and these connections have actually 
expanded and become more formalised in the last few decades. Within the Teesside-area 
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 Although cognitive lock-in may also have existed at this level (see Gray, 2001; Chapman, 2011), but this 
has had far less impact on the policies that have been implemented in Teesside. 
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by contrast, connectedness within the public sector, and between the public sector and 
private sector, was slow to arise, and only since about 2000 suitable arrangements are in 
place (although these still do not extent to unions and community organisations). 
 
The multi-actor policy network in South Saarland, is also reflected in its ‘intelligence 
system’, in which multiple perspectives are developed and discussed. Strategic planning 
and intelligence in Teesside on the other hand, was until about 2000 mainly concentrated 
at one unit, which mainly served the local authorities, and thus had a limited role in 
facilitating an exchange of perspectives and coordinating actions between various actors. 
Since 2000, there is more interaction between local authorities, central government 
bodies, and the business community in the area. The strong continuity of policy in South 
Saarland and the relatively irregular development of policy in Teesside, are reflected in 
the principal patterns within the evolution of the institutions to manage interventions. 
Table 19 gives an overview of the evolution of governance arrangements in both areas.  
 
 South Saarland Teesside 
Connectedness and collaboration Well-developed connectedness 
between actors from the start. 
Arrangements have expanded 
somewhat and become more 
formalised over time. 
Connectedness includes unions 
and community organisations. 
Poorly developed connectedness 
between actors from the start. 
Connectedness took a long time 
develop, with some 
recombination already in the mid-
1980s, but only since about 2000 
arrangements in place which 
connect local authorities, local 
business, and central government 
agencies. Still unions and 
community organisations are 
barely involved.  
Strategic intelligence and 
strategic planning 
Intelligence spread over various 
actors. ‘Intelligence system’ 
facilitates development of 
multiple perspectives, and is 
relatively open to outside 
influences.  
Intelligence is quite concentrated. 
At first, mainly local authority 
perspective was favoured, since 
about 2000 also complemented 
by a business perspective. Other 
perspectives are not 
accommodated in formal 
arrangements. 
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 South Saarland Teesside 
Managing interventions Dominant patterns in the 
evolution of the entities for the 
implementation of policies, are 
layering and conversion. 
Institutional changes are 
principally driven by policy-
making internal to the area. 
Dominant pattern in the 
evolution of the entities for the 
implementation of policies, is 
churning. Institutional changes 
are mostly driven by policy-
making external to the area 
(especially at the central level). 
Table 19: Comparing the evolution of governance arrangements in South Saarland and 
Teesside 
 
Patterns of path dependency seem very clear in the evolution of governance 
arrangements in South Saarland. Within the state of Saarland a strong framework was in 
place to perform the strategic functions with regard to regional economic development: 
deliberation, diagnosis, and decision-making on policies. This framework is based on both 
formal and informal connections, and no large-scale changes have taken place over the 
years. It has become somewhat more formalised (e.g. with the institution of the 
‘Saargemeinschaftinitiative’), and some new arrangements have been added in the 
context of cross-border cooperation within the ‘Greater Region’. This framework has 
been susceptible to some form of ‘political lock-in’ in two episodes (from about 1963 until 
1967 and from about 1982 until 1985). But these episodes of lock-in emerged mostly 
because of disagreements between actors in combination with a lack of financial 
resources; rather than the postponement of renewal to protect certain vested interests 
(as originally suggested by Grabher (1993)). Overall, the framework has allowed for a 
consistent, gradual, and coordinated development of policy initiatives in a variety of 
domains, which in turn is also reflected by the dominant patterns in the evolution of the 
operational arrangements. These clearly built on already existing structures: ‘layering’ / 
‘sedimentation’ and to a lesser extent ‘conversion’. In Teesside by contrast, the evolution 
of governance arrangements show very little path dependent development. Government 
arrangements that connect local governments, other local actors, and central 
government agencies, were long absent in the area, and emerged rather slowly.98 It is 
only since the establishment of the Tees Valley Partnership in 2000, that suitable 
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 Although there were some arrangements that connected different actors in the wider North East region. 
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arrangements may be said to exist, mainly driven by the actions of local authorities and 
local businesses. ‘Political lock-ins’ could not arise in this situation. But rather, it seems 
that the ‘institutional thinness’ (with regard to arrangements at the strategic level) has 
negatively affected the development of policy, as it importantly contributed to the far less 
integrated and inconsistent development of policies for the area. This fragmentation and 
inconsistency is also seen in the development of operational governance arrangements, 
of local governance organisation and of central government executive agencies active in 
the area. The dominant pattern can be termed ‘churning’. The development of these 
arrangements is thus also not characterised by path dependence: instead of building on 
existing arrangements, arrangements are restructured, refitted, dismantled and 
(re)created, mainly as a result of policy changes outside of the area (also see Pike, 2015).  
 
 
8.3.3. The role of policy and governance in adaptation and resilience 
The policy initiatives implemented can have a direct impact on overcoming the 
mechanisms of lock-in, and possibly creating new mechanisms of positive path 
dependence. The impact of governance arrangements is more indirect, as they contribute 
to the discussion, appraisal, coordination, and decision-making with regard to policies, 
and subsequently support their implementation. Overall, the policies and governance 
arrangements in South Saarland seem to have contributed to preventing and breaking 
through various interrelated mechanisms of lock-in in the regional economy, and created 
some mechanisms for positive path dependency. In Teesside governance arrangements 
and policies, for the most part do not seem to have addressed such mechanisms of 
negative path dependency effectively, and lock-ins in some functional domains seem to 
have persisted (although the efforts enacted since 2000 show some promise of tackling 
these mechanisms; but the effects are not visible yet in key economic indicators).  
 
In South Saarland, the steel industry has been retained as an economic driver as a result 
of considerable efforts by the state government (and to a lesser extent, the federal 
government). Policy has also been instrumental in creating several new economic drivers. 
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The policies in the attraction of inward investment in especially the late 1960s and early 
1970s, have facilitated the rise of the automotive-industry as one of the new mainstays in 
the economy. The steel industry, automotive, and machinery (which has continued to 
develop), now form the heart of a strong core in (meanwhile advanced) manufacturing in 
South Saarland. Science, Technology and Innovation-policies in the 1980s have 
contributed to the development of new economic drivers in Information Technology and 
to a lesser extent in nano- and biotechnology. These developments have been 
complemented by more ‘autonomous’ growth patterns in some service industries and the 
public sector (also witnessed in Teesside). The policies to support the steel industry - as 
well as coal mining - and to manage the downsizing operations in these industries, led to 
the retention of many of the existing skills in the area, which could subsequently be 
utilised in growing segments in manufacturing. Furthermore, the education system and 
the system of further training (to attain further work-related qualifications and skills), has 
adapted well to the changes over the years (IW Consult, 2009). The combination of new 
economic drivers, the continued utilisation of skills already present, and policies to ensure 
good education and training, have led to a labour market with sizeable segments in which 
a ‘high-skill equilibrium’ is maintained; i.e. positive feedback-effects between the demand 
for high skills and the supply of high skills (see Table 17). Furthermore, in the built 
environment the Land and Gemeinde have initiated targeted and continuous investments 
in the remediation of old industrial sites and in urban regeneration. These investments, 
together with the investments by businesses and citizens as a result of the renewed 
economic dynamism, have enabled South Saarland to become a moderately attractive 
place. This attractiveness (and the distinctive way of life in Saarland) will in turn be 
important in retaining and attracting highly skilled people (especially as the population is 
ageing and declining), and will hence be important for the further development of the 
economic base and the labour market. 
 
In Teesside, the net result of the decisions taken during the period of restructuring in the 
1970s and 1980s, has been that the steel industry is no longer a very prominent element 
in the area’s economy. Efforts to attract inward investment over the years have had 
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limited success in manufacturing: they seem to have stimulated some continuing 
investment in the chemical industry, but have not resulted in the attraction of lasting, 
new strengths in other types of manufacturing (despite some success in food and textiles 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s). The main economic effect of the ‘property-led 
regeneration’ policies of the 1980s and 1990s seems to have been to facilitate 
employment growth in retail, hospitality and low-end business services (such as call 
centres and back office processing). Moreover, the growth of employment in the public 
sector and relatively low employment growth in the private sector, has led to the public 
sector being the most important source of employment (especially in health care). 
Although also the chemical industry and engineering have lost importance in terms of 
employment, from their knowledge and technological base several new ‘branches’ have 
emerged or begun to emerge, in pharmaceuticals, materials, renewable energy and 
recycling. More recent STI-policy efforts have attempted to stimulate these processes of 
‘path branching’. Overall, policy efforts have not been able to stimulate the development 
of strong, new economic drivers to compensate for the loss of significance of steel and 
other heavy industry. This lack of strong drivers has coincided with an overall ‘low skill 
equilibrium’ in the area99, with the availability of low skills in the labour market and 
comparatively little private sector investment in training, being matched and reinforced 
by a general supply in low skill jobs. Despite the fact that the education system seems to 
be functioning well in Teesside (Chapman et al, 2007), and the public sector has invested 
substantially in the upgrading of skills through various initiatives in further training100, 
such efforts have not been matched by similar investments by the private sector in the 
development of skills and the creation of opportunities for more highly skilled people 
(GHK, 2000; Chapman et al., 2007; Tees Valley Unlimited, 2014). Low aspirations are thus 
being confirmed by a relatively poor quality of the jobs on offer. With deindustrialisation, 
Teesside seems to have lost an important part of its previous skill-base. As a result of a 
quick reduction of manufacturing employment – partly as a result of central government 
policies with regard to steel but also shipbuilding and heavy engineering – much of the 
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 With the exception perhaps of a relatively small segment of the labour market in advanced engineering. 
100
 Although in a somewhat incoherent and fragmented way (. 
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existing skills-base was devalorised. Workers that found new employment in the area 
often had to learn and utilise very different types of skills; while others migrated to other 
parts of the country or abroad, or saw their skills erode as a result of worklessness. A 
major focal point in policy has been to combat deprivation and to improve the 
attractiveness of the area. Although such efforts have been valuable and have led to 
important improvements on a localised scale (in especially Stockton and Hartlepool), they 
seem also to have been a way of combatting the symptoms of a problem rather than the 
underlying causes. The continuing overall lack of attractiveness and lack of variety in the 
housing stock in the area (as a result of a lack of investment which is not induced by the 
public sector), will make it more difficult to retain and attract more highly skilled people 
for possible new growth sectors. 
 
 
 Conditioning by differences in institutional environment 8.4.
The evolution and role of policies and governance in South Saarland and Teesside have 
been conditioned by the respective institutional environments in which both areas are 
embedded. In section 3.5 I discussed two dimensions that will be especially relevant in 
this regard: the type of government structure and the type of economic organisation. I 
will discuss the importance of both dimensions in turn. 
 
The importance of differences in the government structure, is quite clear from the 
comparison between South Saarland and Teesside: the federal structure in Germany 
made that in Saarland there was much more local control with regard policies and 
governance arrangements, whereas in the unitary and centralised government structure 
of the UK, the most important decisions were taken outside of the Teesside-area. From 
the late 1990s however, some decentralisation has taken place in economic development 
policy in the UK. Regional Development Agencies were set up in 1999, and this also led to 
some further devolution of resources to the subregional level. These developments were 
further reinforced by other central government programmes with a territorial focus, 
mainly on city-regions. In 2010, the new coalition government of Conservatives and 
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Liberal Democrats however abolished the Regional Development Agencies, and replaced 
these with Local Enterprise Partnerships. It also instituted several new programmes for 
economic development, some with a territorial focus and others focussed on specific 
industries; but the allocation of funds from these programmes is decided on the basis of 
criteria formulated at the central level. Hence despite a trend towards somewhat more 
decentralisation in the UK, the central government retains most powers and resources, 
and only hands these down under its own terms (see also Perry, 2007). Moreover, the 
volatility of national policy continues, and thus also the lack of consistency of policies at 
the subnational level. 
 
The multi-level governance framework with respect to economic development in 
Saarland has facilitated its adaptation process. Within the area a multitude of actors have 
been included (as already discussed above), while at the same time it has supported the 
attraction of resources from beyond the Land: through Federal arrangements (such as the 
‘Gemeinschaftsaufgabe für Verbesserung der Regionalen Wirtschaftstruktur’, support for 
the steel industry, and the partial debt relief in the 1990s), and through European 
programmes (such as the structural funds). By contrast, the multi-level governance 
framework has not been supportive of the adaptation process of Teesside. Relations 
between local authorities, the main executive agencies of the central government, and 
entities at the regional level, have varied over time, and coordination of initiatives from 
these various actors within the area has been poor (especially before 2000). Moreover, as 
mentioned, resources and powers from the central government have only become 
available under stringent terms if at all, and it has been hard to get longer term 
commitments. The support through European programmes has been mediated by actors 
at the regional scale and/or national scale, and hence the area has not had full say in the 
attraction and spending of European funds. Hence besides the greater local control, also 
the stability in the relations between the federal level and the Länder, and the availability 
of well-specified procedures, have positively contributed to the adaptation process in 
Saarland. Conversely, the absence of such stability and indeed of any constitution that 
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would regulate the relations between the subnational level and the central level in the UK 
(and in particular England), have negatively affected adaptation in Teesside.  
 
This study thus also constitutes some evidence for economic benefits derived from 
decentralisation in economic development policy. Although with important qualifications 
(which may explain why an ‘economic dividend’ from decentralisation, is not picked up in 
large-N studies, such as Pike et al., (2012) and Ezcurra and Rodríquez-Pose (2013)). First, 
the effect of a transfer of powers and resources to subnational governments, will have to 
coincide with strong commitments and stability with regard to the arrangements for 
decentralisation (as just noted above). Second, the effect of decentralised powers and 
resources will likely be especially important in regions which need to undergo a 
comprehensive transformation, and hence need to coordinate initiatives in multiple 
domains for a long period of time.101 It is possible that for regions that face smaller 
challenges (and in which there is thus less of a need for coordination between various 
types of policies), some of the positive effects of decentralisation are cancelled out by the 
increased competition between regions for investments and skilled workers. Third, the 
type of economic organisation may also be an important factor in whether 
decentralisation provides additional policy levers for subnational governments, or not. 
This point will be further detailed below.    
 
To an important extent the adaptation processes in South Saarland and Teesside have 
followed the patterns the Varieties of Capitalism model would predict. The differences in 
government structure and public policy responses in Germany respectively the United 
Kingdom have significantly reinforced these patterns however (following e.g. Wood, 
2001). The Varieties of Capitalism model hypothesises that the type of market-based 
coordination privileged in Liberal Market Economies will benefit sectors as financial 
services, other high-end business services, the creative industries , biotechnology, etc., 
and will induce most segments in manufacturing to focus primarily on cost-competition. 
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 Though this point will now be relevant for most regions, when it is accepted that ‘adaptive resilience’ in 
the face of global processes and changes has gained in importance.  
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With the shift in the 1980s from a type of economic organisation with some cooperative 
features to a full-fledged Liberal Market Economy, the adaptation process on the national 
level in the UK has been very disruptive, like the model would lead to expect. The already 
weak competitive position of heavy industry and manufacturing in the UK, was further 
eroded by the fact that the institutional environment quickly became even less conducive 
to these sectors. The institutional environment (rid of corporatist arrangements and 
many regulations for the financial sector) instead facilitated the rise of other economic 
activities. This has had very significant geographical effects, with strong growth in London 
and the South East, and relative decline in other parts of the county, most significantly 
the North of England, Wales, and later also the West-Midlands. Teesside has been one of 
the main ‘victims’ of these changes, as the institutional infrastructure with regard to 
corporate finance, vocational training, industrial relations, and inter-firm relations worked 
against the long term viability of its core industries. The centralised government structure 
in the UK inhibited local action to reverse or even slow down this process. The 
Coordinated Market Economy in Germany on the other hand, provided an environment 
which facilitated a relatively smooth and managed process of deindustrialisation, in which 
manufacturing could by and large continue to be a significant economic driver. The 
institutional framework has favoured the ongoing modernisation of large segments of the 
manufacturing industry, and a focus on quality and high-value products. Large 
geographical shifts in patterns of economic growth have been avoided. These 
developments have been reinforced by the fact that the federal government structure 
allowed the strategic governance arrangements at the national level (between business 
association, labour unions, and the federal government), to be mirrored at the regional 
level. This ‘nested’ set of arrangements enabled the careful management of the 
adaptation process in South Saarland, in which the institutional complementarities 
between industrial relations, vocational education, inter-firm relations, and corporate 
finance were preserved and updated.   
 
The Variety of Capitalism model may thus be further refined to also incorporate more 
sensitivity to geographical impacts, differences in government structure, and multi-scalar 
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relations. The basic model may go some way in explaining processes and forms of uneven 
development in the context of deindustrialisation. However, as discussed above, 
differences in government structure and in public policy, are at least as important. It is 
indeed the intersection between broad types of economic organisation, and different 
structures of government, which produces ‘regional variegations’, as this study testifies. 
Geographical patterns in economic development may become even more polarised in 
strongly centralised, unitary systems; while more federalised and decentralised systems 
would allow for a greater range of institutional frameworks at the subnational level. 
Taking differences in government structure into account, would thus be a practical step 
towards a more ‘variegated’ and ‘regional varieties’ perspective, as suggested by Peck 
and Theodore (2007), Crouch et al. (2009), and Schröder and Voelzkow (2014). 102 
 
 
 Conclusions 8.5.
South Saarland has by and large successfully adapted to cope with the disruptive effects 
of the steel crisis and deindustrialisation. Teesside has been far less successful. At the 
level of industries and clusters, South Saarland has managed to grow new economic 
drivers in automotive and IT, while retaining existing strengths in steel and machinery. 
Teesside on the other hand, has not been very successful in attracting and growing new 
economic drivers for its economy. The chemical industry and engineering sector have 
morphed into the ‘process industry’, from which some new branches have started to 
emerge in more recent years. The significance of the steel industry has continued to 
shrink, while other segments of heavy industry, such as heavy engineering and 
shipbuilding, have completely disappeared. In the labour market and built environment, 
South Saarland has managed to prevent and break through mechanisms of negative path 
dependence. Lock-ins in these fields seem to persist in Teesside however. The greater 
dynamism in the regional economy in Saarland, was helped along by a notable 
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 Following Peck and Theodore (2007), it is better to speak of a ‘regional variegation of capitalism’ rather 
than ‘regional variety of capitalism’, to reflect the fact that the institutional framework in Saarland is nested 
in a larger framework, and hence is not a variety that is separate from other varieties. 
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consistency in the evolution of policies, and a gradual, path dependent evolution of 
governance arrangements. The persistent lock-ins in Teesside on the other hand, are at 
least partly explained by the inconsistent development of policies, and the instability in 
the development of governance arrangements. This highlights that lock-ins in the 
functional domain (industries / clusters, labour market and built environment) are 
certainly not necessarily related with lock-ins in the political and cognitive domain (as 
suggested by Grabher (1993) and other authors stressing institutional rigidities); but 
functional lock-ins may instead emerge and persist because of a lack of continuity and 
force in the institutional and cognitive domains (at the regional level). This would also 
seem to qualify notions of ‘adaptive’ and ‘flexible’ forms of governance: though some 
level of flexibility is indeed important (especially in the strategic functions of governance), 
a stable framework (within which such change can take place) is also crucial. 
 
The greater success in adaptation in South Saarland compared to Teesside, can be 
attributed to a substantial degree to the different policy responses and different 
institutional frameworks (both within the two regions and in the wider environment in 
which they are embedded). The comparison of South Saarland and Teesside suggests that 
the following factors have been especially important in this regard, and hence appear to 
be determining elements for transformative economic resilience: 
 Policies that actively slow down and mitigate the disruptive effects of immediate 
shocks, through support measures and phasing of redundancies. So there is time to 
redeploy assets and preserve these. 
 Policies that build on existing assets in the region, and develop these in a path 
dependent manner. Such policies seem to do better than policies that focus on 
developing a new economic base without much connection to existing strengths (e.g. 
in service sectors and by attracting new types of manufacturing from elsewhere).103 
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 This conclusion differs from Cowell (2015), who, in her study of 8 metropolitan regions in the Midwest of 
the US, instead comes to the conclusion that developing new economic activities in e.g. high tech, finance 
and services and letting manufacturing “die a natural death” (‘Bowing Out’), has produced better long-term 
results, than an ongoing commitment to manufacturing (‘Betting on the Basics’). A reason may be that 
these metropolitan regions are significantly bigger than South Saarland and Teesside, and thus have a 
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Such path dependence in the evolution of industries and clusters, can then enable and 
reinforce the positive path dependent development of the regional labour market and 
built environment. Strong breaks in the evolution of the economic base, can lead to 
the persistence of lock-ins in the labour market and in the built environment, which 
will be hard to overcome, and will hold back economic development.  
 A certain degree of ‘institutional thickness’ within the region especially with regard to 
governance arrangements for connectedness and collaboration, and strategic 
intelligence and planning. In order to manage the adaptation process, there need to 
be robust arrangements for parties to come together, develop and exchange 
perspectives on the basis of good intelligence, coordinate initiatives, resolve conflicts, 
and make strategic decisions. These governance arrangements need to have a certain 
amount of flexibility to incorporate new actors and prevent capture by vested 
interests. 
 Local control over powers and resources in multiple policy domains (industrial and 
innovation policy, labour market policy, and urban development and planning), which 
should lead to coordinated policies that are based on knowledge of local 
circumstances, and hence can be better directed at opportunities and obstacles 
particular for an area.  
 Additional support from outside the area for a long period of time, as local resources 
will not normally be sufficient to cover the huge investments needed for a 
comprehensive transformation.  
 Stability in the relations between different territorial (as well as sectoral) levels of 
government. Arrangements in the territorial government structure and in government 
organisation need not to be subject to too many sudden changes, but rather evolve 
gradually. Between levels of government, there should be fixed, transparent, and 
stable procedures, especially with regard to resource allocation from the central level 
to the subnational level. 
                                                                                                                                                                
better chance at attracting and growing such new economic activities. Also Hamm and Wienert (1990) and 
Miehe-Nordmeyer (2000) recommend ‘embracing the new, rather than holding on to the past’ on the basis 
of their comparative studies. 
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 A type of economic organisation which relies to an extent on strategic coordination, 
rather than only market-based coordination. Arrangements for strategic coordination 
(in industrial relations, education and training, corporate finance, urban regeneration, 
etc.) make it easier to deliberately steer the adaptation process, and allow for more 
targeted government interventions in areas where support is needed. Relying on only 
market-based coordination will lead to a much less coordinated adaptation process, in 
which it will be much more difficult to direct government interventions and achieve 
specific effects. 
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Chapter 9. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 Introduction 9.1.
This thesis aims to contribute to the burgeoning strand of Evolutionary Perspectives in 
Economic Geography, conceptually, methodologically, and empirically, by further 
developing an approach which would also adequately integrate Political Economy 
concerns (an ‘Evolutionary Geographical Political Economy’ approach). The ambition is to 
address the perceived gap within Evolutionary Perspectives to adequately conceptualise 
and understand aspects of policy and institutions in the economic evolution of regions 
(MacKinnon et al., 2009; Pike et al., 2009; Coe, 2011; Martin and Sunley, 2015b; Pike et 
al., 2015). This then would also more explicitly foreground especially notions of collective 
agency, multi-scalarity and power: how do actors come together to shape the evolution 
of a region, and how in turn is this conditioned by the wider institutional environment? 
Evolutionary Perspectives encompass several distinct but partly overlapping theoretical 
frameworks: Generalised Darwinism, Complexity Theory, and Path Dependency Theory. In 
Chapter 2, I concluded that that Path Dependency Theory offers the best prospects for a 
further conceptualisation of the evolution and role of policy and governance. However, 
also the incorporation of policy and governance within the framework of Path 
Dependency Theory is not immediately straightforward, and additional conceptual work 
has been needed. 
 
In taking up the overall objective of this thesis, I have focussed on the issue of how 
regions cope with economic change. How do regions adapt to economic changes, and 
what makes a region resilient? More in particular, what is the role of policy and 
governance in adaptation and resilience of regions? These questions seem particularly 
pertinent in connection to old industrial regions in Europe and North America, and in the 
way these regions have dealt with the disruptive structural changes - in the form of 
deindustrialisation – in the 1970s and 1980s. Indeed in an earlier period this was a central 
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concern in the literature on local and regional development.104 Recently, the issues of 
adaptation and especially resilience in regions have however again started to feature 
prominently in the light of the financial crisis of 2008 and subsequent economic 
downturn.105 Hence in this thesis, I have revisited the question of long-term adaptation 
and resilience in old industrial regions, with a view to apply some of the new theoretical 
insights, and add to the further conceptual, empirical and methodological development of 
an Evolutionary Geographical Political Economy approach. Policy and governance have 
played a prominent role in the responses in old industrial regions to deindustrialisation, 
and so they offer an ideal subject in the context of my overarching objective. 
Furthermore, the performance of old industrial regions has been varied, among other 
things depending on the policies and governance arrangements enacted, and the wider 
institutional environment in which they are located (Hamm and Wienert, 1990; Beatty et 
al., 2007; Feyrer et al. 2007; Birch et al., 2010; Power et al., 2010; Hobor, 2013; Cowell, 
2015).  
 
In the Introduction the following research questions were formulated: 
With regard to adaptation and resilience in regional economies faced with disruptive 
structural change: 
 How can the evolution and role of policy and governance be understood conceptually 
within Evolutionary Perspectives in Economic Geography? 
 How have policies and governance evolved, and what role did they play in South 
Saarland (Germany) and Teesside (United Kingdom)? 
 How did differences in the wider institutional environment matter in this regard? 
 
                                                     
104
 E.g. Checkland (1976); Cooke (1986, 1989); Hudson (1989); Hamm and Wienert (1990); Grabher (1993); 
Beynon et al. (1994); Miehe-Nordmeyer (2000). 
105
 E.g. Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, Vol. 3, No. 1 (March 2010); Davies (2011); 
Fingleton et al. (2012); Martin (2012); Weir et al. (2012); Raumforschung und Raumordnung, Vol. 72, No. 2 
(April 2014); Bristow and Healy (2014a); Boschma (2015); Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and 
Society, Vol. 8, No. 2 (July 2015); Martin and Sunley (2015a). 
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In order to answer these questions I have first reviewed the literature on adaptation and 
resilience in regional economies, and assessed whether and how the three strands within 
Evolutionary Perspectives can conceptualise aspects of policy and governance in 
adaptation and resilience. This then led me to more systematically develop an analytical 
framework that encompasses three distinct but related levels of analysis: the evolution of 
policy and governance, the role of policy and governance in adaptation and resilience, 
and the conditioning influences by differences in the institutional environment. The basis 
of the analytical framework is formed by Path Dependency Theory, but I have combined 
this with concepts and insights from several other strands of literature (other approaches 
within Economic Geography, Historical Institutionalism, State Theory, and Varieties of 
Capitalism). The empirical part of this research consisted of a comparative case study of 
South Saarland in Germany, and Teesside in the United Kingdom. These two city-regions 
are comparable in size, economic make-up, and their peripheral location within their 
respective countries. Furthermore, they were both hit hard by the global steel crisis from 
1974 until about 1987, which was a particularly salient and disruptive episode within the 
larger process of deindustrialisation. However, both areas operated in the markedly 
different institutional environments offered by (West-)Germany and the United Kingdom 
respectively.  
 
In this final Chapter I will present the main conclusions with respect to the main empirical 
findings (section 9.2), theory and concepts (section 9.3), and methodology (section 9.4). 
Furthermore, I will discuss some reflections on the study (section 9.5), suggestions for 
further research (section 9.6), and implications for policy and governance (section 9.7). 
 
 
 Main empirical findings 9.2.
On the whole South Saarland has been more successful than Teesside in adapting to the 
steel crisis and deindustrialisation. The study presents compelling evidence that this has 
to a considerable extent been a result of (1) different priorities and consistency in the 
policies implemented, (2) the more robust governance arrangements present in South 
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Saarland compared to Teesside, and (3) the federal government structure and more 
cooperative form of capitalism in Germany, which appears to have been more conducive 
for long-term resilience than the centralist structure and more liberal model in the United 
Kingdom. 
 
The policies in South Saarland have focussed on spreading out the effects of the 
immediate shock of the steel crisis over a larger period of time. This was achieved 
through elaborate support measures for the restructuring of the regional steel industry, 
and active labour market policies for redundancies. Furthermore, the close involvement 
of the labour unions and other employee representatives (together with legislation for 
the protection of employment), ensured that the restructuring process was carefully 
managed, with an eye on the long-term viability of the industry. In Teesside by contrast, 
the steel industry followed a path of rapid downsizing (after a phase of expansion in the 
first part of the 1970s), without much consideration for the effects on the local labour 
market. Combined with similar processes in other segments of heavy industry in Teesside, 
this meant that the disruption in the area was much greater and proved intractable. This 
has also meant that important assets for further economic development could be 
preserved in South Saarland: most notably, a strong core in the steel industry and other 
manufacturing sectors (such as machinery), and a skills-base in the local labour market. In 
Teesside, much of the existing industry disappeared or continued to struggle, and much 
of the skills-base was devalorised. 
 
These conclusions imply to some extent a reassessment of findings from some other 
comparative studies (Hamm and Wienert, 1990; Miehe-Nordmeyer, 2000; Cowell, 2015), 
which depicted the active support for the old industrial base, and the slowing down of the 
restructuring process, as attempts to hang on to the old, while failing to embrace the 
new. However, when seen over a longer time period and seen from the perspective of 
path dependency, these policies have facilitated a more smooth transformation process 
and have led to the preservation of important assets, which proved crucial for the 
renewal process. Policy initiatives for renewal could latch on to some of the legacies of 
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the past. The lack of continuity in the industrial base in Teesside by contrast, may have 
coincided with an embracement of new economic opportunities (at least in official 
policy), but also led to a loss of its assets (in technologies, knowledge, skills), and with this 
the possibilities to effectively compete for these opportunities were much diminished. 
The development of industries and clusters in South Saarland has thus followed a path 
dependent pattern: a strong manufacturing core was preserved, and added to by the 
successful attraction and growth of automotive, partly through a policy of providing 
incentives and by highlighting and developing existing assets (in skills base, transport 
infrastructure, and industrial sites). At the same time segments of the service sector 
gradually grew in importance. Active innovation policies from the 1980s onwards 
contributed to the rise of, in particular, the IT-sector. In Teesside on the other hand, the 
primary policy responses of ‘property-led regeneration’ and attraction of inward 
investment from abroad, facilitated new employment in retail, hospitality, logistics, 
health care, and other relatively low-value services. These sectors did not really build on 
existing economic strengths, and their contribution to a new economic dynamism is 
limited. Hence within the economic base there has been a notable interruption in the 
development path. These developments have also meant that mechanisms of lock-in in 
the labour market (which can on the whole be characterised as a ‘low-skill equilibrium’) 
and in the built environment (characterised by unattractive housing and brown field sites 
in need of remediation), persist in Teesside, despite substantial policy efforts in 
enhancing education and training, and in urban regeneration. In South Saarland, such 
lock-ins seem to have been partly prevented or otherwise overcome. The stronger 
economic base in South Saarland made it easier for the interventions in education and 
(vocational) training, and in urban regeneration to be effective on the long run.  
 
The more coordinated and consistent evolution of policies, and the greater sensitivity to 
local opportunities and issues, can be partially explained by the evolution of governance 
arrangements. Governance arrangements for actors to come together, discuss priorities, 
coordinate their initiatives, and take decisions, were already much better developed in 
South Saarland than in Teesside (or the North East region in England). Arrangements for 
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connectedness and collaboration only gradually emerged in Teesside; and hence the 
institutional basis for a more coordinated and integrated approach to cope with 
deindustrialisation was long inadequate. Arrangements for strategic intelligence and 
planning in Teesside have been in place since the early 1970s, and have in themselves 
functioned well. However, they mainly catered to the needs of local authorities, and only 
later also for local business. These arrangements are more sophisticated in Saarland, as 
they stimulate the development of, and exchange between, different perspectives, and 
an attitude that is more outward-looking. Hence this confirms the importance of 
connectedness, collaboration, and communication between actors, for economic 
resilience, also noted in the accounts of Margaret Cowell (2013, 2015), Rüdiger Wink 
(2013), and Gillian Bristow and Adrian Healy (2014a, 2014b, 2015). 
 
A significant contribution of this study is the development of a more multi-scalar 
perspective on regional adaptation and resilience, with explicit attention to the 
importance of factors in the wider institutional environment (at the national and 
transnational levels) in which both regions are embedded. The importance of such a 
perspective has been signalled by several authors (Birch et al., 2010; Pike et al., 2010; 
MacKinnon and Derickson, 2012; Bristow and Healy, 2014a, 2014b; Martin and Sunley, 
2015a), but it has remained underdeveloped so far. The research has specifically 
examined two dimensions in this regard: the type of government structure and the type 
of economic organisation. We can conclude that more local control, with subnational 
governments being able to dispose over powers and resources in multiple policy domains, 
will positively contribute to regional resilience. In the context of debates on an alleged 
‘economic dividend’ from decentralisation, we can say that there seem to be significant 
benefits from decentralisation when a region needs to undergo a comprehensive and 
long-term adaptation process (that requires coordination between policy efforts in a 
range of domains). However, in addition such local control needs to exist within a 
relatively stable framework of relations between territorial levels of government; not 
affected by frequent restructuring operations, and with clear and transparent procedures 
for in particular the allocation of resources from the central level (and European level) to 
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subnational levels. Locally sourced resources will normally not be sufficient for the 
investments needed to manage a comprehensive transformation. Hence dependable 
support from outside the region is crucial. 
 
The way the economy is organised, may reinforce such patterns of control, or lack of 
control, in the face of disruptive changes in the regional economy. In economies that rely 
primarily on market-based coordination, there will be fewer ‘levers’ available for policy 
interventions and integrated action between different actors across various domains (in 
education and training, in investments in the knowledge- and technology-base, in the 
labour market, in finance, in the development of real estate, etc.), whereas coordination 
between various actors will be easier in economies with established arrangements for 
strategic coordination (see Hall and Soskice, 2001; Hancké, 2009). Hence it is the 
intersection of differences in government structure and of differences in economic 
organisation that will matter for regional resilience. For Teesside the context of the UK 
meant both a relative absence of local control over powers and resources and of stability 
in the government structure, as well as a relative absence of arrangements for strategic 
coordination (and thus an overall reliance on market-based coordination). This clearly 
worked against its development during and after deindustrialisation, and favoured 
development in other parts of the UK instead (notably London and the South-East). 
Conversely, the context of Germany offered both the availability of substantial powers 
and resources at the subnational level (with constitutional guarantees and procedures), 
and a set of nested arrangements for strategic coordination at the federal and regional 
levels. Saarland was able to benefit from this, and seems to have been able to catch up 
with other parts of West-Germany. In other words, the federal government structure of 
West-Germany has allowed South Saarland to retain and nurture its own ‘regional 
variegation of capitalism’ (see Crouch et al., 2009; Schröder and Voelzkow, 2014; Ebner, 
2015), build around a strong manufacturing core and developing strengths in IT and nano- 
/ biotechnology (and so largely consistent with the institutional framework at the national 
level). The centralised system in the United Kingdom on the other hand, has given 
Teesside fewer opportunities to retain its regional distinctiveness (with manufacturing as 
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a primary driver), and instead Teesside has increasingly become ‘only’ a peripheral 
element relying on comparatively low-value activities, in the larger spatial economy of the 
United Kingdom. 
 
 
 Conceptual and theoretical contributions 9.3.
As noted in the introduction to this Chapter, the primary objective of the thesis is to 
contribute to the further advancement of Evolutionary Perspectives within Economic 
Geography, and combine Evolutionary Perspectives with a Geographical Political 
Economy approach. I have attempted to do so in two ways. First, by further developing 
the conceptual apparatus. I have reviewed the three stands within Evolutionary 
Perspective on their capacity to conceptualise aspects of policy and governance within 
regional economic adaptation and resilience. Based on this I subsequently extended and 
refined especially the Path Dependency Theory framework (within Evolutionary 
Perspectives) along the three levels of analysis: the role of policy and governance in 
adaptation and resilience, the evolution of policy and governance, and the conditioning 
influences of the wider institutional environment. Second, beyond this purely conceptual 
work (to address the first research question), the empirical findings of the project, also 
inform the development of an Evolutionary Geographical Political Economy approach 
within these three levels of analysis. 
 
I have started by defining adaptation as referring to a process, and resilience to an 
underlying capacity. As underlying capacities are not in themselves observable, any 
conclusions about resilience have to be inferred from an examination of actual adaptation 
processes, and the factors that are seen to contribute or inhibit adaptation. The literature 
on regional economic resilience should acknowledge this more explicitly than it has so far. 
One important implication is, that the comparison of cases (both through quantitative 
(large N) and through qualitative (small N) methods) should be central in the study of 
resilience: through the systematic comparison between adaptation processes (preferably 
to similar shocks) in different regions and/or in different times, we can learn about the 
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underlying factors that determine successful or less successful adaptation (and thus 
resilience). In this study, we are particularly interested in long-term ‘transformative’ 
adaptation and resilience, which sees adaptation and resilience as dynamic processes of, 
respectively capacities for, transformation and renewal. This means that we employ 
notions of adaptation and resilience, which can explicitly encompass how regions cope 
with slow-burn processes such as structural change and deindustrialisation106 (see Pendall 
et al. 2010; Boschma, 2015; Cowell, 2015), and can accommodate a role for collective 
agency  through policies and institutional arrangements between actors (see Bristow and 
Healy, 2014a; 2014b). 
 
Within the three main theoretical frameworks within Evolutionary Perspectives, Path 
Dependency Theory offers the best prospects for developing a more holistic perspective 
on evolutionary processes in regional economic development, which can also adequately 
accommodate aspects of policy and governance. Because of its inherent methodological 
individualism (taking micro-processes at the firm-level as a starting point), Generalised 
Darwinism is not suited for developing a holistic approach, which also takes macro-
entities such as the state and societal structures into account. Complexity Theory would 
be compatible with such an approach, and has offered some insights into the importance 
of connectedness, collaboration, and anticipation in coping with shocks. However, the 
theoretical framework provides little guidance in theorising the evolution of policies and 
institutions over time (mostly emphasising ‘leadership’ or ‘networks’, which leads to a 
relatively static conceptualisation in this respect). The Path Dependency framework does 
provide scope to explicitly theorise continuity and change in the development of policy 
and governance, and moreover it is also suggestive about the role of policy and 
governance. The Path Dependency framework needs to be further expanded and detailed 
however, to connect to Political Economy concerns (with the role of the state, macro-
institutional structures, collective agency and power). Building on recent conceptual 
                                                     
106
 However, the extent of slow-burn processes may become especially manifest during a recession (a 
cyclical perturbation) or a one-off event (such as the Oil crisis); so the analytical distinction between slow-
burn processes and system shocks may not be so clear-cut in practice. 
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developments with regard to Path Dependency in Economic Geography, and utilising 
insights from various other literatures (in particular Historical Institutionalism, State 
Theory and Varieties of Capitalism), I have tried to advance theory in Evolutionary 
Perspectives within the three levels of analysis.  
 
With regard to the role of policy and governance in adaptation and resilience, I have first 
of all build on recent developments in the literature on path dependence in Economic 
Geography, that have started to disentangle the notions of regional path dependency and 
regional lock-in. Gernot Grabher already made a distinction in his 1993-paper between 
different domains in which lock-ins could exist: functional, political and cognitive. More 
recently, Henning et al. (2013) have urged to focus on the specific self-reinforcing 
mechanisms in different domains and at different levels that would produce path 
dependence and / or lock-in: “because a regional economy contains individuals, networks 
(groups, firms), institutions and technologies, the region can in fact be seen as a bundle of 
several potential sources of path dependence on different levels” (pp. 1354; emphasis 
added). I have taken these suggestions forward, by clearly distinguishing between 
mechanisms of path dependence and lock-in in different domains and at various levels 
within the regional economy: in industries and clusters, in the labour market, in the built 
environment, and in policy and governance. From this perspective, the role of policy and 
governance in adaptation and resilience is quite distinct: to break through mechanisms of 
lock-in and create mechanisms of positive path dependence within the regional economy 
(the functional domain). Subsequently I have distinguished between different types of 
policies, and especially different types of governance arrangements. Instead of ‘lumping’ 
all sorts of institutions together (as often seems to happen), we need to distinguish 
between institutions with very different functions: there are governance arrangements 
which play a strategic role (in connectedness and collaboration between actors, and in 
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strategic intelligence and planning), and arrangements that play rather a more 
operational role (in the execution and delivery of specific policies).107  
 
With regard to the evolution of policy and governance, I have based myself on a 
conception of path dependence as an on-going process (rather than a steady state), put 
forward by Ron Martin (2010), who in turn builds on developments in the literature in 
Political Science. Concerning the development of institutions in particular, such a process-
based conception has been further refined by the notions of path plasticity and path 
contingency, which explicitly highlight the interplay between structures and agency: 
actors may deliberately use structures and legacies from the past in creative ways to 
renew and innovate from within (Strambach, 2010; Strambach and Halkier, 2013; 
Johnson, 2001; Hudson 2005). The literature on Historical Institutionalism offers some 
ideas to then better understand incremental change in the evolution of governance 
arrangements (Crouch, 2005; Streeck and Thelen, 2005; Boyer, 2006; Mahoney and 
Thelen, 2010). I have suggested to carefully separate patterns from mechanisms however. 
Patterns are the manifestations of changes in governance arrangements (such as layering 
/ sedimentation, conversion, recombination or churn). Mechanisms connect such 
patterns to the ways in which actors can bring about changes in the institutional 
arrangements. They can be the result of decrees and deliberate design by actors (such as 
the central government, or regional governments). They can be the result of consent 
between actors, which will result in a recombination (this will be especially relevant for 
strategic arrangements for connectedness and collaboration). Or they can be result from 
bottom-up processes like reinterpretation and subversion. By elaborating the analysis of 
incremental institutional change in this way, we can better incorporate actors and 
processes at different levels of scale (national, regional, subregional). The evolution of 
policy may also show path dependent patterns; especially in the development of ideas 
and ideologies, which may be characterised by myopia’s or escalating commitments. But 
                                                     
107
 These distinctions would also allow us to be more specific when we talk about ‘institutional thickness or 
thinness’ in a region (Amin and Thrift, 1995). 
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as policy is by definition an expression of agency, path dependency will be less applicable 
as a concept. 
 
The empirical findings in this study serve as an important qualification of the notion of 
‘institutional rigidities’ being a cause of stagnation, in earlier literature on economic 
adaptation (Olson, 1982; Elbaum and Lazonick, 1986; Grabher, 1993; Setterfield, 1993). 
This research evaluates the stability and firmness of at least some institutions rather 
more positively. A strong overall framework of especially strategic governance 
arrangements, seems crucial to support and guide transformative and adaptive economic 
resilience. Such a framework does need to leave some space for ongoing amendments, 
but on the basis of existing arrangements; through recombination, layering / 
sedimentation, and conversion. A weak framework and a lack of continuity in its 
development, will result in a lack of effectiveness and thus a failure to address lock-ins in 
the regional economy (as is evidenced by the development of Teesside). Thus the 
importance of adaptive and flexible forms of governance in adaptation and resilience (as 
suggested by Safford (2009) and Bristow and Healy (2014b)), needs to be refined 
somewhat. 
 
In addition to a more thorough theorisation of the role and evolution of policy and 
governance, the research has also attempted to extend the Path Dependency framework 
by considering processes and structures in the wider institutional environment in which a 
region operates. This implies that governance arrangement and policy within the region 
(territorial aspects of regional development), are placed within a wider set of relations 
that extend beyond the region (relational aspects of regional development). This 
foregrounds on the one hand the ‘constructedness’ of entities and structures at the 
subnational level, but at the same time such constructedness is strongly conditioned by 
past legacies and by the way powers are distributed between actors at different levels of 
scale. Especially the government structure and the type of economic organisation will be 
crucial dimensions. With respect to government structure, we can distinguish between 
unitary government structures and federal government structures. However, this needs 
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to be qualified somewhat, as many unitary states have devolved some powers and 
resources to subnational governments especially in economic development policy, and 
relations between governments and actors at different spatial levels have become more 
complicated (which is captured in the term ‘multi-level governance’ (e.g. Bache and 
Flinders, 2004; Piattoni, 2009)). Following the literature on Varieties of Capitalism, we can 
make a basic distinction between two ideal types of economic organisation: Cooperative 
Market Economies and Liberal Market Economies (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Hancké, 2009). 
Also this distinction needs to be considerably qualified, as within these national varieties, 
considerable regional differences can exist; i.e. regional variegations (Peck and Theodore, 
2007; Crouch et al., 2009; Schröder and Voelzkow, 2014). 
 
The empirical results of this research have shed some new light on debates on 
decentralisation of economic development policy on the one hand, and on Varieties of 
Capitalism at the regional level on the other hand. An ‘economic dividend’ from 
decentralisation has so far proved to be elusive in more quantitative studies (Pike et al., 
2012; Ezcurra and Rodríquez-Pose, 2013), but this study contains some qualitative 
evidence for benefits derived from decentralisation. In the context of regions coping with 
structural change, such benefits may consist in the better coordination between various 
policies, and the more customised, place-based approach. However, several conditions 
seem important for such benefits to materialise: stability in intergovernmental relations, 
intraregional coordination taking priority over interregional coordination, and a type of 
economic organisation that would allow for policy interventions. On this last point, the 
research has contributed to a better understanding of the interaction between different 
government structures and different forms of economic organisation, which may in 
particular inform the fledgling debate on Regional Varieties of Capitalism (Crouch et al., 
2009; Schröder and Voelzkow, 2014; Ebner, 2015). A federal government structure would 
in principle leave more scope for the development and persistence of a particular 
institutional framework to support a distinct regional variegation of capitalism (following 
Sternberg et al., 2009). Although South Saarland does not seem to constitute a 
‘productive incoherence’ (in the terminology of Crouch et al. (2009) and Schröder and 
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Voelzkow (2014)), and does not deviate from the national model, it nevertheless has its 
own set of institutions (in industrial relations, vocational training, science and technology, 
etc.) that are nested within a similar set of institutions at the federal level. The regional 
variegation in Teesside however, seems to have much less independence from the 
national configuration: Teesside has on the whole not been able retain (or rebuild) an 
institutional framework (in industrial relations, the development of skills, corporate 
finance, and technological development and innovation) which would be more supportive 
to high-value manufacturing, and has instead mostly become a peripheral part of the 
strongly centralised, liberal market model of the United Kingdom. However, also in the 
United Kingdom, deviations from the national model (‘productive incoherences’) may 
exist - such as the Motor Sport Valley in the South of England (Henry and Pinch, 2001) – 
but strong international links (for the attraction of skills and for the development of 
technology) seem to be crucial for this. 
 
 
 Methodological contributions 9.4.
This project represents a further step in developing a more holistic approach, which 
fruitfully combines Evolutionary Perspectives with relevant concepts and practices from a 
Geographical Political Economy approach (building on earlier work by MacKinnon et al. 
(2009), Hassink et al. (2014), Martin and Sunley (2015b), and Pike et al. (2015)). This study 
is one of the first attempts to move beyond merely conceptual discussions, and 
operationalise such a holistic approach in order to undertake original, empirical research 
using a methodology that combines several methods and techniques (comparative case 
study, archival research, collection of statistics, interviews). With regard to methodology, 
I believe this research offers valuable lessons with regard to four issues: the importance 
of a focus on mechanisms, the strategic selection of cases, the development of a ‘deep 
contextualisation’, and the practicalities of this type of evolutionary research. 
 
First, in this research mechanisms which connect particular outcomes to causes and 
conditions, have taken centre stage. The ontology and epistemology behind this is 
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provided by Critical Realism (Sayer, 1982; Pratt, 1995; Sayer, 2010; O'Mahoney and 
Vincent, 2014; Næss, 2015). Critical Realism maintains a stratified ontology, in which 
entities, actors, structures, processes, and events can exist on various levels (micro, meso, 
and macro). Hence mechanisms can be pertinent within and between various levels, 
which makes it particularly suitable for a multi-scalar approach. Furthermore, the 
existence and operation of particular mechanisms is always conditioned by the wider set 
of circumstances: in some contexts, some mechanisms will not exist, or instead their 
workings will be reinforced, moderated, or altered. This fits well with the ‘deep 
contextualisation’, also developed in this project. Moreover, Critical Realism reserves an 
important role for human agency, and explicitly incorporates and problematises the way 
people interpret the world and construct meanings. Overall, through a Critical Realist 
ontology and epistemology it is possible to find common ground between both 
Evolutionary Perspectives based on Path Dependency Theory (and also Complexity 
Theory), and Geographical Political Economy. In fact, by focussing on particular 
mechanisms in regional development in different domains – and the way these 
mechanisms are in turn conditioned by events, processes, and structures in a wider 
context – new possibilities open up to combine insights from different strands of 
literature (as indeed the analytical and comparative frameworks developed in Chapter 3 
and Chapter 4 may testify).  
 
Second, following on from the previous point, the choice for city-regions that are 
medium-sized and peripheral allows for a better focus on the mechanisms of adaptation 
in the two areas. Larger city-regions and / or areas at locations nearer to other economic 
centres, will be affected by multiple developments which will lead to a less clear picture. 
This highlights that for the study of a particular set of mechanisms, a focus on in some 
ways special (salience of the operation of these mechanisms), but in most other ways 
more ordinary and smaller cities and regions, may yield more valuable insights, than a 
focus on Global Cities or the ‘usual’ points of reference in regional economic 
development (Baden-Württemberg, the Third Italy, Silicon Valley, the Ruhr Area, 
Catalonia, etc.) (following Robinson (2002)). In these more prominent and larger cities 
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and regions, the same mechanisms will often exist, but will be more ‘contaminated’ (from 
the researcher’s point of view) by the many other events and processes that are also 
taking place. Moreover, by also selecting two extreme contexts (concerning government 
structure and economic organisation), in which these two typical and similar city-regions 
had to operate, a fuller spectrum of relevant mechanisms in the context of adaptation, 
opens up.      
 
Third, I have placed these city-regions expressly in their geographical and historic 
contexts. The ambition was to move beyond a focus on just ‘policy’, and a subsequent 
representation of this as ‘leadership’ (as in e.g. Bailey et al. (2010) and Cowell (2015)). In 
my opinion this leads to a depiction that is too voluntaristic. The structures and context in 
which actors operated – at the regional level, but also at the national and even 
transnational levels - should actually take centre stage (without becoming deterministic), 
as it is this context that strongly shapes (but not determines) decisions, events, and 
outcomes. A more holistic Evolutionary Approach, will benefit most from studying the 
relations between events, decisions, mechanisms, processes and structures in different 
domains and at different levels in a comparative and systematic way. 
 
Fourth, the practicalities of such a ‘deep contextualisation’ (Martin and Sunley, 2015b, pp. 
717-718), encompassing three levels of analysis (the role of policy and governance in 
adaptation and resilience, the evolution of policy and governance arrangements, the 
wider institutional and policy context), are indeed daunting. To reconstruct and trace 
processes at and between these levels, I had to use multiple sources of information (both 
primary and secondary) and employ overlapping research techniques (archival research, 
collection and analysis of statistics, and interviews). Each of these techniques (let alone 
the combination), requires a commitment of time and effort, and involves a degree of 
conscientiousness and determination. Doing comparative research in different contexts 
compounds these difficulties. It requires the fine-tuning of analytical categories (so they 
are relevant and similarly applicable in both contexts) and the collection of matching 
information for each of these categories, while the researcher needs be acquainted with 
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different cultural and institutional settings (and in this case it even required proficiency in 
two languages). But for theoretically informed empirical work, which can then again feed 
into the further development of theory, there really is no alternative to hard work (to 
paraphrase Andrew Sayer (1987, p. 395)). 
 
 
 Reflections on the study 9.5.
With the consolidation of the main empirical, conceptual and methodological 
contributions of this study, also its limitations and some of its ‘hidden’ assumptions come 
to the fore. One obvious limitation has been that it has been impossible to establish with 
certainty that the more successful adaptation and greater transformative resilience in 
South Saarland was a result of differences in policy and governance. It seems plausible 
that policy and governance have played a significant role, based on the evidence 
presented. But nevertheless a number of other factors may also have been important. 
The somewhat more favourable location of Saarland in the heart of Western Europe (but 
on the other hand, it could also be argued that Teesside has not fully exploited its coastal 
location). The reintegration of Saarland into West-Germany in the late 1950s, and the 
earlier start of the process of structural change in South Saarland (with the crisis in coal 
mining in the 1960s), which resulted in a programme for the renewal of the industrial 
base of the area already in the late 1960s and early 1970s (whereas the modernisation 
programme in Teesside in the same period was still very much geared towards its 
booming heavy industry). Differences in the make-up of the heavy industrial base 
between the two regions, with the combination of coal mining and steel leaving a 
different (and perhaps less immobilising) imprint on the working culture and landscape, 
than the combination of steel and chemicals. In a comparative study of two cases, which 
could moreover only be selected from a small number of available cases (mid-sized city-
regions with a history in steel), it is impossible to isolate the influence of one variable.108 
                                                     
108
 In theory, a large-N statistical study would be more suitable for that. However, the number of old 
industrial regions in the world that went through a process of disruptive structural change, is limited. 
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But such an approach does lend itself for attempting to trace the mechanisms through 
which policy and governance could have had an effect on adaptation and resilience. And 
this is what I have tried to do. 
 
With regard to hidden assumptions, some reflections on positionality seem in order 
(without claiming that all hidden assumptions can then be made explicit (Rose, 1997)). 
This positionality is in the first place temporal: the assessment of the adaptation process 
in South Saarland and Teesside strongly depends on the moment at which I have 
undertaken such an assessment. Earlier studies which featured Saarland (Hamm and 
Wienert, 1990; Miehe-Nordmeyer, 2000) arrived at a less positive assessment as this 
study, as much of the catching-up in Saarland took place after 2000. And also an earlier 
study of Teesside (Beynon et al., 1994) presented its development in an (even) more 
negative light, as also Teesside managed to recover (to a certain extent) after the late 
1990s. Both areas keep evolving on the back of their past legacies. Thus it could be 
entirely possible that the bad state of the public finances of Saarland (an inheritance from 
especially the 1980s) will negatively influence its development in the coming years. Or 
that renewables and biotechnology take off in Teesside, and lead to a renewed growth in 
the area. 
 
This positionality also concerns the relationship between the academic world and the 
‘real’ world. Although I have engaged in a close dialogue with practitioners through a 
number of interviews (following Clark (1998)), it should be noted that on the whole I have 
treated the worlds of academia and policy-making as separate spheres, and have so far 
not problematised their mutual relations. Such a hidden assumption foregrounds 
traditional methodological concerns such as rigour and validity within a Critical Realist 
approach, but to the neglect of its emancipatory and ‘activist’ potential (Sayer, 2007). 
Hence I want to point to two issues in this regard in connection to this project (which can 
possibly be addressed in future research). First, by suggesting that success or failure in 
                                                                                                                                                                
Furthermore, differences in policy and governance would be difficult to capture in quantitative indicators. 
And also (comparable) data for other possible influences will be hard to obtain. 
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adaptation and resilience is a matter of performance on a number of indicators, I have 
stripped these categories of much of their political meanings. Such success or failure 
should in the end be a matter of political debate, preferably within the communities 
affected; and their values and their definitions of success or failure should be leading 
(also MacKinnon and Derickson, 2013; Bristow and Healy, 2014a). Although, it should also 
be observed that such a more ‘relativist’ conception, would make a systematic 
comparison between different regions much more difficult (if not impossible). Second, I 
have not taken much account of the influence of academic discourses on policy in my 
study. But academic research on for example the effects of traditional regional policy, on 
urban regeneration, and on clusters and territorial innovation systems, fed into the policy 
process in both areas, and may have been a factor in the evolution of policies. I have 
however made the simplifying assumption that changing focal points in policy were 
mostly driven by deliberate policy choices (except for those instances where myopia or 
escalating commitment seemed to play a role). Attempting to trace the (subtle) influence 
of (academic) discourses on this as well would have increased the scope of the project 
beyond what was feasible (but would not be impossible to do, see e.g. Schmidt (2008, 
2010)). 
 
 
 Future research  9.6.
I see at least four different directions for future research on the back of this study. First, 
using the analytic and comparative framework developed and specified in Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 3, a logical step would be to also undertake case studies of similar city-regions as 
South Saarland and Teesside, but which are located in countries characterised by a 
federal government structure and a Liberal Market Economy (such as the United States), 
or a unitary government structure and a Cooperative Market Economy (such as France or 
Japan). This could yield additional insights into the impact of different institutional 
environments and multi-scalar processes on the possibilities for regional adaptation and 
resilience. Furthermore, it would allow us to get a better idea of the interactions between 
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the two dimensions of government structure and economic organisation, and thus of the 
range of regional variegations and varieties. 
 
Second, in the interactions between economic development and the evolution of policies 
and governance I have mainly focussed on the policies that have been implemented and 
the effectiveness of governance arrangements with regard to coordinating and managing 
their delivery. As noted above, success was operationalised by looking at certain key 
indicators, and by looking at current challenges and issues with regard to the economic 
development of the respective regions. In future research it would be interesting to more 
closely assess processes and arrangements for policy formation with regard to 
democracy, open debate, alternative discourses, and creating legitimacy. In particular, it 
is possible that more democratic and inclusive processes and arrangements, could also 
induce more alternative development models, which would have to be assessed 
according to their own set of criteria, perhaps more associated with sustainable 
development, equity, empowerment, etc. (see Pike et al., 2007). This will make a 
comparison between cases even harder, and will stretch the concepts of adaptation and 
resilience even further (perhaps too far). But at the same time, it would be exciting to 
explore and expand the range of options in the ways places and regions can adapt and 
show resilience.  
 
Third, this study has focussed on aspects of policy and governance. However, the 
expanded Path Dependency perspective on regional development, with a focus on 
mechanisms of path dependence and lock-in in different domains and at different levels, 
offers prospects to expand the more holistic Evolutionary approach advanced in this 
study even further. Future research could focus on other elements in especially the 
functional domain: the interdependencies between the path dependent evolution of 
industries and clusters, of the regional labour market, and of the built environment in a 
region. It would then also be possible to extend Evolutionary Perspectives in various 
directions, and explore how it could connect with work on for example labour market 
297 
 
dynamics (e.g. Otto et al., 2014), urban morphology, and the cultural analysis of 
landscapes (e.g. Zukin, 1993).  
 
Fourth, it will be worthwhile to see how the findings of this research may support 
adaptation processes and resilience vis-à-vis a wider set of challenges. From a broad point 
of view, many regions in the world face a challenge to adapt and to be resilient, and more 
particularly many regions have an ambition to undergo a comprehensive transformation 
process towards a more sustainable economic development model. This study may offer 
some important lessons with regard to this, especially on the governance of such 
transformations and the limits and possibilities offered by larger institutional frameworks 
in which regions are embedded. It would be very valuable to work this out, specifically by 
connecting with the literature on sustainability transitions (e.g. Geels, 2004; Grin et al., 
2010; Truffer and Coenen, 2012). 
 
 
 Implications for policy and governance 9.7.
This study evidences the enduring relevance of government policy and the way 
governance arrangements are constituted, in fostering economic prosperity. With regard 
to policies, this study points to several ways in which adaptation and resilience are 
facilitated in the face of disruptive structural changes. 
 The first priority in the case of disruptive change should be to the preserve important 
assets: the strategic technologies, knowledge, skills, and functions. This will make the 
process of adaptation much easier than ‘starting from scratch’, i.e. attempting to 
develop a new economic base without much connection to what exists already 
(Boschma, 2009). As witnessed by the development of Teesside, a clear break in the 
evolution of the economic base, can lead to tenacious lock-ins in the labour market (a 
‘low skill equilibrium’) and in the built environment (a persistent lack of 
attractiveness), which have also negatively affected its economic development. In 
South Saarland by contrast, there has been a great degree of path dependence in the 
evolution of industries and clusters, which in turn is reflected in more gradual and 
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positive development of its labour market and built environment. One important way 
South Saarland managed this was by enacting policies that slow down and ameliorate 
the disruptive effects of the immediate shock (through financial assistance and active 
labour market policies), so there was time for firms and other actors to adjust and 
redeploy assets. 
 Policies focussed on long-run economic renewal, should be aimed to break through 
any ‘lock-ins’ (in the economic base, labour market, and built environment), and 
instead facilitate the emergence of forms of positive path dependence on the back of 
the specific assets within the region 109 (also Hildreth and Bailey, 2014). From the 
South Saarland case, it is clear that active STI-policies, targeted attraction of inward 
investment, and support measures for entrepreneurship, will yield the best results 
(provided an underlying asset base (still) exists to which these policies can latch on 
to). Moreover, the recent literature within Evolutionary Perspectives, suggests that 
specific opportunities for ‘creating new paths’ may occur by recombining (related) 
technologies and assets (Neffke et al., 2011). Governments can play an important role 
in this process, through targeted investments in facilities, infrastructures and research 
institutes, and by facilitating the attraction of key players (Dawley, 2014; Fisher, 
2015). The case of Teesside illustrates by contrast that urban regeneration should not 
be the sole focal point of economic development policy, as the potential for 
generating new drivers for economic development will be limited this way. Rather 
urban regeneration policies (as well as policies in training and skills) will be most 
effective when they are complementary to industrial and innovation policies.110 
 
With regard to the institutions for governance, they will work on two levels: on the one 
hand they may play a supportive role concerning the policy responses formulated above 
in the face of a specific disruption, and on the other hand they may also underpin the 
                                                     
109
 Consistent with Smart Specialisation, the guiding concept for European Union Cohesion Policy (McCann 
and Ortega-Argilés, 2015). 
110
 Though it should be noted that urban regeneration and training and skills policies may also be objects for 
social policy. 
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development of a more on-going and proactive adaptability, leading to a better overall 
ability of a region to deal with economic change in general (which seems crucial to secure 
prosperity on the long run (see Evans and Karecha, 2014; Boschma, 2015; Hu and Hassink, 
2015)). However, as this project has made clear, it is both the arrangements within a 
region as well as the wider institutional environment which will determine whether these 
functions can indeed be effectively fulfilled or not. Concerning the wider institutional 
environment, the study points to the importance of three elements in particular:  
 Local control over powers and resources in the policy domains affecting economic 
development (industrial and innovation policy, labour market policy, and urban 
development / planning). This enables governments at the regional level to 
coordinate policies in different domains, and to enact policies suitable for local 
circumstances. 
 Stability in the relations between different levels of government. Between the central 
and subnational governments there should be set, clear, and stable procedures 
(preferably codified within a constitution), especially with regard to the allocation of 
resources and the distribution of competences. 
 Extra (financial) support made available from outside the area for a long period of 
time to be able to adapt in the face of far-reaching structural change. Resources 
sourced locally will normally not be sufficient to pay for the expenses required for a 
comprehensive transformation across multiple domains.  
 
With regard to governance arrangements inside the region in question, the following 
points can be observed on the basis of the findings from this project: 
 Strategic governance arrangements need to exhibit some degree of flexibility 
(following Safford (2009) and Bristow and Healy (2014b)), but should in the first place 
be robust. This means that there should be inclusive arrangements that connect and 
support the collaboration between the main actors within the region and beyond the 
region, but these arrangements should be able to incorporate additional actors when 
needed, and should not prioritise vested interests. This then will facilitate 
coordination between initiatives, and the mobilisation of resources from within and 
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outside the region during the transformation process. The arrangements for strategic 
intelligence and planning should preferably incorporate the development of, and 
exchange between, multiple perspectives, so the process of collective sense-making 
does not become susceptible to complacency and remains outward-looking (Weick 
and Sutcliffe, 2007). The development of operational governance arrangements needs 
to follow on from the policies to be implemented (see above), but consistency and 
stability are important for their effectiveness. 
 For the development of a more on-going and proactive adaptability, a region also 
needs to develop particular operational arrangements to manage, develop and 
coordinate the ‘strategic couplings’ between economic activities and regional assets 
(in e.g. technologies, supply chains, skills, etc.) (also MacKinnon, 2012).111 Especially 
more capital intensive industries (which includes most manufacturing), firms need an 
environment in which crucial inputs are secure and in which they can confidently 
invest to further develop their competitiveness. Arm’s length and market-based 
relations will not provide this security, and hence more deliberate coordination needs 
to take place through arrangements between firms in these industries, and other 
actors in the region (in the labour market, in the supply chain, in the development of 
knowledge and technologies, etc.). Such arrangements seem to have been an 
important component of the success of South Saarland, and especially of its relatively 
large manufacturing core. As noted, it appears to have nurtured a distinct ‘regional 
variegation of capitalism’ this way, nested within Germany’s wider institutional 
environment). In Teesside such arrangements have been largely absent (especially in 
the development of skills and in technology development / innovation), which 
appears to have (very) negatively affected its manufacturing base.  
                                                     
111
 A connection can also be made to the notion of ‘niche construction’, suggested by Ron Martin and Peter 
Sunley (2015b, pp. 717-718). 
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APPENDIX: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
 
South Saarland 
Experts  
Prof. dr. Rüdiger Wink Professor in Economics HTWK Leipzig 15 January 2014 
Prof. dr. Hans-Peter 
Dörrenbächer 
Professor in Human Geography Saarland University 29 January 2014 
Dr. Anne Otto Researcher at Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und 
Berufsforschung Rheinland-Pfalz-Saarland 
12 March 2014 
Joachim Penner Former economic editor Saarbrücker Zeitung 19 March 2014 
Dr. Luitpold 
Rampeltshammer  
Head Kooperationsstelle Wissenschaft und Arbeitswelt 
(KoWA) at Saarland University 
21 March 2014 
Policy makers 
Raphaela Adam Policy officer export promotion Saarland Innovation und 
Standort (Saar.is)  
17 February 2014 
Dr. Hanspeter Georgi Former minister of Economic Affairs and Science in 
Saarland (1999-2007); Former chief executive Chamber 
of Commerce (IHK) Saarland 
24 February 2014 
Dr. Lothar Kuntz Head unit Economic Development, Labour Market, and 
International Cooperation of City Saarbrücken 
25 February 2014 
Dr. Pascal Strobel Policy officer automotive cluster (automotive.saarland) 
Saarland Innovation und Standort (Saar.is) 
26 February 2014 
Otto Werner Schade Former director regional office Bundesagentur für 
Arbeit Rheinland-Pfalz-Saarland 
25 March 2014 
Prof. dr. Peter Moll Former chief of planning and former head of 
interregional cooperation within the government of 
Saarland 
26 March 2014 
Thomas Schuck Chief executive Strukturholding Saar; Chief executive 
Saarbrücken Airport 
10 April 2014 
Dr. Anselm Römer and 
Markus Körbel 
Head respectively policy officer in unit Economic Policy 
at Ministry of Economic Affairs, Labour, Energy, and 
Transport Saarland 
14 April 2014 
Reinhard Klimmt Former prime-minister of Saarland (1998-1999); Former 
leader of the SPD faction in the Landestag of Saarland 
(1985-1998) 
14 April 2014 
Hans-Joachim Hoffmann Former minister of Economic Affairs Saarland (1985-
1991); Former Lord-Mayor of Saarbrücken (1991-2004) 
14 April 2004 
Business representatives 
Carsten Peter Teamleader Transport and Communication at Chamber 
of Commerce (IHK) Saarland 
5 February 2014 
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Oliver Groll Head International Relations at Chamber of Commerce 
(IHK) Saarland 
18 February 2014 
Dr. Heino Klingen and 
Gerd Litzenburger 
Deputy chief executive respectively policy officer 
Regional Economic Policy at Chamber of Commerce 
(IHK) Saarland 
27 March 2014 
Labour union officials and community representatives 
Wolfgang Lerch Former economist Chamber of Labour (Arbeitskammer) 
Saarland 
5 March 2014 
Robert Hiry Representative IG Metall Völklingen 15 April 2014 
Franz-Joseph Simon Policy officer unit Economic Affairs at Chamber of 
Labour (Arbeitskammer) Saarland 
24 April 2014 
 
 
Teesside 
Experts  
Prof. dr. Alan Townsend Professor in department of Geography Durham 
University; Chair of North East Research and 
Information Network (NERIN) 
10 January 2013 
16 May 2013 
21 May 2015 
Prof. dr. Fred Robinson Professorial Fellow at St Chad’s College Durham 
University; Visiting Professor at Northumbria University 
and at Teesside University 
7 June 2013 
Prof. dr. Ray Hudson Professor in department of Geography Durham 
University 
28 August 2013 
Dr. Stephen James Senior lecturer Economics Teesside University 19 September 2013 
Policy makers 
John Rundle Former director Europe at Government office for the 
North-East 
20 February 2013 
David Walsh Former leader of Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council; 
Former leader of Cleveland County Council  
26 February 2013 
John Lowther Former director Tees Valley Joint Strategy Unit 4 March 2013 
19 June 2015 
Peter Ellis Former assistant director Regeneration at Redcar and 
Cleveland Borough Council; Former chief executive 
Renew Tees Valley; Former policy officer Planning 
department Cleveland County Council 
26 March 2013 
Dr. John Bridge Former chair of ONE North-East; Former chief executive 
of Northern Development Company (1988-1999) 
17 May 2013 
17 June 2015 
Steven Catchpole and 
Linda Edworthy 
Managing director respectively director of Strategy and 
Investment at Tees Valley Unlimited  
24 May 2013 
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Sir Ian Wrigglesworth Peer in House Lords; Former Member of Parliament for 
Stockton South (1981-1987 and for Thornaby (1974-
1981) 
26 June 2013 
Dr. John R. Foster Former chair of South Tees Hospitals NHS Trust (1997–
2004); Former chief executive Middlesbrough Borough 
Council (1974-1996) 
2 July 2013 
John R. Walker Former chief executive English Partnerships; Former 
chief financial officer Teesside Development 
Corporation 
5 July 2013 
Joe Docherty Former chief executive Tees Valley Regeneration 8 July 2013 
Graham Henderson and 
Laura Woods 
Vice-Chancellor / chief executive respectively director of 
Academic Enterprise at Teesside University 
23 July 2013 
Business representatives 
Neil Etherington Director Group Development Able UK; Former chief 
executive Tees Valley Development Company  
11 April 2013 
Dr. Stan Higgins Chief executive North East Process Industry Cluster 
(NEPIC) 
25 June 2013 
Julian Philips Former information officer ICI 3 July 2013 
Sandy Anderson Chair of Tees Valley Unlimited; Former executive at ICI 
Billingham; Former member of the board Teesside 
Development Corporation 
7 August 2013 
Labour union officials and community representatives 
Neil Foster Policy and Campaigns Officer, Northern Trades Union 
Congress (TUC) 
9 May 2013 
Margaret Wotherspoon Campaign manager Community Union 20 June 2013 
Graeme Oram Chief executive Five Lamps 3 December 2013 
Dinah Lane and Carl 
Ditchburn 
Chief executive Middlesbrough Voluntary Development 
Agency (MVDA) respectively chief executive Community 
Campus 
20 June 2014 
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